Narrow search


By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:


Displaying: 31-40 of 70 documents

Show/Hide alternate language

0.116 sec

31. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1998 > Issue: 21
Wing-wah Chan 陳榮華
Is the Mind in Mencius' Philosophy Self-sufficient for Moral Cultivation?
孟子哲學的心概念在這德實踐中是否自足?

view |  rights & permissions
32. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 1998 > Issue: 21
Tim Lane 藍亭
Quiet Qualia, Unsensed Sensa
無感覺的感知

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In C. I. Lewis's epistemology, qualia are taken to be directly intuited and inherently recognizable. He distinguishes sharply between qualia and that which C. D. Broad and Bertrand Russell refer to as “sensa" or “sense-data." Where Broad and Russell appear to allow for the possibility of unsensed, incompletely sensed, or inaccurately sensed sensa, Lewis regards qualia as given--to be is to be sensed and certain. Lewis finds the Broad-Russell view to be incredible and says of sensa so construed that they are “neither fish, flesh, nor good red herring."I argue that the Broad-Russell view is at least as plausible as Lewis's and, indeed, that to adequately describe and explain mental phenomena, it may be necessary to distinguish the phenomenal aspect of consciousness (sensa or qualia) from the accessing function of consciousness. In arguing the pIausibilityof this distinction, I draw upon work from both cognitive science and phenomenology. I also argue that, in principIe, experimental evidence could be adduced to decide the issue between the Broad-Russell and the Lewis views. In a concluding section I suggest implications of the view developed here for Lewis's epistemology.
33. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2001 > Issue: 24
Gerald Cipriani Reflections on the Nature of the Figural in Art
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this essay I develop evelop a critique of different modes understanding what is a moment of meaningful form in art (the figural). I attempt to show that approaches which maintain a separation between form and content, or the subjective and the objective cannot truly do justice to the presentational nature of meaning in art. In particular, I refer to Mikel Dufrenne's conception of expression in his Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience as being paradoxically misleading when it comes to understand the figural in its phenomentality. I ultimately argue for the need to bear in mind that the relationship between presentation and representation, or experience and objectivity ought to be approached in terms of complementary difference.
34. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2002 > Issue: 25
Jih-Ching Ho 何志青
Inferentialism, Conceptualism, and Social Pragmatism
推演論,概念論,及社會實踐論

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
How do our minds grasp the world? The nlajor task in explaining the relation between mind and the world is to indicate how facts, experiences, and judgments stand in justificatory relation. This paper examines three ways of explaining the cognitive relation between mind and world: inferentialism, conceptualism, and social pragmatism. These three theories differ from the traditional foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism in that they no longer attempt any analysis of the epistemic notions such as knowledge and evidence abstractly; rather, they explore, in a Wittgensteinean way, these notions in relation to linguistic practices. In this paper, I will first examine the debate between inferentialism and conceptualism, a debate involving Sellars, Davidson, McDowell, and Brandom. I will show that both inferentialism and conceptualism have difficulties in giving a complete account of empirical justification and that their difficulties can be remedied only by resorting to some social pragmatisnl notions such as the social development of conceptual capacities and the social recognition of cognitive performance.
35. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2002 > Issue: 25
Francisco Calvo Garzon The connectionist sceptic versus the “full-blooded" semanticist
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Gareth Evans produced a powerfulline of argument against Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. In one part of his attack, Evans argued that, under certain conditions, structural simplicity may become truth-conducive for semantic theories. Being structurally more complex than the standard semantic theory, perverse semantic theories a la Quine are an easy prey for Evans' considerations. The bulk of the paper will be devoted to addressing Evans' criticism. By reviewing the classical/connectionist debate in cognitive science between a hypothetical sympathizer of “cognitive orthodoxy" and the friend ofconnectionism, I shall contend that the Quinean has nothing to fear from a classical reading of Evans' considerations.
36. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2002 > Issue: 25
Chung-Chi Yu 游涼祺
Schutz on Pure We-Relationship
舒茲論純粹我們關條

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
An inquiry into the “pure we-relationship" in Schutz is attempted. In his early major work The Phenomenology of the Social World Schutz regards the “pure we-relationship" as the ultimate foundation of the social world. Because of the confusion with “concrete we-relationship," its meaning remains misunderstood among many interpreters. While this concept is rooted in “Thou-orientation" and is regarded as formal concept without any content, Schutz is criticized for having taken up an idealistic and egocentric position in his social theory. I find it is deficient to defend Schutz by reference to the lifeworld theory that he develops in late thought. Instead , I suggest that we might save him from such criticism by introducing the “mutual tuning-in relationship."
37. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2003 > Issue: 26
Francisco Calvo Garzón Francisco Calvo Garzón
Is Simplicity Alethic for Semantic Theories?
「簡單性」是否為語義理論所不可忘 者?

