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121. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Alexandr Bilyk, Yaroslaw Bilyk The Utilization of Myth in Philosophical Literature
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Any philosophical work is not only the aggregate of ideas, but is also the work of literature. The myth, used for the transmission of philosophical ideas, has a particular importance. Take for example the Homeric cycle. Philosophers often use topics bound up with the adventures of Odysseus: the salutation from Sirens, from Scylla and Haribdis, from Cyclop, from the witchcraft of Circe and the lotus-eaters. This paper will explore these issues.
122. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
M.E. Orellana Benado, Andrés Bobenrieth, Carlos Verdugo Metaphilosophical Pluralism and Paraconsistency: From Orientative To Multi-level Pluralism
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In a famous passage, Kant claimed that controversy and the lack of agreement in metaphysics — here understood as philosophy as a whole — was a ‘scandal.’ Attempting to motivate his critique of pure reason, a project aimed at both ending the scandal and setting philosophy on the ‘secure path of science,’ Kant endorsed the view that for as long as disagreement reigned sovereign in philosophy, there would be little to be learned from it as a science. The success of philosophy begins when controversy ends and culminates when the discipline itself as it has been known disappears. On the other hand, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, many have despaired of the very possibility of philosophy constituting the search for truth, that is to say, a cognitive human activity, and constituting thus a source of knowledge. This paper seeks to sketch a research program that is motivated by an intuition that opposes both of these views.
123. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Daniel H. Cohen If, What-If, and So-What: Mixing Metaphors, Conditionals, and Philosophy
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With the possible exception of completely formal exercises in logic, philosophy is thoroughly metaphorical and largely conditional. Moreover, the purposes served by metaphors and conditionals in it are similar. Metaphors ask us to imagine the world in a new way, while conditionals may ask to imagine a new world. Yet some conditionals and metaphors are incompatible. There are limits to how metaphors can occur in conditionals, and how conditionals can themselves be metaphors. Specifically, only certain kinds of metaphors can be accommodated in the antecedents of conditionals, and even then only within a restricted class of conditionals. This paper focuses on the linguistic tension between metaphors and conditionals. I argue that this echoes a tension at the heart of philosophy between two modes of philosophizing: a speculative-revisionary mode that is metaphorical and an analytic-explanatory mode that is conditional. The tasks are generally complementary so that the difference can be ignored with impunity. However, if we do not respect that difference, we may find ourselves analyzing metaphors and seeing logical analyses as metaphorical, and thus missing the point on both fronts.
124. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Herman Cappelen, Douglas G. Winblad Intuitions
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This paper examines two attempts to justify the way in which intuitions about specific cases are used as evidence for and against philosophical theories. According to the concept model, intuitions about cases are trustworthy applications of one’s typically tacit grasp of certain concepts. We argue that regardless of whether externalist or internalist accounts of conceptual content are correct, the concept model flounders. The second justification rests on the less familiar belief model, which has it that intuitions in philosophy derive from one’s (often tacit) beliefs. Although more promising than the concept model, the belief model fails to justify traditional philosophical use of intuitions because it is not clear a priori that the beliefs at issue are true. The latter model may, however, legitimize a less a prioristic approach to intuitions.
125. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Margret E. Grebowicz Philosophy as Meaningful Science: The Subject and Objective Knowledge in Husserl and Popper
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Both Husserl and Popper share the sentiment that philosophy should model itself after something called "science," despite their differing attitudes toward the Galilean tradition. I begin by describing their respective approaches to the problem of objectivity by examining their accounts of the origins of science in Husserl's Vienna Lecture and Popper's Conjectures and Refutations. Each of them explicitly takes up the problem of objectivity in The Origin of Geometry and Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject, respectively, and it is here that they develop their notions of the role played by subjectivity in science. I argue that Popper suffers from a commitment to subjectivism even in the course of renouncing the subject as irrelevant for science. Husserl, on the other hand, sees in the possibility of crisis the need to reinstate subjectivist concerns in order for any discourse to be capable of saying something about the world. Husserl thus proposes a scientism which takes account of the fact that the world is, first and foremost, experienced by subjects. I contend that Popper can ultimately be held to the same position, and thus be forced to qualify his strong dismissal of subjectivity.
126. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
V.A. Iakovlev Philosophic Principles of Creativity
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The principle of universal significance of the creative process is promoted in this thesis. The principles of the ecology of creation and of the subject's humanistic orientation of the cognitive and practical activity, will also be investigated.
127. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Constanze Peres On Using Metaphors in Philosophy
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This paper deals with the question of whether metaphors are sufficient for the fulfillment of philosophical tasks, and, if they are, which cognitive or methodological place metaphors can have within philosophical discourse. We can distinguish three attitudes toward metaphors. First is the general rejection of metaphors in philosophy. Second is the unrestricted affirmation of metaphors as ‘absolute’ and as compensating for metaphysics. This conception will be analyzed critically and shown to be self-contradictory. The third position can be described as the restricted affirmation of using metaphors. According to this view, metaphors can be characterized as-strictly speaking-non-philosophical but extrinsic to constitutive forms in constructing theories. In this view, their function is not to explain, and they cannot be used as arguments. But, often they contain numerous implications with value for innovation, as they can anticipate holistic projections which are not yet fulfilled by theoretical analysis.
128. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Richard Rickert Lost in a Paradigm: Dennett’s Dangerous Dream
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The power of paradigm in science is ascendant, as exemplified in the growing debate over the role of DNA in natural selection, which Dennett (1995, 1996) has sustained with opponents like Gould (1996) and Fodor (1996). Here I focus on Dennett's quest for a dominating theory of natural selection and the ways in which two key issues of scientific method escape the notice of all debaters. In a scientific report or expository book a summary is an essential component of method — work which authors should do, not readers. Experience demonstrates its superiority in research analysis, reporting and conclusions. The second omission in Dennett's DNA model is any summary admission of limitations and of types of potential confounding factors which might be overlooked. In Dennett's case, the force of his material object reductionism and his rejection of Penrose's suggestions on quantum effects apparently prevents him from recognizing other field effects on DNA molecular dynamics, such as EMF and other radiation sources. I then introduce an amended version of the DNA paradigm in evolutionary causation, based on a range of evidence that researchers need to address. There are reports of certain types of adverse health effects of EMF proximity that have not, to my knowledge, been denied. But given DNA components of complex atoms bonded into a dynamic structure, it is prima facie implausible that proximate EMF fields have no influence on DNA dynamics, whether or not influence can be proved negative.
129. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
John Tomarchio Computer Linguistics and Philosophical Interpretation
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This paper reports a procedure which I employed with two computational research instruments, the Index Thomisticus and its companion St. Thomas CD-ROM, in order to research the Thomistic axiom, ‘whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver.’ My procedure extends to the lexicological methods developed by the pioneering creator of the Index, Roberto Busa, from single terms to a proposition. More importantly, the paper shows how the emerging results of the lexicological searches guided my formation of a philosophical thesis about the axiom’s import for Aquinas’s existential metaphysics.
130. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
David Kennedy Notes on the Philosophy of Childhood and the Politics of Subjectivity
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The Western onto-theological tradition has long been preoccupied with two symbolizations of childhood. One conceives of it as an original unity of being and knowing, an exemplar of completed identity. The other conceives of childhood as deficit and danger, an exemplar of the untamed appetite and the uncontrolled will. In the economy of Plato and Aristotle’s tripartite self, the child is ontogenetically out of balance. She is incapable of bringing the three parts of the self into a right hierarchal relation based on the domination of reason. In other words, attaining adulthood means eradicating the child. Freud’s reformulation of the Platonic community of self combines the two symbolizations. His model creates an opening for shifting power relations between the elements of the self. He opens the way toward what Kristeva calls the "subject-in-process," a pluralism of relationships rather than an organization constituted by exclusions and hierarchies. After Freud, the child comes to stand for the inexpugnable demands of desire. Through dialogue with this child, the postmodern adult undergoes the dismantling of the notion of subjectivity based on domination, and moves toward the continuous reconstruction of the subject-in-process.
131. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Christina Slade Why Not lie?: Television talk and moral debate
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This paper proposes that we should aim to refine talk about issues in soap opera as a means of developing moral reasoning skills. I begin with a report of work at schools in New Jersey over 1996-97, during which excerpts of a popular soap opera, 'Party of Five,' were used as the basis of a rigorous philosophical discussion of moral behavior. I then turn to the distinctive role of soap opera as a locus of moral discussion, with an example of a Mexicana telenovela. I suggest that children are already engaged in moral debate about soap operas and are eager to develop a more rigorous critical framework for the debate. I argue that children appreciate the opportunity to flesh out the school yard gossip about soap operas with a philosophically sophisticated discussion. My approach draws on the work of Matthew Lipman in philosophy for children, Neil Postman's critique of television, and David Buckingham's analysis of children's responses to television.
132. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Wendy C. Turgeon Metaphysical Horizons of Philosophy for Children
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Central to the explanations of justifications for Philosophy for Children is the concept of the 'community of inquiry.' This paper explores the question of the metaphysical foundations for this notion in terms of the nature of the individual versus the community and the question of truth.
133. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 18
Ana María Vicuña Navarro Ethical Education Through Philosophical Discussion
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This paper addresses the problem of educating for democracy in Chile and other places where human rights have been violated. Based on a research project conducted about the ethical foundations of human rights, I maintain that ethical education must be an indispensable ingredient of an education for democracy. I argue that an effective ethical education requires both an appropriate setting for the fostering of an open and tolerant discussion, and adequate guidance from the teacher for the understanding of complex ethical problems. As the ideal setting for it, I propose the creation of a ‘Community of Inquiry’ as it is understood and practised by the Philosophy for Children Program created by Matthew Lipman. As the basis both for identifying the main problems and for the training of the teachers, I build on Ernst Tugendhat’s ethical theories. The most significant consequence for ethical education derived from Tugendhat is the inclusion of a discussion of the problem of the foundation of ethics in order to avoid ethical relativism resting on the individual’s personal decision to belong to a moral community. To this the child should be invited through philosophical dialogue in a community of inquiry.
134. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 19
Louis Caruana Habits and Explanation
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Habits form a crucial part of the everyday conceptual scheme used to explain normal human activity. However, they have been neglected in debates concerning folk-psychology which have concentrated on propositional attitudes such as beliefs. But propositional attitudes are just one of the many mental states. In this paper, I seek to expand the debate by considering mental states other than propositional attitudes. I conclude that the case for the autonomy and plausibility of the folk-psychological explanation is strengthened when one considers an example from the non-propositional-attitude mental states: habits. My main target is the radical eliminativist program. As regards habits, eliminativists could argue in two distinct but related ways. They can either abandon the concept "habit" altogether or retain the folk-psychological term "habit" by reducing it to the causal chain of the observed behavior pattern, as is sometimes done in social theory. I contend that both of these strategies are defective. The correct way to talk about habits is in terms of manifestations and activating conditions, not in terms of causal chains. Hence, if eliminativists take up either of the two arguments given above, they will not succeed. Correspondingly, by the added generality gained through the consideration of habits, the case for folk-psychology is strengthened.
135. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 19
Neb Kujundzic The Role of Mental Variation in Cognitive Science: Structured Imagination and Conceptual Combinations
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What is the role of mental variation in cognitive science? I will attempt to answer this question by dividing it into two separate questions: (1) what role does mental variation already (or implicitly) play in cognitive science? and (2) would cognitive science benefit by inquiring (explicitly) into the role of mental variation? I will attempt to show that mental variation already plays an important (though not always explicit) role in cognitive science. Additionally, I will suggest that explicating the role of mental variations in cognition may be seen as a vital component of maintaining the strength of certain approaches and "schools" of cognitive science.
136. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 19
David DeMoss Aristotle, Connectionism, and the Morally Excellent Brain
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Can a mass of networked neurons produce moral human agents? I shall argue that it can; a brain can be morally excellent. A connectionist account of how the brain works can explain how a person might be morally excellent in Aristotle's sense of the term. According to connectionism, the brain is a maze of interconnections trained to recognize and respond to patterns of stimulation. According to Aristotle, a morally excellent human is a practically wise person trained in good habits. What an Aristotelian theory of ethics and a connectionist theory of mind have in common is the assumption that the successful mind/brain has the disposition to behave appropriately in appropriate circumstances. According to Aristotle, the good person knows the right end, desires and chooses to pursue it, and recognizes the right means to it. Thus the good person's brain must be able to form certain moral concepts, develop appropriate behavioral dispositions, and learn practical reasoning skills. I shall argue that this collection of the brain's cognitive capacities is best accounted for by a connectionist theory of the mind/brain. The human condition is both material and moral; we are brain-controlled bodies with ethical values. My essay seeks to understand the relationship between our brains and our values, between how the brain works and how we make moral decisions.
137. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 19
Andrzej Chmielecki What Is Information?
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There is a striking paradox in contemporary brain and cognitive science. Their purported fundamental category of information either is not defined or is used in a Shannonesque sense, which is unable to account for the processes of regulation and control when content, not the quantity of information, is concerned. I try to provide a more adequate formula which is applicable to a wide range of systems commonly counted as informational systems. Representative examples would include a single biological cell, animals, persons, and computers. In fact, I consider information-defined here as any detectable difference of physical states-to be the determining principle of all animate systems, one in which determines both their achitecture and their operation. I claim that the concept of information is a realist category and that information itself is, in ontological terms, an irreal entity unable to act on its own. Three hierarchically ordered forms of information are distinguished and a number of applications of the proposed definition are discussed.
138. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 19
Henrique de Morais Ribeiro On the Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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Psychophysical dualism — the distinction between mind and body — is the counterposition between essentially irreducible elements: the mind and body. Such a dualism implies the main ontological problem of the philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem (MBP). The dualism and the referred-to problem has been insistently discussed in the philosophical tradition and several solutions have been proposed. Such solutions are properly philosophical or require a scientific approach. First, I will expound the philosophical solution to the MBP proposed by Descartes, to be followed by an exposition of Ryle's criticisms to the solution. Second, from Ryle's criticism, I will deduce a scientific solution to the MBP related to the neural framework model of mind in cognitive science by means of what I call 'the principle of the embodiment of the mind.' Finally, I shall point out the philosophical difficulties that are to be found in using such a principle.
139. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 19
Peter Skagestad Peirce, Virtuality, and Semiotic
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The adjective 'virtual,' practically unheard-of a few years ago, has become a primary buzzword of the 90's. Yet the word 'virtual' is nothing new, although its ubiquity is new, as is perhaps its current meaning or meanings. In 1902 the word was defined by Charles Peirce as follows: 'A virtual X (where X is a common noun) is something, not an X, which has the deficiency (virtus) of an X.' Peirce also references Scotus's concept of virtual knowledge, the concept of virtual velocity in physics, and Edmund Burke's doctrine of virtual representation, which is not representation but is supposedly as good as. The concept of virtuality is deeply embedded in Peirce's doctrine of signs and hence in his semiotic doctrine of mind. In this Peircean doctrine, which has been more recently echoed in the writings of Wittgenstein and Popper, we find the most promising philosophical framework available for the understanding and advancement of the project of augmenting human intellect through the development and use of virtual technologies.
140. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 19
Jean-Michel Roy Cognitive Turn and Linguistic Turn
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My first goal is to question a received view about the development of Analytical Philosophy. According to this received view Analytical Philosophy is born out of a Linguistic Turn establishing the study of language as the foundation of the discipline; this primacy of language is then overthrown by the return of the study of mind as philosophia prima through a second Cognitive Turn taken in the mid-sixties. My contention is that this picture is a gross oversimplification and that the Cognitive Turn should better be seen as an extension of the Linguistic one. Indeed, if the Cognitive Turn gives explicit logical priority to the study of mind over the study of language, one of its central features is to see the mind as a representational system offering no substantial difference with a linguistic one. However, no justification is offered for the fundamental assimilation of the nature of a mental representation with that of a linguistic symbol supporting this picture of the mind, although the idea that a system of mental representations is identical in structure with a system of linguistic symbols has been argued over and over. I try to demonstrate this point through a close critical examination of Fodor's paradigmatic notion of 'double reduction.' My second claim is that the widespread contemporary assimilation of a mental representation with a symbol of a linguistic kind is no more than a prejudice. Finally I indicate that this prejudice cannot survive a rigorous critical examination.