Displaying: 31-35 of 35 documents

0.043 sec

31. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Cheol-Seung Lee 유가철학에 나타난 충서(忠恕)관의 논리 구조와 현실적 의미
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Today, the trend of "globalization" with the background of neo-liberalism, led by some economically developed countries around the U. S. is on the increase. However, while the ideology of the neo-liberalism plays a positive role in securing the individual rights independent from a group, it also causes diverse socialconflicts derived from the differences among groups and regions as well as individuals, according to its logic of competition, which evokes infinite egoism. For this reason, a group of scholars have been exerting themselves to find out the wise solution for the social problems. And the "Zhongsu (忠恕)" Thought, which roughly means the consideration for "Zhong (忠)" and "Shu (恕)", has become a significant ideological resource to solve such problems. Traditionally, in Confucian world, "Zhong" is understood as the revelation of the pure good morality as an innate nature of the self, and "Shu" the expansion of the "Zhong" to others. Such point of view of traditional Confucian world regards the two areas not as separate spheres but as closely related ones. That is to say, it is maintained that the sphereof "Zhong", which covers the moral order of an individual and that of "Shu," which covers that of the society are organically related to establish a community based on morality resulted from the ideal relationship between an individual and a society. However, it is somewhat difficult to apply the idea of moral society of traditional Confucian world based on the relationship between "Zhong" and "Shu" to the present society, which emphasizes pluralism in the origin and the contents of its morality. For the nature of morality contained in the "Zhongshu" Thought of traditional Confucian world is based on the "Good Human Nature Principle," which covers the absolutist ethics emphasizing the immediate identification of existence and value, while many people of today regard such point ofview as a result of the false ideological system without any realistic foundation. Those who criticize the absolutist ethics maintain that morality is not a transcendental gift but an empirical product and the value and principle of life shaped by the heros of a historical period. For the reason they regard morality as a relative value restricted by time and space, not as an invariable transcendental value. They also maintain the point of view of limited or conditional universality thatthe universality of morality is a common conscious shaped by an organic relationship between specialities, which can be continued for a specific period of time and then would change or disappear. As mentioned above, the "Zhongshu" thought of traditional Confucian world has some difficulty in being adopted into the plural society of today, which means that it should be transformed into a new shape to be significantly utilized in today's society.
32. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Dong-hee Lee Did Shilhak School in Chosun Dynasty Make a settlement of Sung-li Debate?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This article has the purpose of examining the commentation that Sung-ho Yi Ik and Da-san Jung Yak-yong developed of Sa-chil Debate (사칠논쟁) Which was a philosophical debate in Chosun Dynasty. Sa-chil Debate began from Toe-gye Yi Whang and Ko-bong Gi Dae-sung and soon as a result of Yul-gok Yi Yi and Woo-gae Sung Hon repeating the debate, It appeared as a kind of philosophical theme. After that, Yul-gok and Toe-gye's students formed a kind of school. They also made the debate extended and the theory more sophisticated by criticizing a counterpart's argument on base of ideologizing their teacher's theory. About 200 years after Toe-gye died, Sung-ho Yi Ik was born and after about 250 years, Da-san Jung Yak-yong was born. Both they experienced a western naturalscience and a catholic theory as Silhak Scholars (실학자). Therefore their this kind of interpretation about Sung-li Debate must be offering a deeply interesting investigation to us. In conclusion, Sung-ho advocated Toe-gye's theory at all, adding more explanation to it and Da-san evaluated all of Toe-gye's and Yul-gok's theory to be right because their theories have a unique logicality of making a sense. Sung-ho stood on a Shilhak view point gave up a organic cosmology ofSung-li theory which has a continuity to cosmology and moral theory, arguing Sa-chil-Li bal-Yil-lo Theory (四七理發一路說) by understanding Sa-chil Debate based on only moral perspective. Even though Da-san also said Yang-si Theory (兩是論) that both their theories are all right, he argued that Toe-gye's theory is much more important in the aspect of moral practice owing to his religious opinion by a catholic affect. By the way, Sung-ho supplemented and explained Toe-gye's theory, but he had not a sufficient logic and was not objective because of his leaning into advocating Toe-gye's theory much further. Da-san had an advantage of evaluating both Toe-gye's and Yul-gok's theory to be all right, but came to argue an insufficient philosophy on account of its simplicity.
33. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Eun-Young Cho 다산(茶山)의 미발설(未發說) 고찰: ‘심지사려(心知思慮)’ 문제를 중심으로
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
For any inquiry into Tasan (茶山)'s philosophy, it is absolutely necessary to investigate its relationship with Neo-Confucianism. Out of the many notions of his philosophy, the Kung-fu theory (工夫論) is considered to be important. Therefore, the comparison between Chu-hui 's (朱熹) system of Neo-Confucianism and Tasan's theory on Kung-fu is expected to offer clues that help us understand Tasan's philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to investigate Tasan’s viewpoints on the notion of ‘having not yet arisen,’ especially in regards to his issues of 'the mind, intelligence, consideration, and discretion (心知思慮),' as presented in his Kung-fu theory. Tasan insists that the statement that "The joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure have not yet arisen." differs from the statement that "The mind, intelligence, consideration, and discretion (心知思慮) have not yet arisen." In this paper, the author will inquire into Tasan's assertions on the meaning, contents, subject, and significance of ‘the mind, intelligence, consideration, and discretion,’ which he emphasizes. In addition, the author will make clear that the above assertion is related to the following: 1) Tasan’s recognition of Cheon (天), 2) his assertion on the capability of the mind to make decisions by itself (心自主權), and 3) his emphasis on the actualization of morality.
34. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Young-Jin Choi 朝鮮性理學의 普遍性과 特殊性: 退溪 四端七情論과 巍巖 未發論의 比較를 通한 試論
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Joseon neo-Confucianism critically reviewed Chinese Chu Zi Studies and transformed it as Joseon seonglihak through intense debates occurred in the process of trying to settle down the problems raised in the contemporary Joseon society. The representative theories of Joseon seonglihak includes sadanchiljeongron(四端七情論, the theory of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings), inmulseongdongiron (人物性同異論, the theory of whether human nature and animal nature are the same or different), seongbeomsimdongbudongron (聖凡心同不同論, the theory of whether the mind of the nobler man and that of the inferior man arethe same or different), mibalon (未發論, the theory of not-yet-aroused). Among these, this article traces the originality of Joseon seonglihak by means of comparing the sadanchiljeongron of Lee Hwang(Toegye, 1501-1570) with the mibalon of Lee Gan (Oeam, 1677-1727). The clause that 'the nature is li [性卽理]' is the central proposition in Chu Zi Studies, whereas the clause that 'the Four Beginnings are the arousal of li [四端理之發]' is the central proposition in Lee Hwang's theory. The clauses that 'the nature is identified with the mind [心性一致]', that 'the nobler man takes li to be the mind', and that 'the mind is the nature and the nature is the mind' are the main claims made by Lee Gan. Chu Hsi takes the nature (the original nature) to be li, Lee Hwang takes the feeling (the Four Beginnings) to be li, and Lee Gan takes the mind (the original mind) to be li. These claims made by Lee Hwang and Lee Gan are fundamentally different from Chu Hsi's theory of mind and nature.
35. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Chaehyun Chong 맹자의 도덕내재주의는 어떻게 정당화될 수 있나?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The purpose of this paper is to show one way how the Mencian internalism of morality can be justified. Since previous studies of Mencius's internalism have paid too much attention to explaining or training it, they have failed to disclose the difficulties of and the importance of justifying it. In this study, I claim that Mencian internalism is a full development of Confucius' spirit of subjectivity and so can be justified in the same practical way as Kant used in justifying morality.