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Displaying: 21-30 of 710 documents

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21. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Peter Ludlow Semantics, Tense, and Time: a Note on Tenseless Truth-Conditions for Token-Reflexive Tensed Sentences
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According to a number of authors it is possible to give tenseless (B-series) truth conditions for tensed sentences by utilizing token indexicals in something like the following fashion. (1a) An utterance u of 'Past S' is true iff at some time earlier than u, S is true (1b) An utterance u of 'Pres S' is true iff at some time overlapping u, S is true This strategy has been challenged on the grounds that it will break down in cases like (2). (2) There was no spoken language A number of strategies have been attempted to circumvent this difficult, including the introduction of possible utterances, etc. In this paper I argue that such moves are unnecessary — that the problem turns on scope interactions with hidden modals in the theorems of the T-theory.
22. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Gerhard Preyer Verstehen, Referenz, Wahrheit. Über Hilary Putnams Philosophie
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The main theme of Hilary Putnam’s philosophy is the problem of realism. But to discuss his position in the debate on natural kind terms, his criticism of logical empirism and Tarki’s theory of truth, a reconstruction of his „theoretical framework“ (Rahmentheorie) is required. The best characterization of this „theory“ concerns the oppositon: theoretical names (theory of understandig, fixing reference by experts of linguistic division of labour) versus empirical pragmaticism (truth, reference i.e. the successful patterns of linguistic behaviour). In this context we can identify the problems of Putnam’s philosophical orientation: his „main theme“ of revitalizing realism. The following step is to expose in the context of „radical interpretation“ a position, which may be dubbed „radical contextualism“. This may be seen as an alternative position to both realism and anti-realism.
23. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Mark Sainsbury Can Rational Dialetheism Be Refuted By Considerations about Negation and Denial?
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Rational dialetheism is the view that for some contradictions, it is rational to believe that they are true. The view, associated with the work of among others, Graham Priest, looks as if it must lead to absurd consequences, and the present paper is an unsuccessful attempt to find them. In particular, I suggest that there is no non-question-begging account of acceptance, denial and negation which can be brought to bear against the rational dialetheist. Finally, I consider the prospect of attacking the position without trying to "refute" it, but even these approaches seem unpromising in the present case. If the drift of the paper is correct, the only strategy is to examine the paradoxes one by one, and show in each case that the best account is non-dialetheic.
24. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Klaus Sachs-Hombach Die Simulationstheorie
25. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Joseph Agassi Wittgenstein — The End of a Myth
26. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Bookpublications within the Project
27. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
28. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
29. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Kent A. Peacock, Richard Feist The Einstein-DeSitter Controversy
30. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
On ProtoSociology