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31. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Karel Novotný L’ouverture du champs phénoménal : la donation ou l’interprétation ?: Sur le problème de l’apparaitre comme tel chez Jan Patočka
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Jan Patočka made a tentative to renew phenomenology as an investigation of the appearance as such. This project should not only liberate the phenomenal field from certain « metaphysical closure » imposed on it by the construction of a transcendental subjectivity. The givenness of the sensible world with its possibilities for corporal activity is opposed also to Heidegger’s concepts of understanding and projection as another types of subjectivism. However, in the end, these kinds of « metaphysical closure » seems to be replaced by another one when Patočka looks for the ultimate foundation of the appearance in a « ground of the world ».
32. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Lukas Marcel Vosicky Anders’ Heidegger – Heidegger anders
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The paper discusses the critique of Gunther Anders (1902–1992) against his Doktorvater Heidegger, on the basis of the studies written in Paris and during his American exile in the thirties and forties and published in Uber Heidegger (2001). Long before Sloterdijk, Anders rejected Heidegger’s defence against modern civilisation and technique; on the contrary, it is mankind which technology made “antiquated.” Anders was also the first one who drew the attention to Heidegger’s “pseudo-concreteness” as oblivion of the origins and of the bodily and economic needs: Dasein is “the self-made man as a mystic.” Heidegger kept silence on power mechanisms, and its anti-democratic philosophy is intricately related to the national-socialism. Anders explained the success of Heidegger’s individualistic nihilism in the French existentialism through the basic mistrust caused by the war. In a somewhat similar light may be understood Heidegger’s revival in the post-socialist East European countries.
33. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Marek Maciejczak Terms Denoting Natural Kinds: Prototype’s Effect and Consciousness
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This essay shows links between linguistic (mental) meanings and perception, and proposes that cognitive theories of language acquisition should find some foundation in phenomenological evidence. A need for the sharp distinction between linguistic and extra-linguistic is questioned because regularities of categorization processes, manifested in the meanings of terms denoting natural kinds, are the regularities of perceptual processes and language. In this the role of language as the one and only determinant of the structure of experience is limited. The first part deals with Merleau-Ponty’s theory of immediate perception to show the place for spontaneous normalization and its norms. The second part takes into account a more general view on consciousness in order to show the domain where the connection between perception and language is being created.
34. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
B. M. Mezei Plato, Husserl, and Theistic Intentionality
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In what follows I offer a comparison between two significant instances of the doctrine of intentionality, the view of Plato, and that of Edmund Husserl. My purpose is to show four things. (1) I shall argue that the notion of intentionality goes back to Plato. (2) I argue too that the notion of Platonic intentionality entails the notion of personal intention. (3) While Platonic intentionality is theistic in a certain way, Husserlian intentionality is not. (4) This omission in the Husserlian conception of intentionality is due to an unsolved problem in Husserlian metaphysics.
35. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Victor Molchanov Experience and Fictions: Stream of Consciousness and Hypertrophy of Ego
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The hypertrophy of Ego or “I” is a deformation of experience differentiation, which leads to the formation of the fictive center claiming to rule all of our mental life. The Ego is rather a designation of the lacuna in experience, which represents the hypertrophied unity of consciousness. Husserl’s various attempts to describe the unity of the consciousness in terms of “flux” and “I” (Ego) are instructive for the investigation of the Ego-hypertrophy. The differentiation of fore- and background, whole and parts, and simple and complex are relevant for preventing of any hypertrophy of Ego.
36. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Joona Taipale Perceiving the Other: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on the Genesis of Intersubjectivity
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The Husserlian phenomenology of intersubjectivity has gained increasing interest in recent years. However, some aspects of the traditional interpretation still obstruct the meaning of Husserl’s views and block the access to the phenomenological theme of intersubjectivity. This essay aims to disclose and unravel some of these obstacles.The constitution of the other is still often understood as being, for Husserl, merely a matter of empathy, of a relation between two full-fledged egos. This misreading connects to the interpretation according to which the constitution of the ego is independent of the constitution of the other. It will be argued that both these notions are untenable in the light of Husserl’s writings.
37. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Olga Shparaga Versuch einer kritischen Phänomenologie: Vom produzierten Körper (Foucault) zum sich konstituierenden Leib (Merleau-Ponty) und zurück
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The article explores a formal similarity between two investigations of human body presented by M. Merleau-Ponty and M. Foucault. Considering human body in its relation to space, time and bodily scheme they come to oppositely different conclusions. While Foucault stresses that human body is always in process of production and alienation, Merleau-Ponty argues that it opens the way to self-understanding. In the article I am performing a shift from the Foucauldian analysis to that of Merleau-Ponty and back in order to present a variety of subjects – counter-subject, co-subject, transitive subject – which allows understanding human being beyond metaphysical and social reductionism.
38. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Tatiana Shchyttsova Miteinandersein und generative Erfahrung: philosophisch-anthropologische Implikationen der Fundamentalontologie Heideggers und der Kosmologie Finks
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This essay is devoted to the analysis of the conceptual grounds of Heidegger’s and Fink’s interpretations of the relation between generations as a factical (anthropological) concretization of being-with-one-another. It is shown, that the cosmological teaching of Fink overcomes a systematic negativity of the existential analysis of Heidegger concerning the following questions: 1) what kind of infinity is accessible for human being in its fundamental finitude? 2) how is constituted the authentic being-with-one-another? 3) what kind of attunement is decisive for human being? These three moments are considered in their interconditionality which is clarified in the frame of the phenomenological description of the interrelation between parent and child.
39. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Tamás Ullmann Die zwei Dimensionen des Sinnes
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In the framework of a comparative analysis the article tries to show structural similarities and parallels between Husserl’s phenomenology and Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. The first step is to present their common conviction that the traditional concept of consciousness in the Modernity – based on the concept of “interiority” and that of re-presentation (Abbildung) – is not able to solve the real problems of meaning and experience. The second step is to show that their response to this metaphysical difficulty are not completely different, but have some strange complementarity, based on the concept of rule. Time and rule on one hand, and rule and language-game on the other determine the two different aspects of sense.
40. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Peter Reynaert A Nonrepresentationalist Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness
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The question of a naturalistic explanation of human existence ultimately means naturalizing conscious embodiment. This requires two steps. First we need a sound definition of the socalled phenomenal consciousness that is typical of embodiment. Secondly, we need to clarify the nature of a naturalistic explanation of this phenomenal consciousness. The paper argues that classical phenomenological analyses of embodiment (Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) can be relevant here.Phenomenology’s noetico-noematic analysis can help to distinguish phenomenal consciousness from so-called qualia. In accordance with recent representationalism, qualia are to be understood as phenomenal properties of the perceived object, and are elements of representational or intentional content (noema). Noematic phenomenology of the experience of the lived body further permits an identification of the phenomenal properties of the lived body, and a complementary noetic phenomenology identifies a specific bodily self-awareness as the proper phenomenal consciousness (subjective experience) of embodiment. Phenomenology thus leads to the clarification of several central issues in the actual discussion about the possibility of naturalizing consciousness, and more precisely to a defense of a nonrepresentatonalist conception of phenomenal consciousness. This clarification substantiates the claim for a more radical naturalistic explanation of conscious embodiment.