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201. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Haidong Yu Multiple Negative in the Overall Generation
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The world (specifically the universe in which modern mankind, the same below) there is no absolute essence. The world's primitive also has uncertainty; the existence of all is possible. On the universe in which modern human live, the unity and distinction of material and spirit constitute the world's basic contradiction. (1) The unity of material and spirit. Many have a negative in the overall delicate generation: the material includes the spirit, the spirit depends on the material, among them under certain conditions can be transformed into each other. (2) The material and spirit is distinct: The material is essentially an objective system, the objective freedom is the essence of the spirit .The collection system is the unity of opposites; freedom is relative to the state system. (3) The spirit and awareness are two different concepts, it is necessary to distinguish between. Material and the sense of confrontation: the material is an objective reality, subjective consciousness is reflected. (4) The material and the sense of unity: the material is the source of awareness, consciousness is a product of material; material decides consciousness, awareness counterproductive in the material. Material and a sense of the unity of opposites minor contradictions in the world. (5) World of certainty and uncertainty, know and unknown, relative and absolute, as well as activity problems are dialectical. (6) Dialectics generally applicable to the entire world, but also dialectical view of its own, it should be the development of a multiple, three-dimensional, not the sleek dialectics.
202. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Serghey Gherdjikov Virtual and Real Relativity
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Here the topics of the virtual and that of relativity are joined together. New concepts of relation, virtuality and reality are devised. Relation is definition. It is not something detached and real but is the very ‘thing’. Relating is virtual defining – projection of the real connection between moments of a life process. ‘This’ without ‘that’ is not this. ‘I’ without ‘you’ is not I. ‘West’ without ‘East’ is not west. ‘Man’ without other living beings is not man. We pass each other. In the same degree we do not know ourselves as an ego, as community, as civilization. This is an unconsciousness relativity effect, which comes into being in the process of communication between cultures and between individuals. Relativity in awareness can be a virtual freedom for a synthesis of definitions, relations and descriptions, and a real freedom for a synthesis of a life process, identity and life in a human form. Which is real and which is not, if thongs are definiteonly in relation? Which is real and which is not in a global interrelating and virtual communication? The virtual pertains to all artefacts. The reality of artefacts, and especially of signs, lies in their being related to a meaning, their reality is relational. Meaning is understood as a moment of a human life process. The scheme iselaborated in two spheres: virtual and real relativity analogous to special and general relativity (Einstein).
203. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Cheng Long On Ontology Being a Philosophy Tendency
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This paper tries to show that ontology is one of the important tendencies in the future philosophy. The author thinks that ontology as the basic spirit makes philosophy be different from other subjects. Ontology originates from people’s examination to essence of the world. However, ancient long-term argument couldn’t get any clear conclusion. So philosophers gradually understand that ontology is connected with epistemology. If we want to make a good explanation to ontology, we must return to check ourselves cognition. And the epistemology turns into the main stream of the philosophy Since Descartes. But this doesn’t mean ontology being disappeared. It only tends from the stage to background. In fact, the discussion of the linguistic philosophy still belongs to epistemology. As a whole, we can say philosophy really goes though one negative development. According to dialectic, negation of negation is a universal law. The philosophy has to undergo another inevasible reform and return to ontology again. Many contemporary philosophers have regarded this and begin to do it effectively.
204. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Eric M. Peng Indiscernibles and Trope Transferability: A Trilemma and a Possible Way Out
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Assuming the position that takes properties to be tropes rather than universals and takes ordinary objects as bundles of tropes, the essay first argues that the Law of the Identity of Indiscernibles survives the challenge raised by Black's "two-sphere universe". It is because the Law of Indiscernibles becomes a trivialconsequence of the assumed trope ontology. The essay then considers four construals of the thesis of Uniqueness differing in strength. The construals are developed in terms of both the possibility that tropes of an object may be transferred to another object and the possibility that objects may survive cross-worldproperty changes. Finally, the essay argues that a trilemma arises from three intuitively innocent claims: (1) that same world objects do not share tropes, (2) that cross world objects may share some (but not all) tropes, and (3) that objects may survive cross-world property changes. And, unfortunately, Indiscernibles plays a role in giving rise to one horn of the trilemma. The essay suggests "ultraessentialism" as a possible way out of the trilemma.
205. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Asokananda Prosad Judging the Superiority
206. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Michael Jungert In Memory We Trust?: Philosophical Remarks on the Relation between Memory, Self and Truthfulness
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The common sense regards memory as fairly exact, reliable and trustworthy in the majority of cases. However, latest scientific findings in the fields of psychology and biology seem to object this point of view. According to them, memory appears as a highly constructive and often deceptive phenomenon. These assumptionslead to various philosophical problems. The talk will address some of them. At first the question will be raised which conclusions can be reasonably drawn from empirical findings brought by memory research. Based on this analysis the relation between memory and truth will be examined more closely. Therefore I will ask which concept of truth respectively accuracy could be compatible with a constructive and dynamic character of memory and whether these insights will give rise to a change of our self-concept or the idea of man in general. This requires an inquiry of the relationship between self-concept and (autobiographical) memory that can be illustrated by the case-study of traumatical disorders, a field which so far is stunningly unnoted by philosophy. As a result of these findings some main features and further problems of the anthropological dimension of memory will be outlined.
207. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Simon Glynn From the Delusion to the Dissolution of the Ego
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Certainly many in “Western” philosophy and psychology have conceived of the human subject in the Cartesian or neo-Cartesian tradition, as a self subsisting, self identical, monadic consciousness or Ego, which is to say as an essentially unchanging, substantial subject, initially isolated or separate from the world and others. On the other hand Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu and other “non-Western” traditions, adopting a more holistic approach, have argued that such a reified,atomistic and hypostatized conception of the self is illusory. However, suggesting that from at least since the time of Hume, and later, in Hegel, there has been an alternative “Western” view of consciousness, self-consciousness and identity, the development of which can be traced through the Phenomenology, Existentialism and Poststructuralism of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida and others, the paper attempts to show how this evolving view may now contribute to a sophisticated and nuanced understanding and confirmation of the wisdom of “non-Western” conceptions.
208. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Dmytro Bushuyev Crisis of the Consumer Society: Searching for a New Ideology
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The paper “Crisis of the consumer society: searching for a new ideology” studies the ideology of the consumer society and its main tendencies such as values substitution, human self-isolation and loneliness and the dehumanization of the world. Based on the analysis of contemporary mass art and advertisements the author traces the growing gap between the real life of people and the dominating consumerist model of society. The author evaluates different radical movements (nationalist, racial, religious) as people’s attempt to discover their identity, to find genuine feelings and experiences in the consumerist society. This results in the increase of xenophobia and intolerance in the intertwined and fragile modern world. The paper also states the possible solution to this problem – ajoint effort of the philosophers of the world to create a new, nonconsumerism ideology that would be able to overcome the existing detachment among people
209. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
William L. Wang A New Analysis on Metaphysics and Ontology
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By means of comparison between Lao Tzu’s theory of Tao in ancient China and the concept of metaphysics originated from ancient Greece, the author redefined the concept of “form” and therefore, elaborated the ultimate meaning of metaphysics from its Chinese translation. According to the author’s re-interpretation of Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu had resolved the ontological questions in a different way with that of ancient Greek philosophers, and he had answered the question of “One and Many”. In the past, people had mixed the fact that there are actually two different ones in this question, and hence, metaphysics and ontology had been remained in a confused state. By giving an example in natural science, the author had illustrated clearly what is Tao or natural metaphysics,and then extended the idea to moral metaphysics. As a conclusion, the author suggests that it is better to use a new term to replace the imperfectly defined “metaphysics”, for example, metaformology. Both Metaphysics and Ontology are basic concepts of philosophy. However, in the long history of philosophy, both of them have not yet been adequately defined and therefore, caused controversies. Different philosophers referred to them in many different ways, and this can be easily seen in almost every philosophical dictionary. What is the way to settle it down? This is the purpose of this paper.
210. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Marina F. Bykova Fichte’s Conception of the Self in Jena Projects of the Wissenschaftslehre
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief sketch of Fichte’s account of the self and discuss it as significant contribution to the modern theory of the selfhood. This discussion focuses on thinkers’ Jena projects of Wissenshaftslehre, including the 1794/95 Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre and Wissensftslehre novo methodo (1796/1797). For Fichte, the Jena period is a time of profound search for the ground and structure of his philosophical system. He finds such ground in a uniquely formulated conception of the self. Furthermore, beginning with the self as a direct intuition and ending with the self as a necessary idea, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre become an immense description of the development of the selfhood. Providing a conceptual outline of the main points of Fichte’s account of the self, the paper shows it as a unique philosophical result that is key to the emergence of post-Kantian German idealism.
211. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Tao Delin On a Prerequisite Problem of Sinicization of Marxist Philosophy
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Is it possible to sinicize Marxist Philosophy? This is a prerequisite for Marxism localization. Some people answer “no”, because their main arguments are like this: so far, the Marxist Philosophy understood by Chinese is not the real Marxist Philosophy, and it is impossible for Chinese to understand Marxist Philosophy;even though Chinese have understood Marxist Philosophy, they could not sinicize Marxist Philosophy. Thus this paper shall discuss this point. Although Marxist Philosophy has originated from the Western Europe, its visual threshold involves the total human history and overall situation of the world, but not just the WesternEurope. Therefore, it is not a regional theory, but an international theory. Its fundamental principles are not just the generalization of the Western Europe conditions, but the generalization of developing process of the world history. Besides, Chinese distinctiveness does not deny the universality of these fundamental principles. That Chinese Marxists adapt Marxist Philosophy to conditions in China is not to cancel the universality of these fundamental principles by Chinese distinctiveness, but to make detailed analysis on Chinese special conditions taking these fundamental principles as guide; of course it shall include absorbing and drawing upon fruits of all active and reasonable elements in Chinese traditional culture and then arriving at a new conclusion.
212. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Jan Gerrit Strala Rethinking Individuality: The Self in the Philosophy of Nishida Kitarô and William James
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Kitaro Nishida, a famous Japanese Philosopher and the founder of the Kyoto-School, for the first time in history transformed Zen-Buddhism, which here means especially a Japanese school of Buddhism and whose characteristics consists in its methodological meditation, into a philosophical theory of our existence. On the other hand he transformed western philosophy into a very original form of thought, which at the same time contains oriental elements. As Nishida did the bilateral transformation between western and eastern philosophies, he developed a new perspective on the inquiry concerning the individuality of our personal existence and the relation between Self and the other. In his first Work, “An Inquiry into the good” Nishida examines the characteristics of pure experience, which is not understood from the outside, indirectly, and it is not a passive and static experience like for example in ordinary empiricism. It must be understood as active and creative experience which is experienced from within. In reading Thinkers as Ernst Mach and William James he came to realize that there must be a prereflective, pre-individual, unitary pure experience. This pure experience as ultimate reality on which the individual is based, is systematically self developing and Self-unfolding. In Nishidas understanding the pure experience is the common basis for, and is realized prior, to the distinction between subject and object, the Self and the Other, the Knower and the known. I try to explain how Nishidas approach overcomes this subjectivistic perspective and discuss in which way this standpoint offers a new understanding of the Self and the Other. Abe Masao, Ives Christopher: Translation of “An Inquiry into the Good”, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1990. S. xviii.
213. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Igor’ Valer’evich Kochubey To See General Acceleration of Culture’s Living as Fatally Dead-End Appearance
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The author pays attention to the contemporary culture’s two challenges: 1) differentiation; 2) general acceleration. Extrapolation → inevitable impotence of an individual to understand Other/himself. The author’s concept “strictio intervallorum constantiae” expresses the catastrophic accelerated tightening of the temporal distance from the past which has already become obsolete in the essential life relations, indistinct, strange… Two revolutions in time’s feeling: 1) christianization → time’s linearity; 2) strictio intervallorum constantiae → the new experience of time. An extrapolation of the contemporary principial trend of an informationdinamics leads to inevitable impotence of an individual to understand neither Other, neither himself!
214. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Desheng Zong Three Forms of Psychological Discontinuity
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Contemporary philosophers writing on the issue of personal identity agree that, whatever is disputable about fission cases, there is little doubt that, if there could be fission, there would be psychological continuity between the original person and her offshoot (if the branching is one-one), or between the original personand her offshoots (if the branching is one-many). The belief is one with a long history dating back to John Locke; it has, over time, acquired the status of self-evident truth. This paper is not an attempt to refute this deeply rooted belief, though I think the near universal acceptance of it is rather unfortunate. My main goal in what follows is to make an initial case for three forms of psychological discontinuity that I believe would exist between the fission ancestor and the offshoots. If I am right about the existence of the three forms of psychological discontinuity, contemporary Lockeans on the issue of personal identity will need to rethink their position, or so I will argue in the last section of the paper.
215. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Anke Haarmann Hybrid Identities: Japanese Concepts of the Self
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Looking at contemporary Japanese images of the self and how Japanese scholars have conceptualised the notion of the subjectivity three remarkable concepts of “the self” can be identified and distinguished from another: the Inner Self, the Political Self, the Social Self. In my paper I will discuss these concepts by high lightening their hybridity, plurality and their emphasis on the identity as an effect of self-realization. I shall argue that the investigation in the Japaneseunderstanding of the self is particularly fruitful for a global understanding of subjectivity, because Japanese selfhood does not represent the “otherness” of the western thought but is actually crisscrossed by western and eastern ideas. What can be marked as the Inner Self combines ideas of the Buddhist “Non-Self” (anatman) and the European Idealistic Ego (Ich). Embedded in practises of meditation the Inner Self in the Japanese understanding is realized through the activity of finding and loosing oneself. The Political Self can be perceived as an amalgamation of the Asian art of the regime of the group and the western thought of Liberalism and personal identity. Somewhat discovered in Japan as a possibility of the self in the 19th century the Political Self comes into existence througheducational practise. Furthermore the Social Self brings together Chinese Confucian ethics and ancient Japanese Shintoism. Understood as a particle in the flow of social relations the Social Self is realized in Japan within the rituals of everyday live and physical hence tactical education in the childhood of a person. The Japanese concepts of the self exemplify on the level of their formal configuration the qualities of what can be called a plural anthropology.
216. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Zinaida Ivanova Ethnic and National Identity in the Context of Mass Migration
217. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 19
Shojiro Kotegawa Epoché and Teleology: The Idea of Philosophy as ‘Infinite Task’ in Husserl
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In Husserl’s phenomenology, there are two essential moments; one is the Epoché which makes the phenomenology possible, the other is the teleology of science which directs it to its own goal (telos). The former, later appeared in Husserl’s text, does not seem quite consistent with the latter – on the contrary, theseseem so exclusive that a question arises as to whether Husserl could reconcile Epoché with teleology consistently claimed from the beginning of his career. My aim in this paper is to reveal their conflict in Husserl’s phenomenology, confining my argument to the science as teleological activity which had been claimed from Logical Investigations (1900) to his last work Crisis (1936). The plan is as follows; firstly we will confirm that Husserl defined the idea of the science as an activity which tends to one universal science; secondly we will examine that when he innovated the Epoché as the phenomenological method (Ideas 1, 1913), he confined the range of Epoché in such a science; thirdly we will prove that in his last work, this idea of the science remained in the form of “teleology of history”claimed by Husserl to be possible only by the Epoché; finally we will examine the inconsistency between the Epoché and the teleology, making reference to the critique of Jan Patočka.
218. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 19
Dermot Moran Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl on Embodied Perception
219. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 19
Chandra Shekhar Concept of Consciousness in Yoga Sūtra (Yoga Philosophy)
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According to Yoga Philosophy though the right knowledge of any phenomena is based on direct cognition, inference or testimony but the cognizance conjured up by words without any substance is devoid of objectivity. The consciousness is an aspect of the ultimate reality or substance, which is functioning, and manifesting itself in five progressive stages at five levels. What we experience or sense as consciousness is the first to five level experiences and the phenomenal cognizance in these stages, which can be described in words, is instrumental one and modification of our mind. Therefore the state of consciousness as we experience is an out come of the five mental modes, viz. valid knowledge, error, imagination, deep sleep and recollection. So cognizance conforming to a word/language is devoid of a phenomenal object. Since we may speak of the unicorn though there is no real phenomenal object as such and thus the word/words may produce cognition, even though its object is nonexistent. The real consciousness and the study of consciousness cannot be instrumental one. The Yoga Sūtra suggests that the direct and unwavering awareness is required and that pure consciousness is devoid of any thing known by way of perception, memory, imagination, reasoning and intuition. The Consciousness in Yoga Sūtra is characterized as one of the four states of consciousness namely Vitarka accompanied by reasoning, Vicāra accompanied by reflection, Ānanda accompanied by bliss and Asmitā accompanied by sense of pure being. And then, after transcending these states of consciousness the one enters into the realm of real consciousness, that is the purest and non-intentional state of the self or the Knower or the Consciousness itself.
220. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 19
Julia Jansen ‘Top Down’ and ‘Bottom Up’: Imagination in the Context of Situated Cognition
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In this paper I want to discuss the implications of adopting different general philosophical approaches for assessing the relation between perception and imagination. In particular, I am interested in different views resulting from ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches to cognition. By ‘top down’ approaches I meanapproaches that conceive of cognition as a process or activity that is guided by intellectual or conceptual (‘top’) elements. (I consider broadly speaking Kantian accounts typical.) By ‘bottom up’ approaches I mean approaches that conceive of cognition as a process that emerges from perceptual or embodied (‘bottom’)elements of cognition. (I consider phenomenological and situated cognition accounts typical.) My considerations are framed by a particular interest in the ensuing consequences of assuming different general frameworks for integrating the issue of imagination within a theory of situated cognition.