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31. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 10
Douglas P. Lackey Divine Omniscience and Human Privacy
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This paper argues that there is a conflict between divine omniscience and the human right to privacy. The right to privacy derives from the right to moral autonomy, which human persons possess even against a divine being. It follows that if God exists and persists in knowing all things, his knowledge is a non-justifiable violation of a human right. On the other hand, if God exists and restricts his knowing in deference to human privacy, it follows that he cannot fulfill the traditional function of being the perfect and final judge of all things.
32. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 10
Gary J. Percesepe Telos in Hegel’s Differenz des Ficthe’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie
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The Differenzschrift is Hegel’s first distinctively philosophical work. Traditionally, the chief significance of the work has been said to be its announcement of the breach between Fichte and Schelling. The purpose of the present paper is to move from this proximate perspective to a systematic-teleological perspective. From the latter perspective we can see that it is in the Differenzschrift that Hegel not only criticizes and comprehends the work of his immediate predecessors but also constructs the conceptual-hermeneutic frame which makes his critique possible.Essentially Hegel argues that philosophy-as-science advances by means of text and commentary, but its advance is not continuous. Its history is characterized by violent, epoch-making leaps, which must be viewed as necessary organic constituents of telic progress. The impulse or force behind this telic advance is the concrete historical situation, in Hegel’s words, “the need of the times.”
33. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 10
Claudia M. Murphy Anti-Reductionism and the Mind-Body Problem
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I argue that there are good reasons to deny both type-type and token-token mind-brain identity theories. Yet on the other hand there are compelling reasons for thinking that there is a causal basis for the mind. I argue that a path out of this impasse involves not only showing that criteria of individuation do not determine identity, but also that there are sound methodological reasons for thinking that the cause of intelligent behavior is a real natural kind. Finally, a commitment to this methodology suggests both that these familiar anti-reductionist arguments fail to establish that identity is impossible and at the same time suggest that the preferred alternative will be some version of neutral monism.
34. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 10
Michael W. Howard Worker Control, Self-Respect, and Self-Esteem
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In this paper it is argued that the predominant mode of organization of work in capitalist society undermines the conditions for self-respect and self-esteem. Although no society can guarantee that everyone have self-respect and self-esteem, it is a requirement of justice that a society provide conditions favorable to their development. Worker control is a form of society which can satisfy this requirement, in a manner that is compatible with political democracy and basic liberties, and thus, from the standpoint of justice, is to be preferred to capitalism.
35. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 10
Sander H. Lee Sartre’s Acceptance of the Princple of Universality
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It is claimed, in a recently published introductory text book on ethics, that Jean-Paul Sartre did not accept a principle of universalizability. In this paper, I will briefly demonstrate that Sartre did indeed accept such a principle, and I will support my claim by reference to Sartre’s own words.
36. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 10
Lawrence L. Heintz The Occasional Rightness of Not Following the Requirements of Morality
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Laymen and philosophers alike find it counterintuitive to consent to the assertion that “it is sometimes right not to follow the requirements of morality”. This may be because the conventions of ordinary language do much to encourage the view that “morally ought to do” functions as an equivalent for “what one ought to do all things considered”. In this paper I will argue against such an equivalence and attempt to shake the holders of the prevailing view, that moral reasons are always overriding, from their dogmatism. The primary theses of this paper are (1) there is no acceptable ordering of reasons for acting--not between types of reasons nor within the category of moral reasons, and (2) moral reasons are not unconditional or unexceptionable.The body of this paper will include a discussion of various versions of the prevailing view (that reasons do have an order with moral reasons as overriding all reasons). I will make some brief remarks about several forms of simplification or reductionism which provide fertile ground for the prevailing view, specifically (a) efforts to transform ‘the all things considered ought’ into a ‘moral ought’ and (b) three efforts to offer a single principle as the basis of moral reasoning. Then I will attempt to reveal flaws in two contemporary expressions of the prevailing view; those of D.Z. Phillips and Kurt Baier. The bulk of my efforts will be directed at demonstrating the conditionality and overrideability of moral reasons. In the process I will also attempt to illuminate the attractiveness of the, if I am correct, mistaken but prevailing view. And finally a moral will be drawn.
37. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 10
Michael W. Howard A Contradiction in the Egalitarian Theory of Justice
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This paper sets out to account for conflicting interpretations of Rawls’ theory of justice by Marxian critics, by uncovering an unresolved contradiction in the theory between individualist and communitarian values. The contradiction comes to light particularly in the more egalitarian interpretation of Rawls, and can only be overcome by incorporating a fuller theory of the good than that with which Rawls has provided us. It may not be possible to do this without giving up the claim that the theory of justice articulates the considered judgments of all thoughtful persons in our society, irrespective of class or ideology.
38. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 10
Frank Lucash What Spinoza’s View of Freedom Should Have Been
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I argue that Spinoza’s view of freedom in Part 5 of the Ethics is not incompatible with his view of determinism in Part 1, as Kolakowski claims, nor is it compatible for the reasons Parkinson, Hampshire, and Naess offer. Spinoza did not work out a clear view of how freedom differs from determinism. Using various resources in Spinoza, I present a view of freedom which is different from both internal or atemporal determinism and external or temporal determinism. Freedom, in the sense of the temporal process by which passive ideas become active, is compatible with both temporal and atemporal determinism.
39. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 10
Saul Traiger The Hans Reichenbach Correspondence—An Overview
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The Hans Reichenbach Collection, part of the Archives of Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science, is located at the University of Pittsburgh. In the past few years work on the recently acquired Hans Reichenbach Collection has resulted in a useful research source. A great deal of organizational work on the collection has now been completed, and the correspondence is open to study by interested scholars. What follows is an overview of the correspondence catalogued in the collection. All of the information recorded here has been found in the many thousand letters to and from Reichenbach which make up only a portion of the collection. The purpose of this essay is both to acquaint the philosophical public with the wealth of material in this research source and to argue for the importance of this material for the history of recent philosophy.
40. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 10
Joseph Wayne Smith What is Wrong with Verisimilitude
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Karl Popper introduced the idea of verisimilitude to explicate the intuitive idea that a theory T2, even though it is strictly speaking false, may be closer to the truth than a competitor T1. However, as is now well known, the results of Pavel Tichý, John Harris and David Miller establish that on Popper’s qualitative theory of verisimilitude, a theory T2 could be closer to the truth than another theory T1 only if T2 contains no false sentences. This result has been taken universally to show the inadequacy of Popper’s original account of verisimilitude, since the Miller-Tichý-Harris Theorem conflicts with the very basic intuition which first led Popper to formulate his theory.In this paper I shall first review the Miller-Tichý-Harris Theorem and examine a number of attempts to salvage the concept of verisimilitude. It will be argued that none of these attempts is successful. Finally an alternative, simple and intuitively satisfactory account of verisimilitude will be offered. This account will be along the lines first suggested by Popper, but it is not subject to any known limitation theorem. Further, the account is capable of giving verisimilitude orderings between not only scientific theories, but philosophical theories as well. This will be achieved without the use of the excessive formalism which dominates the contemporary verisimilitude research programs.