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41. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Zdenka Brzović The Species problem: A Philosophical analysis (Studies in Philosophy and Biology)
42. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Dunja Jutronić Kako bi trebali govoriti hrvatski magarci? O sociolingvistici animiranih filmova (How should Croatian donkeys speak? Sociolinguistics of animated films)
43. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Tea Logar “Diagnostic Hedonism” and the Role of Incommensurability in Plato’s Protagoras
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The dispute over Socrates’ apparent endorsement of hedonism in the Protagoras has persisted for ages among scholars and students of Plato’s work. The solution to the query concerning the seriousness and sincerity of Socrates’ argument from hedonism established in the dialogue is of considerable importance for the interpretation of Plato’s overall moral theory, considering how blatantly irreconcilable the defense of this doctrine is with Plato’s other early dialogues. In his earlier works, Socrates puts supreme importance on virtue and perfection of the soul, so the puzzle apparent in the Protagoras merits a thorough examination.Several scholars have argued that, since Socrates’ defense of hedonism in this work clashes significantly with his views on morality in other dialogues, Socrates must only have been defending hedonism ironically, or with the intention of “diagnosing” his opponent’s point of view. In this paper, I examine the approaches according to which Socrates didn’t in fact mean to defend hedonism, but merely used it as a diagnostic tool; I argue that there is no compelling evidence for this resolution of Socrates’ defense of hedonism, and that the views that attempt to defend it really have no convincing grounds for it apart from the desire to reconcile the Protagoras with other Socratic dialogues.
44. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
John Collins How Long Can a Sentence Be and Should Anyone Care?
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It is commonly assumed that natural languages, construed as sets of sentences, contain denumerably many sentences. One argument for this claim is that the sentences of a language must be recursively enumerable by a grammar, if we are to understand how a speaker-hearer could exhibit unbounded competence in a language. The paper defends this reasoning by articulating and defending a principle that excludes the construction of a sentence non-denumerably many words long.
45. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Guido Melchior Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge
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Closure is the principle that a person, who knows a proposition p and knows that p entails q, also knows q. Closure is usually regarded as expressing the commonplace assumption that persons can increase their knowledge through inference from propositions they already know. In this paper, I will not discuss whether closure as a general principle is true. The aim of this paper is to explore the various relations between closure and knowledge through inference. I will show that closure can hold for two propositions p and q for numerous different reasons. The standard reason that S knows q through inference from p, if S knows p and knows that p entails q, is only one of them. Therefore, the relations between closure and inferential knowledge are more complex than one might suspect.
46. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Alun Davies Occasional Domains: Some Remarks on Stanley’s Variable
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Jason Stanley has proposed that we can account for the effects of extralinguistic context on truth-conditional content whilst remaining loyal to a compositional semantics for natural language. This is possible, he argues, because there are covert variables present in the logical forms of certain sentences whose values are fixed relative to contexts, but which do not register in the overt structure of those sentences. In the present article I assess the plausibility of positing such variables in logical form, focusing particularly on the examples Stanley provides in order to corroborate their presence. I argue that these examples are apt for an alternative treatment than that offered by Stanley—one which does not make recourse to covert variables, and is hence more credible. I end by spelling out some consequences of this argument for Stanley’s proposal.
47. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Table of Contents of Vol. X
48. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Hanoch Ben-Yami Could Sherlock Holmes Have Existed?
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In Naming and Necessity Kripke argued against the possible existence of fictional characters. I show that his argument is invalid, analyze the confusion it involves, and explain why the view that fictional characters could not have existed is implausible.
49. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Nenad Miščević, Dunja Jutronić Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Ten year anniversary
50. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Marko Jurjako From Reasons to Norms: On the Basic Question in Ethics