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Displaying: 101-120 of 415 documents

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101. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Tyler Klaskow “Looking” for Intentionality with Heidegger
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Phenomenologists find themselves in the unusual position of attempting to describe non-sensuously phenomenal phenomena. Intentionality is one such oddity. It is not sensuously phenomenal, yet Husserl and Heidegger both purport to be able to “read off” its necessary features. Both were well aware that such an enterprise has its difficulties. The primary difficulty is how to make intentionality into an “object.” To do so, a method for directing our “phenomenological vision” is necessary. Heidegger, however, is unable to utilise Husserl’s methods for this purpose. Since the phenomenological method must “follow its matter,” and Heidegger’s matter is different from Husserl’s, Heidegger cannot merely adopt Husserl’s methods. Thus, Heidegger must develop a new method to investigate intentionality. In this paper, I show the ways in which Heidegger’s conception of intentionality diverged from Husserl’s while retaining its core sense, and why intentionality poses particularly difficult methodological problems. Finally, I investigate the new methods Heidegger develops (c. 1925–28) to deal with theseproblems—categorial intuition, a reformulated version of the reduction, and a form of objectification—and why each of these methods fails.
102. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Thomas W. Busch Sartre’s Hyperbolic Ontology: Being and Nothingness Revisited
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Late in his career, Sartre told us that “subjectivity (in Being and Nothingness) is not what it is for me now,” but I do not think that this should be understood as simple rejection. Rather, I think that his notion of the “spiral” best expresses his meaning. The development of his thought progressed through levels of integrating new experience with the past and, in the process, refigured the past. Sartre was, all along, a philosopher protective of subjectivity and freedom, but these notionsunderwent transformation over time, preserved and modified in their surpassing. Sartre’s philosophical itinerary follows the model of the spiral, and in that way, he is his own best commentator.
103. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2
James Mensch Religious Intolerance: Hating Your Neighbour as Yourself
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Religion has been a constant throughout human history. Evidence of it dates from the earliest times. Religious practice is also universal, appearing in every region of the globe. To judge from recorded history and contemporary accounts, religious intolerance is equally widespread. Yet all the major faiths proclaim the golden rule, namely, to “love your neighbour as yourself.” When Jesus was asked by a lawyer, “Who is my neighbour?” he replied with the story of the good Samaritan—the man who bound up the wounds and looked after the Israelite who was neither his co-religionist nor a member of his race. Jesus’ example has been rarely followed. What is it in religion—and not just in the Christian religion—that leads its members to limit their conception of their neighbour? How is it that, in preaching the universal brotherhood of mankind, religions so often practice the opposite? In my paper, I suggest some answers by focusing on the notions of faith, ethics and finitude.
104. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2
Peter Milne Sensibility and the Law: On Rancière’s Reading of Lyotard
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This paper responds to Rancière’s reading of Lyotard’s analysis of the sublime by attempting to articulate what Lyotard would call a “differend” between the two. Sketching out Rancière’s criticisms, I show that Lyotard’s analysis of the Kantian sublime is more defensible than Rancière claims. I then provide an alternative reading, one that frees Lyotard’s sublime from Rancière’s central accusation that it signals nothing more than the mind’s perpetual enslavement to the lawof the Other. Reading the sublime through the figure of the “event,” I end by suggesting that it may have certain affinities with what Rancière calls “politics.”
105. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2
Joseph Tanke Sharing Sense: Editor’s Introduction
106. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2
Xander Selene A Philosophy that Imitates Art?: Theodor W. Adorno’s Changing Constellations
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Theodor W. Adorno claims that a philosophy that tried to imitate art would defeat itself, yet he seems to have based his own model for philosophical interpretation, which he compares to changing constellations, on Gustav Mahler’s musical montage (the first Ländler from the second movement of the Ninth Symphony.) The paper first examines two aspects of montage that Adorno mentions in his reading of the Ländler: (1) its reified working material and (2) its combinatory procedure. Next, these aspects are located within the interpretive model advanced in the inaugural lecture of 1931. The latter part of the paper makes a case for the philosophically binding force of constellations by drawing on the concepts of aesthetic semblance [ästhetischer Schein] and praxis.
107. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2
Christina Howells Rancière, Sartre and Flaubert: From The Idiot of the Family to The Politics of Aesthetics
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This paper discusses Rancière’s attitude to Sartre through an examination of the two philosophers’ analyses of Flaubert, and especially of Madame Bovary. It argues that Rancière simplifies Sartre’s conception of literary commitment and seriously downplays the subtlety of his understanding of the relationship between literature and politics. Furthermore, by limiting his sources to Sartre’s Qu’est-ce que la littérature? (1948), and not considering L’Idiot de la famille (1971–72), Rancière fails to recognise the similarities between Sartre’s account and his own, with respect to both aesthetic theory and stylistic analysis.
108. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2
Gabriel Rockhill Rancière’s Productive Contradictions: From the Politics of Aesthetics to the Social Politicity of Artistic Practice
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This article explores the force and limitations of Jacques Rancière’s novel attempt to rethink the relationship between aesthetics and politics. In particular, it unravels the paradoxical threads of the fundamental contradiction between two of his steadfast claims: (1) art and politics are consubstantial, and (2) art and politics never truly merge. In taking Rancière to task on this point, the primary objective of this article is to work through the nuances of his project andforeground the problems inherent therein in order to break with the “talisman complex” and the “ontological illusion” of the politics of aesthetics in the name of a new understanding of the social politicity of artistic practices.
109. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2
Kevin Newmark A Poetics of Sharing: Political Economy in a Prose Poem by Baudelaire
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The rehabilitation of aesthetics that is undertaken by Jacques Rancière for a thinking of both art and politics is as stylistically refreshing as it is philosophically appealing. The combination of vast scholarship and lively polemic that underpins all his analyses also lends his celebration of democracy, equality and humanity a persuasiveness that is difficult to resist. This paper examines how Rancière’s understanding of “the aesthetics of politics” differs from that of Walter Benjamin, especially in terms of Benjamin’s elaboration of the change sustained by “experience” in modernity. It considers how reading a prose poem by Baudelairethrows into relief what is at stake in this difference.
110. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2
Colin McQuillan The Intelligence of Sense: Rancière’s Aesthetics
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In this paper, I argue that Jacques Rancière does not propose a purely sensible conception of the aesthetic in his recent writings on art. Unlike many contemporary philosophies of art, Rancière’s aesthetics retains an important cognitive dimension. Here, I bring this aspect of Rancière’s aesthetics into view by comparing the conception of intelligence found in his earlier works with his more recent writings on art, showing that intelligence and sense are distributed in the same ways. The distinction between them is, moreover, governed by the same politics. Rancière’s analysis of the sensible and the intellectual breaks down thedistinction between them and establishes their equality.
111. Symposium: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Vittorio Hösle Sociobiology
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The essay explores the development of sociobiology, its basic tenets, and its contributions to the study of human nature as well as ethics. It insists that Darwinism is more than a biological theory and presents a possibility of interpreting sociobiology as manifesting not the triumph of the selfish gene but, on the contrary, the only way in which the expansion of altruism was possible.
112. Symposium: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Marguerite La Caze Moss, Fungus, Cauliflower: Sartre's Critique of "Human Nature"
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I argue that Sartre's understanding of needs is not inconsistent with his conception of the human condition. I will demonstrate that his use of the term "needs" signals a change of focus, not a rejection of his earlier views. Sartre's Iater "dialectical" account of human needs should he read, in light of his phenomenological account in Being and Nothingness, as aspects of our facticity and situation. Satisfying needs is compatible with a range of choices about how to satisfy those needs and what they mean for us. I contend that Sartre remains true to the phenomenological roots of his work and avoids a commitment to a human nature or essence. Finally, I will address some of the questions that arise from Sartre's focus on needs in his dialectical ethics. I will begin by examining Sartre's early account of the human condition, and then consider his focus on needs in relation to this account.
113. Symposium: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Ian Angus The Pathos of a First Meeting: Particularity and Singularity the Critique of Technological Civilization
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In this essay, I will outline the positive content of George Grant's conception of "particularity" and clarify it by comparing it to Reiner Schürmann's similar concept of "singularity" as a starting point for an engagement with the positive good to which it refers. In conclusion, a five-step existential logic will he presented, which, I will suggest, can resolve the important aspects of the difference between them.
114. Symposium: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Max Deutscher In Sensible Judgement
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Only in being pleased at what is done can I judge it as right. Kant is correct, nevertheless, then my motive is not the object of my judgment's concern. In working to make a good judgment, it is not pleasure but die right result that one seeks. In taking the jury's decision to be right, one is pleased at it—one takes pleasure in it. At the same time, it would shift attention from judgment's proper object to find the point of die justice of the decision in one's having been pleased.
