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51. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Books Received during 1995
52. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Analysis Exercise 9: Descartes on Sensations
53. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Antony Flew Stephen Hawking and the Mind of God
54. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Anthony Rudd In Search of Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus
55. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Crossword
56. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Editor’s Booknotes
57. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
John Lippitt Existential Laughter
58. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
David Garr The Primacy of Virtues in Ethical Theory: Part 11
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In fairly recent times there has been an enormous growth of interest, especially from ethical theorists generally under the speIl of Aristotle, in both the moral virtues and the central significance of the notion of a virtue for an adequate grasp of the character of moral life. In the light of this it may weIl appear a useful exercise to sketch in very broad terms how a virtue-theoretical account of moral life and the nature of our moral responses stands in relation to other ethical views and to present the general outline of a case for regarding such an approach as preferable to others. In the first part of this article, then, I tried to prepare the ground for a virtue-theoretical account by showing how a safe conceptual course needs to be steered between the Scylla of ethical realism and the Charybdis of non-cognitivism. In this second part, however, I shall endeavour to develop a more positive view of the way in which a virtue-theoretical approach may successfully steer this course.
59. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
John Wilson The (Un)examined Life
60. Cogito: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Jordan Howard Sobel Egoisms, Psychological and Ethical
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Speaking rather grandly, Egoism is the philosophy of self interest. It says that actions are ‘ruled’ by self interest which makes it prima facie a philosophy of selfishness. Whether this is its real character needs to be looked into. But first a complication intrudes, for only a little reflection reveals that egoism as here characterized is not one philosophy, but two. These want to be distinguished, and once distinguished, their relations understood. These preliminaries to investigating the merits of forms of egoism and connections with ordinary ideas of selfishness make the business of the present paper.