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181. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski Varieties of Intentional Objects
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I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of suchentities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all entities which function this way deserve the name of intentional objects. In particular, neither Frege’s senses nor mental contents of the early Husserl are tobe classified as intentional objects in my sense. Roughly speaking, to be properly called ‘an intentional object’ a postulated entity must be supposed to function as a quasi-target of the subject’s intention. In other words: intentional objects are supposed to stand ‘before the subject’s mind’, so that they, in a sense, ‘replace’ the common sense objects of reference. It turns out that the intentional objects that were introduced in the history of philosophy make up groups which,from the ontological point of view, are very heterogeneous. Nevertheless it is possible to formulate certain systematic criteria of classifying them.
182. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Mezentsev Gennady The Character of Crisis Events in the Bases of Modern Philosophy and the Ways of Solving These Problems
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This article is devoted to the crisis of the modern philosophy caused by the generally accepted approach towards the ontology issues of existence and the ways to solve these problems. Before Kant’s theory the fundamental principle of the universe organization in the ontology was the determination of the existence as the number of objects that were independent from the subject and explored as they were. Kant showed then that the subject deals only with the images of its own conscience. The existence became not the thing-in-itself, but the thing, that opens to the human mind. But this experience gave no answer to the question about the differences between the immanent perceptions of conscience and the universe itself. This article reveals that the transition from the understanding of things as independent existing objects toward the understanding of their subjective origin as objects themselves demands more radical conclusions. These conclusions consist of that fact that the ontology should concentrate more exploring existence as the unformed organic whole and not to forget about its general problemsand presentations about the conscience. Currently we can get non-verbal knowledge about the existence itself and take steps of getting verbal one. Separation of the existence as the unformed organic whole from the presentations of conscience prevents from mistake of determining the things created by the subject in the process of universe perception as its attributes (the plurality of interpretations turns into the ontology pluralism).
183. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Wen-fang Wang Ockham’s New Razor: A Model-Theoretical Approach to Shrink the Size of Unwanted Ontology
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I show in this paper how Putnam’s model-theoretical argument can be modified so as to generate a new general tool for Nominalism. I call such a tool “Ockham’s New Razor”. Section I illustrates how the model-theoretical technique that I have in mind can be applied to argue against Meinongian theories. Section II shows how the technique can be generalized to other cases as well. It also contains a brief discussion of the major assumption in the technique. Section III discusses possible objections to my so-called “Ockham’s New Razor”.
184. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Endre Kiss Construing Identity Under the Role of Difference: Some Philosophical Elements of the Actual Problems of Identity
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By 1989, the neo-liberal logics of identity and difference took over the Socialist, as well as the Christian basic notions of identity and difference. This means, neither Socialist solidarity nor Christian love for brethren eases the power of difference. In such cases, difference is not a simple difference, value, or ideology any more, but ontology, moreover, it acquires logical character. While in the divided world difference was based on hidden identity, now neo-liberal - human-rights identity is being filled with concrete contents by an unreconcileable difference. The power of difference is the final state of being different. In the relations of the present, the logic of identity doesn't simply dominate, but it seems to be a higher, maybe straight unexceedably final variant of identity - we are not simplyidentical with one another, but as a result of the grounding on human rights we are identical in our most dignified nature. But in actual fact, political and social spaces show a row of mutations differing from this. This doesn't mean the ideology of identity would have got unveiled, but that identity - logic has become selective in a new way. While the identity - logic is working in the foreground, in the background, a difference - logic stronger than ever before, is operating ruthlessly.
185. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Sun Demirli Bundles, Indiscernibility and Triplication Problem
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The bundle theory, supposed as a theory concerning the internal constitution of individuals, is often conjoined with a constitutional approach to individuation entailing the thesis ‘no two individuals can share all their constituents’ (CIT). But then it runs afoul of Black’s duplication case. Here a new bundle theory, takingdistance relations between bundles to be a sufficient ground for their diversity, will be proposed. This version accommodates Black’s world. Nonetheless, there is a possible objection. Consider the ‘triplication case’—a world containing three indistinguishable spheres, each 5-meters from each other. Since distance relations are dyadic, this version must fail to distinguish the threespheres world from Black’s world. In response to this objection, I maintain that we must construe distance relations as irreducibly multigrade and n-ary. Then these two worlds will be distinguished by appealing to a triadic relation—R3—that three things enter mutually. Aren’t all polyadic relations in principle reducible to dyadic relations? I won’t deny that. But I will aim lower and argue that R3 cannot be reduced to dyadic relations that obliterate the distinction between the three-spheres world and Black’s world.
186. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
David Gawthorne Existence as a Primitive Resistance to Ontological Contradiction
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There are two crucial problems for those who would take existence to be a ‘real’ property. (1) The predication of such a property of a thing appears insufficient to distinguish cases where the thing exists, on the one hand, from those where it does not exist on the other. That is, the property of existence does not add anythingto the concept of a thing. (2) If non-existent things are capable of having properties and identity – which is necessary to avoid an objection made by A. J. Ayer – then the identity of all things with all other things appears to follow. However, if the concept of existence is explained as a primitive property manifest as resistance toontological contradiction then these problems can be solved. The pay-off for considering existence to be a first-order predicate is, therefore, an argument against existing ontological contradictions.
187. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Haidng Yu 多重否定中的整体生成论
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There is no absolute essence in world (esp. it refers to the cosmos of modern hunman beings) The origin of world is also indefinite, which existing everying is possible. When it comes to our modern humancosmos material and spirit of place not two have a cent, constituted the basic antinomy of this world. Material and spirit can’t be separated with each other. In the layer after layer negation of whole have delicate born. Material and spirit are different he essence of the material is an objective system, the essence of the spirit is freely objective; The system is The system is a collection of the unity of opposites of materials the freedom is opposite to he appearance of system. The dialectics is a theory which can be applied to explain everything in the world. However, we should consider itself dialectly, and evolve a multiple and stereoscopic but not flexible philopsophical theory.
188. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Chen Lixin An Ontological Interpretation to Baudrillard’s Consumption Society Theory
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Ontology: An Ontological Interpretation to Baudrillard’s Consumption Society TheoryJean Baudrillard used “Consumption society” to describe a novel transformation of the contemporary life, “consumption society” has become to the symbol of contemporary ideology. From this we can say that reading Jean Baudrillard is very necessary. Compared with what Jean Baudrillard said, what we comprehended is more important, so it is very necessary to analyze Jean Baudrillard’s consumption society theory on the ontological viewpoint. To this, Iattach great important to the follow key issues: what kind of existent character Jean Baudrillard revealed? Hegel’s modern western philosophy participated in the foundation of the Capitalist civilization; Jean Baudrillard was unavoidably involved in, so what is the advancement in theory system? How to define the demarcation to Jean Baudrillard? He animadverted on Marx and appropriated his valuable thoughts.
189. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Patricia Hanna Realism without Empiricism
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In his later writings, Wittgenstein is generally taken as committed to anti-realism. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. Although he is committed to ontic anti-realism, this does not preclude his acceptance of epistemic realism. I argue that the possibility of using practices to fix meanings and to provide aframework for conceptual differentiation of our experiences rests upon a version of realism, which I call “praxial realism”, which does not presuppose anything like a Kantian noumenal world.
190. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Xinyan Zhang Philosophical Theory of Everything
191. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Hilan Bensusan, Manuel de Pinedo Holism and Singularity Towards an Ontology of the Unfitting
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Holism about thought content – especially coupled with a measure of semantic externalism – can provide us with an attractive account of how thinking relates to the world. It can help us to tell a neat story that starts out with the inseparable entanglement of truth and intelligibility: in order to understand thought, to confront it to the world and to give verdicts about that confrontation, we need to grasp a considerable amount of truths. A variety of positions that emerge under the influence of Davidson’s arguments (see, for instance, his 1974) deny the possibility of severing the connection between thought and facts of the world. However, this holisticunderstanding of thought seems less attractive when it is forced to account for our capacities to engage with singularities. A (roughly) Davidsonian conception of thought faces serious problems when it tries to answer questions regarding singular thoughts, de re attitudes and beliefs, and the nature of items of the world that cannot be described or referred to without the aid of demonstratives. This tension between thought and singularity is a well-known one and shows up in different traditions of philosophy. We aim at easing the tension without giving up the intuitions behind holism.
192. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Anatoliy Stoletov Creative Types
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The notion of creativeness is widely used in a number of sciences. The same time meaning of this word is not so obvious as it may seem at first sight. In most cases the notion definitions contain only one of it's meaning features unchangeable: creativeness is a kind of ability to create something new. There are several sometimes absolutely different points of view regarding to the following questions: who is a bearer of this ability, what are the main peculiarities of it’s appearance, not to mention its formation possibility and methods. We analyze these points of view to approach to the comprehension of the nature of creativeness. Demands of modern world to person increase. Creativeness is one of these aspects. Besides this one is foundation of human’s nature. Sodeciding this problem we make a base for solving many other problems. Probably the decision of this problem lies in dividing of creativeness types.
193. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Takeshi Akiba Objection to Simons’ Nuclear Theory
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A number of philosophers today endorse the view thatmaterial substances (ex. cats, stones, atoms) can be analyzed asbundles of “particular properties” or “tropes”. Among severaldevelopments, the theory that P. Simons proposed is seen as themost successful one. Simons’ theory seems to owe its high reputationto mainly two advantages which he claims for his theory: thecapacity for avoiding infinite regress, and the explanatory adequacyfor phenomenon of change. In this paper, however, I try to object tothis high appraisal, by showing that the two alleged advantagesindeed cannot be simultaneously secured by Simons’ position. Tothis aim, I proceed as follows: First, I present Simons’ theory andexplain its alleged two advantages. Next, I take up A. Denkel’scriticism and show that the explanatory adequacy will be lost unlessSimons admits a certain revision of his theory. Finally, I show that asa result of the revision needed, Simons’ position comes to lose thecapacity for avoiding regress in turn.
194. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Chenchulakshmi Kolla Some Perspectives on Business Ethics
195. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Bokyoung Son, Yeonoh Son The Principle of Human Essence
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Even though many people have been looking for the origin of human beings, we still don’t know how human beings came into existence. So far, there are two major theories to explain human beings’ starting point – creationism and the theory of evolution. These theories are so abstract that it is hard to accept either one.This essay presents a new theory which explains how human beings and all beings come into existence and carries implications bearing on human conduct. The theory is called “The Principle of Human Essence,” and it was first proposed by Hungduk Bokyoung Son. He points out everything in the world was created by human beings, for nothing can be mentioned or described without them. Then he asks what the human being is, and defines it as a living thing which thinksand speaks. Next, he tries to determine where human consciousness came from, and shows that language is the source of consciousness. Finally, he explains that language can exist only where it is formed between at least two people, and that consciousness is the ability to discern words. Through his unique concept, summed up in the maxim “Words and Earth are simultaneous existence,” Hungduk shows that two living things become human beings through communication, that mind and body exist simultaneously, and that human beings and space exist at the same time. If words are the origin of thoughts, and none of us can possess language without communication with other people, it follows that no one can be a human being by himself or herself. For this reason, Hungduk claimseach person is the cause of each other’s being, so people exist as mutual causations at the same time. I think that, through his metaphysical principle, he offers clear reasons why we must trust each other, solve conflicts between people, and make a world where people live well together, so I hope to introduce his philosophy to other philosophers around the world.
196. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
DongKai Li 本体论在古中国和古希腊分别是怎样开始的
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From the beginning of human, human’s thinking about the nature object begun refers to the root basis of everything, the people in all the parts of the world , from the far far old time, begun their thinking. In old Greece, there are theory or understanding about the Onto produced by many famous person with big name such as THALES, ANAKSIMANDROS, PUTHAGORAS, HERAKLEITOS. By Herakleitos, the understanding of the onto in Greece got a very good step. While in China, almost at the same age as Herakleitos, China’s understanding about the onto, was standing at almost equivalent level with that in Greece. In China, this theory is called “Yin-Yang, Wu Hang”. “Yin-Yang” means the contrast mentioned by Herakleitos, the movement of the “Wu Hang" means the logic mentioned by Herakleitos. So, by time of Herakleitos, (about 5th. Century B.C.) Greece and China got almost same understanding level about the Onto. but, they are also different. China’s is the way of describe, imagery, while the greece’s is the explain and demonstrate by thinking, by logic. The way of imagery go around without development, but the way of logic could go on for the development. So, in China, theory of Onto stay at the imagery explain, in Greece and Europe latter, theory of Onto continue develop, gave birth to the Cognition, Science.
197. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Xuegong Yang 马克思哲学与存在论问题
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This paper begins with a discussion of the translations of the term “ontology” in Chinese language, and argues that its translation as “bentilun”(in Chinese PinYinorthography) can be supported by ample evidence from the history of doctrine and the tradition of Chinese culture. Therefore, It is necessary to keep this translation on condition that one distinguish strictly “ontology” as a branch of philosophy from “bentilun” as a special morphology of philosophical theory. Examining the history of metaphysics, this thesis draws a clear line of demarcation between “traditional ontology” and “modern ontology”, and reveals themain characteristics of traditional ontology. It holds that although the reformation of Marx’s Philosophy was realized through criticizing traditional ontology, his Philosophy did not abolish the concept of ontology as a branch of the discipline. The ontology of Marx’s philosophy is a theory that considers natural being, social being and human being as a unity. This theory emphasizes understanding the meaning of being from the perspective of a pattern. The main idea of ontology of Marx’s philosophy is that of a practical outlook and practical model of thinking. First, the concept of ontology and its translations would be reviewed. As regards itsderivation, we could find that Ontologie in German and in French both came from the word of Ontologia in Latin, which originated from the Greek. In the literal meaning of Greek,this word means the “logos” of “on”. In Greek, “on” corresponds to “being” in English. As to its signification, according to Heidegger, “on” has a twofold meaning that can signify both “being in general” and “the ground of being”. The former is close to essence while the latter to origin. From the angle ofhistory, Goclenius was the first one who used the term “Ontologia” in philosophy in 17th century. Since then this word was used and developed by subsequent philosophers. Although this term appeared in 17th century, yet its correlative questions had been studied from ancient Greece. The sticking point here is to pay attention to the demarcation between subject and theory. As a branch subject or as a universal noun, “Ontology” is counted in the historical tradition of western philosophy. Here all the problems discussed are public, but the concrete solutions and viewpoints are different. The former corresponds to the level of subject and the latter to the level of theory. These two levels must not be confused or substituted from one and other. That is, different ideas, schools and opinions could bebrought under the same problem. So it could be said that traditional ontology and modern ontology are two branches. Of course these two branches are very different in dealing with the problem of Ontology. This difference could be illustrated as following: (1) What to be→beings→substance —traditional ontology; (2) How to be→the mode of being→relation—modern ontology. Obviously both begin with the problem of being and end with Ontology, while their approaches are very different. The essential characteristic of traditional ontology is to seek the eternal substance, pursue the transcendent nature, establish the base of knowledge, and take the absolute truth as the ultimate telos. Traditional ontology ended with the critique of modern philosophy, Marxmade the crucial critique of traditional ontology in his remarks on Hegel’s philosophy. His critique of Hegel’s speculative method is actually the critique of traditional ontology although Marx himself never used the term of ontology explicitly in his new philosophy. Being in Marx’s philosophy is the real world of real beings. Concretely speaking, it is sensible world, objective world or human world that is integrated on the base of human praxis. The keystones here are natural being, social being and human being. There are some important similarities between Marx’s ontological approach and Heidegger’s ontology, that is, to understand the meaning of being through the mode and relation of being. In any case, the standpoint and thinking mode of praxis characterize the ontology of Marx’s philosophy.
198. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Seyed Masood Sayf The Issue of Existence-quiddity Difference as the Background of the Doctrine of the Principiality of Existence
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The issue of existence - quiddity difference is one of the important issues that were put forward for the first time in Islamic philosophy without having any background in Greek philosophy. Aristotle's metaphysics which is the main source of the first philosophy contains only synonymous and verbal meaning ofexistence. The issue of existence - quiddity difference has no room in Aristotle's works. This issue was proposed first by Farabi and then was completed by Ibn sina. In Islamic philosophy when it is proved that existence in the mind is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it but differs with it and is excess of it, that is, when it is proved that existence occurs on quiddity, this question arises that how is their relation in the outside? Whether existence occurs on quiddity or existence and quiddity are identical in the external world? To this question the Islamic philosophers answer that existence and quiddity are identical in the outside and it isimpossible that they differ from each other in the external world. The importance of this issue is that it finally led to the origination of the doctrine of the principality of existence which is known as the culmination of Islamic philosophy. The main goal of this article is study this issue and its impact upon the origination of the doctrine of the principiality of existence.
199. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Mark Vasilyevich Zhelnov Rethinking Death as Ontological Basis of Authority in the XXI Century
200. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Igor I. Kondrashin The Motion in Quality as the Scientific Alternative to Ideas of Creationism
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Rethinking “philosophy” to-day, it is necessary to think first of all about ontological foundations of the modern scientific universe description and rethink them on the ground of modern scientific knowledge, because until now there is no any precise scientific conception of the structure of the universe, of reasons and movingforces of its permanent evolution. All of it create basis to propose various unscientific ideas of creationism. Until now most of philosophers associate the motion of Matter on the whole only with its motion in space and in time, mixing philosophical and physical aspects of these two principle categories. Generally speaking, the present-day ontological model of understanding the World, the Universe is constructed purely on the basis of only these two fundamental categories. However, a more deep reflection of the essence of Being, if to realize it on the basis of only these two global categories, brings us to the disappointing conclusion, that in this case we have nothing more except a mechanical motion, i.e. spatial displacement of a material point (or a system of points) relatively some point of counting off. To make it normal and logic we should add to the ontological model one more essential part – the motion in quality. So, in order to create the full and complete picture of the formation and evolution of the material World it is necessary to observe the motion of material forming in the three equivalentphilosophical categories: in space time quality. The ideas of the new conception of ontological model become actual supplementation of really scientific philosophical knowledge on the way of a more objective ontological comprehension of our Being, of the law of development of the human civilization and the Universe as a whole. This knowledge can be successfully used for the description of the realistic paradigm of Being, in explanations of the meaning of Life.