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Displaying: 41-60 of 101 documents

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41. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Stanislav Sousedík M. Rhonheimer o Kantovi a katolické teologii: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
42. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Ladislav Koreň Záverečné slovo: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
43. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Lukáš Novák Sémantika vlastních jmen Odpověď L. Koreňovi: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
44. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
David Svoboda Pravdivost výroků o (podmíněně) budoucích nahodilých událostech: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article deals with the problem of the future contingents from the logical point of view, i.e. whether the propositions about (conditional) future contingents have a determinate truth-value. The author attemps to show how the problem was discussed both in the 17. century between a Prague’s Jesuit M. Větrovský and a French Dominican A. Goudin, as well as how the discussion has progressed through contemporary analytical philosophy. Firstly the history of the problem is explored to provide the sources for the discussion. Secondly the polemic of Větrovský with Goudin is examined and finally how A. J. Freddoso and W. L. Craig discuss the problem in contemporary analytical philosophy. The essential aspect of the argument is whether the propositions about (conditional) future contingents might have a determinate truth-value if the causal grounding (futuritio causalis) is being detached.
45. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD Ad „K modálnímu ontologickému důkazu“: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
46. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Marvan Putnamovy realismy a pojmová relativita: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The aim of the paper is twofold. First, it expounds the thesis of ‘conceptual relativity’ propounded in a series of writings of the well-known philosopher Hilary Putnam and indicates the alleged manner in which the thesis, according to Putnam, undermines the foundations of metaphysical realism (understood in a peculiar way spelled out in the paper). Second, a critical examination of Putnam’s anti-metaphysical-realist argument is offered. It is argued that Putnam offers examples only of a trivial, so-called indexical relativity, and that his strategy leaves the foundations of metaphysical realism intact.
47. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Michal Chabada Abstraktívne poznanie podl'a Jána Dunsa Scota základné prístupy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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According to Scotus, abstractive cognition is independent of the actual existence of its object, and must therefore rely on the intentional species. Scotus presents several arguments in favour of the necessity of the species intelligibilis for abstractive universal cognition. After discussing opinions that ascribed exclusive causality in the process of cognition either to the intellect or to the object, Scotus arrives at the conclusion that both the object and the intellect act as essentially ordered partial causes of cognition: the intelligible species is caused both by the phantasm and the active intellect. Thus results a new order of representation, in which the common nature is represented as universal. The process of cognition is described by Scotus as a dynamic succession of active and passive phases. On the basis of these and other characteristic features, Scotus’s epistemology can be described as departing from the Aristotelian tradition, and as the locus of the first appearance of the motives of modern epistemology.
48. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Josef Smolka Caramuelův List Markovi Marci Ještě Jednou: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
49. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD Reálné Potence: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
50. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Kamila Pacovská Kritika metaetiky v díle P. Footové a dalších „deskriptivistů“: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article aims to present one of the most decisive criticisms of metaethics which resulted in the restoration of substantive ethics in Great Britain in the late fifties. Philippa Foot attacks the basic metaethical presupposition that evaluative meaning is logically independent of descriptive meaning. She concentrates on the semantics of the word “good”. The second, most extensive part of my article summarizes her argumentation for the thesis that evaluative meaning of the latter word can imply some description of the object evaluated. This result can be linked with the rejection of formalistic methods in ethics.
51. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Petr Dvořák Univerzální preskriptivismus R. M. Hara: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article is a critical systematic presentation of R. M. Hare's ethical concepts and doctrine as outlined in his books The Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963). The theory merits attention for many reasons, yet it appears to suffer from some weaknesses; the chief among them being the lack of explanation for the source of binding force of moral principles.
52. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Marek Otisk Significatio a Appellatio v sémantice Anselma z Canterbury: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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This paper is consecrated to the problems of the semantics in the Anselm’s philosophy of language – one of the most important parts of his philosophical inquiry. The main care is focused to the analysis of terms veritas and rectitudo, mainly because of significatio and the semantics – e.g. significatio with respect to names (proper and common; infinite, privative and empty). Special passage refers to denominative names, because in their case Anselm of Canterbury makes differences between significatio ( per se, per aliud and ut unum) and appellatio in his semantic analysis.
53. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD Znovu o abstraktních pojmech: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
54. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Paul E. Oppenheimer, Edward N. Zalta O logice ontologického důkazu: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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In this paper, the authors show that there is a reading of St. Anselm’s ontological argument in Proslogium II that is logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion). This reading takes Anselm’s use of the definite description “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” seriously. Consider a first-order language and logic in which definite descriptions are genuine terms, and in which the quantified sentence “there is an x such that…” does not imply “x exists”. Then, using an ordinary logic of descriptions and a connected greater-than relation, God’s existence logically follows from the claims: (a) there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable, and (b) if x does not exist, something greater than x can be conceived. To deny the conclusion, one must deny one of the premises. However, the argument involves no modal inferences and, interestingly, Descartes’ ontological argument can be derived from it.
55. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD Suárezova nauka o receptivních potencích a její ohlas u R. Arriagy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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Receptive potencies are the essence in relation to the act of being (esse) and the matter in relation to the form. Suárez identifies the essence with the existence. A potential essence, according to Suarez, is nothing; therefore it cannot be receptive potency for being (esse). The actuality of an actual essence is its being (esse). Hence, the actual essence does not need to receive any further being distinct from it. Essence does not differ really from being (esse); nevertheless, we can conceive it without being. Essence as “whatness”, quiddity, is closely connected with concept and definition. In this regard we may make some critical remarks on Suarez’s doctrine: If the “whatness” is identical to the being (esse), this fact has to be reflected in the adequate notion of the “whatness”. If it is so, it seems that the essence conceived without being (esse) is not the same essence any more. Furthermore: If essence and existence are identified, what is it to which existence can be non-trivially ascribed? What is the receptive potency for being (esse)? Arriaga follows Suárez in the doctrine of essence and being, in his teaching on the prime matter however he goes even further. Whereas Suárez ascribes to the prime matter its own actuality, Arriaga assigns to it some attributes of substance. In contradistinction to the Suarezian conception of receptive potencies, the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of participation between potency and act permits metaphysics to withstand the threats of mechanicism and the post-fregean trivialization of the notion of being (esse).
56. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Anselmův ontologický důkaz očima teorie abstraktních objektů: Úvodní poznámka
57. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD K Novákově odpovědi: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
58. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Problém abstraktních pojmů: Odpověď Davidu Peroutkovi
59. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Peter Hoenen SJ Descartův Mechanicismus: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
60. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD Závěrečné vyjádření: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism