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21. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Susan Haack Epistemology: Who Needs It?
22. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Gert-Jan van der Heiden Technology and Formation: Stiegler on Event and Self-Care
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This essay critically examines how Bernard Stiegler addresses the question of present-day technological developments and how they affect our understanding of education and self-formation. The first section is devoted to an account of the basics of Stiegler’s understanding of the relationship between technology and humanity as well as of his characterization of the specific problems that characterize technology today. The main part of the essay analyzes how the questions of self-care, self-formation and education are addressed in relation to these specific problems. Stiegler addresses these problems in terms of the Derridean vocabulary of the pharmakon, and accounts for the present-day technological inventions in terms of pharmacological events. It is shown that Stiegler’s account of education is difficult to combine with his attention to the pharmakon as well as to the event. In the concluding section, it is suggested that the question of self-formation in relation to pharmacological events should be reinterpreted in terms of the concept of experience.
23. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
James Wetzel Scenes of Inner Devastation: Confessional Improvisation
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Wittgenstein and Cavell have both been alerting me over the years to unsettling possibilities: that secularization is not always a lessening of religious intensity, that philosophy can be a religious calling, that God is less real in our theories than in the grammar of our lives. In short, I have been made aware of the possibility of a secular confession, not as an amputated version of the religious original, but as a genuine improvisation: a way of speaking to God without having to say much, if anything, about God. When Cavell’s hefty memoir came out in 2010, some thirty years after my first encounter with his writing, I assumed I would have my chance to test this possibility. This essay is the outcome of that testing.
24. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Nicholas Rescher Ideas
25. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Ralph D. Ellis Moral Hermeneutics, Coherence Epistemology, and the Role of Emotion
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Coherence requires more than logical consistency. Self-consistent viewpoints notoriously conflict with each other. Besides avoid logical selfcontradiction, coherent viewpoints must of course be consistent with empirical facts, including any social and interpersonal emotional facts that may be shared by all humans. But since these sets of facts are inherently probabilistic, they again lend themselves to motivated hermeneutical tweaking to make them fit one’s initial prejudices and presuppositions, trapping us again in the “hermeneutic circle” – the fact that we cannot know how much our previously-existing worldview motivates selective facts, proliferation of ad hoc hypotheses, choice of “moral intuitions,” etc. The problem of ad hoc hypotheses thus becomes crucial. Proliferation of ungrounded assumptions is motivated emotionally in the same way that believing a “conspiracy” theory requires positing unproven assumptions. Moral theory requires studying the way our emotions play into these moral “conspiracy theories.” Contemporary neuropsychology of emotion suggests that a certain kind of inner conflict model – one that grants autonomy to the exploratory drive, but in conflict with other hermeneutically relevant emotions – is especially useful in addressing the complexities of incoherence in ethical thinking.
26. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Kubilay Hoşgör Algı Problemi Üzerine
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Algı ve kavramlar arasındaki ilişki problemi bize Kantçı felsefenin mirasıdır. Burada nesne adını alan şey, zihnin sentetik birlik fonksiyonu yoluyla ortaya çıkmaktadır. Peki, bu algıda verilene kavramsal olanın eklenmesi işlemi zihnin biricik fonksiyonu olabilir mi? Eğer öyle olsaydı algı veya duyum ile kavramlar arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklamak pek güç olacaktı. Çünkü bu durumda dışsal-duyusal ile içsel-kavramsal olan arasındaki ilişki ancak bir üçüncü bağlantı aracılığıyla açıklanabilir. Oysa zihnin kavramsal-teorik fonksiyonu dışında daha başka fonksiyonları da vardır. Yani algı yalnızca nesnenin algısı olarak sınırlandırılamaz. Kavramlar algıdan tamamen farklı olmak şöyle dursun, aksine algının kendisi de bir zihinsel süreçtir. Bir başka deyişle Kant’a göre kavramlar aprioridir. Ben de bu görüşe katılıyorum ama burada asıl problem kavramların nasıl apriori oldukları ve duyumun onların içine nasıl girmekte olduğudur. Bu soru yanıtlandığında algı ile kavramlar arasındaki ilişkinin de aydınlanacağına inanıyorum. Ve bu soru algının daha arkaik fonksiyonları incelenerek yanıtlanabilir. Bu bakımdan burada ifade fonksiyonunu algı-kavram ilişkisi açısından ele alıyorum. Ben bu metinde yukarıdaki görüşü, Ernst Cassirer’in -bir tür ‘fonksiyonalizm’ olarak tanımlanan-zihin felsefesi açısından inceliyorum. The problem of relationship between perception and concepts is known with Kantian heritage. Here, what is called object, emerged in the way of the function of synthetical unity of the mind. Then our question becomes could the operation of adding the conceptual to the given in perception be the only function of mind? If it were so, (giving the explanation of) explaining the relationship between perception and concepts would hardly be possible. Since in this case a third causal function should be required to construct the relationship between external-sensorial and internal-conceptual. Thus, this requirement could only mean that mind is a conceptual apparatus. However, (mind has many other functions alongside the conceptual-theoretical function) conceptual-theoretical function is not the only function that mind does have. That is, perception could not only be limited as the perception of the object. Concept as a mental process is not different from perception; rather perception itself is a mental process too. According to Kant concepts are a priori and I agree with this view. Yet, here the point is to decide how concepts are a priori and how sensation affects concepts. Once this question is answered, (it could be possible to throw light to) the relationship between concepts and sensation could be illuminated. This problem also could be solved by investigating the more archaic functions of perception. In this context I am taking into consideration expressive-function in terms of the relationship between perception and concept.In this paper, I will address the above mentioned view in terms of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of mind which I define (this) as a kind of ‘functionalism.’
27. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Ralf Stoecker, Büşra Çakıl İnsan Onuru ve Rencide Paradoksu
28. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Ferhat Onur Horkheimer’da Akıl
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Frankfurt Okulu’nun sembol isimlerinden biri olan ve eleştirel kuramın temellerini atarak kuramsal çerçevesini belirleyen Horkheimer’ın sosyal felsefesinde akıl kavramı merkezi bir öneme sahiptir.Zira o, Batı dünyasında gördüğü sosyal ve kültürel kötüye gidişi nihayetinde aklın dejenerasyonuna bağlamaktadır. Bu çalışmada rasyonel bir sosyal düzenin imkânını araştıran Horkheimer’ın öznel ve nesnel akıl ayrımına dayalı akıl anlayışı doğruluk problemiyle ilişkilendirilerek ele alınmış ve diyalektiğin bu iki akıl tasavvurunun uzlaştırılmasındaki rolü tartışılmıştır.The concept of reason has a central importance in the social philosophy of Max Horkheimer, one of the leading representatives of Frankfurt School and who laid the foundation for critical theory and defined its theoretical framework. He ultimately attached social and cultural deterioration which he sees in the Western world to the degeneration of reason. In this study, Horkheimer’s understanding of reason, which is based on the distinction between subjective and objective reason, is examined by associating it with the problem of truth and dialectic’s role is discussed in reconciliation of these two ideas of reason.
29. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Erhan Demircioğlu Against McGinn’s Mysterianism
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There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted.McGinn’in gizemcilik adı verilen görüşü açısından iki iddia merkezi önemdedir: (1) zihin-beden probleminin doğalcı ve yapıcı bir çözümü vardır ve (2) insanlar zihin-beden problemini ilkesel olarak çözemezler. (1) ve (2), çelişik iki tez değildir: birinin doğruluğu diğerinin yanlış olmasını gerektirmez. Fakat savunacağım iddia odur ki, McGinn’in (2)’nin doğruluğuna dair verdiği gerekçeler (1)’in doğruluğu ile – McGinn’in kendisinin de varsaydığı, ‘doğalcı’ ve ‘yapıcı’ terimlerinin standart yorumlarını hesaba kattığımızda – çelişik durumdadır.
30. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Funda Neslioğlu Serin İnancın Deneyimsel Olanaklılığı
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Bu çalışmada, bir yandan bilgiye yol açması bağlamında deneyimin inanca kaynak oluşturması, öte yandan insan edimlerine yol açması bağlamında inancın deneyimlenmesine olanak oluşturması nedeniyle inanç-deneyim ilişkisi irdelenecektir. İnanç-deneyim ilişkisinin olanaklılığı ve bu ilişkinin kuşkulu doğası, Davidson ve Wittgenstein gibi iki önde gelen çözümleyici filozofun konuyla ilgili açıklamaları dikkate alınarak araştırılmaktadır.Yazının ana savını şu temel fikir oluşturmaktadır: Sanılanın aksine, ne deneyimler inanç için sağlam ve kesin bir temel oluştururlar ne de deneyimler bilinmek için inançlara gereksinim duyarlar. In this paper, the relationship between belief and experience will be investigated because on the one hand, experience creates a source for beliefs which leads knowledge and on the other hand it makes the experience possible, which leads human actions. Considering the analysis of two prominent analytic philosophers Davidson and Wittgenstein, the relationship of belief and experience, and the questionable nature of this relationship will be studied. The basic claim of this paper consists of the following primary idea: Contrary to what is believed, neither experiences form a firm and certain basis for beliefs, nor experiences are in need of beliefs to be known.