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51. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Mihailo Marković Rationality of Methodological Rules
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There are two different senses of rationality of methodological rules: one is instrumental rationality, another is rationality of goals. In the first sense methodological rules are mere means of an apparently neutral true description of a given reality. Such a description, no matter how adequate, involves hidden value-assumptions and may be used for irrational purposes. A different notion of ends-means rationality characterizes methodological rules of critical science which analyses limitations of the given reality from an explicitly stated value-standpoint. The ultimate purpose of such critical research is to produce changes in human behaviour and in objective reality. As in the case of medical activity: diagnosis is followed by therapy. Methodological rules of critical inquiry are only a special case of a general methodology of human practice, the rationality of which presupposes a universal emancipatory goal.
52. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Karel Lambert On "The Limits of Rationality"
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This note is a comment on Suppes's essay on the limits of rationality. The substantial point is that if a theory of rationality is conceived as a structure plus scope, then, contra Suppes, intuitive judgement is part of the theory of rationality because it is part of the scope of that theory. The point is supported by analogy with a learning theory. Finally, intuitive judgement and informal knowledge is suggested to be evidence of the irreducible vagueness of theory as opposed to irreducible limits on theory.
53. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Franz von Kutschera Criteria for Justice
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Two criteria, one for distributive and one for commutative justice are formulated, the latter applying to cases of free cooperation. Both criteria follow Aristotle's idea of proportional equality which in the first case is equality in the fulfillment of legitimate claims, in the second case equality of the gains derived from cooperation. The theory of social welfare functions is employed in the definition of the two criteria, but such functions are applied only to morally or legally justified interests. A theory of justice only has to say how to satisfy conflicting legitimate claims, it is argued, but not what interests are justified in some given context.
54. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Adrienne Lehrer Observation Statements in the Social Sciences
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Philosophers have assumed that observational statements in the sciences are unproblematic and that statements like "X is blue" or "Y is salty" have the same meaning for everyone. Four fields are examined (oncology, phonetics, enology, and psychology) where there is evidence that observational language is not used consensually by practicioners in the field, even though they share the same theory and use the same vocabulary. Enology and psychology are developing sciences, so that agreement on what vocabulary is appropriate is still being developed. The precise use of observational expressions must be carefully taught and supervised. Linguistic consensus and reHability cannot be assumed.
55. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Paul Weingartner A System of Rational Belief, Knowledge and Assumption
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The first part of the papaer contains desiderata for a realistic epistemic system as opposed to idealistic ones. One of the main characteristics of idealistic epistemic systems is their deductive infallibility or deductive omniscience. The system presented avoids deductive infallibility though having a strong concept of knowledge. The second part contains the theorems of the system. The system is detailed in so far as it distinguishes between two concepts of belief and one of assumption and interrelates them to the concept of knowledge. Though all concepts satisfy certain consistency criteria the strongest ones hold for the concept of knowledge; whereas a belief in or a assumption (assertion) of a proposition which has inconsistent consequences (not known or believed or assumed by the believer or assumer) does not entail the commitment of believing in (or assuming of) an explicit contradiction. Moreover the system contains a lot of distinctions and details concerning propositions with a second person involved like "a knows that b knows whether p is the case" etc. The third part of the paper contains the semantics of the system which consists of many-valued truth-tables. Since the matrices are finite the system is consistent and decidable.
56. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Ryszard Wójcicki Is There Any Need for Non-Classical Logic in Science?
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The role of classical logic as the base of formalized scientific theories seems to be unshakable. Yet legitimate doubts about its universal applicability in science have resulted in the development of alternative systems, among which constructive and modal logic are discussed in syntactic and semantic terms.
57. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Rudolf Haller Preface
58. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Daniel Hunter Reference and Meinongian Objects
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Terence Parsons has recently given a consistent formahzation of Meinong's Theory of Objects. The interest in this theory lies in its postulation of nonexistent objects. An important implication of the theory is that we commonly refer to nonexistent objects. In particular, the theory is committed to taking fictional entities as objects of reference. Yet it is difficult to see how reference to fictional entities can be estabHshed if Parsons' theory is correct. This difficulty diminishes the attractiveness of the theory and also raises questions as to the ability of the theory to give a satisfactory account of intentional attitudes towards fictional entities.
59. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Eike von Savigny Das sogenannte "paradigm case argument": Eine Familie von antiskeptischen Argumentationsstrategien
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Grundgedanke des paradigm case argument ist, Skepsis gegenüber Ansprüchen auf Tatsachenwissen durch Appell an den Sprachgebrauch zu widerlegen. Die naivsten Formen der Argumentation sind nicht schlüssig; in ihrer weiteren Verwendung und Diskussion ist sie daher in drei unterschiedHchen Richtungen modifiziert worden: durch sprachtheoretische Ergänzungen (zur Rolle von Standards, Lehrbeispielen, Hinweisdefinitionen, Verwendungskriterien, semantischen Beziehungen, Unterscheidungsfunktionen), zu ad hominem-Strategien sowie zu quasi-transzendentalphilosophischen Varianten (Bedeutung impliziert Wahrheit; Sprachbenutzung impliziert Überzeugung; Sprachspielbeherrschung enthält Wissen).
60. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Wüliam J. Rapaport How to make the World Fit Our Language: An Essay in Meinongian Semantics
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Natural languages differ from most formal languages in having a partial, rather than a total, semantic interpretation function; e.g., some noun phrases don't refer. The usual semantics for handling such noun phrases (e.g., Russell, Quine) require syntactic reform. The alternative presented here is semantic expansion, viz., enlarging the range of the interpretaion function to make it total. A specific ontology based on Meinong's Theory of Objects, which can serve as domain on interpretation, is suggested, and related to the work of Castaneda, Frege, Katz and Fodor, Parsons, and Scott.