115. Symposium: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Christian Lotz Distant Presence: Representation, Painting and Photography in Gerhard Richter's Reader
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In this essay, I offer thoughts on the constitution of images in art, especially as they are constituted in painting and in photography. Utilizing ideas from Gadamer, Derrida and Adorno, I shall argue that representation should be conceived as a performative concept and as an act of formation; i.e., as a process rather thanas something "fixed." My reflections will be carried out in connection with a careful analysis of Gerhard Richter's painting Reader (1994), which is a painting of a photograph that depicts a female who is reading. I demonstrate how a close analysis of this fascinating painting leads us deeper into the problem of painted images, insofar as it enacts what it is about, namely, the constitution of itself as an innige by means of a complex and enigmatic relationship between seeing, reading, memory, inner, outer, gaze and blindness.
116. Symposium: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
James Bradley Philosophy and Trinity
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I will argue that 'Continental Philosophy' is an Anglo-American invention. It is 'Pseudo-Continentalism,' no more than a highly selective rendering of Western European Philosophy. Borne out of opposition to the dominance of analytical philosophy in our universities, Pseudo-Continentalism in fact converges with analysis in remarkable ways. Both are advertised as revolutions in thought and both stand over against the tradition of speculative philosophy: both repeat eachother's historical shibboleths about traditional speculative philosophy in respect of the completeness of reason and of reality, the priority of identity and totality, the predetermined fixity of teleology. What this amounts to is a common rejection of a chimera, which in Pseudo-Continental Philosophy is usually called onto-theology or the metaphysics of presence and in the analytic tradition is sometimes called speculative philosophy. Here, indeed, the analytic tradition is moreradical: as I will show, it characteristically rejects any notion of a special kind of activity of actualisation as a feature of the real, whether this is understood as Being, mind, will, the élan vital. Difference, or the impotential. These are the vestiges of the tradition of speculative philosophy that are retained under the rubric of Continental Philosophy.
117. Symposium: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray, Jeff Mitscherling The Phenomenological Spring: Husserl and the Göttingen Circle
118. Symposium: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Angela Ales Bello, Antonio Calcagno What Is Life? The Contributions of Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein
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The phenomenological movement originates with Edmund Husserl, and two of his young students and collaborators, Edith Stein and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, made a notable contribution to the very delineation of the phenomenological method, which pushed phenomenology in a “realistic” direction. This essay seeks to examine the decisive influence that these two thinkers had on two specific areas: the value of the sciences and certain metaphysical questions. Concerningthe former, I maintain that Stein, departing from a philosophical, phenomenological analysis of the human being, is interested particularly in the formation of the cognitive value of the human sciences. Regarding the latter, Conrad-Martius, given her knowledge of biology, tackled the question of the role and meaning of the sciences of nature. The second question, related to metaphysical themes, became a specific and relevant object of research for both women phenomenologists.It will be investigated by comparing two works, one by each thinker, namely, the Metaphysische Gespräche by Conrad-Martius and Potenz und Akt by Edith Stein.
119. Symposium: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Guillaume Fréchette Phenomenology as Descriptive Psychology: The Munich Interpretation
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Is phenomenology nothing else than descriptive psychology? In the first edition of his Logical Investigations (LI), Husserl conceived of phenomenology as a description and analysis of the experiences of knowledge, unequivocally stating that “phenomenology is descriptive psychology.” Most interestingly, although the first edition of the LI was the reference par excellence in phenomenology for the Munich phenomenologists, they remained suspicious of this characterisationof phenomenology. The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the reception of descriptive psychology among Munich phenomenologists and, at the same time, to offer a re-evaluation of their understanding of realist phenomenology.
120. Symposium: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski Negative States of Affairs: Reinach versus Ingarden
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In Reinach’s works one finds a very rich ontology of states of affairs. Some of them are positive, some negative. Some of them obtain, some do not. But even the negative and non-obtaining states of affairs are absolutely independent of any mental activity. Despite this claim of the “ontological equality” of positive and negative states of affairs, there are, according to Reinach, massive epistemological differences in our cognitive access to them. Positive states of affairs can be directly “extracted” from our experience, while to acquire a negative belief we must pass through a quite complicated process, starting with certain positive beliefs. A possible and reasonable explanation of this discrepancy would be a theory to the effect that these epistemological differences have their basis in the ontology of the entities in question. Our knowledge of the negative states of affairs is essentially dependent on our knowledge of the positive ones precisely becausethe negative states of affairs are ontologically dependent on the positive ones. Such a theory has, in fact, been formulated by Roman Ingarden. According to him, negative states of affairs supervene on some positive ones and on certain mental acts of the conscious subjects.