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41. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1973 > Issue: 3
Catherine D. Rau The Artist's Intention and G.E.M. Anscombe's Intention
42. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1973 > Issue: 3
Robert L. Martin Ayer on Sense and Reference
43. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1973 > Issue: 3
Martin A. Bertman Pain
44. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2005 > Issue: 30
Francisco Calvo Garzón Francisco Calvo Garzón
Game-Theoretical Semantics and Referential Inscrutability
賽局理論語意學與指涉之 不可測度說

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This paper consists of two parts. First, (i) I shall consider two defences of Quine´s polemical Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference put forward by Hookway (1988), and Calvo Garzón (2000a; 2000b), respectively. Then, (ii) I shall consider an extension of Quine´s succinct behavioural criteria of Radical Translationsuggested by Hintikka´s Game-Theoretical Semantics (1973; 1976). I shall argue that Hintikka´s semantics suggest behavioural criteria which we can use to constrain perverse semantic theories. In particular, I shall try to show that whilst Hintikka´s behavioural data tells against Hookway´s proposal, it reveals, nonetheless, a reason as to why my proposed perverse semantic theory enjoys the same priviledged status that a standard semantic theory is supposed toenjoy.
45. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2005 > Issue: 30
Aysel Doğan Aysel Doğan
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities and Causal Determination
其他可能性原則與因果決定論

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Some compatibilists believe that the principle of alternative possibilities has been shown to be false by Frankfurt-style arguments, and this gives way to the compatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. Those incompatibilists who defend the principle of alternative possibilities, on the other hand, insist on the truth of the principle and on the incompatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. In this article, I argue that Frankfurt-stylecounterexamples are unsuccessful in indicating the falsity of the principle of alternative possibilities, and yet this failure is inconclusive to prove the correctness of incompatibilism. In fact, the principle of alternative possibilities is, I show, compatible with causal determination and thus with compatibilism on a specificunderstanding of determinism and compatibilism.
46. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2007 > Issue: 34
Caleb Y. Liang 梁益堉 *
Conceptualism and Phenomenal Character
概念論與現象特性

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Consider two of the central debates in the contemporary philosophy of mind: the debate between representationalism and anti-representationalism about phenomenal character, and the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism about the content of experience. The former, the qualia debate, centers on whether the phenomenal character of conscious experience is exhausted by its representational content. The latter is about whether conceptual capacities are constitutive of the representational content of perceptual experience such that the only kind of content that perceptual experience possesses is conceptual content. Most philosophers consider these two debates as unrelated, or at least should be treated separately. In this paper, I argue that there is an obvious and important sense in which the two issues are related. More specifically, if one accepts conceptualism, it would impose a significant constraint on what position one is allowed to take in the qualia debate. First, I suggest that once it is made clear that conceptualism can be considered as a particular version of representationalism, the conceptualist would have to take a certain stance on whether there are nonintentional qualia. The reason why the conceptualist needs to worry about the qualia issue is that if in addition to intentional content perceptual experiences also contain nonintentional qualia as constituents, then perceptual experiences cannot be fully conceptual. Second, I argue that although in McDowellian conceptualism the content of perceptual experience is construed in terms of Fregean sense rather than internal mental representation, it still faces challenges from the Inverted Earth argument against representationalism. My goal is not to show that conceptualism fails, but to show that it is a serious issue that the defenders of conceptualism have to take into consideration.
47. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2007 > Issue: 34
Melissa Zinkin Melissa Zinkin
Kant’s Concept of Force: Empiricist or Rationalist?
康德之力的概念: 經驗論者或理性論者?

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This paper explores Kant's account of force, a topic that was of central philosophical concern in his day, but which he does not explicitly address in any of his Critiques. Just as with the nature of space and time and the nature of the human will, the nature of force was under dispute by the philosophers and natural scientists to whose legacy Kant was responding. Yet, Kant does not make force an explicit topic of his Critiques, and thus provides no explicit transcendental account of force. Nevertheless, I will argue that one can indeed find in Kant a transcendental account of force, one that is a synthesis of empiricist and rationalist accounts, but in an unexpected place; the third Critique, in the discussion of the principle of purposiveness
48. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2010 > Issue: 39
Chung-Kee Lee 李仲 驥
From Aquinas’ Analogy to Ian Ramsey’s Models and Disclosures – the Possibility of Religious Language Then and Now
從阿奎那的類比法到藍聖恩的 「模型」與「揭示」 ──宗教語言可能性的古與今

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The search for a proper language for God-talk is a perennial task in theology as well as in philosophy. From times of antiquity, the use of analogy was employed in different realms of knowledge. Yet it was not until the medieval era, primarily through the effort of Thomas Aquinas, that analogy was used extensively in religious discourse. However, Thomistic analogy was not accepted by all. The contention between univocal and analogical use of words was never settled. The contemporary scene adds further fuel to the debate. Logical positivism claims that God-talk is totally meaningless, as truth claims can never be established in such a domain. And some critics say that religion belongs to the world of the ‘un-sayable’ and silence is the only response. The situation demands an urgent response from the side of the religious thinkers, and Ian Ramsey, previous Nolloth professor of Philosopy of Christian Religion at Oxford University, has taken up the task to face this challenge. Ramsey’s job is twofold. First, he is of course concerned with defending religious discourse against such philosophical critiques. At the same time, he is eager to show how theological apologetics could actually benefit from the tenets of Logical Empiricism. His method of ‘models’ and‘disclosures’ is used to demonstrate the empirical relevance of religious language. Such approach also reveals that religious discourses do containsomething more than the narrowness of meaning and truth set down by the logical empiricists. The purpose of this paper is to place Aquinas’ analogyside by side with Ramsey’s models approach and see how they compare and contrast each other. Specifically, we will see how these approaches haveroughly the same dynamics of going from what is seen to what is unseen in talking about God. We will also see how the two projects differ owing to a fundamental difference in their ontology.
49. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1981 > Issue: 4
Paui Yu On Theories of Reference
50. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1981 > Issue: 4
Po-wen Kuo On Arthur Danto's Criticism of the Speculative Philosophy of History