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41. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Paolo Godani Variazioni Sul Sorvolo: Ruyer, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze e lo statuto della forma
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Variations sur le survolRuyer, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze et le statut de la formeLa question principale que j’aborde dans cet article concerne la manière dont Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze assument l’héritage du finalisme du vingtième siècle.En analysant certains textes fondamentaux de ces deux auteurs, on aperçoit en effet clairement leur dette à l’égard, notamment, du néo-finalisme de Raymond Ruyer. Autant Merleau-Ponty que Deleuze lisent l’oeuvre de Ruyer en la séparant de son contexte d’origine et de ses intentions explicites, à savoir hors de toute exigence de nature épistémologique. Entre ces deux auteurs subsiste toutefois une différence substantielle dans la manière d’employer les concepts ruyériens. Merleau-Ponty réfute l’hypothèse d’une forme qui survole les matériaux constituant l’organisation idéale, mais valorise l’idée d’un thématisme immanent, d’une essence qui subsiste seulement à l’intérieur de ses variations. Deleuze, lui, semble reprendre sans réserve à son compte ces mêmes notions de forme et de survol parce qu’il les interprète comme des concepts plutôt que comme des causes formelles ou finales. Le concept deleuzien n’est pas pris dans la « pâte » du vécu, mais survole toute expérience vécue et tout état de choses. C’est pourquoi il ne peut être que créé, et c’est pourquoi la philosophie ne peut pas être uneactivité descriptive, à la manière de la phénoménologie, mais doit être nécessairement constructive.Variations on the SurveyRuyer, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze and the Status of the FormThe main question that I confront in this article concerns the way in which Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze take up the heritage of 20th century finalism. By analyzing some of both of these authors’ basic texts, we clearly perceive their debt to, particularly, the neofinalism of Raymond Ruyer. Merleau-Ponty as much as Deleuze read Ruyer’s work separately from its original context and its explicit intentions, that is, they read it outside of any sort of epistemological demand. Nevertheless, we still find between the two a substantial difference in the manner of using Ruyer’s concepts. Merleau-Ponty refutes the hypothesis of a form that surveys the materials that constitute the ideal organization, but valorizes the idea of an immanent thematism, of an essence that only subsists within its variations. Deleuze, for his part, appears by contrast to take unreservedly into his own account these same notions of form and survey because he interprets them as concepts rather than formal and final causes. The Deleuzian concept is not “infested” with the lived, but surveys all lived experience and every state of things. That is why itcan only be created and that is why philosophy cannot be a descriptive activity, in the manner of phenomenology, but will necessarily be constructive.
42. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Gilles Deleuze, Claudio Rozzoni Corso Vincennes – Saint Denis (20/01/1987)
43. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Claudio Rozzoni Breve Nota Sulla Piega: “Una storia come quella di Merleau-Ponty”
44. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Claudio Rozzoni Lo Spazio Estetico: Il “rovesciamento del cartesianismo” in Deleuze e Merleau-Ponty
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L’espace esthétiqueLe « renversement du cartésianisme » chez Deleuze et Merleau-PontyCet essai se propose de développer le rapport entre Deleuze et Merleau-Ponty à partir de la tentative des deux philosophes français d’aller au-delà du courantde pensée qu’on pourrait qualifi er, comme le fait Merleau-Ponty lui-même, de « cartésianisme ».Nous commençons notre itinéraire avec la critique que les deux philosophes adressent à la notion cartésienne de « ligne » – passage obligé pour penser, à travers Leibniz et sa notion de « point », la ligne en tant qu’« ensemble de points ». On cherche ensuite à penser une ligne qui ne serait plus tracée dans un espace objectif présupposé, mais plutôt qui « se trace » dans un « espace expressif ».Un tel renversement de la « ligne cartésienne » produit, comme on le verra, des effets qui intéressent également la représentation de la ligne du temps. Émanciper cette dernière du modèle cartésien signifi e la penser par-delà toute référence chronologique, toute dépendance du temps de Kronos. On peut lire dans ce sens la tentative des deux philosophes pour penser le temps de l’événement, le temps de l’Aion. On verra enfin comment, d’un espace et d’un temps anticartésiens, doit naître, pour Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze, une nouvelle grammaire porteuse d’une nouvelle compréhension de la métaphore. Ni l’idée de métaphore proposée par Merleau-Ponty, ni le concept de devenir créé par Deleuze ne concernent une ressemblance fondée sur une identité donnée. Si la métaphore