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101. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Dan Zahavi A Question of Method: Reflective vs. Hermeneutical Phenomenology
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In his Allgemeine Psychologie of 1912, Natorp formulates a by now classical criticism of phenomenology. 1. Phenomenology claims to describe and analyze lived subjectivity itself. In order to do so it employs a reflective methodology. But reflection is a kind of internal perception; it is a theoretical attitude; it involves an objectification. And as Natorp then asks, how is this objectifying procedure ever going to provide us with access to lived subjectivity itself? 2. Phenomenology aims at describing the experiential structures in their pretheoretical immediacy. But every description involves the use of language, involves the use of generalizing and subsuming concepts. For the very same reason, every description and expression involves a mediation and objectification that necessarily estranges us from subjectivity itself.In his early lecture course Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem of 1919 Heidegger responds to Natorp's challenge and attempts to show that the criticism is based on some questionable assumptions. More specifically, Heidegger argues that Natorp's criticism might be pertinent when it comes to a phenomenology based on a reflective methodology, i.e. when it comes to a Husserlian phenomenology, but it is wide of the mark when it comes to Heidegger's own hermeneutical phenomenology.In this paper I wish to present both Natorp's criticism and Heidegger's response in detail. One of the aims will be to articulate the criticism that Heidegger himself—via his discussion with Natorp—directs against a reflective phenomenology. In the final part of the paper I will then evaluate the pertinence of this criticism. Is it at all justified?
102. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Véronique M. Fóti Time's Agonal Spacing in Hölderlin's Philosophy of Tragedy
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This paper interrogates Hölderlin's effort to deconstruct the speculative matrix of tragedy, with a particular focus on his "Remarks on Antigone," which are appended to his translation of the Sophoclean tragedy. In focus are, firstly, the separative force of the caesura, which stems tragic transport and is here analyzed, in terms of Hölderlin's understanding of Greece in relation to "Hesperia," as an incipiently Hesperian poetic gesture. Secondly, Hölderlin's key thought of the mutual "unfaithfulness" of God and man is at issue: the god here is revealed as sheer time, while man is thrown back upon the bare moment. This "unfaithfulness" must be tempered by a striving that turns back from the quest for transcendence to the measures of fmitude and to this world. By attentiveness to the singular (which is not the particular), the tragic poet, unlike the speculative philosopher, reveals time's agonal spacing.
103. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Käthe Trettin Tropes and Relations
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A straightforward ontological account would be one which acknowledges relations as real beings, and that means, according to the scholastic tradition, as universals. The realist move in this sense which has been re-established within contemporary analytical ontology at least since Russell's early theory, is, however, not the only possible way to take relations seriously. In my paper I shall argue that there is much room for the ontological reconstruction of relations, even if one does not accept universals. The background for this argument is a particularist and realist theory, based on tropes ("trope" being the short name for "property instance" or "individual quality"). One way of reconstruction is that relations themselves are particulars. They are supposed to be relational or polyadic tropes (J. Bacon, D. Mertz). The other way is to hold that relations are internal or formal, and therefore do not require a category sai generis (K. Mulligan, P. Simons). I shall discuss these alternatives and finally opt for the second, i.e., the reconstruction of relations as internal to their relata. Moreover, I offer an argument for why basic relations such as existential dependence should be granted a transcategorial status within trope ontology. Hence, the gist of my paper is to take relations seriously without falling prey either to stubborn nominalism or to strict realism. What I intend to explore is a middle avenue thereby choosing the best of both sides in order to explicate a moderate view on the realism of relations.
104. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Irmgard Scherer Irrationalism in Eighteenth Century Aesthetics: A Challenge for Kant
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This essay deals with a particularly recalcitrant problem in the history of ideas, that of irrationalism. It emerged to full consciousness in mid-eighteenth century thought. Irrationalism was a logical consequence of individualism which in turn was a direct outcome of the Cartesian self-reflective subject. In time these tendencies produced the "critical" Zeitgeist and the "epoch of taste" during which Kant began thinking about such matters. Like Alfred Bäumler, I argue that irrationalism could not have arisen in ancient or medieval philosophical discourse, as they both lacked a certain type of rationalism required as its conceptual antipode. Only after the Lisbon earthquake (1755), and the ensuing reason vs. passion debate acknowledging for the first time both human powers as equal contenders, did the specter of irrationalism arise and become a focus. Kant's revolution in thought produced "transcendental psychology" reconciling "pure" sensibility and "pure" reason and provided, I argue, the conceptual wherewithal to grant aesthetic feeling and irrationalism a philosophical niche.
105. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Yvonne Raley Science and Ontology
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Many philosophers (such as, for instance, Nancy Cartwright, Brian Ellis, and Hartry Field) regard scientific practice as the final arbiter in ontology. In this short paper, I argue that the very philosophers who profess to derive their ontological commitments from scientific practice impose certain views on the theories established by that practice that the practice itself does not support. This is not consistent with their view that science tells us what there is.
106. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Brit Strandhagen Disconnecting Reality: On Kant's Aesthetic Judgement
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In the Critique of Judgement Kant develops a theory of taste, according to which taste is the ability to make judgements concerning beauty, beauty in nature and in art. These judgements are based on a particular reflective activity, an activity in which the understanding is driven into a never-ending play with the imagination.In my paper I will try to show the actuality of Kant's aesthetic theory as a general theory of aesthetic experience, not only in connection with art, but as a particular kind of experience possible in other areas as well. Aesthetic experience is, as I read Kant, a peculiar kind of setting free, of detaching the connection between our experience and objective reality, a connection presupposed in every non-aesthetic discourse. This disconnection from the empirical world, which is essential in aesthetic reflection, I will call an aesthetic emancipatedness.To experience something aesthetically means to set it free, to embody it in the aesthetic emancipatedness, to set it free from the boundaries of normality and make it something extraordinary; a deviation. But a deviation would only exist in contrast to that which it deviates from. Emancipatedness can only exist in contrast to a not yet emancipated condition. This explains why the aesthetic experience also affects the moral and the cognitive aspects of reality.
107. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Thomas W. Pogge "Assisting" the Global Poor
108. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Betül Çotuksöken Some Remarks on the Culture of Philosophy During the Republican Era in Turkey
109. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Gürol Irzik Science and its Discontents
110. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Don Ihde Imaging Technologies: A Technoscience Revolution