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161. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Hans Poser The Multiplicity of Languages and the Unity of Reason: A Leibnizian Approach
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Nothing is as complex as the world – but soon we must master this complexity to be able to live in it. Our means to do so are the languages. However, they are so manifold and so differently in vocabulary, structure and in the way linked with the world that it is difficult to ascribe to them a common relation. Noam Chomsky’s empirical search for a deep structure grammar had no success. For Leibniz our actual world is infinitely complex, beginning with the monad and its subordinated “worlds in the worlds”. Thus exactly our problem constellation of today can already be found there–namely how to master infinite complexity by languages. But what connects these languages? This will be discussed from (1) the representational function of signs concerning the connection between res / signum / notio / idea, via (2) the Ars characteristica and its formal-linguistic sign systems; the next step counts (3) for the natural languages and their functions, marked above all by an adaptation to new problems. The last step deals with the functions of languages, finally leading to the unity of reason.
162. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Patrick Gamez Leibniz, Absolute Space and the Identity of Indiscernibles
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The goal of this paper is to set out the structure and order of Leibniz’s discussion of the so-called “static shift,” in his correspondence in Clarke. The immediate point of this exercise is to determine precisely how Leibniz puts to use his two famous principles – the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and the Principleof Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) – in constructing, and defending his relational view of space, while providing a refutation of Absolute Space. In specific, it is to set out an interpretation of this argument contrary to the generally accepted one – here represented by Chernoff – about the use of the PII.
163. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Dongkai Li 哲学的混乱是因为丢失了研究对象
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It could be said that after Hegel’s, Philosophy in the world begun its downturn, falling in chaos during more than one hundred years. The Science study the specific thing replaced the philosophy as the King position in human’s knowledge. But, in fact, the science was born by philosophy. From 19th century, people could study the specific object by way of science, not philosophy. Of course, the best way to study the specific thing is the science. But, to study the onto, science does not work. The onto is the target object of philosophy. The specific object is not the target study object of philosophy! The object for philosophy is the onto. But, in 19th and 20th century, people did not know this very well, viewing all the specific thing was studied very well by science, the scholars of philosophy were very upset. this is because they did not know the target object of philosophy is the onto, not the specific object. If they want to get a kind of specific object in nature to be the object of philosophy, of course, they would get defeated by the science, which was really the history. Finally, some got a field, called the phenomena, then, the phenomenology begun, but the phenomenology is not philosophy. Now, the human have got very large achievement in study of nature object. as per ontology and cognition logic, the onto is the root basis of every object, but, to get to know the specific object is the correct way for to get to know the onto. Now, with theachievement of study various object, philosophy could get new progress in study the onto. Following is the abstract explain why the phenomenology is not philosophy. From the very beginning of philosophy, people know the reality, the onto is hided in the phenomena, philosophy’s task is to find out the essence, the reality hided in the phenomena. At the time about early 20th century, there came out a kind of philosophy, called Phenomenology, ever developed ardently during last century for several decades, even now, it is still there, continue split philosophy, bring confusion to philosophy. Philosophy was produced by study the essence of object, especially the onto of everything. but in Phenomenology, there is no essence or the onto hided in the nature, it regard the phenomena as the study object, it deny the onto exists. The onto is the target object of philosophy over the past 2000 more years, but the phenomenology deny the onto, then, how could the phenomenology still regard itself as “philosophy”? Obviously, the phenomenology is not philosophy. Of course, the onto is there, longlive with the nature, the sun, the space. To get to know the onto, is the long live study for human. So, the phenomenology is wrong, at least wrong in the regard of the philosophy. Because of phenomenology’s ridiculous study object and theme, it produced various kinds of ridiculous answer and explain, by its main study such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and latter, The structuralism, post structuralism and post modernism ect.. Finally, philosophy was split, falling apart in everything, it seemed any kind thing or phenomena could produce a kind of philosophy, what more ridiculous is any kind of phenomena ever expected to explain the nature the world the space by its several points of view about itself. this make philosophy look like garbage, loss the glory it ever had. Now, it is high time to say that the phenomenology, since it deny the essence and the onto in the nature, is not philosophy. It shall not be called as philosophy. philosophy’s target object is the onto, which is the root basis of everything, the root theory in the space.
164. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Teppei Baba Is Berkeley's Theory of Ideas a Variant of Locke's?
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I try to show that Berkeley's theory of ideas is not a variant of Locke's. We can find such an interpretation of Berkeley in Thomas Reid. So, we could call this interpretation a 'traditional interpretation'. This traditional interpretation has an influence still now, for example, Tomida interprets Berkeley in this line (Tomida2002). We will see that this traditional interpretation gives a serious problem to Berkeley (section 1). And I am going to present an argument against this traditional interpretation (section 2).
165. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Joo-Jin Paik The Unity of the Cartesian Method in the Rules
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1) Gaukroger estimates that there exist two irreconcilable theses in the Cartesian method in the Rules. The first thesis concerns the problem of the cognitive grasp of inference, the other the problem of the method of discovery. Descartes, by integrating deduction as a simple object of intuition, rejects the psychologicalinterpretation of inference, and elevates deduction to the status of a necessary condition of knowledge. On the other hand, the problem of the method of discovery requires that inference produces a new truth as its conclusion. Descartes takes the algebraic solution of equations as the model of this method. But this orientation leads Descartes to deny all cognitive function operating in the inference of synthetic form. Thus, according to Gaukroger, these two theses tendto be opposed, calling into question the unity of the method. 2) We admit the cognitive analysis of Gaukroger on the Cartesian inference. However, Gaukroger does not see the importance of “the natural power of the mind” in the Rules. Indeed, the cognitive role of inference is always understood by Descartes, in light of this natural power. Thus, the main role of the method is to teach ways of increasing this power. Descartes tries to pose, by the algebraic treatment of questions, an analogy between the mathematical order and the order of the operations of the mind, enabling him to discover pure schemes of these operations. And, It is by theses schemes that the mind exercise itself in order to increase its natural power. For this reason, we must reconsider Gaukroger’s thesis that Descartesassimilates literally the method of discovery and algebraic solution, as well as his thesis of the inconsistency of the Cartesian method.
166. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Abel B. Franco Descartes’ Theory of (Human and Animal) Passions
167. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Said Shermuhamedov Today’s Philosophy: National, Regional, World
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We know the history of philosophy as Arabian, English, American, Greece, Indian, Chinese, Korean, German, Russian, French, Japanese… But it is surprisingly that we do not use more common concept as "national philosophy", which may be included in notions "regional" and "world" philosophy. The other words common to all mankind. As the President of Independent Republic of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov emphasized, "It is important to understand the life giving, deep sources of national culture, East philosophy which serve at vigorous stimulus of rapid progress and renovation". We suppose that the main part of philosophy is human life, man's coming to be and evolution as a subject of interaction with the world. Any philosophy is the philosophy of a man, His life. A man belongs tosome nationality, nation and mankind. The nature is definite geographic midst for a man. Each nationality, nation has its own history and specific outlines – style of life, way of life, traditions, nation interests, psychology, ideas, values, culture. It is common and typical for all nations and it imposes an imprint at all sides of realityas well as philosophy.
168. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Halla Kim Spinoza on Universals
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Spinoza’s stance against “bad” universals is well known but his own view on “good” universals is not obvious. In this paper we examine the ontological status of general terms in Spinoza against the background of his metaphysical ontology. We then move onto his view of universals in his discussions of the three kind of knowledge. I argue that Spinoza’s view may be best characterized as trope-conceptualism. Universals are, considered in things themselves, nothing but tropes, i.e., fully particularized properties of individual objects. In particular, I claim that what Spinoza calls “attributes” in his grand scheme of ontology are tropes, of which we can have “adequate” ideas. Spinoza’s theory is a lot more delicate and sophisticated than is usually construed.
169. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Toshihiko Ise Hume’s Animal and Situated Human Reason
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In comparing humans and animals, we may use humans as the standard to measure animals, or conversely, animals as the standard to measure humans. While most philosophers have adopted the former approach, David Hume is among those few who use the comparison with animals as means to throw light on human nature. I focus on Hume’s treatment of human and animal reason. The cognitive processes and states that Hume holds to be common to humans and animals may be called situated, that is, embedded in the process of guiding actions that is actually going on and consequently relative to the agent’s current position in space-time. Hume’s treatment of causal reasoning underlines the centrality of situated cognition in the workings of human, as well as animal minds. Taking situated reasoning and beliefs as the paradigm of human cognition enables us to look from an alternative point of view, at the features supposedly unique to human cognition, like the use of general words and concepts. Thus we can find a confirmation of the practical import of general words and concepts in Hume’s account of the obligation of promises, where words play an essential role in extending our control over objects and actions beyond what is present and particular into what is absent or not yet actualized. This is also a confirmation of how deeply our cognitive abilities in general are rooted in our practical needs.
170. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Alexander L. Gungov Vico’s Critique of Descartes’ Cognitive and Moral Optimism
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The purpose of the present essay is to explain how the basic notions of Modern philosophy, forming Descartes’ optimistic attitude towards knowledge and human relations, were altered in order to be critically implemented into Vico’s more sober teaching. Several decades after Descartes took up the fight against skepticism, an Italian thinker, Giambattista Vico, critically approached the Cartesian project of Modernity. While Descartes believed that the essence of a human being consists in applying reason properly and using free will according to its guidance in order to achieve the greatest success in science, mathematics, and philosophy, Vico insisted that human imagination and ingenuity ought to be directed to the humanities and legal studies and should aim at practical results. This was the eighteenth century Humanistic reply to Descartes.
171. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Marina F. Bykova Hegel’s Phenomenology as a Project of Social Ontology
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief sketch of Fichte’s account of the self and discuss it as significant contribution to the modern theory of the selfhood. This discussion focuses on thinkers’ Jena projects of Wissenshaftslehre, including the 1794/95 Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre and Wissensftslehre novo methodo (1796/1797). For Fichte, the Jena period is a time of profound search for the ground and structure of his philosophical system. He finds such ground in a uniquely formulated conception of the self. Furthermore, beginning with the self as a direct intuition and ending with the self as a necessary idea, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre become an immense description of the development of the selfhood. Providing a conceptual outline of the main points of Fichte’s account of the self, the paper shows it as a unique philosophical result that is key to the emergence of post-Kantian German idealism.
172. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Sunny Yang Hume on the Authority of Desire in Explaining Action
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The association of passion with desire has a long history, from Aristotle to contemporary philosophers. The Aristotelian conception of passion as involving desire has exerted a considerable influence on modern philosophers. I shall take this idea to be the thesis that emotion implies desire. In order to elaborate this thesis, in this paper, I shall focus on Hume’s theory of passion in Book 2 of Treatise. To this end, I first of all present an interpretation of Hume that relies on an account of desire as such that I have developed. Secondly, I demonstrate what kinds of authority, if any, desires have in Hume’s view of the explanation of action.
173. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Akinori Hayashi Descartes: Knowledge as One’s Own Achievement
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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate what Descartes’ purpose of philosophy is by raising questions concerning the style of Descartes’ writing. In particular, I shall focus on investigating the characteristic style of Descartes’ Discourse on the Method. It is often considered that Descartes is not only the founder of modernphilosophy but also the father of foundationalism in epistemology. In fact, Descartes’ most celebrated argument of cogito is sometimes understood only in the context of epistemological foundationalism. However, Descartes’ epistemology is quite different from the one that is often understood as the theory of knowledge in the contemporary scene of philosophy. Paying attention to Descartes’ style of writing, we realize that it is necessary for us to see his epistemology in a different framework from the contemporary philosophers’. I shall show that the purpose of philosophy for Descartes is not to present disputations for propounding anddefending his own theory in philosophy, but to let the readers of his writing engaged with philosophy.
174. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Laureen Park Hegel and Locke on the Thing of Perception
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Hegel’s critique of traditional metaphysics is well-known. The first half of the Phenomenology, in particular, attempts to expose the faults underlying the metaphysics of the thing, and the subject-object dualism that arises out of it. This section in the Phenomenology aligns Hegel with Modern Philosophy, thematizing the tensions between thing-in-itself and appearance, the one and its properties, and substance and accidents. For Hegel, the thing is exposed as Spirit, albeit Spirit frozen and isolated from itself. By bringing up Locke in this context, I show how Locke’s own conclusions confirm Hegel’s. A close reading of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding shows that Hegel’s conclusions about the thing is immanent to the empiricist’s very own formulations of the problem. The theme of the presentation is both an apology for Hegel and a critique of Locke.
175. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Günter Zöller Pax kantiana: Kant on Perpetual Peace in Philosophy
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The paper investigates Kant's usage of the legal-political symbolism of war and peace in his self-interpretation of the historical role of the critical philosophy. The focus is on Kant's late essay, "Announcement of the Imminent Conclusion of a Treatise on Perpetual Peace in Philosophy" from 1796. The essay is placed in thecontemporary context of Kant's controversy with the historian and publicist, Johann Georg Schlosser, who had reduced Kant's transcendental philosophy to the mechanical operations of a "manufacturing industry for the production of mere form" and had misread Kant's moral philosophy as requiring complete cognition ofnature for arriving at the formation of the categorical imperative. Kant's reply to Schlosser places the refutation of the latter's charges into the broader context of the cultural function of philosophy as an area for intellectual warfare. On Kant's view, neither dogmatic pseudo-victories nor skeptical pseudo-truces are able to assure a lasting peace in philosophical debates. Only the critical balance between the theoretical restriction of reason to possible experience and its practical enlargement to unconditional principles of action is able to pacify the world of thought into a peace of mind armed with strong arguments.
176. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Kurt Mosser Kant’s General Logic and Aristotle
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In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant uses the term “logic” in a bewildering variety of ways, at times making it close to impossible to determine whether he is referring to (among others) general logic, transcendental logic, transcendental analytic, a "special" logic relative to a specific science, a "natural" logic, a logic intended for the "learned" (Gelehrter), some hybrid of these logics, or even some still-more abstract notion that ranges over all of these uses. This paper seeks to come to grips with Kant's complex use of "logic." Kant is standardly regarded as saying that since Aristotle, there need be no more concern about logic as a discipline or a field of study, and that Aristotle (with some minor embellishments, in terms of presentation) is the last word in logic. I argue here that, in spite ofHegel, Peirce, Strawson, and others, one must take into consideration Kant’s sophisticated critique of Aristotle’s logic in order to see Kant’s own conception of logic in contrast to that of Aristotle’s. In this way, Kant's strategy in the First Critique—grounded as it is in logic—becomes more plausible, defensible, and, consequently, more attractive.
177. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
L.M. Demchenko About the Unity of Power, Knowledge, Communication in M. Fuco’s “Archeological Search”
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Mishel Fuco not only influenced the consciousness of modern West, but changed the modus of thinking, the way of perception of many traditional notions, transformed the opinions about the reality, history, person. Philosopher’s principle research programme which attaches the entirety to his works is “archeology of knowledge” programme, the search of human knowledge’s original layers. Let us mark that all Fuco’s works in 1960s are devoted to main aim: to clear up the conditions of historical origin of different mental aims and social institutions in the culture of the Modern Time. Though in the whole this common aim remained for Fuco invariable, but the level on which he realizes his research search is changing constantly and rather logically. Relations of power, and to be more exact,accumulations of power and knowledge, social and cognitive which define all the aggregate of specific possibilities of culture in each given historical period. More than that the philosopher offers the particular prospects of sight of modern society and precisely totality of power relations, its ubiquitous nature and specific productivity which produces itself in each moment in any point or rather in any attitude from one point to another. From Fuco’s point of view the power is everywhere and not because it involves everything but because it comes from everywhere. The power is productive in that degree in which it is not associated with one definite imperious instance but pierces all kinds of activity in society, putting on its indelible stamp, developing under definite angle and due to this factit causes products, produced by them. The power induces and at the same time determines the fact which appears as a result of its inducement. The thirst of supremacy, which surrounds the individual and is focused on it as on the center of its use of force, comes out as a defining sign. It should be noticed that Fuco’s conception of power is not reduced to the understanding it as anonymous impersonal net of relations, piercing all society. It is supplemented by power treatment,coming out in “designed” look of definite imperious structure or imperious institute.
178. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Miran Bozovic Metaphysical Egoism and its Vicissitudes
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The paper discusses the metaphysical theory developed in the early eighteenth century in France by the so-called égoïstes, and explores some of its ramifications. In the eighteenth century French, the term égoïsme was used not only in the ethical sense, but also in the metaphysical sense, that is, to denote the extremist view that only oneself exists. The paper focuses primarily on Jean Brunet's work Projet d'une nouvelle métaphysique, published in 1703, which has since been lost, analyzing its fundamental principle that the egoist's thought is the cause of the existence of all creatures, as found in a contemporary review of the book. Examining Brunet's "new metaphysics" within the framework of its own epistemology, the paper shows that the egoist philosopher himself was not trulyconvinced of the central tenet of his own metaphysical theory, that is, he did not sincerely believe that other minds were nothing other than modes of his thought or ideas that refer to nothing outside his mind, and argues that the very existence of Projet d'une nouvelle métaphysique in the form of a book in the mind of its author was contrary to the metaphysical theory expounded in it.
179. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Nathan M. Solodukho The Universe as a Fluctuation of Being
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An extract from the author's «A Philosophy of Non-being». The Universe is a fluctuation of being originating spontaneously in non-being (i.e., in a non-existing reality). Substance as a whole and cosmic space in the first place are the result of non-being which has lost its state of balance. Fluctuations of being, (i.e., spontaneous transitions from non-existence to existence), are immanent in the nature of unstable non-being. The world of non-being is neither a separate sphere nor a parallel world, but the very bosom of being. Non-being is here, there, and everywhere, it shrouds, penetrates and saturates being. It is substantial. Тhere will inevitably appear conditions for new fluctuations of being. And this will ever be because it is never. And this is everywhere because it is nowhere. Forthe time which non-being lacks is eternity, and the space which it does not possess is infinity. The Universe represents the superposition of cycles with the following phases: non-being - being - non-being, or nothing - something - nothing. Transition from non-being-before-being to being, and further, to non-being-after-being determines the irreversibility of processes and directivity of time from past to future through the present time. The above-mentionedcyclic processes prove to be infinite, continuous, general, and by virtue of their superposition, constantly running; they form the unified world flow of states that differ in quality. Closely related with the processes cyclicity is the law of the being regeneration which expresses the essence of movement caused due to intertransitions of non-being and being. The real world has eternal and continuous origin. It begins always and constantly terminates. And it resumes constantlyand continuously in the process of eternal and infinite regeneration of being.
180. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Jari Palomäki Constituting Concepts by the Logically Basic Entities
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There are three conditions which an item has to fulfill in order to be listed into an inventory. Based on those three conditions, the logically basic entities are introduced: they are points, sets, and collections. These logically basic entities are related with three different logical relations, i.e., “is an element of”, “is a subset of”, and “is a part of” –relations, to constitute concepts. Those three logical relations have different relational properties, and thus they are to be distinguished. The logically basic entities are said to exist whereas the concepts constituted by them are said to subsist. One of the most important results is that we should not mix two inventories together, since otherwise inconsistencies follow.