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21. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Matthew J. Goodwin Art and the Deflagration of Being: Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Aesthetic Phenomenological Method
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This essay compares artistic and phenomenological methods to show how Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s artistic examples develop his method as a distinctly active and transformative phenomenology. This reverses one view that artists complete something like a phenomenological reduction in order to more adequately express the given. Instead, Merleau-Ponty turns to artists who manipulate, torment, and deflagrate being. Rather than avoiding presuppositions, artists employ them through passively constituted habits to see how they change and are reciprocally changed by their materials. Finally, rather than identifying certain artists or works as phenomenological, this recognizes Merleau-Ponty as ushering in a distinctly aesthetic method of phenomenology.
22. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Michael D. Barber Introduction to Volume 5: The Breadth of Phenomenology
23. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Lester Embree The Justification of Norms Reflectively Analyzed
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Beginning from the equivalence of “A warrior ought to be courageous” and “A courageous warrior is good” in Husserl’s Prolegomena, the attempt is made to show how what these statements refer to are constituted in processes especially of valuing and are justified.
24. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Shazad Akhtar Between Oneself and Another: Merleau-Ponty’s Organic Appropriation of Husserlian Phenomenology
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Merleau-Ponty’s “existential” reading of Husserl has long been controversial in phenomenological circles. In this paper I present this reading in a new light by arguing that the style and substance of Merleau-Ponty’s own philosophizing are organically interwoven with his interpretation of Husserl. This is a case of mutual implication: one cannot fully “buy” Merleau-Ponty’s Husserl without accepting certain “Merleau-Pontyean” figures of thought, but reciprocally, one cannot understand these figures without situating them within the stream of Merleau-Ponty’s reading and appropriation of Husserl. The bulk of the paper concentrates on the latter side of the equation through a systematic reconstruction of Merleau-Ponty’s as a “Husserlian” phenomenology.
25. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
George Heffernan From Violence to Evidence? Husserl and Sen on Human Identity and Diversity: Toward a Postcolonial Phenomenology of Humanity
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In The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936) Edmund Husserl describes how the crisis of the European sciences represents a crisis of European humanity, which in turn involves a crisis of human identity. In Violence and Identity: The Illusion of Destiny (2006) Amartya Sen explains how some human beings get others to see themselves in terms of a singular unique identity instead of in terms of their disparate but shared identities. This paper investigates Husserl’s and Sen’s approaches to human identity and diversity and explores their respective applications to and implications for humanity, rationality, and solidarity.
26. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Matthew C. Eshleman The Misplaced Chapter on Bad Faith or Reading Being and Nothingness in Reverse
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This essay argues that Sartre’s notion of bad faith cannot be adequately understood, unless one takes the latter half of Being and Nothingness into serious consideration. Sartre employs a Cartesian methodology; consequently, his analysis proceeds from abstract simples to complex, concrete wholes. As his analysis becomes progressively concrete, Sartre revises two abstract claims made early in the text. Only after one appreciates that Sartre, strictly speaking, abandons a non-egological view of consciousness and an absolute view of freedom can one make sense out of several especially vexing features of bad faith.
27. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Tanja Staehler Heidegger, Derrida, the Question and the Call
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Derrida alerts us to the significance of the question and the call in Heidegger’s philosophy; he claims that, for Heidegger, these two phenomena are always connected. The question emerges for Heidegger as the question of Being whereas the call is originally the call of conscience. Derrida claims that Heidegger imports unquestioned presuppositions into his investigations. A phenomenological perspective on the question and the call asks how, or in what way the question and the call are issued; it also asks from whom and to whom they are delivered. An investigation of the encounter shows that Heidegger’s text provides responses to at least some of Derrida’s criticism. In the end, the question and the call emerge as two ‘figures of the unconditional’ and thus serve to shed a new light on the unconditional in Derrida’s sense, including its ethical dimension.
28. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Susanna Lindberg Schelling’s Organism and Merleau-Ponty’s Flesh
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Merleau-Ponty’s 1956/1957 lectures on Nature show that his late philosophy of the flesh in Le visible et l’invisible was preceded by a study of Schelling’s philosophy of nature. But what is Schelling’s Naturphilosophie like, and what does Merleau-Ponty actually inherit from it? This article gives an overview of the different stages of Schelling’s philosophy of nature, that starts as a transcendental philosophy of natural sciences, develops through a metaphysics of nature’s productivity and takes finally the form of a peculiar ontology of “gravity” and “light.” Then it shows how Merleau-Ponty’s idea of “flesh” repeats Schelling’s idea of nature as “organism,” except for one thing: relying on “perceptive faith” instead of “reason,” it refuses the general overview on the organic totality of nature and rests embedded in the tissue of flesh. Finally, pointing at a critical confrontation with Schelling that is lacking in Merleau-Ponty, the article weighs the pertinence of Schelling’s ideas for us, today.
29. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Petr Kouba Temporality of Madness
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Even though our primal concern is strictly philosophical, this article has also relevance for psychiatry and psychotherapy, as it is focused on the application of Heidegger’s existential analysis in the area of mental disorders. After a critical examination of the works of Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss and Alice Holzhey-Kunz who based their psychiatric and psychotherapeutic conceptions on the ontological fundament laid by Heidegger’s existential analysis, we try to uncover new thematic possibilities relevant to psychopathological phenomena in the ontological frame of the existential analysis. This brings us to the notion of the third mode of temporality that differs both from the temporality of the authentic existence and from the temporality of the inauthentic existence. Finally, we come to the possibility of the temporal disintegration of Dasein, in which we find the very core of the psychopathological phenomena. The phenomenon of temporal disintegration of Da-sein, however, shows the whole ontological structure of Dasein in a new light which is why it brings us to a fundamental revision of Heidegger’s existential analytics.
30. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Dermot Moran, Hans Rainer Sepp Preface
31. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Ivan Chvatík Rethinking Christianity as a Suitable Religion for the Postmodern World
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In his late essays of 1970’s, Patočka investigates the essence of European civilization—its birth in Ancient Greece, its formation in the Christianity of the Middle Ages, its success in producing modern natural science and its fall in the World Wars of the 20th century. He asks what legacy the old Europe left for humankind in the post-European, globalized world. One of the main parts of this legacy is the Christian religion. In my paper, I attempt to explicitly reconstruct how Patočka wants to formulate this religion in a very heretical way so that it may introduce a wholly new era in world history.
32. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Nicholas Smith Self-Alteration and Temporality: The Radicalized and Universal Reductions in Husserl’s Late Thinking (au-dela de Derrida)
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This text argues that Husserl’s late philosophy of temporal and bodily subjectivity can only be understood by means of the interplay between different reductions. For various reasons, this decisive methodological aspect has been largely overlooked by most interpreters. As a consequence, the cooriginality of the constitution of space and time, which first enables a comprehensive grasp of the originary processes in the living streaming present, has remained virtually unknown. This also means that the proper understanding of egology and intersubjectivity has been obfuscated. It is only by bringing out the bodily and temporal foundations of the lebendige Gegenwart as presented in the C-manuscripts that Husserl’s investigations of constitutive intersubjectivity in other texts can ultimately be clarified. Notably this calls for a renewed understanding of the role of Vergegenwärtigung, showing that the community of streams, not located in my ego but precisely in a manifold of streaming living presents, are united by means of an “intersubjective association”. The problem of the individualization of the “intersubjective streaming being” that characterizes the monadic totality here finds its solution, by means of a ceaselessly ongoing and self-altering duplicity that accounts for my preidentity at the deepest genetic level.
33. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Peter A. Varga The Architectonic and History of Phenomenology:: Distinguishing between Fink’s and Husserl’s Notion of Phenomenological Philosophy
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It is the aim of my paper to explore the chances of a decidedly historical approach to Eugen Fink’s involvement in Edmund Husserl’s mature philosophy. This question has been subject to much debate recently; but I think that the recently published early notes of Fink have not been sufficiently evaluated by Husserl scholarship. I embed the investigation of Fink’s ideas in the contemporaries reactions to them, and argue that Fink’s very specific methodological ideas was already formulated in details before he has composed the Sixth Cartesian Meditation and his other much researched assistant writings. Furthermore, I argue that, although it is not possible to draw a clear dividing line between Husserl’s own position and the alleged influences by Fink, it is still possible to delineate a specifically Husserlian understanding of the methodology of phenomenological philosophy, especially in the light of Husserl’s discussions of the circularity of phenomenological philosophy, which antedate his encounter with Fink. I think that the approach and results outlined here could serve as the basis of a larger investigation of Fink’s involvement in the formation of Husserl’s notion of philosophy.
34. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Silvia Stoller The Sleep of the Beloved: Beauvoir on Patriarchal Love
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What does love have to do with sleep? In her philosophical essay The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir reflects upon the sleep from the perspective of existentialist feminism, focusing on the French writer Violette Leduc and her novel Je hais les dormeurs from 1948 in which she describes how a woman unloads her hate for a man while he sleeps. These few passages remained widely unexplored within the phenomenological and feminist research. In this article, I explore Beauvoir’s existentialist reading of Leduc and suggest some alternative conclusions.
35. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Authors
36. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
László Tengelyi On Absolute Infinity in Cantor
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Georg Cantor, the originator of set theory, distinguishes between two kinds of actual infinity: he separates the transfinite from the absolutely infinite. Whereas the transfinite is the proper object of set theory, the absolutely infinite remains inaccessible to mathematical inquiry. In Cantor’s writings, the absolutely infinite seems to have both a positive and a negative aspect. It is shown in this paper how Cantor’s remarks on his forerunners in the history of philosophy—and especially on Nicholas of Cusa—help us to understand the inseparability of these two aspects.
37. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Hans Rainer Sepp Possible Necessities: A Phenomenological Analysis of Yves Tanguy’s The Palace of the Windowed Rocks
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When Ives Tanguy painted his mysterious imaginary landscapes he realized in artistic form a tableau that shows never-seen, quasi-real imaginary things within a quasi-real imaginary space. The imagination that presents such things is totally free—accompanied by “the feeling of an absolute freedom,” as Tanguy said—, whereas the product is a world that not only looks as if it were real but appears as a coherence of facts put together with unshakeable necessity. The imagination is free because it undertakes the ultimate challenge: it creates imaginary products in a way that they give the impression of being real. This imagination realizes itself like the dreaming I but in a state of not-bounding-itself (better to say: as an imaginative force that both reveals and confirms the self-bounding imagination); and it realizes a kind of world experiencing with correlative objects that seem to be real (comparably to a trompe l’oeil) although they can never be found within the real world (contrary to a trompe l’oeil).
38. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Mette Lebech Beginning to Read Stein's Finite and Eternal Being
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Stein called Finite and Eternal Being her ‘spiritual legacy’. The access to this legacy has been restricted by the difficulty of assessing exactly what it is that Stein is doing in the work. It has been regarded as a work of Thomist philosophy, but a closer reading reveals it as quite critical of St Thomas. After the publication of the appendices of the work, it has become fairly clear that it can be conceived as a critique of the early Heidegger. Stein understood her task as being that of bringing together Aristotelian and Modern philosophy, the latter represented by Phenomenology and the former by Scholasticism. We shall propose (the beginnings of ) an interpretation of the work that sees it as the culmination of Stein’s phenomenological project, as well as a work standing in the tradition of the philosophia perennis.
39. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Alice Koubová The Double Structure of Experienece
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The article aims to develop the concept of powerlessness in relation with the notion of self-understanding and always already powerful being in the world presented in classical and hermeneutically oriented phenomenology. As a counterpoint to this classical position a short inspirational text from G. Bataille will be presented. This concerns the experience of transcendence mentioned in the work Inner Experience. This analysis will lead to the post-phenomenological conception of the experience of powerlessness in which the exceeding transgression took place (necessarily in the past) and transformed as such the classical phenomenological scheme of experience.
40. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Victor Molchanov On the Space of Internal Experience
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This investigation addresses the internal experience as a spatial phenomenon. Ascertaining the difference between internal and external experience as a space metaphor leads to the question of the source of the space metaphors in principle. The analogy between time and space and the space metaphors in Husserl’s conception of time are considered. The question of the temporality of consciousness, evidence, and internal experience are brought to the fore by comparing Brentano’s and Husserl’s conceptions. The difference between the direct and indirect modes of consciousness by Brentano, his conception of time as the boundary in the continuum, and his concept of the proteraesthesis proves to be relevant for the concept of internal experience as a spatial phenomenon. The essay calls in question the self-sufficiency of time-experience and the traditional correspondence of time to the internal experience and of space to the external one. The relation of the Here/There- and Now/Then- experience is discussed. I intend to elucidate the experience of boundary as a primary internal experience from which the space-experience arises. In its turn the boundary-consciousness has its origin in the differentiation-experience. In the latter there is no time, the internal one included, but there is a boundary-experience as a primary and indirect experience. In every differentiation there is the experience of “between”, the experience of the difference between boundary and expanse, of hierarchy and openness, as well as of fore- and background where boundary and expanse can change their “place”, thus transforming the primary space of experience.