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51. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 15
Michael P. Goldsmith Mutual Metaphysical Musings: A Connparative Analysis of Śamkara's and Vasubandhu's Ontological Schennata
52. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 15
Melanie K. Johnson-Moxley "Our Jane" and Gitā-yoga: Non-Gender Exclusiveness of the Bhagavad-Gitā
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Suppose that the protagonist of the Bhagavad-Gitā had been a woman. Would Krishna's message to her have been the same as it was to the morally tormented warrior Arjuna? Could it have been, without violating the essential intentions of this work? Consider the historical case of Lakşmibai, the Rani of Jhansi, a rare and legendary female warrior who lived, fought and died in nineteenth-century Colonial India. For the sake of argument, one could imagine her in Arjuna's place and ask: what if she had experienced Arjuna's moment of moral doubt (and spiritual need) before taking to the battlefield? Would the answers for her be the same as they were for Arjuna? Or to put it another way: is there a gender-exclusiveness in the message of the Gitā?Upon close examination, this does not appear to be the case. The three-fold discipline described by Krishna, or Gitā-yoga" to borrow a phrase from Bina Gupta, is multi-faceted precisely because human beings are different from each other as individuals; yet it is capable of being articulated as a universalizable discipline because human beings are fundamentally the same with respect to their humanity and mortality, irrespective of gender, occupation or circumstances. Anyone can pursue Gitā-yoga in order to act morally and realize spiritual satisfaction, albeit the particulars of that pursuit are expected to vary according to individual capacity, character and disposition. The Gitā does not at any point, however, draw distinctions between the duties, virtues or spiritual capacities of persons on the basis of gender. Lakşmibai serves as an excellent example of a woman who could potentially realize all three aspects of Gitā-yoga, further belying any temptation to interpret Krishna's message as surreptitiously gender-exclusive and thus strengthening a case for its applicability as a moral philosophy for a contemporary world.
53. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 15
Kevin M. Brien Humanistic Marxism and Buddhism: Complementaries
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In this paper I argue that Buddhism and humanistic-Marxism have much in common, and that they really are quite complementary in many ways. Early on I cite the Dalai Lama and some remarks he makes in relation to Buddhism and Marxism—remarks that seem not to make a distinction between orthodox-Marxism and humanistic-Marxism. I then go on to give a brief sketch of some of the central aspects of humanistic-Marxism; and in doing 50 I draw from a number of well-known Eastern European philo-sophers. Among other things, I focus on the relation between the early and late Marx, "praxis", 'free conscious activity", historical materialism, the spiritual dimension in Marx and its role in social transformations, etc. After a brief indication of the Buddhist "four noble truths", I bring out that both Marx and Buddha are deeply concerned about human suffering; but that there is an important difference in emphasis with respect to the external and internal Factors associated with human suffering. I go on to bring out that both perspectives agree that there is no creator God, or eternal soul; and that both perspectives see reality as process in character. For each perspective this means that things are what they are by virtue of the dynamic interrelations they have with other things. whether directly and indirectly. I bring out that both perspectives begin their analysis of the human condition with the given situation in which human beings find themselves, and that both perspectives see human beings as the makers of themselves, but that they do so in somewhat different ways. Also both perspectives see human beings as making themselves on the basis of the ways they have made themselves in the past, but as doing so in ways that are not fatalistic. In this connection I compare the Buddhist view of karma, and an overlapping view of social karma in Marx. Also I discuss Buddhism ancj Marxism with respect to the notion of the ego-self, and the question of whether there are many different forms of the ego-self; and if so, how such different forms might come about, and what this would mean in relation to the Buddhist notion of ''samsara". Finally, ! point to a way that humanistic-Marxism could consistently acknowledge a possible transcendence of the ego-self. In passing I point out that the notion of "unalienated spirituality" in Marx has much in common with the Buddhist notion of "enlightenment".
54. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 15
Robert Boyd The Notion of God in Hindu Understanding
55. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 15
Kisor K. Chakrabarti AAtmatattvaviveka (Analysis of the Nature of the Self) An Annotated Translation: The Argument from Inevitability of Destruction
56. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 15
Ellen Goldberg What Can Cognitive Science Tell Us About Hatha and Tantric Yoga?
57. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Gordon Haist Self and Kenosis
58. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Barbara A. Amodio The Mahavidya (Great Lesson) of Sacred Transformation in Ten Mahesvan Icons of the Goddess: Secret Identities of Siva and the Goddess (Sakti) as One
59. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Joshua Anderson Character Consequentialism: Confucianism, Buddhism and Mill
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When discussing Eastern philosophy there is often a difficulty since characteristically Eastern ways of thinking do not map well onto Western philosophic categories. Yet, P. J. Ivanhoe suggests that a careful reading of Confucianism can illuminate and expand Western approaches to ethics. Ivanhoe maintains that the best way to understand Confucian ethics is as a hybrid of virtue ethics and consequentialism, a view he calls character consequentialism (CC). The paper will progress in the following way. First, I present Ivanhoe's conception of character consequentialism. Second, I discuss how C C , particularly as it is developed by Charles Goodman as a way to interpret Mahayana Buddhist ethics, relates to aspects of Mill's utilitarianism. This suggests that there is nothing especially new about CC. However, the similarities actually underscore the ways that Eastern and Western ethical theories can illuminate each other. Finally, I respond to Damien Keown's concern that CC is hopelessly confused.
60. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Kisor K. Chakrabarti AAtmatattvaviveka (Analysis of the Nature of the Self) An Annotated Translation: Examination of the View that Destruction is unreal