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141. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Philip L. Peterson Fact-, Proposition-, and Event-Individuation
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The distinctions among facts, propositions, and events are supported by linguistic analyses segregating factive, propositional, and eventive predicates. The concepts of fact, proposition, and event may be basic categories of human understanding, as well as being ontologically significant. FPE theory was developed in part to reject the identification of facts with true propositions. The degree of ‘fineness’ of individuations within each category results from how closely event-, fact-, or proposition-individuation mirrors linguistic semantic structure. Event structure is not reflected in many event phrases. Fact- and proposition-structure typically does reflect semantic structures of factive and propositional clauses. The relevant properties for event individuation are all expressible by eventive predicates. Fact and proposition individuation is not as straightforward, because so many factives and propositionals do not express properties relevant to the Leibnizian principle. The intractability of proposition individuation may be overcome through an explanation of fact cognition.
142. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Manuel García-Carpintero Token-Reflexivity and Indirect Discourse
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According to a Reichenbachian treatment, indexicals are token-reflexive. That is, a truth-conditional contribution is assigned to tokens relative to relational properties which they instantiate. By thinking of the relevant expressions occurring in “ordinary contexts” along these lines, I argue that we can give a more accurate account of their semantic behavior when they occur in indirect contexts. The argument involves the following: (1) A defense of theories of indirect discourse which allows that a reference to modes of presentation associated with expressions occurring in indirect contexts can be made depending on contextual aspects. (2) A defense of the “doubleindexing” theories proposed by Stalnaker and others in order to account for the difference between metaphysical and epistemological modalities. (3) The claim that a Reichenbachian view improves upon the theories defended in (1) and (2).
143. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
R. Mark Sainsbury Empty Names
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This paper explores the idea that a name should be associated with a reference condition, rather than with a referent, just as a sentence should be associated with a truth condition, rather than with a truth value. The suggestion, to be coherent, needs to be set in a freelogical framework (following Burge). A prominent advantage of the proposal is that it gives a straight-forward semantics for empty names. A problem discussed in this paper is that of reconciling the rigidity of names with seeming truths of the form “there might have been such a planet as Vulcan.”
144. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Roger Wertheimer The Synonymy Antinomy
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Logical form has semantic import. Logical sentences (GG: Greeks are Greeks) and their synonym interceptions (GH: Greeks are Hellenes) state the same fact but different truths with different explanations. Terms retain objectual reference but its role in explaining truth is preempted by syntax or synonymy. Church’s Test exposes puzzles. QMi sentences (GmG: ‘Greeks’ means Greeks), and QTi sentences (p≡it is true that p≡“p” is true) are metalogical necessities, true by syntax. Their interceptions alter syntax and modality, yielding contingent truths (GmH: ‘Greeks’ means Hellenes, HmG: ‘Hellenes’ means Greeks). Meta-logical translation preserves syntax (GmG: ‘Greichen’ bedeutet Greichen), not necessarily objectual reference. Metalogical syntax secures truth by self-referential quotational indexing that identifies quotational referent with an intrasentential replica.
145. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
George M. Wilson Satisfaction Through the Ages
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In a recent paper, Ebbs has given an elegant statement of a notable puzzle that has recurred in the literature since the original publication of Putnam’s “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” The puzzle can be formulated, for a certain characteristic case, along the following lines. There are very strong intuitions in support of a thesis that Putnam has explicitly endorsed, namely, the thesis: The extension of the word ‘gold’, as we use it now, is the same as the extension of ‘gold’, as it was used in 1650 (before the rise of molecular chemistry). However, strong convictions about language use and truth conditions also incline us to the view that the extension of a term, as it is used at a time t, is determined by facts about the use of the term in the language at or before t, together with the facts about the various items to which the term prospectively applied. This paper looks at the various issues involved regarding these matters.
146. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Terry Horgan Facing Up to the Sorites Paradox
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The ancient sorites paradox has important implications for metaphysics, for logic, and for semantics. Metaphysically, the paradox can be harnessed to produce a powerful argument for the claim that there cannot be vague objects or vague properties. With respect to logic, the paradox forces a choice between the highly counterintuitive ‘epistemic’ account of vagueness and the rejection of classical two-valued logic. Regarding semantics, nonclassical approaches to the logic of vagueness lead naturally to the idea that truth, for vague discourse, is not direct language-world correspondence grounded in referential connections linking a statement’s basic subsentential constituents (names, predicates, the apparatus of quantification) to real objects and real properties; rather, truth is a matter of indirect correspondence between vague language and nonvague reality.
147. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Timothy Williamson Semantic Paradox and Semantic Change
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If semantic paradoxes such as the Liar arise because ‘true’ and other metalinguistic expressions can change their reference with changes of linguistic context, is that due to indexicality (they have the same linguistic meaning as reference changes) or ambiguity (their linguistic meaning itself changes)? An argument from communication that appears to favour the indexicality interpretation is not compelling. This paper defends the ambiguity interpretation. It is left open whether its considerations generalize to other kinds of paradox.
148. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
D. Goldstick Correspondence
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Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief.
149. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Stephen Schiffer Pleonastic Fregeanism
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Fregeans hold that propositional attitudes are relations to structured propositions whose basic constituents are concepts, or modes of presentation, of the objects and properties our beliefs are about. It is widely thought that there are compelling objections to the Fregean theory of mental and linguistic content. However, as I try to show, these objections are met by the version of Frege’s theory which I call Pleonastic Fregeanism.
150. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Lorenz B. Puntel What Does ‘... Is True’ (‘It Is True that...’) Express?
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The first section states two general theses: the claim that semeantic features are not expressible in language is indefensible; and, the role semantic expressions play in language consists in making language fully determinate. The second section elaborates on the main thesis of the paper; that is, ‘ . . . is true’ expresses neither a predicate nor a PROsentence-forming operator (R. Brandom), but a PERsentence- (and PERproposition-) forming operator (‘PER’ from ‘PERfect’ or ‘PERform’). Contrary to the ‘anaphoric’ conception, it is argued that the truth operator functions ‘cataphorically’ in the following sense: it applies to semantically indeterminate (or underdetermined) sentences (and propositions) and yields fully determinate sentences (and propositions), i.e., PERsentences (and PERpropositions). This leads to a surprisingly new understanding of (Tarski’s) Tbiconditionals. The final section shows how to conceive of the fully determinate semantical and ontological status of sentences and propositions.
151. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Gabriel Sandu Minimalism and the Definability of Truth
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In this paper I am going to inquire to what extent the main requirements of a minimalist theory of truth and falsity (as formulated, for example, by Horwich and Field) can be consistently implemented in a formal theory. I will discuss several of the existing logical theories of truth, including Tarski-type (un)definability results, Kripke’s partial interpretation of truth and falsity, Barwise and Moss’ theory based upon non-well-founded sets, McGee’s treatment of truth as a vague predicate, and Hintikka’s languages of imperfect information, to see which axioms of the minimalist theory they satisfy or fail to satisfy. Finally, I will discuss the relation between the minimalist program and compositionality.
152. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Jaakko Hintikka What Is True and False about So-Called Theories of Truth?
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Pretheoretically, truth is a correspondence between a sentence and facts. Other so-called theories of truth have typically been resorted to because such a correspondence is thought of as being inexpressible or as being incapable of yielding a definition of truth which expresses what we actually mean. It can be shown that truth is indefinable in the paradigm case of ordinary first-order languages only because they cannot express informational independence. As soon as this is corrected, as in independence-friendly first-order logic, truth predicates are readily definable, Tarski notwithstanding. Hence, there is no reason to think that truth cannot also be defined for our actual working language—Tarski’s “colloquial language.”
153. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Oswaldo Chateaubriand Logical Forms
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The standard view of logical form is that logical forms are synthetic structures which are the forms of sentences and of other linguistic entities. This is often associated with a more general linguistic view of logic which is articulated in different ways by various authors. This paper contains a critical discussion of such linguistic approaches to logical form, with special emphasis on Quine’s formulation of a logical grammar in Philosophy of Logic. An account of logical forms as higher-order properties, which essentially builds on Frege’s analysis of quantification as higher-order predication, is suggested at the end.
154. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Stewart Shapiro Set-Theoretic Foundations
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Since virtually every mathematical theory can be interpreted in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, it is a foundation for mathematics. There are other foundations, such as alternate set theories, higher-order logic, ramified type theory, and category theory. Whether set theory is the right foundation for mathematics depends on what a foundation is for. One purpose is to provide the ultimate metaphysical basis for mathematics. A second is to assure the basic epistemological coherence of all mathematical knowledge. A third is to serve mathematics, by lending insight into the various fields and suggesting fruitful techniques of research. A fourth purpose of a foundation is to provide an arena for exploring relations and interactions between mathematical fields. While set theory does better with regard to some of these and worse with regard to others, it has become the de facto arena for deciding questions of existence, something one might expect of a foundation. Given the different goals, there is little point to determining a single foundation for all of mathematics.
155. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Bob Hale Reals by Abstraction
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While Frege’s own attempt to provide a purely logical foundation for arithmetic failed, Hume’s principle suffices as a foundation for elementary arithmetic. It is known that the resulting system is consistent—or at least if second-order arithmetic is. Some philosophers deny that HP can be regarded as either a truth of logic or as analytic in any reasonable sense. Others—like Crispin Wright and I—take the opposed view. Rather than defend our claim that HP is a conceptual truth about numbers, I explain one way it may be possible to extend our view beyond elementary arithmetic to encompass the theory of real numbers. My approach has affinities to the leading ideas of Frege’s own treatment of the reals, although differing in one fundamental way. I attempt, like the HP approach to elementary arithmetic, to obtain the reals very directly by means of abstraction principles without any essential reliance on a theory of sets. This is the most natural way of extending the neo-Fregean position to the reals.
156. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Donald L. M. Baxter A Humean Temporal Logic
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Hume argues that the idea of duration is just the idea of the manner in which several things in succession are arrayed. In other words, the idea of duration is the idea of successiveness. He concludes that all and only successions have duration. Hume also argues that there is such a thing as a steadfast object—something which co-exists with many things in succession, but which is not itself a succession. Thus, it seems that Hume has committed himself to a contradiction: A steadfast object lacks duration because it is not a succession, but has duration because it co-exists with something which has duration. I am not going to discuss why Hume thinks these things. My goal is simply to show that what he thinks is consistent. To do so, I will offer a Humean temporal logic.
157. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Jaakko Hintikka, Robert Cummings Neville, Ernest Sosa, Alan M. Olson, Stephen Dawson Series Introduction
158. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Akihiro Kanamori Volume Introduction
159. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 7
Michael Ayers Can There Be a New Empiricism?
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‘Empiricism’ has become for many a dirty word, and many writers have in mind the kind of neo-Humean Positivism that is the target of Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument, Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, or Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception. But examination of the Empiricist tradition before Hume uncovers views that do not involve anything like the much-abused “Myth of the Given” or twentieth-century sensedatum theory. This paper identifiesthe particular line of seventeenth-century thought that eventually gave rise to sense-datum theory, and discusses other notions of experience that avoid it. The aim of this history lesson is to point to the possibility of an essentially empiricist approach today, an approach that avoids the neo-idealism or conceptualism of popular modern alternatives to sensedatum theory.
160. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 7
David Woodruff Smith Ontological Phenomenology
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Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience from the first-person point of view. Husserl used principles of formal ontology even as he bracketed the natural-cultural world in describing our experience, and Heidegger pursued fundamental ontology in his variety of phenomenology describing our own modes of existence. I shall address the role of ontology in phenomenology, and vice versa. Our account of what exists depends on our account of what and how we experience. But, moreover, our understanding of the structure of consciousness depends on our understanding of structure, basic ontological structure, and hence of the place of consciousness in the structure of the world. What makes consciousness “hard” for contemporary philosophy of mind is understanding how intentionality and subjectivity fit into the structure of the world: how phenomenology fits with ontology.