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21. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Ke Xiaogang Heidegger's Da and Hegel's Diese: A Destructive Reading of Hegel's "Sense Certainty"
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Heidegger diff erentiates the aspect of referencing from the aspect of substituting in the demonstrative pronoun “this.” This is a hermeneutic of “This” from the phenomenology of “Da.” On the contrary, Hegel determines “Da” from the logic of “This.” Through a reading of Hegel’s analysis of sense certainty in Phenomenology of Spirit, this paper tries to lay bare the free time-space of “Da,” in which the Hegelian dialectic movement of “this” or “meaning [Meinen]” could then be possible to take place. The pivot of this reading is to bring the Hegelian speculation of “meaning” or consciousness back onto the ground of lifeworld.
22. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Holenstein Elmar Natural Ethics: Legitimate Naturalism in Ethics
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It is no accident that the anti-naturalistic objections to an inference from is to ought emerged in the modern era. They presuppose an extremely lean ontology. They presuppose that nothing is necessarily what it is, and accordingly that everything that occurs in sequence is similarly contingent in this sequence. In particular, they presuppose that there is no natural teleology. The objections to the foundation of the ethically good in happiness, pleasure, utility, conduciveness to life, harmony with nature, and the like are similarly guided by predilection for simple concepts. An autonomous value independent of natural desires is presupposed.
23. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Lester Embree, Ion Copoeru, Yu Chung-Chi Preface for All Volumes + Introduction
24. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Cheung Chan-Fai Phenomenology and Photography: On Seeing Photographs and Photographic Seeing
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Although photography is believed to be a copy of reality and an icon for memory, it has attracted scrutiny from philosophers concerned with its semiotic structure and its phenomenological impact. Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre have made reference to the photographic image without any detailed phenomenological analysis. With the help of Roland Barthes’s refl ection on photography, this essay attempts to give a phenomenological description of photographs as seen and on seeing in photographing.
25. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Cho Kah Kyung Husserl and Kant on Intuition
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Husserl recognized the question of the possibility of object in general as the common de jure problem of knowledge for Kant and himself. By insisting that object must be “received” (Kant) or “self-given” (Husserl), both philosophers turned to intuition as the focal point of their inquiry. However, concerning the actual function and range of intuition, their views grew apart. Kant restricted intuition to sensibility, thus erecting the barrier between phenomenal and noumenal world. Husserl, on the other hand, held essence inseparable from fact. Accordingly, intuition crosses over from a merely receptive function of fact to “ideate” or grasp the essence of fact and factual world. Husserl’s intuition is not only “intellectualized,” but also expanded in such a way as to make the division between concept and sensibility—even theory and practice questionable.
26. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Kimura Masato From Intimacy to Familiarity: On the Political Constitution of the Life-World
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The correspondence between A. Schutz and E. Voegelin finally came into print in 2004 through the editorial efforts of Gerhard Wagner and Gilbert Weiss. Taking the comments made by the political philosopher on Schutz’s theory of multiple realities as a clue, this contribution will cast light on the political character of our daily lives possibly delineated by a phenomenological approach. We will especially turn to Schutz’s concept of familiarity which provides us a scope to grasp the political beyond the “animal” description of the life-world.
27. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Jin Xiping Had he to understand the meaning the Being, so far as he is a human?: A critical assessment of Heidegger’s Idea on language in 1928
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Heidegger said in 1928: “die Frage nach dem Sein [ist] keine beliebige und [wird] nicht von aussen dem Menschen zugetragen, sondern in ihm mehr oder minder wach ist, sofern er ueberhaupt als Mensch existiert…” The author is very critical of this assertion. If it is really the case, are the people who speak non Indo-European language still human beings or not? Is it possible the non-Indo-European language speaking people could have latent understanding of the meaning of being without the word being at all in their language? If the second one were a reality, could the assertion of Heidegger be correct that Sprache is “das von Sein ereignete aus ihm durchgefuegte Haus des Seins”?
28. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Hama Hideo Sauntering through HIROSHIMAs
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While “HIROSHIMA,” as the symbol of “Japan, the first and only atom-bombed nation in the world,” is a centripetal force that mobilizes people to nationalism, it is at the same time a centrifugal force that scatters people. HIROSHIMA exists as the arena where those centripetal and centrifugal forces encounter one another. I sauntered through HIROSHIMA as that arena on August 6, atomic bomb memorial day.
29. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Huang Shin-Yang The Social Formation of Psychic Systems
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The sense of solitude is the special feeling that people have on occasion. How is the sense of solitude created? For Luhmann, the operation of conscious systems will oscillate between consciousness and phenomenon, that is, between self-reference and hetero-reference. Husserl considers that philosophy is the privacy of the meditator. This means that the meditator has to live a solitary life, because everything in question can be sought only in his mind.
30. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Inagaki Satoshi Ich, Leben und Trieb: Das Problem des Ich und des Bewusstseinsstroms bei Husserl
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In the Phenomenology of Husserl it is certain that the concept of “I” frames an important sphere of problems. But it is still difficult to say that his concept of “I” is clearly defined. Therefore, in my paper I will illuminate the definition of Husserls concept of “I”. According to Husserl the following thesis is fundamental: The transcendental “I” is always presence (dabei) in all experiences of consciousness. Nevertheless this does not mean that “I” constitutes all experiences of consciousness. Consciousness is nothing else than the consciousness of “I”, but even “I” generates in some kind from consciousness. In the analysis of the stream of consciousness the “generation” of “I” is implicated. During the progress of the genetic analysis it becomes clear, that the stream of consciousness can not be analysed detailed by the egological approach. In the stream of consciousness a phenomenon occurs, alongside the passive synthesis of consciousness, which Husserl described as “Life of drive”.