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Displaying: 121-140 of 613 documents

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121. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Stephen Palmquist Toward a Christian Philosophy of Work: A Theological and Religious Extension of Hannah Arendt’s Conceptual Framework
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Hannah Arendt distinguishes between labor (life-sustaining activity), work (creative activity), and action (activity directed toward maintaining human relationships). This paper extends Arendt’s framework to three corresponding forms of inactivity: incorporating leisure, play, and rest into a balanced, sixfold framework provides a robust, philosophical theology of work as divine-human cooperation. The philosopher’s life of leisure suggests a synthesis of Adam Smith’s and Karl Marx’s contrasting views on labor. An overview of biblical perspectives highlights a similarly paradoxical role for play in “the work” of divine creativity. Finally, an attitude of religious “rest” empowers us to transcend alienating tendencies in employer–employee relationships.
122. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Richard Davis Oppy and Modal Theistic Proofs
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I argue that Graham Oppy’s attempt to redefend his charge that all modal theistic arguments “must be question-begging” is unsuccessful. Oppy’s attempt to show that theism and modal concretism are compatible is not only tangential for his purposes, it is marred by a misunderstanding of theism, and vulnerable to a counterexample that actually demonstrates incompatibility. Moreover, the notion of begging the question employed by Oppy against the theist is seen to be far too permissive.
123. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Graham Oppy Reply to Richard Davis
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In his “God and Modal Concretism,” Richard Davis criticizes the views developed in my “Modal Theistic Arguments.” I argue here that Davis misrepresents the views defended in my earlier paper: in particular, it is simply not true—as Davis claims—that I objected to modal ontological arguments on the grounds that they beg the question by presupposing that Lewis’s modal realism is false. In addition, I discuss—and argue against—some claims that Davis makes about circularity of argumentation and the fallacy of begging the question.
124. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
David Reiter A Dilemma for the Proponent of the Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence
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The transcendental argument for God’s existence (“TAG”) claims that the existence of the Triune God is a metaphysically necessary precondition for the most basic features of human life and experience. Philosopher Sean Choi has recently argued that TAG is best understood as having the following argument pattern: (1) p, (2) Necessarily, if p, then G (God exists), and therefore (3) G. In this note, I pose a dilemma argument for the proponent of the transcendental argument (understood this way). My hope is that the dilemma argument will spur further development and clarification of exactly what the transcendental argument is.
125. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Stephen E. Parrish Rundle on Sustaining the Universe in Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing
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In his book Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing, Bede Rundle argues that there is no need to appeal to God for an explanation concerning why the universe exists, and remains in existence. I argue that on the contrary, Rundle’s philosophical naturalism is unable to give a plausible account for the continued existence of the universe in a lawful manner and the objects of which it is composed. The major reason for this inability is that since, as Rundle admits, everything that exists has a logically contingent existence, there can be no necessary principle by which contingent objects are sustained in existence.
126. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Aaron Bunch The Resurrection of the Bodyas a “Practical Postulate”: Why Kant Is Committed toBelief in an Embodied Afterlife
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I argue that Kant’s own views—his commitment to happiness as part of a transcendent highest good, his view of the afterlife as a place of moral striving, and his conception of the “absolute unity” of rational and animal natures in a human person—commit him to belief in an embodied afterlife. This belief is just as necessary for conceiving the possibility of the highest good as the beliefs in personal immortality, freedom, and God’s existence, and thus it too is a “practical postulate” in Kant’s sense.
127. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
John B. Howell III Forgiveness and Kierkegaard’s Agapeistic Ethic
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In this essay I examine the notion of forgiveness as found in Søren Kierkegaard’s Works of Love. After detailing the work of forgiveness in hiding the multitude of sins, I examine forgiveness as an example of Kierkegaard’s concept of redoubling. Then I relate Kierkegaard’s concept of forgiveness to his concept of hope. Throughout I emphasize the relation between forgiveness and neighbor love, which Kierkegaard views as an essential component of forgiveness. This emphasis counters the prevailing notion in the literature on forgiveness, which views forgiveness as solely concerned with the relinquishing of negative emotions. For Kierkegaard, while this relinquishing is no doubt part of forgiveness, true forgiveness must include love for one’s neighbor.
128. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Craig J. Hazen Editor’s Introduction
129. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
R. J. Snell Thomism and Noetic Sin, Transposed: A Response to Neo-Calvinist Objections
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In this essay I argue that Thomas Aquinas is not as naively optimistic about the noetic effects of sin as is often portrayed by standard neo-Calvinist objections. Still, his metaphysics of the human person requires some development to better explain the mind’s impairment by sin, a development made possible by the work of Bernard Lonergan and the resulting Lonergan/Aquinas (L/A) model of the noetic effects of sin.
130. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Walter Schultz Toward a Realist Modal Structuralism: A Christian Philosophy of Mathematics
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The aim of this paper is to propose a philosophy of mathematics that takes structures to be basic. It distinguishes between mathematical structures and real structures. Mathematical structures are the propositional content either of consistent axiom systems or (algebraic or differential) equations. Thus, mathematical structures are logically possible structures. Real structures—and the mathematical structures that represent them—are related essentially to God’s plan in Christ and ultimately grounded in God’s awareness of his ability. However, not every mathematical structure has a correlative real structure. Mathematical structures are either true or fictional, yet all are possible.
131. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Stephen Kershnar Hell, Threshold Deontology, and Abortion
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In this paper, I argue that Threshold-Hell Christianity conflicts with the pro-life position on abortion. The specific type of Christianity is that which also accepts threshold deontology and the existence of hell. Threshold deontology is the view that ordinarily moral duties consist of nonconsequentialist side-constraints on the pursuit of the good but that in some cases these side-constraints are overridden. My strategy is to establish that a person who brings about an abortion guarantees that the aborted individual goes to heaven and that it is morally permissible to guarantee someone goes to heaven. It follows that if Threshold-Hell Christianity is true, then abortion is morally permissible.
132. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Shawn Bawulski Annihilationism, Traditionalism,and the Problem of Hell
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Logically consistent responses to the problem of hell are readily available. The Christian theologian should seek to go beyond these minimal criteria, providing a response that is also plausible and is harmonious with both Scripture and the tradition. In this paper I will examine annihilationism and two forms of traditionalism, assessing each view’s success not only in defending against the logical problem of hell, but also success with these additional criteria. I will suggest that a refined version of the traditional view best succeeds.
133. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Stephen C. Dilley Philosophical Naturalism and Methodological Naturalism: Strange Bedfellows?
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This essay argues that philosophical naturalists who draw epistemic support from science for their worldview ought to set aside methodological naturalism in certain historical sciences. When linked to methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism opens itself to several problems. Specifically, when joined with methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism can never be scientifically disconfirmed but will nearly always be confirmed, no matter what the empirical evidence. Theistic-friendly “God hypotheses,” on the other hand, can never be scientifically confirmed—again, no matter what the evidence—but are routinely said to be disconfirmed. Methodological naturalism not only leads to this self-serving dynamic, but does not appear to serve a meaningful epistemic purpose in the contest between philosophical naturalism and theism and so, for these reasons, ought to be set aside.
134. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Edward Feser Teleology: A Shopper’s Guide
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Teleology features prominently in recent discussions in the philosophy of mind, action theory, philosophy of biology, and in the dispute between Intelligent Design theorists and Darwinian naturalists. Unfortunately, discussants often talk past each other and oversimplify the issues, failing to recognize the differences between the several theories of teleology philosophers have historically put forward, and the different natural phenomena that might be claimed to be teleological. This paper identifies five possible theories of teleology, and five distinct levels of nature at which teleology might be said to exist. Special attention is paid to the differences between Aristotelian-Thomistic and ID theoretic approaches to teleology.
135. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Troy Nunley Fishnets, Firing Squads, and Fine-Tuning (Again): How Likelihood Arguments Undermine Elliot Sober’s Weak Anthropic Principles
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Elliot Sober has recently attempted to reformulate and defend a standard objection to fine-tuning arguments, the objection from the “weak anthropic principle.” The key to his reformulated defense is his likelihoodist epistemology conjoined to a well-known “fishnet analogy.” Although recent rebuttals from Weisberg and Monton fall short of exposing the flaws in Sober’s objection, I show that Sober’s likelihoodist epistemology and analogy serve instead to undermine weak anthropic principles and objections based upon them.
136. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
William Lane Craig Timothy O’Connor on Contingency: A Review Essay on Theism and Ultimate Explanation
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In the first part of Theism and Ultimate Explanation Timothy O’Connor provides a compact survey of the metaphysics and epistemology of modality, defending modal realism and a priorism. In the book’s second half he defends a Leibnizian-style cosmological argument for an absolutely necessary being. He seeks to answer four questions: (1) Is the idea of a necessary being coherent? (2) In what way is the postulation of such a being explanatory? (3) Does the assumption of necessary being commit us to denying the very contingency of mundane things which it is meant to explain? (4) What are the implications of necessary being for theology? In this review I highlight a few of the obscurities and apparent weaknesses of this otherwise commendable book.
137. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Mark Nowacki Assessing the Kalam Cosmological Argument: A Reply to Guminski
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Guminski’s critical assessment of my version of the KCA (the “N-KCA”) is unfounded because he (1) fails to identify what is distinctive in the argument, (2) overlooks the importance of modality within KCA thought experiments, (3) does not recognize that the central arguments of the N-KCA are independent of specific mathematical accounts, and (4) overlooks key metaphysical distinctions, including that between infinite multitude and infinite magnitude. I also argue against Guminski’s “Alternative Version” of interpreting KCA thought experiments. Finally, I clarify what is meant by “temporal marks” and offer some thoughts on future research directions for the KCA.
138. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Gary R. Habermas Farewell to an Old Friend: Remembering Antony Flew
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This essay is a personal tribute to the life of philosopher Antony Flew (1923–2010). After some brief comments about Flew’s life, the article is divided into academic and personal memories that were shared between Gary Habermas and him. Included are details of various academic publications, debates, critiques, as well as several private discussions.
139. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Craig J. Hazen Editor’s Introduction
140. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Jeremy Evans Guest Editor’s Introduction