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21. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Marcos José Müller-Granzotto Esquisse et pulsion. Le regard selon Merleau-Ponty
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Sketch and Drive. The Gaze in Merleau-PontyIn Seminar XI (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis), Jacques Lacan interrupts the first session, which was to be devoted to the Freudian notion of the drive, in order to consider not this fundamental concept of psychoanalysis, but the way in which Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his posthumous book, The Visible and the Invisible, approaches the idea of the subject and how he points to the divergence between the eye and the gaze. Lacan sees in Merleau-Ponty’s thesis concerning the gaze, a certain analogy with what Freud called the death drive. But, concerning voyance, Lacan wonders if Merleau-Ponty does not fall back into a Platonic imaginary of an ultra-gaze from which each body would issue. But or task now is to show that Merleau-Ponty remained faithful to the fact that the gaze cannot really be explained and that his philosophy of the flesh has not reduced the diverse dimension of experience to a central power of constitution. In order to apprehend better the notion of the flesh, we shall bring into play Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the Gestalt, which will allow us to show how, for Merleau-Ponty, the drive is always an irreducible alterity that stops the indivision of the whole from being able to be experienced as a synthesis.Adombramento e pulsione. Lo sguardo in Merleau-PontyNel seminario XI (I quattro concetti della psicoanalisi), Jacques Lacan sospende la prima seduta dedicata alla discussione della nozione freudiana di pulsione, per esaminare non il concetto fondamentale della psicoanalisi ma la maniera in cui Maurice Merleau-Ponty, nel suo libro postumo Il visibile e l’invisibile, affronta il tema e mostra lo scarto che esiste tra occhio e sguardo. Lacan scorge nella tesi di Merleau-Ponty concernente lo sguardo una certa analogia con ciò che Freud ha chiamato pulsione di morte. Ma, a proposito della voyance, Lacan si chiede se Merleau-Ponty non ricada in fondo nell’immaginario platonico di un ultra-sguardo dal quale dovrebbe provenire ogni corpo. Il nostro intento è quindi mostrare che Merleau-Ponty è rimasto fedele alla concezione dell’inesplicabilità dello sguardo estraneo e che allo stesso modo la sua filosofia della carne non ha ridotto le diverse dimensioni dell’esperienza ad un potere centrale di costituzione. Per meglio comprendere la nozione di carne faremo appello alla teoria merleau-pontiana della Gestalt, la quale ci permetterà di mostrare come, per il filosofo, la pulsione sia sempre un’alterità irreducibile tale da impedire che l’indivisione del tutto possa talvolta essere vissuta come sintesi.
22. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Guillaume Carron Présentation
23. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Shiloh Withney Affective Orientation, Difference, and “Overwhelming Proximity” in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Pure Depth: A New Conception of Intentionality?
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Orientation affective, différence et « écrasante proximité » dans l’analyse merleau-pontyenne de la profondeur pureJe montre ici que la théorie de Merleau-Ponty sur l’expérience particulière d’une « profondeur pure » peut être comprise comme une orientation affective précédant l’orientation perceptive, et explique son rôle dans la proposition d’une « nouvelle conception de l’intentionnalité ». Le corps-monde comme relation de différenciation est repensé comme la différenciation intime et pré-objective de cette dimension affective. Je pense, contrairement à Toadvine (2009), que la position de Merleau-Ponty dans la Phénoménologie de la perception, peut être distinguée de la conception sartrienne de l’intentionnalité comme annihilation. La dimension provocatrice de ma lecture sur la profondeur pure vis-à-vis des discours érudits sur Merleau-Ponty est discutée en conclusion, et je pose en particulier la question de savoir s’il peut être utile de lire Merleau-Ponty comme un penseur de la différence.Orientamento affettivo, differenza e “schiacciante prossimità” nell’analisi merleau-pontyana della pura profonditàNel mio saggio, illustro la descrizione che Merleau-Ponty propone della particolare esperienza della “pura profondità” come un’orientazione affettiva che precede l’orientamento percettivo e ipotizzo il suo ruolo nel quadro del progetto merleau-pontiano di costruire una “nuova concezione dell’intenzionalità”. La relazione differenziante tra corpo e mondo è riformulata come quella differenziazione intima e pre-oggettiva che caratterizza tale dimensione affettiva; ciò supporta la mia ipotesi, in opposizione a Toadevine (2009), che la posizione sostenuta da Merleau-Ponty in Fenomenologia della Percezione può essere distinta dalla proposta sartriana d’intendere l’intenzionalità in termini di annichilamento. Concludo il saggio con una discussione delle possibili provocazioni che la mia lettura della teoria della pura profondità potrebbe sollevare nella comunità scientifica merlau-pontiana, soffermandomi in particolare sull’interrogativoriguardo alla possibilità di leggere produttivamente Merleau-Ponty come un pensatore della differenza.
24. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Guillaume Carron Introduzione
25. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Emmanuel de Saint Aubert « Voir, c’est imaginer. Et imaginer, c’est voir. » Perception et imaginaire chez Merleau-Ponty
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“To see is to imagine. And to imagine, is to see.”Perception and Imaginary in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accords such a phenomenological and ontological priority to perception that this privilege might lead him to minimize the importance of theimaginary in our relationship with the world. In fact, in the work published during his life, the theme of the imaginary does not occupy a large place, and its conceptual elaboration remains little visible. A reading of his posthumous publications and of his unpublished papers leads to a more subtle landscape, inwhich the philosopher destabilizes our common oppositions between real and imaginary, as well as those between the imaginary and truth. From themanuscripts from the end of the 1940s on, Merleau-Ponty expands his inquiry into perception in two complementary directions: the intuition of a form of coextensivity between perceptive life and imaginary life, but also between perception and expression. These intuitions, never disavowed, would continueto deepen up through the late unpublished ontological works. They find a guiding thread in the contestation of Sartre’s separation between the real andthe imaginary, and they open out onto the outline of a complex link between truth, imagination, and expression. Merleau-Ponty pretended to approve of thework of The Imaginary all that which is actually moving beyond it, in the direction most opposite to this essay’s own aims: “To see is to imagine. And toimagine is to see.” This split with Sartre finds one of its pivots in the phenomenological characterization of vision as a surpassing of the observable, a surpassing that would touch on an essential dimension of being and of truth.“Vedere è immaginare. E immaginare, è vedere”.Percezione e immaginario in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accorda alla percezione una tale priorità, fenomenologica e ontologica, che questo privilegio potrebbe condurre a minimizzare l’importanzadell’immaginario nel nostro rapporto al mondo. Di fatto, nell’opera pubblicata in vita, il tema dell’immaginario non occupa un grande spazio, e la suaelaborazione concettuale resta poco visibile. La lettura delle pubblicazioni postume e degli inediti conduce a un disegno più sottile, che vede il filosofo destabilizzare le nostre comuni opposizioni fra reale e immaginario così come quelle fra immaginario e verità. A partire dai manoscritti della fine degli anniQuaranta, Merleau-Ponty allarga la sua indagine sulla percezione in due direzioni complementari: verso l’intuizione di una forma di co-estensività fravita percettiva e vita immaginaria, ma altresì fra percezione e espressione. Mai smentite, queste intuizioni vanno approfondendosi fino ai tardi inediti“ontologici”. Esse trovano un filo conduttore nella messa in causa della separazione operata da Sartre fra reale e immaginario, e sfociano nell’abbozzodi un legame complesso fra verità, immaginario e espressione. Merleau-Ponty finge di “ratificare” il lavoro de L’Immaginario, in realtà sorpassandolo nelladirezione il più possibile opposta allo sforzo compiuto da questo stesso saggio: «edere è immaginare. E immaginare è vedere». Questo distanziarsi da Sartretrova uno dei suoi “cardini” nella caratterizzazione fenomenologica della visione come superamento dell’osservabile, un superamento che riguarderebbeuna dimensione essenziale dell’essere come della verità.
26. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Guillaume Carron Merleau-Ponty, Théâtre et Politique. Vertu et plasticité de l’Imaginaire
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Merleau-Ponty, Theatre and Politics.Virtue and Plasticity of the ImaginaryWe will attempt, starting from a course given at the Sorbonne and devoted to the work of the actor, to develop the meaning of the theatrical metaphor in the political philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. Even if the presence of the theater in his philosophy does not seem evident at first glance, it is possible to negotiate his political thought from the metaphor of the theater. This metaphor even allows us to clarify the meaning of a well known expression from the Preface of Signs: “virtue without resignation.” We will then construe the concept of the “plasticity of the imaginary” so as to show how a reflection on the theater opens up a certain understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s ethics.Merleau-Ponty, teatro e politica.Virtù e plasticità dell’ immaginarioA partire da un corso tenuto alla Sorbona e consacrato al mestiere dell’attore, proveremo a sviluppare il senso della metafora teatrale nella filosofi a politica diMerleau-Ponty. Anche se la presenza del teatro nella sua filosofi a non sembra a un primo approccio evidente, è possibile attraversare il suo pensiero politico proprio a partire dalla metafora del teatro. Quest’ultima permette di chiarire il significato di un’espressione ben nota della fine della Prefazione a Segni: quella di «virtù senza alcuna rassegnazione». Si elabora allora il concetto di «plasticità dell’immaginario» per mostrare come la riflessione sul teatro offra a una determinata comprensione dell’etica merleau-pontiana.
27. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Simone Frangi “Weizsäcker et les autres”. Merleau-Ponty lettore del Gestaltkreis
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«Weizsäcker et les autres »Merleau-Ponty lecteur du GestaltkreisConçu comme un élément de l’essai « Percezione, corpo e movimento. L’estetica antropologia dell’espressione nell’inedito Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression di Maurice Merleau-Ponty » (publié dans le n° 12 de Chiasmi international), le texte « Weizsäcker et les autres » examine la plus importante – et la moins reconnue – des dettes théoriques merleau-pontiennes. Cette source « occultée » recouvre le rôle important dans l’encadrement des questions de l’expression et du mouvement dans la philosophie merleau-pontienne. En approfondissant les consonances théoriques entre certains chapitres centraux de la Phénoménologie de la perception, Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression et Der Gestaltkreis de Viktor von Weizsäcker, nous avancerons l’hypothèse d’une connaissance approfondie de la part de Merleau-Ponty du texte cardinal de l’anthropologie médicale des années quarante.“Weizsäcker et les autres”Merleau-Ponty reads the GestaltkreisConceived as a part of the essay “Percezione, corpo e movimento. L’estetica antropologia dell’espressione nell’inedito Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression di Maurice Merleau-Ponty” (published in Chiasmi International, no. 12), the text of “Weizsäcker and the Others” examines the most important – least recognized – of Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical debts. This “concealed” source covers Weizsäcker’s important role in the framing of questions of expression and movement in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. By treating in depth the theoretical resonances between certain central chapters of The Phenomenology of Perception, Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression (The Sensible World and the World of Expression), and Viktor von Weizsäcker’s Der Gestaltkreis, we will advance the hypothesis that Merleau-Ponty had a profound knowledge of the cardinal text of medical anthropology of the 1940s.
28. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Daniela De Leo La percezione mediante l’immaginazione
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La perception à travers l’imaginationDans le présent travail, je mets en relation les lectures de Wittgensteil et de Gadamer avec les manuscrits de Merleau-Ponty avec l’intention de traverser la construction du « concept de représentation » et de réfléchir sur les questions suivantes : quel lieu occupe la dimension esthétique dans l’expérience humaine ? Dans l’expérience esthétique, faut-il retrouver autant le profil émotionnel que le profil cognitif ? Le point de départ est que l’esthétique ne doit pas être comprise comme une simple perception par les sens; ce qu’aucun discours sur l’esthétique ne peut occulter est sa nécessaire implication de l’horizon problématique de la perception, à partir de l’étymologie même du terme, dérivé du grec aisthesis.Un tel terme porte en lui autant le champ subjectif instable des sensation que le champ stable et tendanciellement structuré des discriminations perceptives.L’affirmation théorique est que l’expérience de la rencontre d’une oeuvre d’art dévoile un monde et à peine cessons-nous de voir une oeuvre d’art comme objet pour la voir comme un monde que nous nous rendons compte que l’art se révèle être l’expédient pour clarifier le sens de notre rapport perceptif avec le monde, cette syntonie perceptive entre l’essence du monde et le sentir des sujets, cette processualité expressive dans laquelle activité et passivité sont les horizons, qu’on peut certes distinguer dans la description, mais qui coopèrent à l’intérieur d’elle-même.Perception Through ImaginationIn the present work, I bring the lectures of Wittgenstein and Gadamer into contact with the manuscripts of Merleau-Ponty with the intention of going over the construction of the “concept of representation” and of reflecting on the following questions: what place does the aesthetic dimension occupy in human experience? In aesthetic experience, is just as necessary to recognize the emotional profile as the cognitive profile? The point of the departure is that aesthetics must not be understood as a simple perception by the senses. That which no discourse of aesthetics may conceal is its necessary implication of the problematic horizon of perception, following the actual etymology of the term, derived from the Greek aisthēsis.This term contains just as much the subjective and unstable field of sensation as it does the stable field of perceptual discriminations that tend to be structured. The theoretical affirmation is that the experience of the encounter with a work of art unveils a world. No sooner do we stop seeing the work of art as an object and start seeing as a world, then we realize that art reveals itself to be the expedient that clarifies the meaning of our perceptual relationship with the world, this perceptual syntony between the essence of the world and the sensing of subjects, this expressive processuality in which activity and passivity are horizons that can certainly be distinguished in description, but that cooperate internally.
29. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Stéphane Roy-Desrosiers La Révélation de M. Merleau-Ponty et F. H. Jacobi contre l’intellectualisme kantien
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M. Merleau-Ponty and F. H. Jacobi’s Revelation against Kantian IntellectualismThe goal of this article is to shed light on the neglected connection between Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). It will be shown through certain themes –I) being in the world, II) description, III) reflexion, IV) revelation and the V) primacy of perception – how Merleau-Ponty echoes Jacobi’s criticism of German Idealism during the Pantheist Quarrel, particularly towards Immanuel Kant’s intellectualist stance, two centuries prior to the Phénoménologie de la perception. Through a historical and philological lens, this article aims to specifically demonstrate how Merleau-Ponty and Jacobi share a common ontology against Kantian intellectualism.La rivelazione di M. Merleau-Ponty e F. H. Jacobi contro l’intellettualismo kantianoL’obiettivo di questo articolo è chiarire la trascurata relazione tra Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) e Maurice Merlau-Ponty (1908-1961). Attraverso l’analisi di alcune tematiche – l’essere nel mondo, la descrizione, la riflessione, la rivelazione –, mostreremo come nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty riecheggi la critica all’idealismo tedesco formulata da Jacobi all’epoca della disputa sul panteismo e diretta, in particolar modo e con due secoli di anticipo rispetto alla Fenomenologia della Percezione, alle posizioni intellettualiste di Kant. Grazie ad una lettura storica e filologica, questo articolo tenta di dimostrare come Merleau-Ponty e Jacobi condividano un’ontologia comune in opposizione all’intellettualismo kantiano.
30. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Kwok Ying-Lau Chiasme du visible et de l’imaginaire. Esquisses pour une approche phénoménologique de la Photographie
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The Chiasm of the Visible and the Imaginary.Sketches for a Phenomenological Approach to PhotographyIn the digital age today, photographic images appear more and more through a virtual space; their appearance takes place more and more throughan “immaterial medium”. This renders the status of a photographic image more ambiguous, if not more enigmatic. Is a photograph merely a journalistic tool?Is photographic activity primarily mimetic which is meant to fulfill the function of unconcealment of the truth of the given state of things in the world? Or thistruth function can only be fulfilled by the assistance of the viewer’s gaze and the viewing subject’s narrative which is deployed not only according to whatis visible and present, but also according to what is invisible and absent on the surface of the photograph itself? If such is the case, doesn’t a photographalso comprise a hermeneutical and even deconstructive dimension? On the other hand, photography is more and more considered as a kind of artwork inits own right as it can awaken pleasure, imagination and emotion: in short, a photograph is a work which exhibits an affective intentionality. What is therelation between the representational, artistic, affective and critical functions of a photograph? Is there any tension between these functions? This articleattempts to answer some of these problems from a phenomenological approach.Il chiasma del visibile e dell’immaginario.Lineamenti di un approccio fenomenologico alla fotografiaOggi, nell’era digitale, le immagini fotografiche ci vengono incontro sempre più spesso attraverso un medium immateriale. Lo statuto ontologico diun’immagine fotografica diviene così sempre più ambiguo, se non propriamente enigmatico. Una foto è un semplice strumento d’informazione ? L’attivitàfotografi ca è prioritariamente mimetica? La sua funzione principale è quella di rivelare la verità di un certo stato di cose nel mondo? Oppure questa funzionedi veridizione ha bisogno, per realizzarsi, del contributo dello sguardo del soggetto che contempla la fotografia, dell’apporto di un discorso che investe non solo ciò che è visibile e presente, ma anche ciò che è invisibile e assente dalla superficie fotografica? La fotografia, in altri termini, non comporta sempre una dimensione ermeneutica o decostruttiva ? D’altra parte, la fotografia viene sempre più considerata come un’opera d’arte in senso pieno, come un’opera che si fa portatrice di un’intenzionalità affettiva, capace di risvegliare la nostra immaginazione e le nostre emozioni. Quale rapporto sussiste tra le diverse funzioni che una fotografia può svolgere, ad esempio quella rappresentativa, quella artistica, quella affettiva, quella critica? L’articolo cerca di rispondere ad alcuni di questi problemi a partire dall’approccio fenomenologico di Merleau-Ponty.
31. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Marcello Ghilardi Tra fenomenologia e neurologia. Merleau-Ponty, Goldstein, Sacks
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Entre phénoménologie et neurologie. Merleau-Ponty, Goldstein, SacksLa phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty a traité des matériaux et des éléments de réflexion importants de diverses études sur des pathologies psychiques et physiques. La confrontation et l’entrelacement entre la pensée du philosophe français et certaines recherches de neuropsychologie, comme Kurt Goldstein ou Oliver Sacks, font émerger la possibilité de nouvelles approches de la dimension de la maladie, entre narration, spéculation et recherche scientifique. Un dialogue fécond entre disciplines et champs de recherche différents met en lumière comment toute modalité perceptive, même quand elle se présente comme déficitaire ou déviante, constitue de fait une vraie recréation ou re-constitution du monde et non pas seulement un enregistrement. Ce processus de création continue est lié à une des questions de fond soulevée par l’expérience de la maladie: celle des modes et des conditions de la singularité, de l’identité d’un soi, à la recherche de reconnaissance et d’acceptation de la part d’un regard ou d’un geste que nous savons contribuer de manière inédite à la relation entre sujets humains.Between Phenomenology and Neurology. Merleau-Ponty, Goldstein, SacksMerleau-Ponty’s phenomenology deals with materials and elements of important reflections in diverse studies on psychological and physical pathologies. The confrontation and the connections between French philosophical thought and certain research in neuropsychology, such as that of Kurt Goldstein or Oliver Sacks, allow the possibility of new approaches to the dimension of sickness to emerge, approaches between narration, speculation, and scientific research. A fertile dialogue between disciplines and fields of different research brings to light how every perceptual modality, even when it presents itself as deficient or deviant, constitutes in fact a true re-creation or reconstitution of the world and not only a recording. This process of continuous creation is linked to one of the basic questions raised by the experience of sickness: the question of the modes and conditions of singularity, of the identity of a self in pursuit of recognition or acceptance from another’s gaze or gesture, a gaze or gesture that, in the relation between human subjects, we have the ability to contribute ever in a unique manner.
32. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Keith Whitmoyer Merleau-Ponty and the Permanent Dissonance of Being. The Temporal Extensions of the Transcendental Field in Phenomenology of Perception
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La dissonance permanente de l’être.L’extension du champ transcendental dans Phénoménologie de la perceptionRépondant aux reproches d’idéalisme subjectif qui hantent la Phénoménologie de la perception depuis sa publication, le présent essai affirme que l’intention deMerleau-Ponty dans ce texte n’est pas de soutenir la primauté ontologique de la conscience constituante transcendantale, mais de restaurer une certaine« épaisseur temporelle » (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 459) à la théorie de la genèse du sens. Dans Le champ phénoménal, Le cogito, et finalement dans certaines des réflexions de Merleau-Ponty sur la peinture, l’enjeu dans sa conception du champ transcendantal n’est pas une nouvelle théorie de la consciencetranscendantale, mais la possibilité de penser les conditions du sens d’une manière qui reconnaît leur extension temporelle. Le résultat est que la réductionphénoménologique ne se résout pas à une série de conditions éternitaires, mais dévoile le champ transcendantal comme la dissonance permanente, temporelle de l’être dans son éclatement expressif : le champ transcendantal n’est donc pas, par conséquent, un λόγος, accordingly, mais un cri.La permanente dissonanza dell’essere.L’estensione del campo trascendentale in Fenomenologia della percezioneRispondendo alle osservazioni critiche riguardo il residuo di idealismo soggettivistico che hanno perseguitato Fenomenologia della percezione fin dalla sua pubblicazione, questo saggio afferma che l’intenzione di Merleau-Ponty in quest’opera non è sostenere il primato ontologico del trascendentale, della coscienza costituente, bensì restituire un certo “spessore temporale” (Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, 456) alla comprensione della genesi del senso. A partire da Le champ phenomenal, Le cogito, ed infine da alcune riflessioni merleau-pontiane sulla pittura, quello che è in gioco nella presa in conto del campo trascendentale non è una nuova teoria della coscienza trascendentale, ma la possibilità di pensare le condizioni del senso in un modo che ne riconosca l’estensione temporale. Il risultato è che la riduzione fenomenologica non si risolve in una serie di condizioni eternitarie, ma dischiude invece il campo trascendentale come la permanente dissonanza temporale dell’essere nel suo éclatement espressivo: il campo trascendentale, dunque, non è un λόγος, ma un grido.
33. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Mara Meletti Bertolini Percezione e azione. La pluralità degli stili percettivi secondo M. Merleau-Ponty e I. Murdoch
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Perception et action : la pluralité des styles perceptifs selon M. Merleau-Ponty et I. MurdochAutant M. Merleau-Ponty que I. Murdoch ont souligné la pluralité des styles perceptifs comme un aspect structurel de l’expérience, rigoureusement lié à la configuration morale du percevant. La compréhension de l’agir humain s’insère dans l’optique d’une ampleur perceptive plus ou moins grande, sans ignorer que les évaluations morales entrent comme facteurs d’orientation dans les descriptions du monde. Les deux auteurs posent la compréhension de l’activité pratique en connexion stricte avec la structuration perceptive, réfutant la mythification de pseudofacultés psychologiques comme le désir, le choix, la volonté. Leurs propositions les plus intéressantes pour leurs conséquences implicites dans le champ éthique concernent la confi guration plurielle du perçu et ses possibilités de remodulation qui permettent une réorganisation continue de l’expérience. L’article relève quelques différences de développement dans cette position commune et identifie certains noeuds problématiques irrésolus qui sont l’objet de débats éthiques actuels.Perception and Action: The Plurality of Perceptual Styles according to M. Merleau-Ponty and I. MurdochM. Merleau-Ponty, just as much as I. Murdoch, has emphasized the plurality of perceptual styles as a structural aspect of experience, rigorously linked tothe moral configuration of the perceiver. The understanding of human action fits into the optics of a more or less large perceptual range, without ignoringthat moral evaluations enter as orienting factors into descriptions of the world. The two authors posit the understanding of practical activity in strictconnection with perceptual structuration, refuting the mythification of such pseudo-faculties as desire, choice, and will. Those propositions of theirs whoseimplied consequences are the most interesting for the field of ethics concern the plural configuration of the perceived and its possibilities of remodulationthat permit a continuous reorganization of experience. The article takes up several differences in the development of this common position and identifiescertain problematic and unresolved knots that are the object of current ethical debates.
34. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Elena Pagni Movimento e corporeità in Patočka. Le origini aristoteliche del concetto di movimento ontologico
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Mouvement et corporéité chez Patočka.Les origines aristotéliciennes du concept de mouvement ontologiquePatočka reconnaît dans le mouvement vital de l’existence humaine le fondement ontolotique de l’ouverture-au-monde et à l’Être entier comme totalité de ce qui est: par rapport à Heidegger par contre, Patočka entrevoit dans la corporéité une dimension ontologique fondamentale pour la donation même de l’existence actuelle. C’est dans ce sens que le mouvement de l’existence prend chez Patočka une dimension ontologique fondamentale: il représente, en dernière instance, un facteur déterminant pour l’apparaître et la donation et le devenir actuel de l’existence, qui trouve précisément dans la corporéité le fondement ultime de sa manifestation.Le phénoménologue aveugle aperçoit chez Aristote la découverte très innovante (par rapport à la tradition philosophique qui l’avait précédé) d’un rapport dynamique et coessentiel entre l’Être et le mouvement: au cours du développement, je chercherai à montrer de quelle manière cette découverte assume pour Patočka une pertinence philosophique fondamentale, contribuant à la théorisation de l’idée de mouvement au sens ontologique. Il s’agira donc de montrer comment, à partir de l’analyse de la conception aristotélicienne du mouvement de sa relation avec la notion de substance,Patočka a élaboré sa propre idée de mouvement ontologique et de corporéité.Movement and Corporeality in Patočka.The Aristotelian Origins of the Concept of Ontological MovementPatočka recognized in the vital movement of human existence the ontological ground of the openness-to-the-world and to Being as a whole as the totality of thatwhich is. Unlike Heidegger, however, Patočka caught a glimpse in corporeality of a ontological dimension fundamental for the givenness of actual existence. It is in this sense that the movement of existence takes on a fundamental ontological dimension in Patočka: it represents, in a final analysis, a determining factor for the appearing and the givenness and the actual becoming of existence, which finds precisely in corporeality the ultimate ground of its manifestation.The blind phenomenologist glimpsed in Aristotle the very innovative discovery (with respect to the philosophical tradition that had preceded him) of a dynamic and coessential relationship between Being and movement. In the course of my argument, I will seek to show in what way this discovery assumes a fundamental philosophical pertinence for Patočka, contributing to the theorization of the idea of movement in an ontological sense. I will show how, following from the analysis of the Aristotelian conception of movement and of its relation with the notion of substance, Patočka elaborated his own idea of ontological movement and corporeality.
35. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
David Morris Merleau-Ponty, Passivity, and Science. From Structure, Sense and Expression, to Life as Phenomenal Field, via the Regulatory Genome
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Merleau-Ponty, la passivité et la scienceJe soutiens qu’il y a plus en jeu dans l’intérêt de Merleau-Ponty pour la science qu’une simple dialectique entre disciplines. C’est parce que son évolutionméthodologique le conduit à trouver dans la science un moyen spécifique d’approfondir ses recherches ontologiques, que celle-ci hante de plus en plus sa philosophie. En effet, dans le chapitre « champ phénoménal » de la Phénoménologie de la perception, il est possible de rapprocher certains aspects de son défi méthodologique et l’idée selon laquelle la philosophie tient son origine d’une conscience réflexive, active et autonome dans son ensemble. Je lie cela aux problèmes de la passivité de telle sorte que la science apparaisse comme une façon de saisir la réflexion non pas comme autonome, mais comme une opération du champ phénomenal, comme réflexion radicale. Grâce à l’analyse critique des recherches récentes sur le génome, je montre ensuite commentl’embryologie peut nous aider à conceptualiser la vie comme un champ phénoménal, c’est-à-dire comme un champ qui engendre ce même genre d’opérations qui caractérisent aussi la phénoménalité. Cela nous conduit à voir la phénomenologie non plus comme une réflexion de survol sur les phénomènes, mais plutôt comme une réflexion radicale qui se realise à travers un phénoménalité plus « ancienne », qui appartient à la vie ellemême. Cela ouvre également des perspectives sur quelques problèmes difficiles de la dernière philosophie de Merleau-Ponty; ceux-ci sont abordés d’une manière nouvelle, grâce au rapprochement de sa première philosophie et de la science actuelle.Merleau-Ponty, la passività e la scienzaRitengo che, nell’interesse che Merleau-Ponty rivolge alla scienza, vi sia in gioco qualcosa di più del semplice confronto dialettico con un’altra disciplina. Il motivo è che il suo impegno metodologico finisce per individuare nella scienza una speciale risorsa per l’indagine di quelle profonde questioni ontologiche che investono in modo crescente la sua filosofia. Intendo argomentare tale ipotesi, connettendo dei passi del capitolo di Fenomenologia della percezione “Il campo fenomenico” con la sua sfida metodologica all’idea che la filosofia abbia inizio da una coscienza riflessiva autonoma e interamente attiva. Collego questo alle questioni della passività in un modo che rivela la scienza come una potenziale risorsa per comprendere la riflessione non come autonoma, bensì in quanto operazione di e nel campo fenomenico – come riflessione radicale. Poi, attraverso un’analisi critica dei risultati recenti riguardanti il DNA regolatore, mostrocome l’attuale embriologia può aiutarci a concettualizzare la vita come un campo fenomenico che implicitamente produce i tipi di operazioni rivelatrici distintive della fenomenalità. Questo ci permette di collocare la fenomenologia non semplicemente come una riflessione dall’alto sui fenomeni, ma come una riflessione radicale che opera grazie ad una “più antica” fenomenalità della vita. Questo ci fornisce degli spunti su alcune difficili questioni nella filosofia dell’ultimo Merleau-Ponty, suggerendo un nuovo percorso che giunga a queste combinando il primo periodo della sua filosofia con la scienza recente.
