Narrow search


By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:


Displaying: 51-60 of 82 documents

Show/Hide alternate language

0.12 sec

51. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Marek Piwowarczyk Marek Piwowarczyk
The Leibnizian Doctrine of vinculum substantiate and the Problem of Composite Substances
Leibnizjańska Koncepcja Vinculum Substantiale A Problem Substancji Złożonych

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper is devoted to the late Leibnizian doctrine of vinculum substantiale. In the first section I sketch the old problem of possibility of composite substances. This possibility is refuted on the ground of Monadism (presented in section two). However Leibniz’s correspondence with Des Bosses contains new thoughts concerning composite substances. A vinculum enters the stage as a real unifier, transforming aggregates of monads into genuine substances (section three). In the last section I give a systematic interpretation of a vinculum.I start with the thesis that every composed thing, which is not a pure plurality of objects, must have two structures: the whole-parts structure and the subject-properties structure. In the case of substances the latter is ontologically prior over the former. A vinculum is a subject-of-properties (accidents) determining such a way of composition which makes a compound entity a true substance. Since Leibniz still thought a vinculum unifies independent (existentially and with regard to activity) substances he was inclined to separate a vinculum from the integrated monads and finally conceived it as an additional relatively independent monad-like substance.
52. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Bogusław Paź Bogusław Paź
The Principle of Reason according to Leibniz: The Origins, Main Assumptions and Forms
Zasada Racji W Interpretacji G.W. Leibniza

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The subject of this article is Leibnizian interpretation of the principle of reason. Although the German philosopher called it principium grande of his philosophy, we do not find its systematic exposition in Leibniz’s works. The main aim of my paper is to present a short exposition of the principle. The article consists of three parts: in the first I present systematic exposition of the principle of reason with particular emphasis on explication of terms “principle” and “reason,” in the second, I show the origins of the principle, finally, in the third part, I discuss in detail three forms of it: the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of determining reason and the principle of rendering reason. I accept two main theses: firstly, a proper interpretation of this principle requires taking into account the whole context of Leibnizian philosophy, i.e. one cannot limit oneself (as it is usually happens among researchers) to only one discipline, e.g. logic. Secondly, the ultimate methodological and heuristical foundation of the principle of reason is Leibnizian metaphysics, especially natural theology.
53. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Adam Grzeliński Adam Grzeliński
Locke and Leibniz on Perception
Locke I Leibniz O Percepcji

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In his critique of the Lockean concept of perception as presented in Nouveaux essais, Leibniz reproaches Locke for neglecting the role of minute perceptions in experience and reducing all mental operations to the sphere of consciousness. However, the critique seems to be the result of the differences of their philosophical standpoints: Leibniz’s idealistic metaphysics, and Locke’s commonsensical empiricism rather than of the different understanding of perception itself. The descriptions of the process of perceiving provided by them seem to be surprisingly similar, whilst the difference between their stances is for the most part no more than terminological. The dispute is rooted in their different approaches to the role of psychological investigations, which for Locke are autonomous and quite independent from the claims of metaphysics.
54. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Jerzy Kopania Jerzy Kopania
The Best of All Possible Worlds and the Christian Thesis of the Corruption of the World
Świat Najlepszy Z Możliwych A Chrześcijańska Teza O Skażeniu Świata

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Leibniz’s claim that we live is the best of all possible worlds is in contradiction with our experience, which is why we tend to maintain that the world would become better if at least some of its properties and characteristics were different. Leibniz criticized such an approach and argued that every attempt at changing the world would make it worse, or even impossible. His claim seems to be in contradiction with the Christian belief that our world is contaminated with sin, but it will be renewed in the end to become the reality of salvation, i.e. the best of all possible realities. This article puts forward two arguments: (1) Leibniz’s claim is not in contradiction with the Christian belief in salvation; (2) Leibniz’s claim is in contradiction with the human experience of the world because it is a result of an intellectual speculation based on the false assumption that the structure of the human mind adequately corresponds to the mind of God.
55. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Aleksandra Horowska Aleksandra Horowska
Iustitia ut caritas sapientis: The Relationship between Love and Justice in G.W. Leibniz’s Philosophy of Right
Iustitia ut caritas sapientis

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The purpose of this paper is an attempt to present and analyse one of the most intriguing and unique elements of Leibniz’s philosophy of right—the relationship between love (amor, dilectio, caritas) and justice (iustitia)—mainly based on selected excerpts from the Elementa Iuris Naturalis (1669-1671) and the preface to the Codex Iuris Gentium Diplomaticus (1693). The author presents the characteristics of this close connection (particularly noticeable in definitions of justice as habitus amandi omnes and caritas sapientis) and she tries to answer the question about the reasons for this relationship referring to the metaphysical assumptions and principles of Leibniz’s philosophy. With respect to the latter the author also explains significance of the connection between love and justice in Leibniz’s philosophy of right as a part of his whole philosophical system.
56. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Bogdan Lisiak Bogdan Lisiak
Leibniz’s Scientific Collaboration with Adam Kochański, S.J.
Współpraca Naukowa Leibniza Z Adamem Kochańskim, S.J.

