Displaying: 21-40 of 422 documents

0.216 sec

21. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Richard Leonard La métaphysique de l’arithmétique: une étude sur le role de la philosophie dans les Grundgesetze der Arithmetik de Frege
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Cet article cherche à travers une étude des textes, et en suivant l'évolution de la pensée de Frege, à dégager le rôle prédominant - à la fois positif et regrettable - qu'a joué la philosophie dans la construction du système fondationnel des Grundgesetze. En premier lieu, sa conception exhaltante de la logique, qui fonde son logicisme est exposée; ensuite, il apparaît que le concept "autonome” d'ensemble n'entrant pas, selon Frege, dans ce domaine pur, ne peut pas fonder l'arithmétique; ensuite, on voit que les types violent à la fois la simplicité privilégiée de la logique et la nature métaphysique des fonctions et en dernier lieu, les raisons philosophiques de la théorie des entités incomplètes sont développées. Il apparaît qu'une vision philosophique empêche de sauver le système des Grundgesetze à moins de le détruire.
22. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Robert A. Monk The Logic of Discovery
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I examine Hanson's idea of a logic of discovery and conclude that there is no such thing. Nevertheless, the idea is based on a correct insight—that scientists often arrive at hypotheses through a process of reasoning. I offer an alternative account of the nature of this process. It consists of the development of a precise hypothesis out of a vague idea, under controls imposed by facts or data and by the nature of the problem to which a solution is sought. I describe the process abstractly and use Kepler's work on the orbit of Mars as an example.
23. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Michael W. Martin A Defence of the Rights of Conscience in Butler’s Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In "Nature and Conscience in Butler's Ethics," Nicholas Sturgeon argues that Butler's account of the role of conscience in morality is fundamentally Incoherent. Butler's emphasis upon conscience as the most superior principle rendering acts natural or unnatural is inconsistent with his tacit commitment to the "Naturalistic Thesis" that conscience always uses naturalness and unnaturalness as grounds upon which it bases its approvals and disapprovals. I argue that Butler is not committed to the Naturalistic Thesis, and hence his views are saved from incoherence. This Thesis is not entailed, as Sturgeon claims, by two of Butler's central doctrines, and there are reasonable interpretations of the passages Sturgeon cites that do not conurlt Butler to the Thesis. Butler's view is that the logically primary perception-approvals of acts as virtuous and perception-disapprovals of acts as vicious by themselves can render acts natural and unnatural, respectively, without the need for conscience to rely upon some other superior principle to first determine the naturalness or unnaturalness of acts.
24. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Verner Smitheram Sartre and Ricoeur on Freedom and Choice
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The paper studies the divergent theories of choice spawned within the larger question of freedom in J.P. Sartre’s Being and Nothingness as well as the Critique de la raison dialectique and P. Ricoeur's Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary.All the key features of Sartre’s and Ricoeur’s theories of choice are reviewed while accounting for their similarities and differences. It is argued that Sartre’s theory is best understood if distinctions are made between ontological freedom, freedom of choice, and freedom of execution. In the light of Ricoeur's position, Sartre's description of choice is shown to be phenomenologically inaccurate while his theory of motivation emerges as onesided in that it submerges all the receptive or involuntary aspects of choice in the act of resolution. The sources of Sartre's voluntaristic one-sidedness are traced to his premature leap into ontology, to his existential naivete in seeking direct description of man’s prereflexive experience, and to his rejection of the results of empirical investigations of man.The conclusion argues for the superiority of Ricoeur’s position over both the determinists' interpretations of choice and Sartre's voluntaristic existential interpretation.
25. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Wesley Morriston Brute Contingency and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This essay deals with a Leibnizian version of the argument from the contingent existence of the world to the necessary existence of God, especially with the statements of the argument presented by Father Copleston in his famous B.B.C. debate with Bertrand Russell and, more recently, by Richard Taylor, in his Metaphysics. The essay is divided into two parts. In the first part, I am chiefly concerned with showing how the principle of sufficient reason, together with the claim that something contingent exists, will allow us to conclude, without any appeal to the impossibility of an infinite series of contingent causes, that there exists a necessary being distinct from the world of contingent beings. In the second part of the essay, I try to show that, in a form strong enough to support the argument, the principle of sufficient reason has the implication—undesirable to many, but not all theists— that nothing could be logically contingent.
26. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Daniel T. Devereux Aristotle on the Active and Contemplative Lives
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The paper offers an interpretation of Aristotle's discussion of the active and contemplative lives in the Nicomachean Ethics. In the first section I outline an interpretation recently set out by John Cooper in his book Reason and Human Good in Aristotle. Through criticism of Cooper's interpretation I attempt to develop my own. In the second section I argue that the active life is a life devoted to practical activity and does not include philosophical contemplation as one of its constituents. I then take issue with Cooper's claim that the contemplative life rules out the possession of moral virtue, and try to show that Aristotle's conception of this life need not be regarded as unreasonably narrow. Finally, I note several respects in which the Nicomachean discussion represents a philosophical advance over the earlier Eudemian Ethics.
27. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Baruch de Spinoza, Paul D. Eisenberg Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The following pages offer, for the first time in English, a translation of Spinoza's Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione which aims to render Spinoza's views as literally as possible; the aim is accuracy rather than elegance. In addition to this new translation itself, I have prepared an extensive commentary on textual problems posed, e.g., by discrepancies (all of which have been indicated) between the original Latin and the original Dutch editions of the treatise, or by the difficulties of rendering certain of Spinoza's phrases into English. There is also a relatively brief introduction, and a detailed index (which no previous English translation of this treatise has included).
28. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
D. D. Todd The Philosophical Orations of Thomas Reid
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Thomas Reid delivered philosophical orations triennially, in Latin, at graduation ceremonies in King's College, Aberdeen, 1753-1762. Each of the four orations is a summary of Reid's views on several philosophical topics, e.g. the "laws of practising philosophy"; the philosophy of science; the "theory of ideas". This translation from the Latin text is prefaced with an historical and philosophical introduction to the thought of Reid and his school. The text is footnoted with cross-references to Reid's published writings to enable the reader to compare these early expressions of Reid's philosophy with his mature thought. A thorough bibliography of the most available editions of Reid's works and of the most important modern books and articles on Reid is appended.
29. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Gary Fuller Freudian Explanations, Rational Explanation, and Meaning
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Can the explanations which Freud gives of neurotic symptoms be seen as fitting into the pattern of rational explanation? After some clarification of the notion of a rational explanation, I shall be examining what I take to be the only plausible ways of trying to construe Freudian explanations as explanations of this type--by treating Freudian cases first as analogous to ordinary cases of pretending (Section II), secondly, as analogous to cases of superstitious belief (Section IV), and finally as analogous to cases involving acts of communication (Section V). I shall be arguing that none of these ways of construing many of the Freudian explanations is successful.
30. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Joseph L. Cowan Cans and Can’ts
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
What has been has been; what is is; what will be will be. Where in this solidity is there room for the alternative paths seemingly demanded by "can"s and "could"s? What is the relation of that which can be, could be, or could have been to that which is, was or will be? The suggestions that "can" is ambiguous and that it is implicitly conditional are rejected. It is argued instead that "can't" is the affirmative, asserting the existence of one or more "preventers" of the event in question. "Can," its contradictory, is then actually the negative, denying the existence of a limited set of preventers generally specified more or less clearly and delimited more or less sharply by the context in question. This eliminates one, illegitimate, class of deterministic worries over responsibility, praise and blame, but merely intensifies those of another, genuine, kind.
31. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Elizabeth Smith Antania: A World Without Rights
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In "Antania: A World Without Rights" I argue against attempts to model moral rights on legal rights because they make moral rights appear as accidental rather than necessary features of a moral system. The device of constructing a hypothetical model of a moral system, Antanla, is used to show that crucial features of a moral system, individual moral responsibility, and praise and blame are conceptually related to Individual moral rights and hence that any moral system must contain moral rights as well as moral agency.
32. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 4
Thomas J. Sheehan Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle: Dynamis and Ereignis
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The essay shows how Heidegger's understanding of physis in Aristotle lays the foundation for his understanding of Ereignis. The essay draws on Heidegger's lecture courses, published and unpublished, particularly "On the Being and Conception of Physis." After introductory remarks on how Heidegger reads Aristotle "phenomenologically" in general, the essay focuses on how Heidegger reads physis as a mode of Being (ousia) by reading kinesis as a mode of Being, specifically as energeia ateles (incomplete Being). But energeia ateles is characterized by Heidegger as Wiederholung (retrieve of possibility) and as Eignung (appropriation of dynamis for appearance). On the basis of that crucial reading of physis, the essay goes on to show how physis-as-dynamis is the foundation for Ereignis in Sein und Zeit through the radical transformation of Wiederholung in natural beings into resolve in Dasein.
33. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 4
Lawrence Stern Freedom and Love in Notes From Underground
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The narrator of the Notes is opposed to determinism, rationality, and socialism. He is also a severe neurotic. The solution to the neurosis, missed in personal life by the narrator, is love. But love also bears on the theoretical positions just discussed. For love is what the socialist programs lack (thinks Dostoevsky). And love is incompatible with a calculating attitude toward personal relations. Dostoevsky and his narrator, while making a telling case against the over-calculated life, mistakenly identify calculation with rationality. Similarly, a manipulative strain in socialism is mistakenly taken to presuppose, And stem from, a belief in determinism. But Dostoevsky's true quarrel would appear to lie not with the deterministic tendency of socialist theory but with its tendency to ignore factors in human nature he thinks important. The narrator's personal disaster occurs through his belief in his incapacity to change his life. But, pace Dostoevsky, this does not show the harm of believing in determinism: it shows the danger of counting oneself out too soon.
34. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 4
L. Nathan Oaklander, Richard Gull Emotions and Judgment: A Critique of Solomon
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
We can only determine what an emotion is if we first ask whether or not there are intrinsically emotional entities. To ask if there are intrinsically emotional entities is to ask if there are entities that are necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of emotion-words. Recently, Robert Solomon has developed a view of the emotions according to which there are intrinsically emotional entities. Specifically, he claims that emotions are a kind of judgment. Our task in this paper is to state and criticize Solomon's view. We argue that he has failed to distinguish emotional and non-emotional judgments. We also argue that Solomon fails to establish his "unitary form" analysis of emotions. He has not, therefore, vindicated the questionable assumption that there are intrinsically emotional entities.
35. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 4
Ronald E. Hustwit Understanding a Suggestion of Professor Cavell's: Kierkegaard's Religious State as a Wittgensteinian 'Form of Life'
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The aim of the paper is to follow a lead of Prof. Stanley Cavell's in his paper, "Kierkegaard's On Authority and Revelation." The lead is: "to understand an utterance religiously you have to be able to share its perspective . . . The religious is a Kierkegaardian stage of life; and I suggest it should be thought of as a Wittgensteinian form of life." I try to present "form of life" as a larger picture sometimes necessary for understanding language-games, and to suggest that what counts as a form of life will depend upon what particular language-game one is trying to understand. Sometimes then, a person's religious belief might figure into this process as a relevant form of life. I then try to represent Kierkegaard's religious stage by discussing three related concepts: paradox, ideal interpretation, and subjectivity. Paradox is one criterion for marking off the religious stage from the ethical and the aesthetical stages. In the religious stage, the talk of believers about God is such that it interprets the events in one's life according to that belief. In calling this an "ideal interpretation" Kierkegaard is calling our attention to the difference between this and the scientific talk of hypothesis, observation, and evidence. The religious stage is subjectivity—a way of life. In it, the truth of what one says is measured by how one lives in relation to it. This, I suggest, is quite close to Wittgenstein's idea of a form of life being important for understanding the language used within it. My conclusion is that Prof. Cavell's suggestion is a helpful lead in thinking about the connection between Wittgenstein's "form of life" and Kierkegaard's religious stage.
36. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 4
Gary Rosenkrantz, Joshua Hoffman Omnipotence and Conjunctive States of Affairs
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Certain philosophers have attacked the problem of defining omnipotence by arguing that the following provides at least the core of a successful definition:(Dl) x is omnipotent = df. (s)(it is possible for some agent to bring about s->-x has the ability to bring about s).In Dl, x ranges over agents and s over states of affairs.Despite the intuitive plausibility of Dl, it has been argued that certain conjunctive states of affairs provide counterexamples to Dl, for example:(si) A ball moves at t and no omnipotent agent brings it about that a ball moves at t.First, we show that if states of affairs like si are genuine counterexamples to Dl, then certain strategies which have been employed in the literature to provide an analysis along the lines of Dl do not succeed. Second, we argue that despite appearances, states of affairs like si are not genuine counterexamples to Dl.
37. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 4
Barbara Winters Acquiring Beliefs at Will
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The paper considers the question of whether it is possible to acquire beliefs at will, i.e. directly, simply as the result of willing to do so. In particular, it discusses an argument of Bernard Williams in "Deciding to Believe" to the conclusion that it is a necessary truth that one cannot acquire a belief at will. The argument is first clarified and reformulated so as to exhibit the underlying assumptions and explain precisely what he means by "acquiring beliefs at will." The truth of the premises is then examined. Attention is focused on the most important assumption, which is that necessarily, if in full consciousness I will to acquire a belief b irrespective of its truth, then after the event it is impossible that I believe in full consciousness [b is a present belief of mine and I acquired b at will]. After further clarification of this claim, I argue that whatever plausibility it has results from the plausibility of another claim: Necessarily ~ (Ǝx) (Ǝp) (x believes [x believes p and x's belief of p is not sustained by any truth-considerations] ) . I defend the latter claim against apparent counter-examples and show that it is compatible with the possibility conscious irrationality and has important implications. Nevertheless, I argue that even if it is true, other premises of Williams' argument are not plausible and he does not succeed in establishing that we cannot acquire beliefs at will.
38. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 4
Michael W. Martin Sartre on Lying to Oneself
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
How, if at all, could a person intentionally persuade himself into believing something he knew to be false? Acting upon his intention would apparently require that he knowingly use his grasp of some truth in the very act of concealing that truth and in getting himself to believe the opposite falsehood. Sartre's elaboration of this problem as well as his examples of self-deception are widely acclaimed, yet too often the remainder of his account has been dismissed as hopelessly riddled with paradox and obscure jargon. I first provide an exegesis of the account that displays its coherence and rich suggestiveness. Next I argue that the account falls short of fully resolving the problems to which it is addressed, but that nevertheless a satisfactory resolution of the problems does emerge from a close examination of Sartre's examples.
39. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 4
Elizabeth Smith Another Way to Derive an 'Ought' from an 'Is'
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In Speech Acts John Searle reframed his derivation of 'ought' from 'is' in order to eliminate the controversial ceteris paribus premises. I argue that the elimination of the first ceteris paribus (3a) is satisfactory but that the elimination of (4a) renders questionable his claim that an 'ought' statement follows from the premises categorically. Further I argue that the use of dilemma in the proof will enable us to show that an 'ought' statement follows from the premises whether everything (at step 4a) is equal or not. Thus Searle's original and clearer conclusion can be saved. Moreover, this proof technique allows us to more clearly illustrate some important features of obligation.
40. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 4
Helen E. Longino Inferring
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper is a discussion of the nature of inferring and focusses on the relation between reasons for belief and causes of belief. Two standard approaches to the analysis of inference, the epistemological and the psychological, are identified and discussed. While both approaches incorporate insights concerning, inference, counterexamples show that neither provides by itself an adequate account. A third account is developed and recommended on the grounds that it encompasses the essential insights of the rejected analyses while being immune to their counterexamples. On this account coming to believe for a reason is taken to be central to our concept of inferring, but a causal relation holds between taking something to be a reason and belief.