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41. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Adrian-Paul Iliescu Rational Reconstruction: Preconditions and Limits
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The aim of this paper is to investigate the preconditions and the limits of rational reconstruction in the philosophy of language, as these preconditions and limits can be deduced from Wittgenstein’s arguments against philosophical constructivism. It will be shown that a main precondition of reconstructions in the field of language is the existence of non-arbitrary patterns of linguistic use, while the limits of this kind of theoretical enterprise derive precisely from the absence of such patterns.
42. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Ilie Parvu Editorial Introduction
43. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Valentin Muresan Transcendentalism, Nomicity and Modal Thought
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The main purpose of this paper is to show that Kant’s transcendental philosophy is tacitly laden with the structures of modern modal thought. More exactly, the surprising parallelism which seems to exist between Kant’s manner of defining necessity (and, on this basis, nomicity) and the modern approaches of the same concepts in the frame of “possible worlds philosophy” is stressed. A new interpretation of the Categorical Imperative is also offered on this basis.
44. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Didier Dubois, Henri Prade New Trends and Open Problems in Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning
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This short paper about fuzzy set-based approximate reasoning first emphasizes the three main semantics for fuzzy sets: similarity, preference and uncertainty. The difference between truth-functional many-valued logics of vague or gradual propositions and non fully compositional calculi such as possibilistic logic (which handles uncertainty) or similarity logics is stressed. Then, potentials of fuzzy set-based reasoning methods are briefly outlined for various kinds of approximate reasoning: deductive reasoning about flexible constraints, reasoning under uncertainty and inconsistency, hypothetical reasoning, exception-tolerant plausible reasoning using generic knowledge, interpolative reasoning, and abductive reasoning (under uncertainty). Open problems are listed in the conclusion.
45. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
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46. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Enric Trillas Menger’s Trace in Fuzzy Logic
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This paper deals with the relation with Fuzzy Logic of some of the ideas of Karl Menger published between 1942 and 1966 and concerning what he called “Hazy Sets”, Probabilistic Relations and Statistical Metric Spaces. The author maintains the opinion that if Lofti A. Zadeh is actually the father of Fuzzy Logic, Menger not only was a forerunner of this field but that his ideas were and still are influential on it.
47. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO DEL VOL. XI / CONTENTS OF VOL. XI
48. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Ilie Parvu The Unity of Scientific Knowledge in the Framework of a Typological Approach of Theories
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The paper proposes a typology of the scientific theories based on the modality of mathematizing (relying on the kind of mathematics which participates to the theory edification and the level of mathematical organizing of the theoretical frame). This gives us, like the classification of the geometries from the famous -Erlagen Program- initiated by Felix Klein, an internal principle for the connection of the different forms or levels of the theorizing, a constructive basis for the understanding of the complex structural nets of the mature scientific disciplines.
49. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Adrian Miroiu Global Warming and Moral Theorizing
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The aim of my paper is to explore in some detail some epistemological issues concerning moral theorizing on global warming. First, I consider the issue of the structure of the theoretical approach in a field of inquiry requiring normative assessments. How do theoretical principles work here? What is to be regarded as a normative evidence for such a theory? Second, the criteria to determine which part, if any, of the theory gets normatively constrained, and which does not, are discussed. Third, I focus on the procedures to reach an equilibrium between such a theory and its evidence and to reach it, changes might be required on the normative side of the theory, rather than on its non-normative one
50. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Mircea Flonta Does the Scientific Paper Accurately Mirror the Very Grounds of Scientific Assessment?
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This paper presents aprevalent representation about the objectivity and impartiality of scientific knowledge that emerges from the structure and style of the standard research paper. This representation is critically examined considering some rather untypical scientific papers reporting controversies between researchers in a certain field of experimental science. The role of personal preconceptions and intellectual prejudices in the assessment of scientific theories is emphasized by reference to Einsteinls grounds for his general theory of relativity.
51. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Francisco Rodriguez Consuegra Nominal definitions and logical consequence in the Peano School
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This paper is devoted to show the development of some of the model-theoretic ideas which are clearly present in the main members of the Peano school (Peano himself, Burali-Forti, Pieri and Padoa) asa result of their conception of nominal definitions. Also, their semantic definition of logical consequence (Pieri, Padoa) is viewed as one of the outcomes of that conception. Some examples of their use of theexpression “nominal definition” are presented first. Second, the main advantages of this kind of definition, as they saw them, are briefly explained, mainly in a philosophical context. Finally, already in the kernel of the paper, some of the details of the model-theoretic view itself are shown, first in Peano, then in Pieri and Padoa, including in both cases some study of their semantic definitions of logicalconsequence.
52. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Gregory H. Moore Hilbert and the emergence of modern mathematical logic
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Hilbert’s unpublished 1917 lectures on logic, analyzed here, are the beginning of modern metalogic. In them he proved the consistency and Post-completeness (maximal consistency) of propositional logic -results traditionally credited to Bernays (1918) and Post (1921). These lectures contain the first formal treatment of first-order logic and form the core of Hilbert’s famous 1928 book with Ackermann. What Bernays, influenced by those lectures, did in 1918 was to change the emphasis from the consistency and Post-completeness of a logic to its soundness and completeness: a sentence is provable if and only if valid. By 1917, strongly influenced by PM, Hilbert accepted the theory of types and logicism -a surprising shift. But by 1922 he abandoned the axiom of reducibility and then drew back from logicism, returning to his 1905 approach of trying to prove the consistency of number theory syntactically.
53. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
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54. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
José Ferreiros Notes on types, sets, and logicism, 1930-1950
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The present paper is a contribution to the history of logic and its philosophy toward the mid-20th century. It examines the interplay between logic, type theory and set theory during the 1930s and 40s, before the reign of first-order logic, and the closely connected issue of the fate of logicism. After a brief presentation of the emergence of logicism, set theory, and type theory (with particular attention to Carnap and Tarski), Quine’s work is our central concern, since he was seemingly the most outstanding logicist around 1940, though he would shortly abandon that viewpoint and promote first-order logic as all of logic. Quine’s class-theoretic systems NF and ML, and his farewell to logicism, are examined. The last section attempts to summarize the motives why set theory was preferred to other systems, and first orderlogic won its position as the paradigm logic system after the great War.
55. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Volker Peckhaus The way of logic into mathematics
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Using a contextual method the specific development of logic between c. 1830 and 1930 is explained. A characteristic mark of this period is the decomposition of the complex traditional philosophical omnibus discipline logic into new philosophical subdisciplines and separate disciplines such as psychology, epistemology, philosophy of science, and formal (symbolic, mathematical) logic. In the 19th century a growing foundational need in mathematics provoked the emergence of a structural view on mathematics and the reformulation of logic for mathematical means. As a result formallogic was taken over by mathematics in the beginning of the 20th century as is shown by sketching the German example.
56. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Ignacio Jane Theoremhood and logical consequence
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In this paper, Tarskis notion of Logical Consequence is viewed as a special case of the more general notion of being a theorem of an axiomatic theory. As was recognized by Tarski, the material adequacy of his definition depends on having the distinction between logical and non logical constants right, but we find Tarskis analysis persuasive even if we dont agree on what constants are logical. This accords with the view put forward in this paper that Tarski indeed captures the more inclusive notion of theoremhood in an axiomatic theory. The approach to logical consequence via axiomatic theories leads us to grant centrality to inference schemas rather than to full-fledged arguments and to view the logically valid schemas as a subclass of generally valid schemas.
57. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Stuart Silvers Nonreductive Naturalism
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Nonreductive naturalism holds that we can preserve the (scientifically valued) metaphysical truth of physicalism while averting the methodological mistakes of reductionism. Acceptable scientificexplanation need not (in some cases cannot and in many cases, should not) be formulated in the language of physical science. Persuasive arguments about the properties of phenomenal consciousnesspurport to show that physicalism is false, namely that phenomenal experience is a nonphysical fact. I examine two recent, comprehensive efforts to naturalize phenomenal consciousness and argue thatnonreductive naturalism yields a dilemma of reductionism or panpsychism.
58. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
AGENDA / NOTEBOOK
59. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero Putnam’s Dewey Lectures
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This paper points out several difficulties to understand Putnam’s views in his recent “Dewey Lectures”, which involve a certain move away from his “internal realism”. The main goal is to set into relief tensions in Putnam’s thinking probably provoked by his philosophical development. Two such tensions are touched upon. In the first place, Putnam wants to reject an account of phenomenal consciousness (sensory experience in particular) he had subscribed to during his realist times, which he calls “Cartesianism cum Materialism”, CM. He puts forward what he takes to be an alternative, apparently based on the traditional Chisholmian “Theory of Appearing”. The paper suggest firstly that, in view of the facts to be accounted for, a theory along those lines cannot count as a real alternative to CM. In the second part, the paper develops an analogous tension between the views on truth Putnam seems to be willing to defend in the Dewey Lectures, and previous criticisms of the semantic conception of truth by hirn that heclaims still to be willing to subscribe.
60. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
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