Displaying: 201-220 of 684 documents

0.078 sec

201. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Larry A. Hickman What Was Dewey’s “Magic Number?”
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Abraham Kaplan once suggested that Dewey’s “magic number” was two. His observation seems to be supported by the titles Dewey gave to his books, such as Experience and Nature. But in making this observation, Kaplan hedged a bit. Perhaps it would be better, he added, to say that Dewey had two magic numbers: he seemed to look for twos in order to turn them into ones. Looking back over the notes I have pencilled in the margins of Dewey’s Collected Works over the years, I am struck with the number of times “1, 2, 3” appears. In some cases these passages are reminiscent of Peirce’s categories. In other cases, they recall Hegel’s dialectic. Dewey’s “magic numbers” are tools that can help us understand the structure and content of his work.
202. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Helmut Pape The Unity of Classical Pragmatism: Its Scope and Its Limits
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
It has been argued that pragmatism as a philosophical movement lacks unity. However, contrasts and similarities are always relative to a level of generality on which they can be distinguished. And, although Peirce, James, and Dewey disagree on a number of important issues, they have quite a number of assumptions and theses in common. The most general and important of these theses is the belief that how our beliefs relate to reality depends on our actions, and that the semantical independence of our actions plays a crucial role in the development of our theoretical beliefs. Although there are other beliefs and assumptions common to the three classical pragmatists, even this property is enough to distinguish the classical pragmatists from one of their contemporary followers, Richard Rorty.
203. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Sandra B. Rosenthal Pragmatism: What’s in a Name?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Pragmatism is a philosophy still in the making, one that has taken (and will take) novel twists and turns as the general spirit of its paradigmatic novelty moves forward. However, when creative appropriation of pragmatic themes begins to destroy this philosophic spirit and paradigmatic vision, such novelty is no longer a further development of pragmatism but, rather, a move to a different position, one that must be clearly distinguished from the pragmatic movement in American philosophy.
204. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Marjorie Grene What Have We Learned from Philosophy in the Twentieth Century?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In general, philosophy does not progress as the sciences do. Philosophers seem largely to follow fashions. Of course there are fashions in the sciences, too, but in philosophy they appear to predominate. So, when I look back at the two-thirds or more of the century that I remember, I see a succession of such fashions replacing one another. At the same time, I see something resembling progress in a couple of fields that I was involved in. Finally, I find us, at the close of the twentieth century, still burdened with one long-dominant attitude that many thinkers, in different ways, have tried (in vain) to overcome—an attitude reflected recently, in fact, in a particularly vocal fashion. Let me follow briefly each of these three lines of reflection.
205. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Paul Weiss Philosophy as an Adventure: Reflections on the Twentieth Century
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Philosophy in the twentieth century, by and large, has not been interested in comprehensive accounts. This development can be attributed in large part to the breaking of philosophy into schools and the rise of professionalism, both of which have led to the reduction of philosophy as a subject. The task of the philosopher cannot justifiably be so confined. He must attempt to understand all the pivotal realities, what they do, and how they are related. Philosophy is an exploration and adventure. I want to engage in it in order to understand reality, to pay attention to pivotal features, and to the ways in which they are interlocked. Philosophy is a discipline in a constant process of adventurous discovery.
206. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
P. F. Strawson What Have We Learned from Philosophy in the Twentieth Century?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Philosophy differs from most other disciplines in that one of the questions with which its practitioners are professionally concerned is its own nature. There is nothing surprising about this since, having no special subject-matter of its own, it is free—and perhaps obliged—to enquire into the special nature of every discipline. But, such an obligation presumes that we know what in general we are—or should be—up to in philosophy. What is, in fact, our objective? To establish how we should live, the nature of the good life? To determine the scope and limits of human knowledge? To achieve self-understanding? If properly understood, I think the last suggestion is correct. I do not mean that we should turn into psychologists or social scientists. Rather, I mean that our essential, if not our only, business is to get a clear view of our most general working concepts or types of concept and of their place in our lives. We should aim at general human conceptual self-understanding.
207. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Jaakko Hintikka, Robert Cummings Neville, Ernest Sosa, Alan M. Olson, Stephen Dawson Series Introduction
208. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Daniel O. Dahlstrom Volume Introduction
209. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Diana Tietjens Meyers Authenticity for Real People
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper I shall offer an account of the authentic self that is compatible with human intrapsychic, interpersonal, and social experience. I begin by examiningHarry Frankfurt’s influential treatment of authenticity as a form of personal integration, and argue that his conception of the integrated self is too restrictive. I then offer an alternative processual account that views integration as the intelligibility of the self that emerges when a person exercises autonomy skills.
210. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Adolf Grünbaum Does Freudian Theory Resolve “The Paradoxes of Irrationality”?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper, I criticize the claim made by Donald Davidson, among others, that Freud’s psychoanalytic theory provides “a conceptual framework within which to describe and understand irrationality.” Further, I defend my epistemological strictures on the explanatory and therapeutic foundations of the psychoanalytic enterprise against the efforts of Davidson, Marcia Cavell, Thomas Nagel, et al., to undermine them.
211. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Jesús Ezquerro, Agustín Vicente Explanatory Exclusion, Over-Determination, and the Mind-Body Problem
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Taking into account the difficulties that all attempts at a solution of the problem of causal-explanatory exclusion have experienced, we analyze in this paper the chances that mind-body causation is a case of overdetermination, a line of attack that has scarcely been explored. Our conclusion is that claiming that behaviors are causally overdetermined cannot solve the problem of causal-explanatory exclusion. The reason is the problem of massive coincidence, that can only be avoided by establishing a relation between mind and body; that is, by denying overdetermination. The only way to defend that mind-body causation is a case of overdetermination would be by denying any modal force whatever to the principle of the causal closure of the physical, and this is a claim we would not like to reject.
212. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Sydney Shoemaker Realization and Mental Causation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if its “forward looking” causal features are a subset of those of the property realized. The instantiation of the realizer property will include the instantiation of the property realized; and when the effects produced are due to the causal features of the latter, it is the instantiation of it that is appropriately regarded as their cause. Epiphenomenalism is avoided, and so is Bealer’s absurd conclusion.
213. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Stephen Yablo The Seven Habits of Highly Effective Thinkers
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
By effective thinkers I mean not people who think effectively, but people who understand “how it’s done,” i.e., people not paralyzed by the philosophical problem of epiphenomenalism. I argue that mental causes are not preempted by either neural or narrow content states, and that extrinsically individuated mental states are not out of proportion with their putative effects. I give three examples/models of how an extrinsic cause might be more proportional to an effect than the competition.
214. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Henry Jackman Belief, Rationality, and Psychophysical Laws
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Davidson has argued that the connection between belief and the “constitutive ideal of rationality” precludes the possibility of their being any type-type identities between mental and physical events. However, there are radically different ways to understand both the nature and the content of this “constitutive ideal,” and the plausibility of Davidson’s argument depends on blurring the distinction between two of these ways. Indeed, it will be argued here that no consistent understandingthe constitutive ideal will allow it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it.
215. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Carlos J. Moya A Proposal About Intentional Action
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper, I want to defend the proposal that one has to be a realist about the existence and causal efficacy of reasons if one wants to have rationally justified actions. On this basis, I will propose to understand intentional action in terms of justification alone, not in terms of justification plus causation. I shall argue that an action is intentional, under a certain description, if, and only if, it is justified, under that description, by the agent’s reasons. The proposal recommends itself as being capable of solving the problem of wayward causal chains and is promising as a way of avoiding epiphenomenalism of mental properties.
216. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Ted Honderich Consciousness as Existence Again
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Perceptual and other consciousness is left out of or is not adequately characterized in naturalist accounts, including eliminative materialism and neural functionalism. We need a radically new start. Phenomenologically, if you are perceptually conscious, then a world—a changing totality of things—must somehow exist. Partly because with consciousness nothing is hidden and all can be reported without inference, perceptual consciousness itself is literally to be understood as things existing spatio-temporally. This account of consciousness as existence does not reduce it to mental worlds and satisfies our conviction of the reality of consciousness—mainly we do not think of it as ethereal or gossamer. The account also explains fundamental subjectivity, as the naturalist accounts cannot, and passes a test having to do with the mind-body problem. It is a near-naturalism. The account can be defended against objections about brains in vats, chairs in minds, and leaving out consciousness.
217. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Ruth Garrett Millikan Naturalizing Intentionality
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
“Intentionality,” as introduced to modern philosophy by Brentano, denotes the property that distinguishes the mental from all other things. As such, intentionality has been related to purposiveness. I suggest, however, that there are many kinds of purposes that are not mental nor derived from anything mental, such as the purpose of one’s stomach to digest food or the purpose of one’s protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand. These purposes help us to understand intentionality in a naturalistic way. The naturalist challenge here is to show, first, that natural purposiveness can explain the intentionality of explicitly represented purposes, hence that it is associated with “aboutness” (as in Brentano’s usage). Second, it needs to show how the same kind of analysis can also be used to naturalize intentionality in cases where facts are represented rather than purposes or ends.
218. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Pierre Jacob Can Selection Explain Content?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s pure teleosemantic theory; then to present two objections; and finally to ask the question whether a teleosemantic framework can be saved from the objections.
219. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
James H. Fetzer Computing is at Best a Special Kind of Thinking
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
When computing is defined as the causal implementation of algorithms and algorithms are defined as effective decision procedures, human thought is mental computation only if it is governed by mental algorithms. An examination of ordinary thinking, however, suggests that most human thought processes are non-algorithmic. Digital machines, moreover, are mark-manipulating or string-processing systems whose marks or strings do not stand for anything for those systems, while minds are semiotic (or “signusing”) systems for which signs stand for other things for those systems. Computing, at best, turns out to be no more than a special kind of thinking.
220. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
James H. Moor Thinking Must Be Computation of the Right Kind
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper I argue for a computational theory of thinking that does not eliminate the mind. In doing so, I will defend computationalism against the arguments of John Searle and James Fetzer, and briefly respond to other common criticisms.