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Crispin Wright (1992) has reshaped debates about Realism by offering a new landscape of what's at stake in the discussions between realists and their opponents. Instead of arguing whether a given discourse can be truth apt, discussion should focus, Wright contends, on what kind of truth predicate a discourse can enjoy. Namely, whether truth for a discourse can be 'robust' or merely ‘minimal' Wright's approach has important implications for Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. The bulk of this paper will be devoted to showing that an argument involving minimalism about truth which Wright (1997) offersagainst the Inscrutability Thesis fails by reductio. By the end of the paper, we'll see how Wright's proposed frame of' discussion for Realism bears on themetaphysical status of Semantic Theories.
38. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2003 > Issue: 26
Szu-Ting Chen (陳思、廷) The Distinction between Causation and Invariance and Its Implications for the Philosophical Discussion of Economic Theorizing
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Recently, certain philosophers have argued that an explanatory relation is a causal relation that is fundamentally about the invariance of a relation betweenvariables of interest under intervention-i.e., about a manipulable invariant relation. This manipulative theory tends to reduce a causal relation to a manipulable invariant relation. By explicating a case from contemporary econometrics, this paper argues that a manipulable invariant relation can be obtained only when the causal chain or causal structure of the targeted relation is free from disturbing influences. In other words, a manipulable invariant relation can be regarded only as a special kind of causal relation, and so the notion of invariance can never replace the idea of causation. This paper also shows that the distinction between causation and invariance has methodological import concerning the philosophical discussion of economic theorizing and of economic theory development.1. Introduction2. Manipulation, Invariance, Superexogeneity, and Causal Structure2.1 The Manipulability Theory of Causation2.2 The Idea ofWeak Exogeneity2.3 The Idea of Invariance and Its Relation to the Idea of Superexogeneity2.4 Can We Equate a Causal Relation with an Invariant Relation?3. The Methodological Import of the Distinction between Causation and Invariance4. A Causal Structuralist Account of Economic Theorizing and Economic Theory Development5. Conclusion
39. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2004 > Issue: 27
Hans Lenk Hans Lenk
Towards a Technologistic Methodology and Philosophy of Science
邁向技術取向的方法論和科學哲學

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
For the past several decades, philosophers of science such as Hacking and Giere, instead of focusing attention on scientific theories and seeing them as just linguistic entities, have been thinking about philosophy of science from the standpoint of experimental manipulation and model-construction. Both Hacking’sexperimentalism and Giere’s modelism have played a great part in giving birth to an action-oriented and technology-shaped philosophy of science. In this paper, it is argued that philosophy of science can benefit from the technological approach and correlatively, the methodology of general technology might profit from taking into consideration the refinements and novel developments of philosophy of science. It is argued, besides, not only that different methodological approaches have to be integrated into a rather general theory of scheme-interpretation, but also that action-“grasping”-knowledge is shaped by interpretations and by perspectives.
40. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2004 > Issue: 27
Ruey-Lin Chen 陳瑞 麟
Testing through Realizable Models
透過可落實模型來檢驗科學理論

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
How is a scientific theory, especial a classical physical theory, tested? This problem has a long history. In this paper I’ll propose a theory of testing based on but differentiated from Giere’s studies on the structure of scientific theories (Giere 1988, 1994, 1999). I will show, from both theoretical and historical perspectives, that a scientific theory can always be understood as one contains a classified model population, including both higher-level models and realizable models, and that scientists always test a theory through its realizable models. To transmit the consequences of testing realizable models to a higher-level model is a very complicated mechanism. Therefore, it is unlikely that a whole theory could ever be completely confirmed or falsified, even if some of its realizable models havebeen conclusively confirmed or falsified. Finally, I’ll illustrate such a theory of testing can give an adequate account of the testing history of a scientific theory, for example, the Newtonian theory. This theory of testing is a rational reconstruction, in Lakatosian sense, of the process of scientific testing.