merleau-pontienne et le devenir deleuzien doivent être en mesure de restituer l’essence d’une chose, une telle essence se trouve, ou mieux se crée,à partir d’un mouvement vers « ce que la chose n’est pas ». C’est précisément dans ce sens que Merleau-Ponty lit la métaphore proustienne et que Deleuze cherche à rendre compte des ressemblances créées dans l’oeuvre de Gombrowicz.The Aesthetic SpaceThe “Reversal of Cartesianism” in Deleuze and Merleau-PontyThe present essay proposes to explore the relationship between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty from the attempt they make to go beyond the current of thought thatwe may qualify, like Merleau-Ponty does it himself, as Cartesianism. We begin our itinerary with the critique that both philosophers direct at the Cartesian notion of the line. The passage through the Cartesian notion of the line is “obligated” in order to think – by means of Leibniz and his notion of point -- the line as a “set of points.” The Cartesian passage is obligated moreover in order to think a line which could no longer be drawn in a presupposed objective space but, rather, which would be “drawn” in an “expressive space.” Such a reversal of the Cartesian line, as we shall see, produces effects that concern also the representation of the line of time. To emancipate the line of time from the Cartesian model means we must think beyond all chronological references, beyond all dependence on the time of Chronos. We are able to read, in this way, both philosophers’ attempt to think the time of the event, the time of Aion. Finally we shall see how, for Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, a new grammar carrying a new understanding of the metaphor must be born from an anti-Cartesian space and time. Neither the idea of metaphor proposed by Merleau-Ponty nor the concept of becoming created by Deleuze speaks of a resemblance founded upon an identity that is given ahead of time. If Merleau-Ponty’s idea of metaphor and Deleuze’s concept of becoming must be able to produce the essence of a thing, such an essence finds, or better, it iscreated on the basis of a movement toward “what the thing is not.” It is precisely in this sense that Merleau-Ponty reads Proust’s metaphors and that Deleuze will seek to give an account of created resemblances in the work of Gombrowicz.
45. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Elena Tavani Il mondo e la sua ombra: estetica e ontologia in Hannah Arendt e Merleau-Ponty
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Starting from a specific critique of the traditional «metaphysical mistake» (i.e., the distinction between being and appearing), Hannah Arendt comes to supporta “phenomenalism” that is not only radical but also spectacular in the sense that it enhances, not appearances that would replace an unknown being or substance, but an appearing as a unique exhibition on the world stage in view of an opinion to communicate or an action to perform. Along this path, an encounter with Merleau-Ponty’s thought can occur at several levels. Specifically, the thesis of the ‘spectacular’ character of the world is presented in Arendt’s political theory as intimately linked to the thesis of an aesthetic and, at the same time, ontological basis of experience, which relates her thought to the Merleau-Pontian theory of vision as “thought conditioned” by the world and “which advents” as “instituted” in a body that is properly its own (Eye and Mind). For Arendt, thought is not only invisible (“not manifest even when it is actualized,” The Life of the Mind), it is also ontologically visible as “doxa” in which it is divided into “aspects of world” that are revealed in a “specular” fashion as positions to take and show “outside,” to present and defend. This is a valuable asset in the context of political “advertising.”
46. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Jakub Čapek, Ondřej Švec Introduzione
47. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Stefano Micali Il giudizio riflettente estetico nella Critica del Giudizio. Una ripresa fenomenologica
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In this essay, the author intends to show the reasons for the interest on the Critique of Judgment, and especially to aesthetic judgment of taste within thephenomenological context. The study is divided into four sections: at first the concept of aesthetic reflective judgment will be introduced, highlighting the crucial role it assumes within the Kantian critical project as a whole (I). In a second step the specificity of the judgment of taste will be studied with particular attention on its character of Zweckmässigkeit and its universal voice (II). In the third section it will be shown how the judgment of taste introduces a new paradigmatic articulation of the relationship between feeling and thinking, which is further explained through a critical comparison with the interpretations of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Marc Richir (III) of aesthetic judgment. In the last and more extended section, the affinity of the disinterested character of the judgment of taste with the phenomenological attitude will be at the center of the research (IV).
48. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Faustino Fabbianelli Dalla “riflessione radicale” alla “superriflessione”. La fenomenologia di Merleau-Ponty tra Hegel e Schelling
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In this essay, I intend to show the evolution that the thought of Merleau-Ponty undergoes from the Phenomenology of Perception to The Visible and the Invisible. I do so by employing the Merleau-Pontyian notions of “radical reflection” and “hyper-reflection,” which I will consider as expressions of two alternative ways of resolving the task of philosophy: to highlight, in the first case, the immediate relation between the subject and the world, in the second case, the chiasm between the thinking and the Being of the world. There are three main stages to my reasoning: 1) to show the conceptual differences that obtain between the first Merleau-Pontyian phenomenology and the Hegelian philosophy; 2) to illustrate the insufficiency, recognized ex post by Merleau-Ponty himself, of the existential analyses contained in the Phenomenology of Perception; 3) to identify the concept that allows him to formulate a new ontology, and to go beyond the Hegelian dialectic, in the “nature” which is spoken of in the positive philosophy of the late Schelling.
49. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Leonard Lawlor Presentazione
50. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Mauro Carbone, Federico Leoni, Ted Toadvine Nota dei Direttori
51. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Rita Messori In Punta di Parole: Figura e Metafora in Maurice Merleau-Ponty e Paul Ricoeur
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La recente pubblicazione delle note di corso Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage sono una conferma del ruolo giocato dal linguaggio poetico in Merleau-Ponty in quell’ambizioso e incompiuto progetto perseguito dal 1951 Sur la phénoménologie du langage. La convinzione che il linguaggio sia la questione cruciale per la fenomenologia avvicina le ricerche di Merleau-Ponty a quelle che Ricoeur svilupperà negli anni Settanta: è nella parola, nel discorso pronunciato, che avviene non solo il rapporto tra soggetti, ma anche quello con le cose. Per entrambi i filosofi la Lebenswelt è una sorta di terra promessa della fenomenologia; un mondo che ci è dato cogliere soltanto in modo mediato. E a rappresentare una forma di mediazione esemplare è la figura retorica della metafora, negazione di ogni tentazione di presa diretta, di trasparenza del linguaggio stesso: nella parola metaforica, non riducibile alla dimensione nominale, viene delineata una ontologia “indiretta” o “abbozzata”. Tecnica stilistica da Merleau-Ponty, a differenza di Ricoeur, più praticata che teorizzata, la metafora poetica, o viva, realizza lo snodo tra pre-categoriale e categoriale, tra mondo sensibile e mondo dell’espressione, tra logos muto e logos pronunciato. Riprendendo l’analogia individuata da Valéry tra danza e linguaggio letterario, Merleau-Ponty traccia una teoria della figura come espressione degli ordini di senso percepiti che può trasfigurare il linguaggio ordinario; teoria molto vicina a quella ricoeuriana di “figurazione” che nel mondo della vita si radica per poi tornarvi.La publication récente des notes du cours Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage confirment le rôle joué par le langage poétique chez Merleau-Ponty dans le projet ambitieux et inachevé qu’il engage à partir de 1951 dans l’essai Sur la phénoménologie du langage. La conviction que le langage est la question cruciale pour la phénoménologie rapproche les recherches de Merleau-Ponty de celles que Ricoeur développera dans les années 1970 : c’est dans les mots, dans le discours prononcé, qu’advient non seulement les relations entre sujets, mais aussi nos rapports avec les choses. Pour les deux philosophes, la Lebenswelt est une sorte de terre promise pour la phénoménologie ; un monde qu’on ne peut saisir que de manière indirecte. Et c’est la figure de la métaphore qui représente une forme de médiation exemplaire, comme négation de toute tentative de prise directe, de transparence du langage lui-même. Dans l’expression métaphorique, non réductible à la dimension nominale, une ontologie « indirecte » ou « ébauchée » est esquissée. Technique stylistique chez Merleau-Ponty, plus pratiquée que théorisée à la différence de Ricoeur, la métaphore poétique, ou vivante, réalise la jonction entre le précatégorial et le catégorial, entre le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression, entre logos muet et logos proféré. Reprenant l’analogie de Valéry entre danse et langage littéraire, Merleau-Ponty trace une théorie de la figure comme expression des ordres de la perception qui peut transfigurer le langage ordinaire ; une théorie très proche de celle de Ricoeur de la « figuration » qui, enracinée dans le monde de la vie, y retourne ensuite.The recent publication of the lecture notes Research on the Literary Use of Language confirms the role played by poetic language in Merleau-Ponty’s ambitious and unfinished project that began in his 1951 essay “On the Phenomenology of Language.” The conviction that language is the crucial question for phenomenology in Merleau-Ponty’s work nears the research Paul Ricoeur would develop in the 1970’s: it is in words, in expressed discourse, that we encounter not only relations among subjects, but also our relation to things. For the two philosophers, the Lebenswelt is a sort of promised land for phenomenology, a world that we can grasp only indirectly. And, it is the figure of the metaphor that represents an exemplary form of mediation, as a negation of every attempt toward a direct grasp, of the transparency of language in itself. In the metaphorical expression, which is not reducible to a nominal dimension, an “indirect” or “outlined” ontology is sketched out. In the stylistic technique of Merleau-Ponty, more practiced than theoretical unlike Ricoeur, the poetic or living metaphor constitutes a junction between the pre-categorical and the categorical, between the sensible world and the world of expression, between silent logos and pronounced logos. Referring to Valery’s analogy between dance and literary language, Merleau-Ponty traces a theory of the figure as expression in the orders of perception that can transfigure ordinary language, a theory very similar to that of Ricoeur’s “figuration” which, rooted in the world of life, subsequently returns to it.
52. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Lamberto Colombo Metafisica ed Esperienza in Ricoeur e Merleau-Ponty
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Partendo dalle definizioni che Ricoeur e Merleau-Ponty assegnano al concetto di filosofi a, è mia intenzione mostrare come non una metafisica tradizionalmente intesa, quanto un ideale metafisico insito in una teoria filosofica della conoscenza appaia e sia necessario ai fini dell’investigazione dell’esperienza (tratto che accomuna le analisi dei due filosofi presi in questione). Ritengo che la dialettica tra trascendenza ed immanenza della verità nella storia, nonostante le diverse declinazioni dovute agli interessi dei due pensatori, possa contribuire a rendere un’immagine unitaria e, a più riprese, interdipendente di Ricoeur da Merleau-Ponty e di quest’ultimo alla luce della revisione ermeneutica operata all’interno della fenomenologia dal filosofo di Valence.En partant des définitions que Ricoeur et Merleau-Ponty donnent du concept de philosophie, c’est mon intention de montrer comment non pas une métaphysique au sens traditionnel, mais un idéal métaphysique logé dans une théorie philosophique de la connaissance apparaît et est nécessaire dans la perspective d’une investigation de l’expérience (un trait qui rapproche les analyses des deux philosophes considérés). Je soutiens que la dialectique entre transcendance et immanence de la vérité dans l’histoire, quelles que soient les différentes déclinaisons qu’elle connaît dans les intérêts des deux penseurs, peut contribuer à donner une image unitaire et, à plusieurs reprises, à montrer une interdépendance de Ricoeur à l’égard de Merleau-Ponty et de ce dernier à l’égard de la révision herméneutique opérée à l’intérieur de la phénoménologie par le philosophe de Valence.By starting from the definitions that Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty give to the concept of philosophy, I intend to show how a metaphysical ideal lodged in a philosophical theory of knowledge, and not a metaphysics in the traditional sense, appears and is necessary when viewed from the perspective of experience (a characteristic which brings the two philosophers under consideration closer together). I hold that the dialectic between transcendence and immanence of the truth in history, despite the difference of interest in how it is developed by the two thinkers, can contribute to the formation of an unified image and, in several ways, to showing an interdependence of Ricoeur in relation to Merleau-Ponty and of Merleau-Ponty in relation to the hermeneutical revision effected within phenomenology by the philosopher from Valence.
53. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Federico Leoni Presentazione
54. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Federico Leoni Introduzione. Un altro inconscio
55. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Jennifer McWeeny Introduzione. Il corpo del nostro tempo
56. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Ted Toadvine Presentazione
57. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Emmanuel Alloa, Judith Revel Introduzione
58. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Marie-Eve Morin Introduzione
59. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Rajiv Kaushik Introduzione
60. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Prisca Amoroso, Gianluca De Fazio Dall’arca Terra allo Spielraum: Natura, corpo, spontaneità
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Il saggio muove da una ricostruzione storico-concettuale dell’interpretazione merleau-pontyana del manoscritto di Husserl Rovesciamento della dottrina copernicana nell’interpretazione della corrente visione del mondo, con cui Merleau-Ponty è in dialogo sin dalla Fenomenologia della percezione, per ripercorrere gli sviluppi del tema della Terra nell’avanzare della riflessione merleau-pontyana sul corpo-proprio, sull’organismo vivente, sulla dimensione carnale dell’essere. La proposta di un ritorno alla Terra, intesa come Boden irriducibile dell’esperienza, trova infatti il suo risvolto ontologico nell’idea di Spielraum, che già Husserl definiva come “ambito di possibilità”, e che in Merleau-Ponty assume il senso di un margine di gioco sempre aperto nella carne. Boden e Spielraum, non a caso tematizzati da Merleau-Ponty in due corsi paralleli tenuti al Collège de France nell’anno 1959-1960, permettono una rivalutazione del vivente secondo un modello che, contro il riduzionismo meccanicista, privilegi la spontaneità e la contingenza, e aprono allo sviluppo dell’ontologia porosa che il filosofo andrà proponendo negli ultimi anni. Ricostruendo la funzione della riflessione sulla corporeità e sul rapporto del vivente al mondo-ambiente in questa maturazione, si argomenterà che la critica che Merleau-Ponty muove al dualismo empirismo-idealismo trovi nell’idea di Terra un momento chiave, che contribuisce ad orientarla in direzione di una filosofia della carne. Questo passaggio riconfigura la Natura stessa, pensata non già come un originario, ma in quanto ambito di possibilità processuale e transindividuale, come quel quasi-oggetto, come lo definiva, ancora, Husserl, che presenta un’irriducibile resistenza ad un pensiero di sorvolo, proprio in quanto è condizione del pensiero stesso e ancoraggio della vita tutta.This essay begins with a historico-conceptual reconstruction of the Merleau-Pontian interpretation of Husserl’s manuscript, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” with which Merleau-Ponty is in dialogue from Phenomenology of Perception onward, and revisits the development of the theme of the Earth in the progression of Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on le corps propre, the living organism, and the carnal dimension of being. The proposal for a return to the Earth, taken as irreducible Boden of experience, indeed finds its ontological reverse side in the idea of Spielraum, which Husserl already defined as a “milieu of possibilities,” and which in Merleau-Ponty takes on the sense of a margin of play always open in the flesh. Boden and Spielraum, two notions that Merleau-Ponty does not thematize by chance in the two parallel courses given at the Collège de France over the years 1959-1960, enable a reassessment of the living being according to a model that, against mechanistic reductionism, privileges spontaneity and contingency, and opens to the development of the porous ontology that the philosopher would propose in his final years. Reconstructing the function of reflection on corporeality, and on the relationship of the living being with its milieu in the process, it will be argued that the criticism directed by Merleau-Ponty against the dualism of empiricism-idealism finds in the idea of the Earth a key moment that contributes to orienting him in the direction of a philosophy of the flesh. This passage reconfigures Nature itself, no longer conceived of as an originating, but as a milieu of processual and transindividual possibilities, like that quasi-object, as Husserl again defined it, that presents an irreducible resistance against high-altitude thinking, precisely as the condition of thought itself and the anchorage of all life.Cet essai commence avec une reconstruction historico-conceptuelle de l’interprétation merleau-pontienne du manuscrit de Husserl, Renversement de la doctrine copernicienne, avec lequel Merleau-Ponty est en dialogue depuis la Phénoménologie de la perception, et revisite les développement du thème de la Terre dans la progression de la réflexion merleau-pontienne sur le corps propre, sur l’organisme vivant, sur la dimension charnelle de l’être. La proposition d’un retour à la Terre, prise comme Boden irréductible de l’expérience, trouve en effet son envers ontologique dans l’idée de Spielraum, que Husserl déjà définissait comme « milieu de possibilités » et qui chez Merleau-Ponty prend le sens d’une marge de jeu toujours ouverte dans la chair. Boden et Spielraum, deux notions que Merleau-Ponty ne thématise pas par hasard dans les deux cours parallèles donnés au Collège de France au cours de l’année 1959-1960, permettent une réévaluation du vivant selon un modèle qui, contre le réductionnisme mécaniste, privilégie la spontanéité et la contingence, et ouvrent au développement de l’ontologie poreuse que le philosophe allait proposer dans les dernières années. Reconstruisant la fonction de la réflexion sur la corporéité et sur le rapport du vivant avec son milieu dans ce processus, on argumentera que la critique dirigée par Merleau-Ponty contre le dualisme empirisme-idéalisme trouve dans l’idée de la Terre un moment clé qui contribue à l’orienter en direction d’une philosophie de la chair. Ce passage reconfigure la Nature elle-même, pensée non pas déjà comme un originaire, mais en tant que milieu de possibilités processuelles et transindividuelles, en tant que quasi-objet, comme le définissait, encore, Husserl qui offrait une résistance irréductible contre une pensée de survol, précisément en tant que condition de la pensée elle-même et ancrage de toute la vie.