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201. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel Merleau-Ponty: De La Perspective Au Chiasme, La Rigueur Épistémique D’Une Analogie
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Merleau-Ponty: From Perspective to the Chiasm,the Epistemic Rigor of an AnalogyHere, we wish to take up the discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm in light of the question of its status. Is it a matter of a metaphor without any cognitive value resulting from an analogical and arbitrary transfer from one domain to another, or is it a matter of a rigorous concept susceptible of being experimented upon, taken up again, or improved? If the latter is the case, what is the nature of this concept? Is it descriptive, heuristic, or even logical? The question is worth asking insofar as it is not only the most orthodox positivists who may be likely to see, in this transfer of concept, nothing more than poetic license. Indeed, the most careful commentators authorized by Merleau-Ponty are in lockstep with the critics of his supposedly “literary” style. “Ambiguous” is thus the term, which more often describes Merleau-Ponty’s notions of encroachment, of reversibility, or even chiasm. First, we shall examine the function and the role of the concept of chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. We shall then establish its scope in order to be able to determine its exact status. It is only at the conclusion of this study that we will be able to show how this notion sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s main concern, namely, to produce a counter-model of perspective and to promote a newcategory of relation – a concern which organizes the seemingly unrelated elements in his philosophy.Merleau-Ponty: dalla prospettiva al chiasma,il rigore epistemico di un’analogiaIntendiamo riprendere, in questa sede, la discussione sulla nozione di chiasma in Merleau-Ponty, alla luce di una domanda circa il suo statuto: si tratta di una metafora, priva di ogni valore cognitivo perché nata da un trasferimento analogico ed arbitrario da un campo semantico ad un altro, o si tratta di un concetto rigoroso, suscettibile di essere messo alla prova dell’esperienza e via via perfezionato? In tal caso, qual è la natura di questo concetto? È descrittiva, euristica, oppure logica? È interessante porre questa domanda dato che non sono solamente i positivisti più ortodossi, a vedere in questo trasferimento una semplice licenza poetica. In effetti, molti tra i commentatori più autorevoli di Merleau-Ponty aderiscono alle diverse critiche sollevate intorno alla presunta natura «letteraria» di questa espressione, e ritengono che il chiasma sia una semplice metafora. Interrogheremo innanzitutto la funzione e il ruolo di questo concetto nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty al fine di determinarne l’esatto statuto. Solo al termine di questo studio preliminare potremo mostrare come questa nozione possa gettare nuova luce sulla preoccupazione principale di Merleau-Ponty, vero e proprio filo rosso che organizza in profondità tutti gli elementi apparentemente eterogenei della sua filosofia: vale a dire, il tentativo di produrre un contro-modello della prospettiva e una nuova categoria di relazione.
202. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Stephen A. Noble Maurice Merleau-Ponty, O Il Percorso Di Un Filosofo: Elementi per una biografi a intellettuale
203. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Paolo Godani Variazioni Sul Sorvolo: Ruyer, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze e lo statuto della forma
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Variations sur le survolRuyer, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze et le statut de la formeLa question principale que j’aborde dans cet article concerne la manière dont Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze assument l’héritage du finalisme du vingtième siècle.En analysant certains textes fondamentaux de ces deux auteurs, on aperçoit en effet clairement leur dette à l’égard, notamment, du néo-finalisme de Raymond Ruyer. Autant Merleau-Ponty que Deleuze lisent l’oeuvre de Ruyer en la séparant de son contexte d’origine et de ses intentions explicites, à savoir hors de toute exigence de nature épistémologique. Entre ces deux auteurs subsiste toutefois une différence substantielle dans la manière d’employer les concepts ruyériens. Merleau-Ponty réfute l’hypothèse d’une forme qui survole les matériaux constituant l’organisation idéale, mais valorise l’idée d’un thématisme immanent, d’une essence qui subsiste seulement à l’intérieur de ses variations. Deleuze, lui, semble reprendre sans réserve à son compte ces mêmes notions de forme et de survol parce qu’il les interprète comme des concepts plutôt que comme des causes formelles ou finales. Le concept deleuzien n’est pas pris dans la « pâte » du vécu, mais survole toute expérience vécue et tout état de choses. C’est pourquoi il ne peut être que créé, et c’est pourquoi la philosophie ne peut pas être uneactivité descriptive, à la manière de la phénoménologie, mais doit être nécessairement constructive.Variations on the SurveyRuyer, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze and the Status of the FormThe main question that I confront in this article concerns the way in which Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze take up the heritage of 20th century finalism. By analyzing some of both of these authors’ basic texts, we clearly perceive their debt to, particularly, the neofinalism of Raymond Ruyer. Merleau-Ponty as much as Deleuze read Ruyer’s work separately from its original context and its explicit intentions, that is, they read it outside of any sort of epistemological demand. Nevertheless, we still find between the two a substantial difference in the manner of using Ruyer’s concepts. Merleau-Ponty refutes the hypothesis of a form that surveys the materials that constitute the ideal organization, but valorizes the idea of an immanent thematism, of an essence that only subsists within its variations. Deleuze, for his part, appears by contrast to take unreservedly into his own account these same notions of form and survey because he interprets them as concepts rather than formal and final causes. The Deleuzian concept is not “infested” with the lived, but surveys all lived experience and every state of things. That is why itcan only be created and that is why philosophy cannot be a descriptive activity, in the manner of phenomenology, but will necessarily be constructive.
204. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Gilles Deleuze, Claudio Rozzoni Corso Vincennes – Saint Denis (20/01/1987)
205. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Claudio Rozzoni Breve Nota Sulla Piega: “Una storia come quella di Merleau-Ponty”
206. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Claudio Rozzoni Lo Spazio Estetico: Il “rovesciamento del cartesianismo” in Deleuze e Merleau-Ponty
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L’espace esthétiqueLe « renversement du cartésianisme » chez Deleuze et Merleau-PontyCet essai se propose de développer le rapport entre Deleuze et Merleau-Ponty à partir de la tentative des deux philosophes français d’aller au-delà du courantde pensée qu’on pourrait qualifi er, comme le fait Merleau-Ponty lui-même, de « cartésianisme ».Nous commençons notre itinéraire avec la critique que les deux philosophes adressent à la notion cartésienne de « ligne » – passage obligé pour penser, à travers Leibniz et sa notion de « point », la ligne en tant qu’« ensemble de points ». On cherche ensuite à penser une ligne qui ne serait plus tracée dans un espace objectif présupposé, mais plutôt qui « se trace » dans un « espace expressif ».Un tel renversement de la « ligne cartésienne » produit, comme on le verra, des effets qui intéressent également la représentation de la ligne du temps. Émanciper cette dernière du modèle cartésien signifi e la penser par-delà toute référence chronologique, toute dépendance du temps de Kronos. On peut lire dans ce sens la tentative des deux philosophes pour penser le temps de l’événement, le temps de l’Aion. On verra enfin comment, d’un espace et d’un temps anticartésiens, doit naître, pour Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze, une nouvelle grammaire porteuse d’une nouvelle compréhension de la métaphore. Ni l’idée de métaphore proposée par Merleau-Ponty, ni le concept de devenir créé par Deleuze ne concernent une ressemblance fondée sur une identité donnée. Si la métaphore merleau-pontienne et le devenir deleuzien doivent être en mesure de restituer l’essence d’une chose, une telle essence se trouve, ou mieux se crée,à partir d’un mouvement vers « ce que la chose n’est pas ». C’est précisément dans ce sens que Merleau-Ponty lit la métaphore proustienne et que Deleuze cherche à rendre compte des ressemblances créées dans l’oeuvre de Gombrowicz.The Aesthetic SpaceThe “Reversal of Cartesianism” in Deleuze and Merleau-PontyThe present essay proposes to explore the relationship between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty from the attempt they make to go beyond the current of thought thatwe may qualify, like Merleau-Ponty does it himself, as Cartesianism. We begin our itinerary with the critique that both philosophers direct at the Cartesian notion of the line. The passage through the Cartesian notion of the line is “obligated” in order to think – by means of Leibniz and his notion of point -- the line as a “set of points.” The Cartesian passage is obligated moreover in order to think a line which could no longer be drawn in a presupposed objective space but, rather, which would be “drawn” in an “expressive space.” Such a reversal of the Cartesian line, as we shall see, produces effects that concern also the representation of the line of time. To emancipate the line of time from the Cartesian model means we must think beyond all chronological references, beyond all dependence on the time of Chronos. We are able to read, in this way, both philosophers’ attempt to think the time of the event, the time of Aion. Finally we shall see how, for Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, a new grammar carrying a new understanding of the metaphor must be born from an anti-Cartesian space and time. Neither the idea of metaphor proposed by Merleau-Ponty nor the concept of becoming created by Deleuze speaks of a resemblance founded upon an identity that is given ahead of time. If Merleau-Ponty’s idea of metaphor and Deleuze’s concept of becoming must be able to produce the essence of a thing, such an essence finds, or better, it iscreated on the basis of a movement toward “what the thing is not.” It is precisely in this sense that Merleau-Ponty reads Proust’s metaphors and that Deleuze will seek to give an account of created resemblances in the work of Gombrowicz.
207. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Edward S. Casey, Donald Landes, Eduardo Mendieta, Michael Naas, Leonard Lawlor Hugh J. Silverman (1945-2013)
208. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Elena Tavani Il mondo e la sua ombra: estetica e ontologia in Hannah Arendt e Merleau-Ponty
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Starting from a specific critique of the traditional «metaphysical mistake» (i.e., the distinction between being and appearing), Hannah Arendt comes to supporta “phenomenalism” that is not only radical but also spectacular in the sense that it enhances, not appearances that would replace an unknown being or substance, but an appearing as a unique exhibition on the world stage in view of an opinion to communicate or an action to perform. Along this path, an encounter with Merleau-Ponty’s thought can occur at several levels. Specifically, the thesis of the ‘spectacular’ character of the world is presented in Arendt’s political theory as intimately linked to the thesis of an aesthetic and, at the same time, ontological basis of experience, which relates her thought to the Merleau-Pontian theory of vision as “thought conditioned” by the world and “which advents” as “instituted” in a body that is properly its own (Eye and Mind). For Arendt, thought is not only invisible (“not manifest even when it is actualized,” The Life of the Mind), it is also ontologically visible as “doxa” in which it is divided into “aspects of world” that are revealed in a “specular” fashion as positions to take and show “outside,” to present and defend. This is a valuable asset in the context of political “advertising.”
209. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Informazioni
210. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Ted Toadvine Presentazione
211. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Jakub Čapek, Ondřej Švec Introduzione
212. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Claudio Rozzoni Chi scrive? Chi legge? Il chiasma fra autore e lettore a partire dalle Recherches sur L’usage littéraire du langage
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The recent publication of Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage, the preparatory notes for Merleau-Ponty’s “Monday course” at the Collège de France in 1953, provides further evidence of the turning points of the French philosopher’s reflections during this period. This course, on the style of expression in the work of Stendhal and Valery, is interesting in that it truly reveals to us a unique perspective on the questions that, on the one hand, are related to research made during the previous period at the Sorbonne; and that, on the other hand, find a new echo, a new development in the course on “The Philosophy of Proust” given by Merleau-Ponty in the following year, also at the Collège of France. The problem of the intersubjectivity of the work of art in particular finds a crucial complement in this course. Starting from the work on literary language, this offers a path toward thinking the chiasm between author and reader in an unprecedented way that avoids falling back into the fruitless opposition between two poles: one represented by a purely subjective point of view, with its solipsistic excesses, and one that tries to take into account the communication between two subjects, author and reader in this case, by thinking them as an “already given” unity before the gesture of writing and the experience of reading.
213. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Informazioni
214. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Stefano Micali Il giudizio riflettente estetico nella Critica del Giudizio. Una ripresa fenomenologica
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In this essay, the author intends to show the reasons for the interest on the Critique of Judgment, and especially to aesthetic judgment of taste within thephenomenological context. The study is divided into four sections: at first the concept of aesthetic reflective judgment will be introduced, highlighting the crucial role it assumes within the Kantian critical project as a whole (I). In a second step the specificity of the judgment of taste will be studied with particular attention on its character of Zweckmässigkeit and its universal voice (II). In the third section it will be shown how the judgment of taste introduces a new paradigmatic articulation of the relationship between feeling and thinking, which is further explained through a critical comparison with the interpretations of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Marc Richir (III) of aesthetic judgment. In the last and more extended section, the affinity of the disinterested character of the judgment of taste with the phenomenological attitude will be at the center of the research (IV).
215. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Presentazione
216. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Faustino Fabbianelli Dalla “riflessione radicale” alla “superriflessione”. La fenomenologia di Merleau-Ponty tra Hegel e Schelling
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In this essay, I intend to show the evolution that the thought of Merleau-Ponty undergoes from the Phenomenology of Perception to The Visible and the Invisible. I do so by employing the Merleau-Pontyian notions of “radical reflection” and “hyper-reflection,” which I will consider as expressions of two alternative ways of resolving the task of philosophy: to highlight, in the first case, the immediate relation between the subject and the world, in the second case, the chiasm between the thinking and the Being of the world. There are three main stages to my reasoning: 1) to show the conceptual differences that obtain between the first Merleau-Pontyian phenomenology and the Hegelian philosophy; 2) to illustrate the insufficiency, recognized ex post by Merleau-Ponty himself, of the existential analyses contained in the Phenomenology of Perception; 3) to identify the concept that allows him to formulate a new ontology, and to go beyond the Hegelian dialectic, in the “nature” which is spoken of in the positive philosophy of the late Schelling.
217. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Federico Leoni Presentazione
218. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Federico Leoni Introduzione. Un altro inconscio
219. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Jennifer McWeeny Introduzione. Il corpo del nostro tempo
220. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Informazioni