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21. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2005
Stephen David Ross Self Love
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The ownership condemned with such rigor by the mystics, and often called impurity, is only the search for one's own solace and one's own interest in the jouissance of the gifts of God, at the expense of the jealousy of the pure love that wants everything for God and nothing for the creature .... Ownership, of course, is nothing but self-love or pride, which is the love of one's own excellence insofar as it is one's own, and which, instead of coming back completely and uniquely to God, still to a small extent brings the gifts of God back to the self so that it can takepleasure in them. (Fénelon: quoted in Nancy, SL, 94)Love defines itself as the absolute opposite and as the destruction of self-love. Self-love is not simply the love of the self; .... One can love oneself with a real love, and it might even be that one must do so .... But self-love, understood according to the signification the spiritual authors gave to it, .... is the love (which, from this moment on, is no longer one) of possession. It is the love of the self as property. (pp. 94-5)
22. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2005
Stephen David Ross Shattered Self
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the face summons me, calls for me, begs for me, ... calls me into question. (Levinas, EFP, 83)we are difference, ... our selves the difference of masks. (Foucault, AK, 130-1)There are no parts, moments, types, or stages of love. There is only an infinity of shatters. (Nancy, SL, 101)Only the body fulfills the concept of the words "exposition," "being exposed." And since the body is not a concept ... there is no "body." (Nancy, BP, 205)Sense is the singularity of all the singular ones, in all senses simultaneously.The originary sharing [partager] of the world is the sharing of Being, and the Being of the Dasein is nothing other than the Being of this sharing. (Nancy, SL, 103)Dasein is first of all thrown. (Derrida, EW, 269)Starting at "birth," and possibly even prior to it, being thrown re-appropriates itself or rather ex-appropriates itself informs that are not yet those of the subject or the project. (p. 270)
23. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2005
Stephen David Ross Responsive Self
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The word I means here I am, answering for everything and for everyone. (Levinas, S, 104)Responsibility carries within it, and must do so, an essential excessiveness. It regulates itself neither on the principle of reason nor on any sort of accountancy. (Derrida, EW, 272)differance, trace, iterability, ex-appropriation, and so on ... are at work everywhere, which is to say, well beyond humanity. (p. 274)
24. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2005
Stephen David Ross Self Image
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The image, at first sight, does not resemble the cadaver, but it is possible that the rotting, decaying, cadaverous strangeness might also be from the image. (Blanchot, EL, 344; [my translation])But what is the image? When there is nothing, the image finds in this nothing its necessary condition, but there it disappears. The image needs the neutrality and the fading of the world: it wants everything to return to the indifferent deep where nothing is affirmed; it tends toward the intimacy of what still subsists in the void. This is its truth. But this truth exceeds it. (Blanchot, SL, 254)
25. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2005
Stephen David Ross Self Betrayal
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At the centre of the principle, always, the One does violence to itself, and guards itself against the other. (Derrida, PF, ix)The One betrays itself in betraying the other.The self double crosses itself in double crossing the others.
26. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2005
Stephen David Ross Self Knowledge
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When one is asked "What is the most important moral principle in ancient philosophy?" the immediate answer is not "Take care of oneself" but the Delphic principle gnōthi sauton ("Know thyself"). (Foucault, TS, 19)I can't as yet "know myself," as the inscription at Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters. (Plato, Phaedrus, 230a)I certainly do not yet know myself, but whithersoever the wind, as it were, of the argument blows, there lies our course. (Plato, Republic, 394d)
27. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2005
Stephen David Ross Index
28. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2005
Stephen David Ross Self Identity
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Possession is preeminently the form in which the other becomes the same, by becoming mine. (Levinas, TI, 46)If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone feels personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other. (Burne, T, App., 635)The I think must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought: .... they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist altogether in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. (Kant, CPR, 76-7)
29. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2005
Stephen David Ross Introduction: The Subject of Myself
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[I]t is I, I and no one else, who am a hostage for the others. In substitution my being that belongs to me and not to another is undone, and it is through this substitution that I am not "another," but me. (Levinas, 5, 116)The ideas of being "true to oneself," of being one's own person, of being a self-actualized individual each refer us to the assumption that what is essential about the self is its separation from others: that it is "ownness" or "mineness" which defines the experience of self. (Wikse, AP, 1)1
30. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2005
Stephen David Ross Bibliography