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41. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
David B. Hershenov David B. Hershenov
Prussian Reproduction, Proper Function and Infertile Marriages
Rozrodczość, właściwe funkcjonowanie oraz bezpłodne małżeństwa w ujęciu Prussa

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Alex Pruss argues that romantic love is a basic form of human love that is properly fulfilled in sex oriented towards reproduction. As a result, homoerotic sexual activity cannot obtain the proper consummation and therefore involves misunderstanding the other person’s nature and the possibility of union with them. Although same-sex sexual activity may feel like a consummation of romantic love, it is wrong to generate such a false experience in oneself or another. Presented is an apparent dilemma for Pruss’s thesis suggesting that either both postmenopausal homosexuals and postmenopausal heterosexuals ought to be allowed to marry for their romantic love is not dysfunctional despite not being oriented towards reproduction, or that matrimony is inappropriate for both groups. I suggest avoiding the dilemma in either of two ways that would allow Pruss to distinguish the infertility of homosexual couples from the infertility of post-menopausal women.
42. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
Alexander R. Pruss Alexander R. Pruss
One Body: Responses to Critics
One Body: Odpowiedzi krytykom

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In this article I respond to a number of powerful criticisms of my book One Body.
43. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
Helen Watt Helen Watt
Intending Reproduction as One’s Primary Aim: Alexander Pruss on ‘Trying for a Baby’
Planowanie potomstwa jako cel podstawowy

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May a couple have the aim of conceiving as their primary purpose in having marital relations? In this paper, I argue against the view of Alexander Pruss that it is wrong to do this since it treats human beings as fungible in their creation when their unique features are not known to their parents. I argue that Pruss cannot separate seeking reproduction as part of a marital vocation from seeking the unknown, unspecified child who is part of what makes for success in this particular area. While neither spouse should treat the other as a mere tool for having a child, success in the shared goal of conceiving (which will incorporate the value of the child’s life), as well as the goal itself and its pursuit, is very much part of the conjugal good. Existing human beings are morally irreplaceable in the sense that they must be individually valued and respected, but we may promote the lives of unknown existing people under a ‘catch all’ description—and may also deliberately conceive new people of some unknown, indeterminate kind.
44. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 64 > Issue: 2
Karolina Rozmarynowska Karolina Rozmarynowska
Civil Disobedience and Its Ethical Meaning
Obywatelskie Nieposłuszeństwo i Jego Etyczne Znaczenie

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The goal of the discussion presented in the article is to recognize the ethical dimension of civil disobedience. Setting out to achieve that goal, the author analyses the difference between civil disobedience and other forms of social protest, and attempts to define its essential substance. With that goal in view, she identifies the key features and the subject matter of an act of disobedience. Having explained the civil character of disobedience, she then goes on to discuss its moral and ethical significance. Emphasizing the personal character of civil disobedience, the author presents it as an expression of ethics.
45. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 64 > Issue: 3
Marek Słomka Uniqueness of Man in Nature and Some Examples of Its Questioning
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There are often mentioned specific features of human consciousness and culture: metaphysical reflection, ability of self-consciousness, moral sensitivity, aesthetical and religious experience. One can express the role of the similar contents, stressing the role of modern sciences in the human development or the worth of altruism in the acts of man, who—existing for others— transcends the biological struggle for existence revealing in such a way the rich world of culture that gives right to assert his unique role in the nature. On the other hand, man still remains the element of nature, by the corporeality subordinated to its physical and biological rules. Taking this fact into account, we are not permitted to speak about the absolute transcendence of man over nature but only about relative one. The latter consists in the biological bond of man with the rest of nature and his cultural openness toward supernatural values.There is also methodologically accepted confirmation for the thesis concerning the coexistence of physical continuity with ontological discontinuity in the evolutionary interpretation of nature. The ontological thesis surely can’t be definitively justified. Therefore, the opposite thesis will be also able to enlist new sympathisers. On the one hand, they would come from the groups that don’t acknowledge the difference between ontological and scientific form of evolutionism; on the other, they would occur among the thinkers capable of the future formulation of a new version of monism making the contemporary opposition between materialism and spiritualism totally pointless.Apart from above mentioned aspects of the debate, the statement emphasizing that man transcends nature is still being criticized by some intellectual circles depending on methodological presuppositions or ontological declarations. Nevertheless, the basic problem of these explanations consists in the lack of an interpretation of features of the human psyche, adequate to the actual data, that express the relative autonomy of the contents of the human psyche in reference to biological determinants.
46. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 1
Zbigniew Kaźmierczak Zbigniew Kaźmierczak
A Trial of Interpretation of Meister Eckhart’s Thought on God and Man through the Analysis of Its Paradoxes
Próba Interpretacji Myśli Eckharta O Bogu I Człowieku Poprzez Analizę Jej Paradoksów

