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181. The Acorn: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Richard L. Johnson Pilgrims in Quest of Truth and Perfection: Aung San Suu Kyi and her Forefathers, Mahatma Gandhi and Aung San
182. The Acorn: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
b. l. g. To the Reader
183. The Acorn: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Hemlata Pokharna Health Is Inner Peace
184. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Sanjay Lal Affirming a Vital Connection: Nonviolence and the Disavowal of Death as a Harm
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Having freedom from the fear of death is a quality needed not just by peace activists; however, it is in particular need of affirmation by those espousing a philosophy of nonviolence. A rich philosophical literature explores the supposed harmfulness of death, but the topic is scarcely discussed by peace theorists. This paper shows the significance of the topic for highlighting the attractiveness of nonviolent philosophy given certain non-religious understandings of death that are well suited for advancing nonviolence. Classic Stoic and Epicurean disavowals of the harmfulness of death are presented, criticisms of the Epicurean position are outlined, and the example of Mahatma Gandhi is provided as an ally to Epicureans in response to the criticisms discussed. The second part of the paper more concretely illuminates the implications that a Gandhian rejection of the harmfulness of death has for living nonviolently in everyday life.
185. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Anthony Sean Neal, Dwayne A. Tunstall, Felipe Hinojosa (R)evolutions of Consciousness in Thurman and Newton: Anthony Neal, Author of Common Ground, Meets Critics Dwayne A. Tunstall and Felipe Hinojosa
186. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
John Nolt Anger, Despondence, and Nonviolence: Reflections on the D.C. Climate March
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Reflections on anger, despondence, and nonviolence are prompted by student responses to the 2016 election, especially given the likely implications for climate change policy. The author reflects on the value of nonviolence, environmental activism, and participation in a national climate march.
187. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Sanjay Lal The Relevance of Northern Ireland: Review of Andrew Fitz-Gibbon, Talking to Terrorists, Nonviolence, and Counter-Terrorism
188. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Court D. Lewis Cosmopolitan vs. Westphalian “Borders”: Review of Eddy M. Souffrant, ed. A Future without Borders? Theories and Practices of Cosmopolitan Peacebuilding
189. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Rick Werner Burdens of Warism: Review of Robert L. Holmes, Pacifism
190. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Bat-Ami Bar On A Realist Approach to Immigration: Review of David Miller, Strangers in Our Midst
191. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Greg Moses Editor's Introduction
192. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Corey L. Barnes Imperatives of Peace: A Lockean Justification for Cosmopolitan Principles
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Cosmopolitanism seems to appeal to liberal neutrality because both are committed to core values such as reciprocity, autonomy, respect for the individual, personal accountability, and inclusivity. Further, cosmopolitanism is legitimate for many only insofar as it endorses value-pluralism in open societies, which is a staple of liberal neutrality. And yet, one might think that there is a moral obligation to create a cosmopolitan community. One can think of this as moral (normative) cosmopolitanism. To the end of creating a cosmopolitan community, certain values ought to be fostered in laws and public policies, and certain attitudes ought to be cultivated. This leads to a potential impasse, namely if cosmopolitanism is committed to neutrality then it cannot promote its normativity, and if it is not committed to neutrality then it cannot promote value-pluralism. I propose a solution to this potential impasse by examining several of the democratic and cosmopolitan commitments of Alain Locke. What I take from Locke is his grounding of both pluralism and moral cosmopolitanism in democratic, time-honored principles that exist in all acts of free association, namely: liberty, equality, and fraternity. These values, of necessity, pervade all political conceptions of good lives because all political conceptions require what acts of free association allow, namely community with others. To this end, I provide an argument for how someone can consistently be committed to both moral cosmopolitanism and liberal neutrality.
193. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Contributors
194. The Acorn: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Greg Moses Pacifism and Nonviolence as Philosophical Mandate
195. The Acorn: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Contributors
196. The Acorn: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Tommy Curry, Anthony Neal, Dwayne A. Tunstall Subjects of Vulnerability: Author Meets Critics: Tommy Curry, Author of The Man-Not, Meets Critics Anthony Neal and Dwayne Tunstall
197. The Acorn: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Duane L. Cady Remembering Mulford Q. Sibley (1912–1989): A Thirty-year Commemoration
198. The Acorn: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Andrew Fiala The Pacifist Tradition and Pacifism as Transformative and Critical Theory
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Pacifism is often painted into a corner as an absolute rejection of all violence and war. Such a dogmatic and negative formulation of pacifism does leave us with pacifism as a morally problematic position. But pacifism is not best understood as a negative claim. Nor is pacifism best understood as a singular or monistic concept. Rather, there is a “pacifist tradition” that is grounded in an affirmative claim about the importance of nonviolence, love, community building, and peaceful conflict resolution. This more positive conception of pacifism aims to transform social and political life. When understood in this way, pacifism is a robust and useful critical social theory. This paper explores the philosophy of pacifism in an attempt to reconceptualize pacifism as a tradition of normative critical theory. The paper argues that pacifism ought to be understood on analogy with other critical theories—such as feminism; that pacifism should be understood in terms of the “pacifist tradition”—along lines familiar from interpretations of the “just war tradition”; and that pacifism should be seen as offering interesting themes and ideas that are worthy of philosophical attention.
199. The Acorn: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Steven Steyl What Can Virtue Ethics Offer Pacifists?
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Though warfare has been a popular subject of inquiry in Aristotelian virtue ethics since antiquity, pacifism has almost never been afforded sympathetic study. This paper helps to fill that lacuna by asking whether and how secular virtue ethics can provide a theory of pacifism, whether and how it might defeat some common/foreseeable objections, and what additional work needs to be done in order for virtue ethicists to provide a philosophically robust account of pacifism. I begin by translating a pacifist argument from suffering into an argument from the virtue of compassion. Compassionate agents, sensitive as they are to others’ plights, will be highly averse to lethal warfare. In the second section, I argue that cases for pacifism like this one, which are rooted in individual virtues, cannot constitute a complete argument for pacifism because of the commonly held view that the virtues are reciprocal/unified, and that such an argument will therefore require supplementation in order to be action-guiding. The third section elaborates on what I call the impracticality objection. Any convincing account of pacifism will have to respond to this objection, and I argue that virtue ethical pacifism is especially vulnerable to it. In the fourth section, I highlight two avenues available to the virtue ethicist who defends pacifism from the impracticality objection. Neither of these avenues is viable without further research, however, so while I insist that virtue ethical pacifism is not defeated by the impracticality objection, I maintain also that this form of pacifism requires further scholarly work.
200. The Acorn: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Arnold L. Farr Viewing the Black Panther Movie through the Lenses of Liberation Philosophy and Liberation Theology: Ryan Coogler, director. Marvel Studios, 2018