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41. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
George Heffernan The Paradox of Objectless Presentations in Early Phenomenology: A Brief History of the Intentional Object from Bolzano to Husserl With Concise Analyses of the Positions of Brentano, Frege, Twardowski and Meinong
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This paper explores the close connection in early phenomenology between the problem of objectless presentations and the concept of intentional objects. It clarifies how this basic concept of Husserl’s early phenomenology emerged within the horizons of Bolzano’s logical objectivism, Brentano’s descriptive psychology, Frege’s mathematical logicism, Twardowski’s psychological representationalism, and Meinong’s object theory. It shows how in collaboration with these thinkers Husserl argued that a theory of intentionality is incomplete without a concept of the intentional object. It provides a brief history of the concept of intentional objects in the philosophical logic of the nineteenth century that demonstrates its relevance to the problem of objectless presentations in the early phenomenology of the twentieth century. It suggests that Husserl accepts Bolzano’s objectivism and Frege’s logicism, rejects Brentano’s conception of immanent objects and Twardowski’s notion of representational pictures, and ignores Meinong’s theory of objects. Thus the paper employs the formation of Husserl’s concept of the intentional object to enhance the understanding of the historical and philosophical relationships between early phenomenology and contemporaneous philosophical movements.
42. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Hynek Janoušek Judgmental Force and Assertion in Brentano and Early Husserl
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The goal of the present article is to describe the Brentanian background of several topics concerning judgments and assertions in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Why did Husserl abandon Brentano’s theory of two judgmental forces? Is the “is true/false” to be understood as an expression of judgmental force or as a logical predication? Is a “common expression” of the objective validity of judgment equivalent with our expression of our belief in that validity? Does the linguistic sign of the logical force manifest this force or not? In order to provide a better understanding of Husserl’s approach, the paper also discusses his earlier views on these issues in recently published manuscripts from the early 1890s and in his Logic Lectures from the year 1896.
43. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Marek Pokropski Leopold Blaustein’s Critique of Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content
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The aim of this article is to introduce the work of Leopold Blaustein — philosopher and psychologist, who studied under Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov and under Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. In his short academic career Blaustein developed an original philosophy that drew upon both phenomenology and Twardowski’s analytical approach. One of his main publications concerns Husserl’s early theory of intentional act and object, introduced in Logische Untersuchungen. In the first part of the article I briefly present Blaustein’s biography and some general features of his philosophy. The second part provides an overview of Blaustein’s dissertation concerning Husserl’s early phenomenology. In the third and final part I summarize Blaustein’s research, including the critical remarks of Roman Ingarden.
44. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Christian Y. Dupont Jean Héring and the Introduction of Husserl’s Phenomenology to France
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The contributions of Alsatian philosopher and theologian Jean Héring (1890–1966) to the early reception of Husserl’s phenomenology in France have been recognized by Spiegelberg, Monseu, and others. This essay probes and elucidates certain historical details to a greater degree than previous studies and also calls attention to the philosophical influences that Héring transmitted to his contemporaries, focusing in particular on his encounters with Emmanuel Levinas and Lev Shestov. It argues that while Héring’s role in facilitating the introduction of Levinas and others to Husserl was important, his more significant contributions consisted in analysing and correcting Levinas’s and Shestov’s appraisals of Husserl’s teachings.
45. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Daniele De Santis Wesen, Eidos, Idea Remarks on the “Platonism” of Jean Héring and Roman Ingarden
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In this paper we will be discussing the “Platonism” of two former Göttingen students of Husserl, notably Jean Héring and Roman Ingarden. By “Platonism” we mean not simply an account of the diff erence between individuals and Forms. We mean a peculiar insight into what Ingarden explicitly designates as “the content of Ideas”. Our primary concern is to emphasize a major shift in Plato’s treatment of Forms: we will see Plato switching the focus of his investigation from the difference between the visible world of bodies and the invisible realm of Forms to the internal structure of the Forms themselves. We will then discuss Héring’s Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee and Ingarden’s Essentiale Fragen in order to explain the diff erence betweenthe notions of individual essence, morphe, essentiality (or eidos) and Idea.
46. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Michele Averchi The Disinterested Spectator: Geiger’s and Husserl’s Place in the Debate on the Splitting of the Ego
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Moritz Geiger developed an original phenomenological account of the splitting of the Ego (Ichspaltung) in two papers, written in 1911 and 1913. Husserl read the 1911 paper as he was working on preliminary manuscripts to Ideas I. The first part of Husserl’s comments focused precisely on the splitting of the Ego. In this paper I will answer three questions: (1.) What is the historical-philosophical context of Geiger’s and Husserl’s discussion on the splitting of the ego? (2.) What are the phenomenological features of the splitting of the ego? (3.) What is the relevance of Geiger’s account of the splitting of the ego, for the further development of Husserl’s phenomenology? Reading Geiger was, indeed, the first occasion in which Husserl started to develop his own phenomenological account of the splitting of the ego. This will prove itself to be crucial for his mature analyses on the phenomenological reduction, as Husserl will distinguish more clearly between reflection and splitting of the ego.
47. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Dalius Jonkus Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness and the Unconscious (Moritz Geiger and Vasily Sesemann)
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This paper deals with the approach to self-consciousness and the unconscious found in the work of Moritz Geiger and the little known philosopher Vasily Sesemann. The aim of this presentation is to provide an account of Sesemann’s disagreement with Geiger regarding the concept of unconsciousness as well as to introduce his phenomenological explanation of the nonobjectifying self-consciousness. The first part of this paper explores Geiger’s concept of unconsciousness. The second part is concerned with Sesemann’s conception of the non-objectifying self-consciousness and its relation to the unconscious. The last part of this paper argues that Sesemann’s concept of selfawareness is similar to the concept of self-consciousness developed by Husserl in his phenomenology.
48. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Alessandro Salice Actions, Values, and States of Affairs in Hildebrand and Reinach
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The present article discusses Dietrich von Hildebrand’s theory of action as presented in his Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung (1916), and focuses on the moral relevance Hildebrand assigns to diff erent kinds of motivations. The act of will which leads to a moral action, Hildebrand claims, can be “founded” or “motivated” in different ways and, in particular, it can be motivated by an act of cognizing (Erkennen) or by an act of value-taking (Wertnehmen). The act of cognizing grasps the state of aff airs that the action strives to bring about as a deontic state of aff airs, i.e., as a state of aff airs that ought to be. By contrast, the act of value-taking is primarily directed towards the values inhering in this state of aff airs. Although both kinds of motivations are morally sound, Hildebrand argues that the latter is preferable due to its vicinity to values and to its immediacy in the way in which it grasps values. In what follows, Hildebrand’s view is reconstructed, assessed and evaluated against the background of Adolf Reinach’s theory of intentionality. More specifically, two elements of Reinach’s thought are highlighted as being central for Hildebrand’s understanding of the notion of an action. First, it is argued that Hildebrand’s idea of the act of willing as a stance (Stellungnahme) that can be founded either by an act of cognizing or by an act of presentation is developed in strict symmetry with Reinach’s view that conviction is a stance that can be founded by means of an identical mechanism. Secondly, it will be shown that Hildebrand adopts the notion of a state of affairs (Sachverhalt) from Reinach.
49. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski Reinach’s Theory of Social Acts
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Some forty years before J.L. Austin, Adolf Reinach developed a highly articulated theory of speech acts. In this paper I present Reinach’s theory, and show some similarities and differences between his approach and the nowadays standard approaches, derived from Austin and Searle. Reinach’s work contains in fact all the cornerstones of the speech act theory. Still when comparing his theory with these contemporary approaches we can find at least two important differences. The first difference concerns what Reinach called the “primitive legal powers,” and what he construed as a part of the metaphysical essence of a person. The second one is that in Reinach’s theory we find a clear distinction between conventional normativity, originating from our performative intentionality, and genuine moral normativity, based on the intrinsic values of certain states of affairs.
50. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Francesca De Vecchi Edith Stein’s Social Ontology of the State, the Law and Social Acts: An Eidetic Approach
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In her Investigation Concerning the State (1925), Edith Stein takes up some of the main ideas of the social ontology presented by Adolf Reinach (1913), and develops a social ontology of the state, of the law and of social acts. I argue that Stein’s social ontology is an eidetics of the state, the law and social acts. Stein identifies the essential relations that constitute the state, the law and social acts, i.e. pinpoints the parts upon which the state, the law and social acts existentially depend as wholes. In doing so, Stein applies Husserl’s account of wholes and parts to the social domain. I also suggest that Stein outlines a regional ontology of sociality that embodies Husserl’s idea of regional ontology. I focus on the intertwining of the wholes-parts relations, which characterize Stein’s regional ontology of sociality, and argue that there are not only necessary but also possible parts within the wholes. This makes Stein’s regional ontology of the sociality a dynamic ontology.