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Displaying: 41-50 of 865 documents

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41. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 16
Thomas Carson “Comments on Brandt’s Paper”
42. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 16
Timothy W. Bartel Like Us in All Things, Apart from Sin?
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A great many philosophers and theologians have recently maintained that we ought to adopt the following interpretation of the Christian Church’s proclamation that Jesus Christ is perfectly human and perfectly divine:(1) The one person Jesus Christ has every essential property of the kind humanity and every essential property of the kind divinity,where F is an essential property of a kind k just in case there is no possible world in which something belongs to k yet lacks F. I argue that these writers need to do much more work if they are to convince us that their view is rationally preferable to rival interpretations of traditional Christology. To be specific, they must try to persuade us that (1) plays an indispensable rôle in our best available explanation of how Christ’s life, death, and resurrection atone for our sins.
43. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 16
Terence Horgan, Mark Timmons New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth
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There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to (most) moral questions, and the possibility of knowing those answers. In the last decade, moral realism has re-entered the philosophical ring in powerful-looking naturalistic form. ln this paper we provide a dialectical overview: we situate the new wave position itself, and also our objections to it, in the context of the evolving program of philosophical naturalism in 20th century analytic philosophy. We seek to show that although this new contender might initially look like championship material, it succumbs to punches surprisingly similar to those that knocked out the old-fashioned versions of naturalist moral realism.
44. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 16
John Langan Egoism and Mortality in the Teleology of Thomas Aquinas
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Aquinas holds that human actions are directed to a last end which is the supreme good and the complete satisfaction of the agent’s desires. He confronts serious difficulties in explaining how morally wrong or sinful choices and renunciatory acts are possible and in avoiding psychological egoism. The distinction that he makes between the concept of the last end as the fulfillment of desire and the object (God) in which that ful fillment is found enables him to alleviate these difficulties but still leaves him with a predominantly instrumental view of morality.
45. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 16
John Heil Introduction
46. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 16
Frederick Adams Audi on Structural Justification
47. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 16
Dan D. Crawford On Having Reasons for Perceptual Beliefs: A Sellarsian Perspective
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I interpret and defend Sellars’ intemalist view of perceptual justification which argues that perceivers have evidence for their perceptual beliefs that includes a higher-order belief about the circumstances in which those beliefs arise, and an epistemic belief about the reliability of beliefs that are formed in those circumstances. The pattem of inference that occurs in ordinary cases of perception is elicited.I then defend this account of perceptual evidence against 1) AIston’s objection that ordinary perceivers are not as critical and reflective as this view requires them to be; and 2) the charge that intemalism leads to various forms of infinite regress and circular reasoning. It is granted that subjects must have further grounds for their justifying reasons, and an attempt is made to identify these second-order reasons. In particular, I argue that epistemic beliefs are grounded in the perceiver’s awareness that his present experience-cum-conditions fits into a larger pattem of similar past experiences that were reliably connected with their objects.
48. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 16
Susan Leigh Anderson Equal Opportunity, Freedom and Sex-Stereotyping
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Michael Levin, in Feminism and Freedom, argues that sex-stereotyping is inevitable and legitimate since there are innate non-anatomical differences between the sexes. He, further, believes that sex-stereotyping is compatible with members of both sexes acting freely and having equal opportunity in the job market and other areas of life. I will attack both claims, but I will particularly concentrate on the second one. I believe that Levin is only able to make his view sound plausible because of his minimal definitions of “freedom” and “equal opportunity” which I shall argue are not acceptable. The result of his mistake is that he presents us with a false dilemma: We must choose between either a Libertarian ideal---which includes freedom, equal opportunity, the inevitable sex-stereotyping and resulting patriarchal society (since it cannot be eliminated voluntarily)---and Feminism---which denies the legitimacy of sex-stereotyping, insists that unequal outcome means inequality of opportunity and so supports a quota system, and attempts to accomplish its aims, at great cost, by depriving people of freedom.
49. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 16
Anthony Cunningham Liberalism, Egalité, Fraternité?
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This essay attempts to assess recent communitarian charges that liberalism cannot provide for genuine bonds of community or fraternity. Along with providing an analysis of fraternity, I argue that there is more common ground here than supposed by communitarians and l iberals alike. Communitarians often fail to see that liberal concerns for liberty and equality function as substantive constraints on the moral worth of fraternal bonds. On the other hand, insofar as liberals ignore fraternity, or see it as a purely derivative ideal, they too make an important error.
50. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 16
Robert Audi Structural Justification
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This paper introduces and explicates a concept of justification not so far adequately treated in the epistemological literature. Structural justification for believing a proposition, p, is a kind implicit in one’s cognitive structure; it contrasts with (1) doxastic justification---justifiedly believing p; (2) situational justification---being justified in believing p (which is possible without believing it); and (3) propositional justification---the kind attributable to propositions for which suitable evidence is available. Structural justification is within one’s reach, but, unlike situational justification, not in one’s hands: one can construct a justification for p by reflecting on, say, one’s beliefs and memories, but does not already have that justification in an integrated form, as where one already believes premises that obviously entail p. Structural justification is accessible, however, through a justificatory path, and much of this paper is an account of the various kinds of path. The concluding section generalizes the notion of structural justification both to the other psychological attitudes---such as desires, intentions, and values---and to actions.