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51. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Dmitry Ivanov Wittgensteinean Philosophy as Foundation of Moral Phenomenology
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To explain evaluation we need to take into account the perspective of an evaluator, we need to turn to phenomenological approach in moral theory. This is the approach proposed by John McDowell. According to him, we need to approach to the question ‘How to live right?’ via the concept of a virtuous person. To lendsupport to his views McDowell employs Wittgensteinean philosophy that could be a good basis for establishing moral phenomenology as a metaethical approach to moral phenomena. First of all, introducing the notion of language-game we can provide a metaethical explanation of moral terms referring to roles they play in certain language-games. From this point of view there is no difference between moral terms and other terms. But understanding a language-game not just as a model of a certain kind of behavior formed by external observer, but as a form of life we can capture moral phenomena form within. The language-game considered as the form of life allows us to discern certain phenomena as moral ones. That is why trying to answer the question about right livingfrom the virtuous person perspective we should be involved in a language game that carves moral phenomena from the brute stuff of the world and forms a certain kind of sensitivity in us to these properties. Wittgensteinean philosophy also allows us to answer the question: how can mere knowledge of situation make us behave? Following Wittgensteinean ideas, we can present moral knowledge as something uncodifiable, which is exhibited in our everyday life, in our way of living and ‘going on doing the same thing’. It is impossible to understand this knowledge from the external point of view. To see how this knowledge can motivate someone, we need to capture the way the person appreciates a particular situation.
52. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Fernanda Barbosa dos Santos Hermeneutics: The Reconstruction of Dogmatism
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The paper reflects on the true meant of the happiness, or, specifically, on the hermeneutic value for happiness in the Aristotelian vision, being identified it as an activity of the soul in accord with the virtue. For a person without knowledge the happiness is an obvious thing as the pleasure or the wealth, different of the conception given to the term for a wise who will establish for being the activity of the soul. In the integrations of the activities, the ends can move, however the last end will be the happiness, gotten for the virtuous man - imperative logical. In such a way, to live happy is to make action/activities and, this is a conquest throughout the time, depending on the maturity for each person. A virtuous activity of the soul is required, being the too much goods instruments for itsaccomplishment. The “telos” of all the thought if assume as rational in the present time. But as to understand ahead of a process of reconstruction of the ethical values in a reality with so great diversity of certainties concerning what it is happiness? The subject is extremely involving, here it is that it searchs through new rules of the human behavior to establish a parameter on the life form, on what is to be happy.
53. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Yi Guo Human Nature, Mind and Virtue
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The key issue of traditional theories of human nature in China is De or virtue, Yu or desire and their correlation. It leads to two developing currents: one is the old tradition since Xia, Shang and Zhou, the Three Dynasties which take desire as nature, another is the new tradition later Confucius initiated which take virtue as nature. So the understanding of human nature in early China experienced a process from desire to virtue, or from the instinct of human to the essence of human. Prior to Confucius, nature is desire and instinct. In that time, the theories of human nature has two themes, namely to manage nature by virtue and to explain nature by Qi. Since Lao Zi, virtue was taken as the inner essence of human. Later Confucius further to take virtue as nature directly, so completes the fundamental transformation of traditional theory of human nature. This is the source of the idea nature of reason and the origin of the theory nature is good. Zisi advocated “what Heaven has conferred is called the nature” to promote the new tradition, and named desire as “the inner”. The new excavated bamboo book Xing Zi Ming Chu not only developed the idea of “the inner” of Zisi, but also further to restore desire as nature, and constructed a unique system of outer moral apriorism for it. Shortly afterward, Mencius turns this trend and advocates none but the four beginnings is nature, desire only is impartment, therefore he develops the new tradition to extremes. Even though, before the period between Tang and Song dynasties, the mainstream of the theory of human nature in China was the old tradition, and that the new tradition merely like a flash in the pan. In fact, the dualism of human nature in Song and Ming dynasties carried on the old tradition, and at the same time, succeeded the new tradition, and put them into a unified thought system.
54. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Debashis Guha Things That Should Be Done In Doing Ethics Today
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Through the ages we have been fond of monolithic ethics, which is either synthetic or analytic; the former covers ethical interests such as the normative, descriptive, empirical, and the practical and professional, whereas the latter covers the metaethical interests covering those of the analysis of language, and the interface of the ethics, logic and epistemology, particularly the issues of proving, justification and the epistemic claims about moral value. Monolithic ethics has its own problems, which troubles us today more than it did before, as it is difficult to see why both these interests cannot be assimilated though each of them well protected for their specific tasks. Rethinking in ethics today leads us to break away from the monolithic ethics – the paper argues why this should be the case.
55. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Krivykh Elena Moral Values: The Problem of Foundation in Evolutionary Ethics
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This article describes different positions of very specific human behavior features in Evolutionary Ethics and their correspondence with the Modern scientific paradigm.
56. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Eugen Schweitzer Atlantis: Theory of Science and Ethics
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It is proverbial that the European tradition of philosophy consists of a set of footnotes to Plato. However, one of his most informative works, the Atlantis story, had been totally neglected by the scientific community because for 2350 years it had simply not been understood. Plato wanted that only eligible persons shouldperceive his Atlantis story and therefore he codified it as an adventure tale. However, he placed a lot of ironical hints in his text. Anyhow, as irony isn’t everybody’s cup of tea, nobody could follow him. Because of respect for Plato’s credibility; the Atlantologists tried to solve the Atlantis riddle as phenomenon, whereas just a simple analytic disquisition supported by lateral thinking had been requested. This is a challenge to prompt science to render account after 2350 years of the previous omission of the Atlantis theme and to start a serious discussion about the here presented analytic approach by lateral thinking to Plato’s Atlantis irony, which turns out to be his humorous metaphysical legacy.
57. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Predrag Cicovacki Reverence for Life: A Moral Value or the Moral Value?
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Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) became well-known for his ethics of reverence for life. While Schweitzer’s life and his ethics have had an enormous appeal to wide audiences all over the world, philosophers have generally ignored his contribution. This may be a loss for philosophy, for, despite some internal problems and inconsistencies, Schweitzer’s ethics of reverence for life promises a viable alternative to utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. The task of my paper is the following. Schweitzer argues that reverence for life is the basic ethical principle and the highest moral value. After briefly presenting Schweitzer’s view, I will consider two questions: 1. Can Schweitzer show that reverence for life is the highest moral value (principle)? 2. Is reverence for life a moral value in the firstplace? I will argue that, with some provision, Schweitzer’s position is tenable. In response to the second question, by comparing Schweitzer with Isaiah Berlin, I maintain that reverence for life is a moral value. In response to the first question, Schweitzer’s position must be modified. By comparing Schweitzer with Nicolai Hartmann, I make a case that reverence for life is the most basic and fundamental, but not the highest moral value.
58. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Sebastian Schleidgen Sustainable Development and Bioethics – Ethical Thoughts on Decisions about Establishing Biobanks
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The so-called Brundtland-Report defines Sustainable Development as a conception of intra- and intergenerational justice, which is to be realized by a globally just distribution of possibilities for satisfying human basic needs as well as assuring such possibilities for future generations. Hence, any political and/or societal decision is addressed by the ethical demands of Sustainable Development insofar it affects possibilities for satisfying human basic needs. In particular, this concerns – contrary to the widespread opinion that Sustainable Development only has to deal with problems of environmental ethics – the legitimization of biomedical applications. After all, especially such decisions often face the problem of measuring and trading-off potential advantages and disadvantages regarding possibilities for satisfying human basic needs. Based on the example of decisions about establishing biobanks, my talk firstly will show that Sustainable Development actually demands much more from political and societal decisions than just being concerned about environmental ethics. Secondly, it will clarify these demands in detail. Thirdly, it will address the issues of how these demands can be implemented adequately. My talk therefore will show which conditions political and/or societal decision processes have to meet in order to comply with Sustainable Development.
59. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Jeffrey Benjamin White Conscience: The A.C.T.With Model Of Moral Cognition
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This work introduces the ACTWith model of moral cognition. This is a model of conscience and conscientious agency, inspired by Socratic philosophy, neurology and artificial intelligence. The ACTWith model is a synthesis across these disciplines, integrating ancient and contemporary insights into the human condition, while distilling this synthesis into a practicable dynamic simplified via architectural paradigms imported from theories of computational models of human learning. It was developed in response to the need in these fields for a clear articulation of conscience. In the world at large, conscience is often referenced, yet hardly understood. This work fills this gap.
60. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Charles W. Wright Natural Selection and Moral Sentiment: Evolutionary Biology’s Challenge to Moral Philosophy
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Evolutionary biologists have suggested that human moral judgment is best understood as an emotionally mediated phenomenon. With few exceptions, philosophers have scorned these proposals. Recent research in moral psychology and social neuroscience indicates, though, that moral judgment is produced by the coordinated activity of multiple regions of the brain, and consists of both cognitive and affective processes. Evidence also suggests that different dimensions of moral judgment – the affective and cognitive processes, for instance – possess distinct evolutionary histories. Moral philosophers will need to reconsider longstanding debates – such as those between Humeans and anti-Humeans, and between motivation internalists and externalists – in light of this evidence. Otherwise we run the risk of disciplinary irrelevance.