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481. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 11
New Books
482. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 11
Don Garrett Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought by Yitzhak Y. Melamed
483. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 12
Index to Volume CXI
484. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 12
Gurpreet Rattan Epistemological Semantics beyond Irrationality and Conceptual Change
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Quine’s arguments in the final two sections of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” bring semantic and epistemic concerns into spectacular collision. Many have thought that the arguments succeed in irreparably smashing a conception of a distinctively analytic and a priori philosophy to pieces. In Constructing the World, David Chalmers argues that much of this distinctively analytical and a priori conception of philosophy can be reconstructed, with Quine’s criticisms leaving little lasting damage. I agree with Chalmers that Quine’s arguments do not have the lasting damage some take them to have. However, I do not think that Chalmers has succeeded in explaining why. The core of Chalmers’s error lies in the rational dispositionalism that forms the metasemantics of his Carnapian intensionalism. Responding to Quine requires recognizing conceptions of both concepts and epistemic normativity that go beyond the opposition between irrationality and conceptual change that Chalmers brings to bear on Quine. I explain this expanded conception of concepts and epistemic normativity in terms of another fundamental aim of Constructing the World, namely that of providing an account of Fregean sense, or more generally of defending what Chalmers calls epistemological semantics.
485. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 12
Justin Tiehen A Priori Scrutability and That’s All
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At the heart of David Chalmers’s book Constructing the World is his defense of A Priori Scrutability, the thesis that there is a compact class of truths such that for any truth p, a Laplacean intellect could know a priori that if the truths in the class hold, then p. In this paper I develop an objection to Chalmers’s defense of A Priori Scrutability that focuses on his reliance on a so-called that’s-all truth. After reviewing preliminaries in section 1, my objection, which draws heavily on Theodore Sider’s discussion of border-sensitive properties, is developed in sections 2 and 3. Section 2 argues against Chalmers’s analysis of the distinction between positive and negative truths, while section 3 argues that the that’s-all sentence formulated by Chalmers is a falsehood rather than a truth. Section 4 offers a concluding discussion of my argument.
486. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 12
Gary Ebbs Conditionalization and Conceptual Change: Chalmers in Defense of a Dogma
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David Chalmers has recently argued that Bayesian conditionalization is a constraint on conceptual constancy, and that this constraint, together with “standard Bayesian considerations about evidence and updating,” is incompatible with the Quinean claim that every belief is rationally revisable. Chalmers’s argument presupposes that the sort of conceptual constancy that is relevant to Bayesian conditionalization is the same as the sort of conceptual constancy that is relevant to the claim that every belief is rationally revisable. To challenge this presupposition I explicate a sort of “conceptual role” constancy that a rational subject could take to be necessary and sufficient for a rule of Bayesian conditionalization to govern her belief updating, and show that a rational subject may simultaneously commit herself to updating her beliefs in accord with such a rule and accept the claim that every belief is rationally revisable. 
487. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 12
New Books
488. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 2
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir Having Value and Being Worth Valuing
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This paper explores the relationship between the ascription of value to an object and an assessment of conative attitudes taken towards that object. It argues that this relationship is captured by an a priori necessary truth that falls out of the mastery conditions for the concept of value: what has value is worth valuing, when valuing is understood to be a relatively stable conative attitude distinct from judging valuable. What kind of assessment of attitude is at stake? How are we to understand the worth-relation that holds between an object and the attitude? It is argued that deontological, evaluative and alethic eluciations of the worth-relation are wrongheaded. We should be looking for a mind-world relation that marks a success in how the emotional and motivational energies integral to valuing are directed: a success that does not consist in meeting a deontic requirement, in exemplifying value, or in representing truly.
489. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 2
Christopher Menzel Wide Sets, ZFCU, and the Iterative Conception
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ZFCU is ZFC set theory modified to allow for the existence of non-sets, or urelements. The most natural conception of sets—the so-called iterative conception—is typically considered to provide the intuitive underpinnings for ZFCU. It is an easy theorem of ZFCU that all sets have a definite cardinality. But the iterative conception seems to be entirely consistent with the existence of “wide” sets, sets (of, in particular, urelements) that are too big to have a definite cardinality. This paper diagnoses the source of the apparent disconnect here and investigates possibilities for modifying the Replacement and Powerset axioms so as to allow for the existence of wide sets. Drawing upon Cantor’s notion of the absolute infinite, the paper argues that these modifications are warranted and preserve a robust iterative conception of set. The resulting theory is proved consistent relative to ZFC + “there exists an inaccessible cardinal number”.
490. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 2
New Books
491. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 3
New Books
492. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 3
Michael Hand Antirealism and Truths Never Known
493. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 3
Patrick Forber, Rory Smead An Evolutionary Paradox for Prosocial Behavior
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We investigate how changes to the payoffs of cooperative behavior affect the evolutionary dynamics. Paradoxically, the larger the benefits of cooperation, the less likely it is to evolve. This holds true even in cases where cooperation is strictly dominant. Increasing the benefits from prosocial behavior has two effects: first, in some circumstances it promotes the evolution of spite; and second, it can decrease the strength of selection leading to nearly neutral evolution of strategies. In light of these results we must reevaluate standard philosophical perspectives on the evolution of cooperation and morality.
494. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 3
Thomas Sattig Pluralism and Determinism
495. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 4
In Memoriam: James Higginbotham
496. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 4
Ben O’Neill Assessing the “Bayesian Shift” in the Doomsday Argument
497. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 4
Ned Hall Writing the Book of the World by Theodore Sider
498. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 4
Daniel Greco Could KK Be OK?
499. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 4
New Books
500. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 5
David Enoch A Defense of Moral Deference
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This paper has two aims – the first is to mount a defense of moral deference, and the second is to offer a (non-debunking) diagnosis of its suspiciousness. The paper defends moral deference by arguing that in the face of moral uncertainty, it is morally obligatory to minimize the risk of one's wrongdoing, and this moral requirement entails that deferring to a moral expert is sometimes not just morally permissible but also admirable, and indeed morally required. I explain the suspiciousness of moral deference by noting that the need to defer indicates a failure to respond to the right- or wrong-making features of the situation de re. The combination of this vindication of moral deference and diagnosis of its fishiness nicely accommodates some related phenomena, like the status of moral beliefs that are based on opaque evidence, and the fact that the scope of suspected deference includes also other normative domains.