Narrow search


By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:


Displaying: 41-60 of 163 documents

0.1 sec

41. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Petr Dvořák Ke Gahérově analýze Tomášovy „druhé cesty“: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
42. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Pavel Blažek Kulturní styky a recepční procesy v teologii 12. A 13. století Zpráva z vědecké konference: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
43. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
M. J. Loux Nutné a možné (dokončení): A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
44. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Michal Chabada Duns Scotus, Metaphysician: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
45. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík (2) Vyjádření k Maternově poznámce: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
46. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Jan Palkoska „Corpus non est Substantia, sed modus tantum Entis“ leibniz o fenomenalitě látkového světa: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The aim of this article is to present and analyze the argumentative structures which are decisive for Leibniz’s position regarding the issue of the ontological status of material things (or bodies) and matter. I reconstruct and thoroughly analyze (i) two different argumentative strategies of Leibniz’s – viz. an “epistemic” and a “realistic” one – for his general thesis that nothing material (and a fortiori no body) has rigore metaphysico the status of a substance, as well as (ii) the corresponding suggestions of his as to how the material world is to be construed out of substances and their modes. Throughout, I lay special emphasis onpinpointing the real key elements of Leibniz’s arguments and on articulating them in such terms that would allow for their direct confrontation with other paradigmatic positions regarding the issue in Leibniz’s times.
47. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Prokop Sousedík Moorova filosofická metoda: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this article I consider two aspects of Moore’s philosophical method which lead to the turn to natural language. These are his interest in the meaning (not the truth) of problematic philosophical theses and his interest in common sense philosophy. However, Moore himself did not completely achieve the linguistic turn: he merely prepared the way for it. In the conclusions I show that Moore’s themes were developed by N. Malcom. The deeper sense of my paper is to show that the linguistic turn as begun by Moore does not conflict with the spirit of the Aristotelian tradition.
48. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Tomáš Nejeschleba K jubileu P. Prof. Vladimíra Richtera SJ: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
49. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Francisci de Mayronis OFM Tractatus De esse Essentiae et existentiae: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
50. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Alfred J. Freddoso Fides et ratio: radikální vize intelektuálního bádání
51. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Stanislav Sousedík Franciscus de Mayronis a jeho traktát De esse essentiae et existentiae: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
52. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Thomas Williams Nad metodou historie filosofie: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
53. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Stanislav Sousedík M. Rhonheimer o Kantovi a katolické teologii: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
54. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Ladislav Koreň Záverečné slovo: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
55. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Tomáš Nejeschleba P. Heinrich Seuse Denifle Op (1844–1905) Zpráva ze slavnostního aktu, Innsbruck, 10. června 2005: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
56. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Lukáš Novák Sémantika vlastních jmen Odpověď L. Koreňovi: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
57. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
David Svoboda Pravdivost výroků o (podmíněně) budoucích nahodilých událostech: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The article deals with the problem of the future contingents from the logical point of view, i.e. whether the propositions about (conditional) future contingents have a determinate truth-value. The author attemps to show how the problem was discussed both in the 17. century between a Prague’s Jesuit M. Větrovský and a French Dominican A. Goudin, as well as how the discussion has progressed through contemporary analytical philosophy. Firstly the history of the problem is explored to provide the sources for the discussion. Secondly the polemic of Větrovský with Goudin is examined and finally how A. J. Freddoso and W. L. Craig discuss the problem in contemporary analytical philosophy. The essential aspect of the argument is whether the propositions about (conditional) future contingents might have a determinate truth-value if the causal grounding (futuritio causalis) is being detached.
58. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Daniel Dominik Novotný Analyse und Kritik des Relativismus: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
59. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD Ad „K modálnímu ontologickému důkazu“: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
60. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Marvan Putnamovy realismy a pojmová relativita: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The aim of the paper is twofold. First, it expounds the thesis of ‘conceptual relativity’ propounded in a series of writings of the well-known philosopher Hilary Putnam and indicates the alleged manner in which the thesis, according to Putnam, undermines the foundations of metaphysical realism (understood in a peculiar way spelled out in the paper). Second, a critical examination of Putnam’s anti-metaphysical-realist argument is offered. It is argued that Putnam offers examples only of a trivial, so-called indexical relativity, and that his strategy leaves the foundations of metaphysical realism intact.