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31. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: Volume > 10
Michael Kelly A Glimpse of Envy and its Intentional Structure
32. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: Volume > 10
Mark van Atten Construction and Constitution in Mathematics
33. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: Volume > 10
Andrea Staiti Different Worlds and Tendency to Concordance: Towards a New Perspective on Husserl’s Phenomenology of Culture
34. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: Volume > 10
Jeff Yoshimi Husserl on Psycho-Physical Laws
35. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: Volume > 11
Emiliano Trizio Husserl and the Mind–Body Problem
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The aim of this article is to situate positively Husserl’s philosophy with respect to current discussions concerning the mind–body problem and, more specifically,the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness. It will be first argued that the view according to which phenomenology can contribute to the solution of the hard problem by being naturalized and incorporated into cognitive sciences is based on a misunderstanding of the nature and aim of Husserl’s philosophy.Subsequently, it will be shown that phenomenology deals with the issue of the relation between mind and body in the framework of the transcendental foundationof the ontology of animal nature, and provides thereby a non-reductionist solution to the hard problem. This discussion will at the same time stress the sharp differences existing between phenomenology and philosophy of mind, and highlight the relation between phenomenology and ontology.
36. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: Volume > 11
Timo Miettinen Edmund Husserl’s Europe: Borders, Limits and Crises
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This article examines the problem of cultural transformation—particularly the problem of modern Westernization—in the framework of Husserlian phenomenology. By focusing on the concept of limit in Husserl’s late manuscripts, the article illustrates how Husserl conceives the concept of culture with regardto a twofold liminal structure: territoriality and teleology. In the birth of Greek philosophy, Husserl detects a radical transformation in the fundamental sense ofboth of these structures, which will be described as the deconstruction and deferment of cultural limits. The article argues that while Husserl was keen to uncoverthe expansionist motive of the European–occidental tradition, his aim was by no means to simply justify it on the basis of universal reason. Instead, Husserl aimed at articulating a novel theory of universalism that would be based on the ideas of self-critique and renewal, and that would conceive cultural transformation through a reciprocal relation between home and alien. By elaborating the twofold liminal structure of culture, the article will answer some of the critiques ofHusserl’s alleged Euro-centrism.
37. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: Volume > 11
Steven Crowell Retrieving Husserl’s Phenomenology: Hopkins on Philosophy’s Last Stand
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Burt Hopkins provides a reading of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology, framing it with an account of its relation to Platonic and Aristotelian theories of unity-in-multiplicity, on the one hand, and the criticisms of Husserl found in Heidegger and Derrida, on the other. Here I introduce a further approach to the problem of unity-in-multiplicity – one based on normative ideality, drawing on Plato’s Idea of the Good -- and investigate three crucial aspects of phenomenological philosophy as Hopkins presents it: the method of reflection, the nature of absolute consciousness, and the status of the ego. I take issue with Husserl’s idea that consciousness can be the sufficient ground of that “meaning” which, for both Hopkins and for me, is the specific topic of phenomenology.
38. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: Volume > 11
Maxime Doyon Husserl and McDowell on the Role of Concepts in Perception
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In his collection of essays Having the World in View (2009), John McDowell draws a distinction between empirical experience (conceived as the conceptual activity relevant to judgment) and empirical judgment (i.e., the full-fledged assertoric content itself ). McDowell’s latest proposal is that the form of empirical experience is transferable into judgment, but it is not itself a judgment. Taking back the view he advanced in Mind and World, McDowell now believes that perception does not have propositional content as such, but the content of perception can, however, always be actualized in a judgment. There is, in other words, a strict parallelism between the deliverances of sensibility and potential future judgments of experience. The early Husserl disagrees with this and recognizesexplicitly the existence of coherent forms of perceptual engagement with the world that is independent of the mastery of language and the use of concepts.Perception constitutes—together with certain other embodied practices—our primary mode of access to the world, and this occurs before and independently ofour thinking activity. However, the realization of the centrality of time for intentionality will lead Husserl after 1905 to recognize a kind of lawfulness internal tothe sensuous materials themselves, prior to any egoical achievement. The most immediate consequence of this paradigm change is that the very idea of non-conceptual content now seems unwarranted. Indeed, if time is that which keeps the process of sense formation unified even at the lowest levels of constitution, then the world-disclosing activity of the ego cannot be discontinuous with the conceptual realm. Against this background, it will be argued that the dialectic between the conceptual and non-conceptual ultimately makes no sense on a phenomenological basis. Once temporality has entered the scene, the only meaningful opposition that stands is that between the conceptual and pre-conceptual spheres.
39. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: Volume > 11
Claudio Majolino Splitting the Μονάς: Jacob Klein’s Math Book reconsidered (Part I)
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This paper assesses the philosophical heritage of Jacob Klein’s thought through an analysis of the key tenets of his Greek Mathematical Thought and theOrigin of Algebra. Threads of Klein’s thought are distinguished and subsequently singled out (phenomenological, epistemological, and anti-ontological; historical, ontological, and critical), and the peculiar way in which Klein’s project brings together ontology and history of mathematics is investigated. Plato’s theoretical logistic and Klein’s understanding thereof are questioned—especially the claim that the Platonic distinction between practical and theoretical logistic is historically neglected because of Plato’s understanding of the manner of being of mathematical objects—in order to advance the claim that Klein ontologically overdetermines the history of mathematics in a manner that ends up limiting some of his most brilliant analyses of the Greek conception of “numbers” and the philosophical meaning of the notion of “multiplicity.”
40. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: Volume > 11
Andrea Zhok The Ontological Status of Essences in Husserl’s Thought
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Phenomenology has been defined by Husserl as “theory of the essences of pure phenomena,” yet the ontological status of essences in Husserlian phenomenology is far from a settled issue. The late Husserlian emphasis on genetic constitution and the historicity of the lifeworld is not immediately reconcilablewith the ‘unchangeable’ nature that is prima facie attributed to essences. However, the problem of the nature of ideality cannot be dropped from phenomenological accounts without jeopardizing the phenomenological enterprise as such. Through an immanent analysis of Husserl’s meditation on essences a positive account of their ontological status is provided. Essences are interpreted as ontological thresholds, primordially rooted in our motivated confrontation with sensuous transcendence. Essences appear as emergent ontological features, which are not reducible to their particular realizations and which exhibit a fundamental continuity between consciousness and being. They manifest themselves as prospectively a priori (a precondition for further experiences), but retrospectively a posteriori (they are founded in experience). Finally, essences manifest the ‘co-essential’ nature of consciousness and sensuous transcendence: they are the way in which we are motivated and constitutively bound to articulate being, which in turn is apt to be thus articulated.