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51. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Hans Rainer Sepp Possible Necessities: A Phenomenological Analysis of Yves Tanguy’s The Palace of the Windowed Rocks
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When Ives Tanguy painted his mysterious imaginary landscapes he realized in artistic form a tableau that shows never-seen, quasi-real imaginary things within a quasi-real imaginary space. The imagination that presents such things is totally free—accompanied by “the feeling of an absolute freedom,” as Tanguy said—, whereas the product is a world that not only looks as if it were real but appears as a coherence of facts put together with unshakeable necessity. The imagination is free because it undertakes the ultimate challenge: it creates imaginary products in a way that they give the impression of being real. This imagination realizes itself like the dreaming I but in a state of not-bounding-itself (better to say: as an imaginative force that both reveals and confirms the self-bounding imagination); and it realizes a kind of world experiencing with correlative objects that seem to be real (comparably to a trompe l’oeil) although they can never be found within the real world (contrary to a trompe l’oeil).
52. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Susan Gottlöber Krieg als Katharsis?: Die Phänomenanalyse Schelers im Spiegel der weilschen Ilias-Interpretation
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Traditionally the phenomenon of war and its causes have been predominantly examined by the disciplines of political science, history and political philosophy, but these disciplines seem to be unable to grasp the nature of the phenomenon of war completely. One of the few methods that actually attempts to ‘grasp the phenomenon of war’ in its totality, is the philosophical-phenomenological method. The philosophical-phenomenological approach to the phenomenon of war can be found in the works of the German philosopher and phenomenologist Max Scheler (1874-1928). In his essays on war Scheler tries to fathom the nature of war in a cultural critical way, that is, war is viewed as being able to reveal “true” structures of reality that have been covered by static perceptions. It will be shown that--though it appears counterintuitive--Scheler’s approach to war as katharsis needs to be understood within the wider concept of his value theory and philosophical anthropology: man as ens amans. The major flaw of Scheler’s argument, however, lies in his assumption that meaning and values remain untouched by the destructiveness of war. A counter point to Scheler’s view can be made by turning to the French philosopher Simon Weil. Weil argues that the all-embracing destructiveness of war changes perceived reality altogether, and instead of removing separation between individuals, new and stronger ones arise that cannot be crossed by acts of compassion or empathy. By bringing both Scheler and Weil’s approaches together, it is argued new light can be shed on the phenomenon of war and thus in turn bring about new explorations which aim to grasp the totality of the phenomenon and its causes per se.
53. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Marcus Knaup Leiblichkeit im Angesicht des Anderen: Zur Aktualität der Leibphänomenologie Edith Steins
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Based on the early phenomenological works of Edith Stein, this essay applies to the problem of intersubjectivity. By fleshing out the issues of corporeality and personhood as being specific premises of approved otherness, it can be demonstrated that Stein certainly belongs to the founders of a philosophy of the living body, a fact that has often been disregarded so far. Her inventive conception of corporeality will be defended against a naturalistic interpretation of the person focusing on the brain, whereupon the mind can be reduced to certain brain-activity making it an epiphenomenon lacking important features of its own. By presenting a valid alternative to this problematic conception, the thought of Edith Stein is both substantial and challenging for contemporary anthropology.
54. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Stefan Volke Das Erlebnis des Schallvolumens
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The article shows that the apparently range-external acoustic volume is a matter of independent instances of sound. Given the particular occurrence of the acoustic volume, the reference sources prove to be inadequate or unessential conditions of the acoustic effect. The affinity to the dimensions of the felt body allows for a more detailed conceptual identification of the acoustic volumes.
55. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Mette Lebech Beginning to Read Stein's Finite and Eternal Being
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Stein called Finite and Eternal Being her ‘spiritual legacy’. The access to this legacy has been restricted by the difficulty of assessing exactly what it is that Stein is doing in the work. It has been regarded as a work of Thomist philosophy, but a closer reading reveals it as quite critical of St Thomas. After the publication of the appendices of the work, it has become fairly clear that it can be conceived as a critique of the early Heidegger. Stein understood her task as being that of bringing together Aristotelian and Modern philosophy, the latter represented by Phenomenology and the former by Scholasticism. We shall propose (the beginnings of ) an interpretation of the work that sees it as the culmination of Stein’s phenomenological project, as well as a work standing in the tradition of the philosophia perennis.
56. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Ruud Welten L’âme cartésienne de la phénoménologie
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From the point of view of Husserlian philosophy, Descartes failed to arrive at a transcendental phenomenological subject. According to Husserl, Descartes’s cogito represents a psychological statement. Michel Henry maintains that Descartes’s “ego cogito ergo sum” implies a full phenomenological subject, not because of its transcendental disposition—on the contrary, because of its pure self-affection. Consciousness according to Henry is not “consciousness of something outside the self,” but the pure consciousness of being affected. This is the real kernel or soul of phenomenology, which can be understood as the Cartesian soul itself. Henry develops this argumentation not only through the formulation of the ego cogito but also by means of art. 26 of Descartes’s latest work, The Passions of the Soul. In this work, the relation between ‘actions’ and ‘passions’ is thought as an early attempt to establish a philosophy of consciousness. According to Henry, this remains fully neglected in the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger. This not only implies a rehabilitation of the soul as phenomenological object, but also the recapture of phenomenology itself, which begins not with Husserl, but with Descartes.
57. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Alice Koubová The Double Structure of Experienece
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The article aims to develop the concept of powerlessness in relation with the notion of self-understanding and always already powerful being in the world presented in classical and hermeneutically oriented phenomenology. As a counterpoint to this classical position a short inspirational text from G. Bataille will be presented. This concerns the experience of transcendence mentioned in the work Inner Experience. This analysis will lead to the post-phenomenological conception of the experience of powerlessness in which the exceeding transgression took place (necessarily in the past) and transformed as such the classical phenomenological scheme of experience.
58. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Kristina S. Montagová Erleben ohne Erblicken: Die vielfältigen Gestalten des Urbewussten bei Husserl
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In this text I deal with the theme of the ‘primal conscious’ (das Urbewusste) in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. The ‘primal conscious’ or ‘primal consciousness’ (die Ur-Bewusstheit) characterizes those ways of experience and consciousness which represent in some way an intermediate level between the non-conscious, on the one hand, and the act-intentional, objective conscious experiences, on the other,. In the first part three basic forms of the primal conscious are distinguished and illustrated with the help of concrete examples. In the second part I offer a—merely sketched—historical-phenomenological reconstruction of the development of Husserl’s analyses of primal consciousness. Nevertheless, the systematic-phenomenological point of view remains foremost also in this part of the text. In the first part I differentiate three basic forms of the primal conscious: (1.) consciousness of the immanent, retentional-primal-impressional-protentional streaming alteration of the experiences (= the immanent, retentional-protentional time-consciousness), (2.) the pre-thematically or non-thematically affective consciousness (= the pre-apperceptive consciousness and experience) and (3.) the consciousness of the execution of acts (= the „accompanying“ executive consciousness, „the internal consciousness“ or also „the consciousness along with“ especially in early Husserl). The differentiating criteria between the pre-apperceptive and apperceptive consciousness are attention, and the synthetic activities of the subject, i.e. its differing attentional activity and its execution of certain syntheses. It is common to all forms of the primal conscious experiencing that it is a non-thematic, non-act-intentional kind of (self)consciousness of the experiencing—and of that, what is being experienced, though not of that, what objectively appears—, which is indeed already fully determined—with regards to content, time, and emotional character. In the second part of the text it will be shown that Husserl wrestled with the theme of the primal conscious for over four decades and that, after several essential transformations and numerous terminological modifications, he gradually arrived at a conception whose development can be traced back through his writings. However the differentiation of the concept of the primal conscious—as undertaken above—namely, offering an extensive examination of all these phenomena under the concept of the primal conscious can be found only implicitly in Husserl’s writings.
59. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Victor Molchanov On the Space of Internal Experience
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This investigation addresses the internal experience as a spatial phenomenon. Ascertaining the difference between internal and external experience as a space metaphor leads to the question of the source of the space metaphors in principle. The analogy between time and space and the space metaphors in Husserl’s conception of time are considered. The question of the temporality of consciousness, evidence, and internal experience are brought to the fore by comparing Brentano’s and Husserl’s conceptions. The difference between the direct and indirect modes of consciousness by Brentano, his conception of time as the boundary in the continuum, and his concept of the proteraesthesis proves to be relevant for the concept of internal experience as a spatial phenomenon. The essay calls in question the self-sufficiency of time-experience and the traditional correspondence of time to the internal experience and of space to the external one. The relation of the Here/There- and Now/Then- experience is discussed. I intend to elucidate the experience of boundary as a primary internal experience from which the space-experience arises. In its turn the boundary-consciousness has its origin in the differentiation-experience. In the latter there is no time, the internal one included, but there is a boundary-experience as a primary and indirect experience. In every differentiation there is the experience of “between”, the experience of the difference between boundary and expanse, of hierarchy and openness, as well as of fore- and background where boundary and expanse can change their “place”, thus transforming the primary space of experience.
60. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 2
Steen Halling Psychology and the Eclipse of Forgiveness
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This chapter, which is based upon empirical phenomenological studies of the experience of forgiving a significant other, details the process people go through as they move from injury to forgiveness. Forgiveness is characterized not just by letting go of anger and resentment but as a movement of compassion toward the injurer and an opening up of a new future in one’s own life. Thus phenomenology reveals that the experience of forgiveness highlights our capacity for transcendence and demonstrates that forgiveness is a discovery rather an action requiring a conscious decision. This portrait of forgiveness is contrasted with traditional psychological studies that eclipse these key features of this phenomenon.