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The exchange of thoughts between Adam Kochański and Leibniz presented in this paper points to a very large spectrum of scientific interests shared by both scientists. The scope of their research included, above all, mathematics, philosophy, linguistics, the construction of a calculating device, a perpetuum mobile, other mechanics, and alchemy. Both men became close to each other through their passion for mathematics in which they searched for a universal method of scientific investigation, a method that would be of use not only in solving typically mathematical puzzles, but would also serve to solve problems in physics and other technical sciences. The ideas they exchanged, in particular those concerning the calculating machine, a perpetuum mobile and the universal cure, the panaceum, indicate a very special aspect of their scientific activity, namely their openness to the technical problems discussed in their time. Both Kochański and Leibniz regarded seriously the practical dimension of human life as it manifested itself in the technical problems that occupied the minds of their contemporaries. They both treated the scientific treatment of these problems as an important area of scientific and technical activity. Kochański, like Leibniz, firmly believed that science should be concerned with practical activity, the attitude captured by one of the principles of his philosophy, Theoria cum praxi. This principle, shared by both learned men, forms one of their principal philosophical ideas.Adam Kochański and Leibniz were scientists and philosophers living in a time of revolutionary changes in both European philosophy and science; they keenly appreciated the value of new currents in intellectual life, yet they did not lose sight of philosophical tradition, especially the tradition of Aristotelian philosophy, which they both regarded as an important vehicle of truth. Thus, in their style of doing philosophy and science, one finds certain peripatetic traits, for example the acceptance of the Aristotelian conception of philosophy as science.
57. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 3
Agnieszka Kijewska Agnieszka Kijewska
Eriugena’s De Praedestinatione: The Project of Rationalisation of Faith and Its Critics
Eriugeny De Praedestinatione

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The De praedestinatione of John Scottus Eriugena was intended as a contribution to a controversy sparked off by Gottschalk of Orbais concerning predestination. This work met with trenchant criticism and condemnation even though it firmly rejected Gottschalk’s views on double predestination. One of the reasons for this hostile reception was undoubtedly Eriugena’s singular conception of the freedom of will, a subject I intend to discuss elsewhere. In the present text, however, I would like to focus on another important cause of the rejection of Eriugena’s treatise. In my opinion, this second reason was a pre-scholastic project of rationalization of the faith in the spirit of St. Augustine and using the method of Boethius and Martianus Capella. It would appear that Eriugena’s contemporaries were not ready for the favorable reception of his idea of the vera philosophia that was the same as the vera religio. Yet, as Goulven Madec once rightly observed, the vera ratio of Scotus was closely bound up with the lux mentium which is nothing else than God revealing himself in the human language of the Scriptures. Eriugena’s masters and models were the Church Fathers and his intention was to continue their efforts to achieve an understanding of the faith in his own, personal way.
58. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 3
Andrzej P. Stefańczyk Andrzej P. Stefańczyk
Doctrinal Controversies of the Carolingian Renaissance: Gottschalk of Orbais’ Teachings on Predestination
Kontrowersje Doktrynalne Renesansu Karolińskiego

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The article attempts to characterize three key doctrinal controversies in the Carolingian Renaissance, namely: the disputes over the Eucharist, the so-called trina deitas, and predestination. The core of the article is an exposition of the controversy concerning predestination, whose main protagonist is Gottschalk of Orbais. The article discusses four crucial issues related to the problem: (i) the concept of God, (ii) the understanding of grace, nature and free will, (iii) the relation of foreknowledge to predestination, and (iv) the doctrine of redemption, i.e., specifically the relationship betweenjustice and mercy. The article is largely an attempt at an interpretation of the texts of the epoch, mainly those of Gottschalk of Orbais and his adversary, Hincmar of Reims. The conclusions point to difficulties in the issues discussed and outline what attempts at solving this problem have taken place in the coming centuries.
59. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Paul O’Grady Paul O’Grady
Grimm Wisdom
Mądrość Według Grimma

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Wisdom has not been widely discussed in analytical epistemology. An interesting recent analysis comes from Stephen Grimm who argues that wisdom requires knowledge and that the traditional dichotomy between theoretical and practical wisdom doesn’t hold. I note a tension between these aspects of his work. He wishes to maintain that traditional exemplars of wisdom (such as Jesus, Buddha, Confucius) may still be termed ‘wise’ by his theory. But his knowledge condition seems to require that only a subset of those who hold conflicting views are really wise. I consider a number of possible responses to this and endorse a non-indexical contextualist approach which will allow the knowledge condition and also allow the traditional exemplars to be termed ‘wise’.
60. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Brian Panasiak Brian Panasiak
Faith and Denarii
Faith and Denarii