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181. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Dan Passell Hume’s Arguments for his Sceptical Doubts
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In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 4, “Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding,” Hume offers three conceptual arguments against causes necessitating their effects. These are a difference argument, a logical, or relations of ideas, argument, and a factual argument. I contend that the logical argument rests on the difference argument, and that the factual argument, when seen for what it is, is simply the difference argument. In effect the three arguments reduce to one.
182. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Denis G. Arnold Introspection and Its Objects
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Traditionally conceived, introspection is a form of nonsensuous perception that allows the mind to scrutinize at least some of its own states while it is experiencing them. The traditional account of introspection has been in disrepute ever since Ryle argued that the very idea of introspection is a logical muddle. Recent critics such as William Lyons, John Searle, and Sydney Shoemaker argue that this disrepute is well-deserved. Three distinct objections to the traditional account of introspection are considered and rejected. It is argued that critics of the traditional account of introspection fail to adequately distinguish potential objects of introspection. Further, it is argued that at least two cognitive states are properly understood as objects of introspection. The conclusions reached suggest that there are sufficient reasons to reconsider ther merits of the traditional account of introspection.
183. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Cora Diamond Realism and Resolution: Reply to Warren Goldfarb and Sabina Lovibond
184. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Mark C. Murphy The Conscience Principle
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My aim is to defend the conscience principle: One ought never to act against the dictates of one’s conscience. In the first part of this paper, I explain what I mean by “conscience” and “dictate of conscience,” and I show that the notion that the conscience principle is inherently anti-authoritarian or inherently fanatical is mistaken. In the second part, I argue that the existence of mistaken conscience does not reduce the conscience principle to absurdity. In the third part, I present two arguments for the plausibility of that principle.
185. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Robert Titiev Arbitrage and the Dutch Book Theorem
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Philosophical writing on probability theory includes a great many articles discussing relationships between rational behavior and an agent’s susceptibility to betting contexts where an overall loss is mathematically inevitable. What the dutch book theorem establishes is that this kind of susceptibility is a consequence of having betting ratios that are in violation of the Kolmogorov probability axioms. In this article it is noted that a general result to rule out arbitrage can be shown to yield the dutch book theorem as a special case. A formal framework is set forth to handle marketplace transactions involving contractual arrangements; and, within that framework, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for ruling out arbitrage. It is then shown that these conditions entail that pricing functions associated with particular kinds of betting contracts must turn out to be probability functions.
186. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Jean-Pierre Schachter The Angel in the Machine
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In “The Angel in the Machine” I argue that the substantial concept of mind is heir to a number of consequences not previously appreciated, included among which (but not limited to) are both Solipsism and Atheism. In addition, I suggest that the difficulties I indicate were to some extent already understood by Aristotle who seems to have laid the foundation for two concepts of mind, one associated with human beings, the other with Angels. His distinction is recalled in the Middle Ages, but seems finally to be lost in Descartes who appears to have linked the angel mind-concept to human beings and dispensed entirely with the concept that Aristotle originally reserved for the human. Hence “the Angel in the Machine”.
187. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Ronald B. De Sousa What Can’t We Do with Economics?: Some Comments on George Ainslie’s Picoeconomics
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Ainslie’s Picoeconomics presents an ingenious theory, based on a remarkably simple basic law about the rate of discounting the value of future prospects, which explains a vast number of psychological phenomena. Hyperbolic discount rates result in changes in the ranking of interests as they get closer in time. Thus quasi-homuncular “interests” situated at different times compete within the person. In this paper I first defend the generality of scope of Ainslie’s model, which ranges over several personal and subpersonal levels of psychological analysis. I raise a problem which results from the temporal relativity of assessments of value, and affects the possibility of objective values. Finally, I offer one example of a form of time-related irrationality on which Ainslie’s scheme does not seem to have a grip, namely one which relates not to a situation’s relative position in time, but to its temporal (‘progressive’ or ‘perfect’) temporal aspect.
188. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Jonathan Vogel Skepticism and Foundationalism: A Reply to Michael Williams
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Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism. (The latter is, approximately, the view that there is such a thing as knowledge of the extemal world in general, which the skeptic can take as a target). I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the sort of situation the skeptic describes (e.g. having one’s brain manipulated by deceitful experimenters). This point can be upheld without embracing any substantial foundationalist tenet, such as the existence of basic beliefs, the availabiIity of something “given,” or the epistemic priority of experience. As to “epistemological realism,” I find that Williams has offered no principled way to distinguish between ordinary chaIIenges to knowledge and skeptical challenges which, supposedly, have no cIaim on our concem.
189. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Béla Szabados Wittgenstein’s Women: The Philosophical Significance of Wittgenstein’s Misogyny
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While Wittgenstein commentators dismiss his remarks on women and femininity as trivial and unworthy of attention, I focus exactly on what they consider parenthetical and of no philosophical value. First, I document Wittgenstein’s attitudes toward women and femininity, and subject his remarks to critical analysis. Secondly, I retrieve and explore some aspects of Otto Weininger’s influence on Wittgenstein. Thirdly, by introducing considerations of chronology and circumstance, I argue that while the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus endorsed Weininger’s views on women and sex, the mature Wittgenstein of the Investigations repudiated them without ceasing to adrnire his work or its spirit. Finally, I sketch crucial, unnoticed differences between Weininger and the mature Wittgenstein concerning femininity and philosophical method. The author’s intention is to contribute to the project of challenging the supposed divide between the understanding of philosophical thought, on the one hand, and socio-cultural contexts and biography on the other.
190. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Julian Dodd Indirect Speech, Parataxis and the Nature of Things Said
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This paper makes the following recommendation when it comes to the IogicaI form of sentences in indirect speech. Davidson’s paratactic account shouId stand, but with one emendation: the demonstrative ‘that’ should be taken to refer to the Fregean Thought expressed by the utterance of the content-sentence, rather than to that utterance itseIf. The argument for this emendation is that it is the onIy way of repIying to the objections to Davidson’s account raised by Schiffer, McFetridge and McDowell.Towards the end of the paper, a view of Fregean Thoughts as utterance-types is defended; and the recommendation offered in the main body of the paper is distinguished from the simiIar account offered by Ian Rumfitt.
191. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Jonathan Kvanvig In Defense of Coherentism
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Alvin Plantinga and John Pollock both think that coherentism is a mistaken theory of justification, and they do so for different reasons. In spite of these differences, there are remarkable connections between their criticisms. Part of my goal here is to show what these connections are. I will show that Plantinga’s construal of coherentism presupposes Pollock’s arguments against that view, and I will argue that coherentists need not breathe their last in response to the contentions of either. Coherentism may be a mistaken theory of justification, but if it is, it is not shown to be so by either Plantinga or Pollock.
192. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Warren Goldfarb Metaphysics and Nonsense: On Cora Diamond’s The Realistic Spirit
193. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Douglas Low Merleau-Ponty and the Liberal/Communitarian Debate
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The main goal of this essay is to bring the works of Merleau-Ponty to bear on the liberal/communitarian debate. His works antedate and in many ways anticipate the themes currently being raised by this debate. I hope to show that Merleau-Ponty comes between liberalism and communitarianism. On the one hand, he supports liberalism’s claim about the importance of individual rights, yet on the other hand, he supports communitarianism by claiming that without certain social and political communities, to which we owe allegiance, these rights would be non-existent.
194. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Leslie D. Feldman Freedom as Motion: Thomas Hobbes and the Images of Liberalism
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Central to the argument of this article is the sense in which Thomas Hobbes and liberals see freedom as centered around the notion of free movement. Hobbes, in chapter 21 of Leviathan, describes freedom as “the absence of opposition” to motion. This work argues that the Hobbesian view of freedom as motion was taken up by liberalism as its hallmark and flourished most of all in America where emphasis on individualism was greatest. In America, movement coupled with individualism to create a conception of freedom.
195. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Daniel Berthold-Bond Hegel and Marx on Nature and Ecology
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While neither Hegel nor Marx can be called “ecologists” in any strict sense of the term, they both present views of the human-nature relationship which offer important insights for contemporary debates in philosophical ecology. Further, while Marx and Engels began a tradition of sharply distinguishing their own views of nature from those of Hegel, careful examination reveals a substantial commonality of sentiment. The essay compares Hegel and Marx (and Engels) in terms of their basic conceptions of nature, their critiques of Romanitic nature-worship, their notions of how a meaningful unity with nature requires the act of socially transforming nature, their respective calls for a new science of nature, and their attitudes towards technology. I argue that we can uncover a largely shared humanistic orientation toward nature, and I situate this view within contemporary debates about the anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric foundation of ecological thinking.
196. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Nigel J. T. Thomas Imagery and the Coherence of Imagination: A Critique of White
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Traditionally ‘imagination’ primarily denotes the faculty of mental imagery, other usages being derivative. However, contemporary philosophers commonly hold it to be a polysemous term, with several unrelated senses. This effectively eliminates this culturally important concept as an appropriate explanandum for science, and paves the way for a thoroughgoing eliminative materialism. White challenges both these views of imagination, arguing that ‘imagine’ never means ‘suppose,’ ‘believe,’ ‘pretend’ or ‘visualize,’ that imagery may occur without imagination, and that the true sense of ‘imagine’ is (roughly) ‘think of as possibly being so.’ I defend a version of the traditional view. The disseverance of imagination from imagery is motivated by an implicit version of the theory of mental images as pictures. Other contemporary scientific theories of imagery do not entail it. I defend a view of imagery as arising from the interpretative aspect of perception (‘seeing-as’) and connect this, and our contemporary concept of imagination, to the root Aristotelian concept of φαντασία.This captures the association between imagination and creativity, and reveals the coherence of the concept, more plausibly than White’s theory.
197. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Richard Lind A Micro-Phenomenology of Consonance and Dissonance
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“Consonance” and “dissonance” can be shown to denote a syndrome of relative characteristics falling within three distinct dimensions of experience: 1) tension-repose, 2) pleasure-displeasure, 3) coherence-incoherence. There is a demonstrable, complex relationship between the specific degree of each of those characteristics associated with a particular tonal interval and the degree of complication of the ratio of that interval. No extant theory is able to explain that correlation, including the currently popular theory of psychological expectation. Using micro-phenomenology, I hypothesize that a consonant tonal interval is simply one that can be subliminally discriminated with relative ease and a dissonant interval is one that is relatively indiscriminable. Predictions implied by the hypothesis can be shown consistent with musical experience. If the theory is true, the affective character of harmonic progression is more the result of the need to discriminate tonal proportionality than the effect of expectation.
198. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Andrew Kelley Intuition and Immediacy in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
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In this paper, I provide an account of what Kant means by “intuition” [Anschauung] in the Critique of Pure Reason. The issue is whether “intuition” should be understood in terms of (1) singularity (e.g., singular concepts, singular representation, etc.), or (2) immediacy in knowledge. By considering issues intemal to the Critique, such as the nature of transcendental logic, the type of intuition God exhibits, and Kant’s use of the term “Anschauung,” I argue that the most fundamental way to view intuition is in terms of immediacy. More specifically, “immediacy” means that intuition is that through which the existence of an object, or the matter that goes into making an object, is given to the mind.
199. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Aaron Ben-Ze’ev Appraisal Theories of Emotions
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Today appraisal theories are the foremost approach to emotions in philosophy and psychology. The general assumption underlying these theories is that evaluations (appraisals) are the most crucial factor in emotions. This assumption may imply that: (a) evaluative pattems distinguish one emotion from another; (b) evaluative pattems distinguish emotions from nonemotions; (e) emotional evaluations of the eliciting event determine emotional intensity. These claims are not necessarily related. Accepting one of them does not necessarily imply acceptance of the others. I believe that whereas (b) is false, (a) and (c) are basically true.
200. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 22
Sabina Lovibond The ‘Late Seriousness’ of Cora Diamond