36. Chiasmi International: Volume > 14
Dominique Séglard La Nature. Errata Merleau-Ponty
37. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Marco Spina La rencontre avec autrui. Distance, regard et silence dans la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty
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The starting point of this essay is an article of Enzo Paci, “Prospettive relazionistiche” published in Dall’esistenzialismo al relazionismo, in which the author interprets Merleau-Ponty’s project in the light of a quotation from Saint Exupery: “Man is a knot of relations, and relations alone count for man.” The problem of relations plays, in fact, a central role in all of Merleau-Ponty’s work; hence the principal objective of this essay: to reflect on the originary value of relations in the constitution of the human subject.As Merleau-Ponty himself suggests in his early reflection on affective life, everything in the human being is manifested under the form of the desire of life understood as relation. It is the affective dynamic of desire that provokes reason and configures a manner of being that, through the discovery of alterity, surpasses natural determinisms in opening us to the experience of freedom, sacrifice and love. It is by building on this originary relational constitution of existence that we re-read Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, in particular the problem of the self as relation. This makes possible a renewed approach to the human sciences with the goal of thinking our relations with others.
38. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Renaud Barbaras L’autonomie de l’apparaître
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The goal of this essay is first to emphasize the proximity of the approaches of these two philosophers starting from their common critique of Husserlian subjectivism. By basing the phenomenality of the world on a sphere of immanence constituted by lived experience, Husserl accounts for appearing [l’apparaître] starting from a certain appearing [apparaissant] and thus falls into a form of circularity, the same one that is at work when the natural attitude makes appearing rest on an objective appearing. The aim of these two authors is then to overcome this deeper and more secret version of the natural attitude by freeing the transcendence of the world from every form of objectivity and freeing the existence of the subject from every form of immanence. It is on this sole condition that the autonomy of the phenomenal field can be guaranteed. However, the dynamic approach to the subject in Patočka, which itself leads to a determination of the world as becoming, allows him to account for the chiasm that Merleau-Ponty put forward at the end of his life without managing to ground it, since he held to an insufficient characterization of existence in terms of flesh.
39. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
David M. Peña-Guzmán Pathetic Normativity: Canguilhem and Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Norms
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Inspired by the genetic phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the historical epistemology of Georges Canguilhem, this paper defends a theory of normativity grounded in pathos rather than logos. Proceeding from the double assumption that (a) accounts of the origins of normativity circulated in antiquity (Aristotle) and modernity (Kant) are unsatisfactory, and (b) the determinacy of norms remains a central problem not only for moral theory but also for epistemology, political theory, and even medicine, the author contends that the realm of lived experience (especially the experience of suffering) can help us furnish determinate though often pre-thetic norms that can underwrite or justify “non-moral normative distinctions,” such as the distinction between the just and the unjust in political theory and (especially) the distinction between the normal and the pathological in medicine. With the aid of comparative and hermeneutic analysis, the author establishes that Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception shares with Canguilhem’s The Normal and the Pathological a similar understanding of the norming (i.e., generative of norms) and normative (i.e., subject to norms) character of subjective experience and, moreover, that in these works one can find a “pathic” (or “pathetic,” from the Greek pathos) theory of norms that can give us, as the author puts it, “a new foundation for the very possibility of critique” in our post-Enlightenment moment.
40. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Pierre Rodrigo Après la phénoménologie? Ontologie de la chair et métaphysique du mouvement chez Merleau-Ponty et Patočka
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Patočka discusses «the disaster of the rejection of metaphysics» by Heidegger. In this critique, he has claimed that «Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Waehlens and others» could neither be satisfied with the Heideggerian closure of the ontological sphere onto itself nor be content with Husserlian transcendentalism. In fact, there is a convergence between Patočka and Merleau-Ponty on this point, as demonstrated by a note from The Visible and the Invisible in which Merleau-Ponty affirms “I am for metaphysics” ...We show that these two thinkers have seen that phenomenology always faces, by eidetic necessity, what remains essentially irreducible for it: being. One thing toremember with Patočka, however, is that «we must not forget that the phenomenon is precisely phenomenon of being» even if «the structure of the appearing is entirely independent of the structure of beings.» But another thing is to thematize the relation between the appearing of the phenomenon and the manifestation of being. This implies that “after” phenomenological description a new type of correlation is analyzed.