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This article interprets Eckhart’s contradictions by presenting them as a result of an existential search for salvific power. It is shown that power is ambivalent in nature: it is the power of what is and the power of (self)overcoming (of what is). Just because power is in itself ambivalent and the process of searching for it existentialist (so not completely conscious), Eckhart’s mystical texts are full of contradictions and the German mystic is apparently not aware of it. The sample of them is shown in this article with regard to his ideas on God and man. Three other interpretations of Eckhart’s (“apophatic,” “educational,” “methodological”) are presented and argued against.
47. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Przemysław Gut Przemysław Gut
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: An Intellectual Portrait
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

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The aim of this paper is to set out the following: firstly, the most important facts from Leibniz’s biography; secondly, the position of Leibniz’s philosophy within the philosophical thought of the 17th century; thirdly, the diverse ways to explicate Leibniz’s philosophical thought that are still in use in literature today; fourthly, basic features which define the general spirit as well as the methods ofLeibniz’s philosophizing.
48. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Krystyna Krauze-Błachowicz Krystyna Krauze-Błachowicz
Content Analysis of the Demonstration of the Existence of God Proposed by Leibniz in 1666
Analiza Treściowa „Dowodu Na Istnienie Boga” Zaproponowanego Przez Leibniza W 1666 Roku

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Leibniz’s juvenile work De arte combinatoria of 1666 included the “Proof for the Existence of God.” This proof bears a mathematical character and is constructed in line with Euclid’s pattern. I attempted to logically formalize it in 1982. In this text, on the basis of then analysis and the contents of the proof, I seek to show what concept of substance Leibniz used on behalf of the proof. Besides, Leibnizian conception of the whole and part as well as Leibniz’s definitional method have been reconstructed here.
49. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Martyna Koszkało Martyna Koszkało
Scholastic Sources of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s Treatise Disputatio metaphysica deprincipio individui
Scholastyczne Źródła Traktatu Gottfryda Wilhelma Leibniza Disputatio Metaphysica Deprincipioindividui

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The object of this article is the scholastic inspirations found in the metaphysical disputation De principio individui by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The purpose ofthis study was, on one hand, a reconstruction of Leibniz’s theory concerning the principle of individuation, and on the other hand, a presentation of some texts by medieval scholastic authors (Henry of Ghent, Peter of Falco, Thomas Aquinas, Aegidius of Rome, Robert Kilwardby, William of Ockham) to whose ideas Leibniz refers in the named work, even though he had, for the most part, only second-hand information concerning them. In his juvenile treatise, Leibniz states that the individuating principle has to be universal, which means relevant to all kinds of being; it has to be metaphysical in character and not merely epistemological. He regards individuality as synonymous with unity combined with difference. He resolutely takes sides with nominalism and rejects the reality of all kinds of universal beings and beings whose unity is weaker than numerical unity. As a consequence of this assumption, he rejects the conceptions in which the principle of individuation is formed by: double negation, existence or the haecceity. By contrast, he embraces the solution (close to the tradition originated by Ockham and also related to Suarez), according to which the whole entity (tota entitas) of an individual thing is the principle of individuation. In effect, for Leibniz, any real thing is simply singular, which comes down to the thesis that a thing is singular owing to its own metaphysical subcomponents, which are singular by themselves.
50. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Przemysław Gut Przemysław Gut
Leibniz: Personal Identity and Sameness of Substance
Leibniz — Osobowa Identyczność I Tożsamość Substancji

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Leibniz’s theory of personal identity has been the object of numerous discussions and various interpretations. In the paper I contrast my view on Leibniz’s solution to the problem of personal identity with the view of Margaret Wilson and Samuel Scheffler. They both claimed that Leibniz failed to formulate a coherent, uniform and tenable theory of personal identity. His stance - as they state - contains so many inconsistencies that it cannot be adopted as a satisfactory solution to this problem. I disagree with this opinion. It is my conviction that a more inquisitive analysis of Leibniz’s texts leads to the conclusion that such severe criticism of the results of Leibniz’s studies of personal identity is ill-founded. My paper consists of two parts. In the first part— drawing on suggestions made by Vailati, Thiel, Noonan, and Bobro—I attempt to present the essential arguments against the interpretation offered by M. Wilson and S. Scheffler. In the second part I address two issues. First, I try to discuss the reasons which Leibniz listed to support his thesis that personal identity requires both the continuity of substance and the continuity of some psychological phenomena. Then, I turn to identifying Leibniz’s arguments which support the thesis that what ultimately provides a person with identity is their substantial principle, i.e. the soul or “I.”