Displaying: 101-120 of 434 documents

0.043 sec

101. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Dan Zahavi A Question of Method: Reflective vs. Hermeneutical Phenomenology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In his Allgemeine Psychologie of 1912, Natorp formulates a by now classical criticism of phenomenology. 1. Phenomenology claims to describe and analyze lived subjectivity itself. In order to do so it employs a reflective methodology. But reflection is a kind of internal perception; it is a theoretical attitude; it involves an objectification. And as Natorp then asks, how is this objectifying procedure ever going to provide us with access to lived subjectivity itself? 2. Phenomenology aims at describing the experiential structures in their pretheoretical immediacy. But every description involves the use of language, involves the use of generalizing and subsuming concepts. For the very same reason, every description and expression involves a mediation and objectification that necessarily estranges us from subjectivity itself.In his early lecture course Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem of 1919 Heidegger responds to Natorp's challenge and attempts to show that the criticism is based on some questionable assumptions. More specifically, Heidegger argues that Natorp's criticism might be pertinent when it comes to a phenomenology based on a reflective methodology, i.e. when it comes to a Husserlian phenomenology, but it is wide of the mark when it comes to Heidegger's own hermeneutical phenomenology.In this paper I wish to present both Natorp's criticism and Heidegger's response in detail. One of the aims will be to articulate the criticism that Heidegger himself—via his discussion with Natorp—directs against a reflective phenomenology. In the final part of the paper I will then evaluate the pertinence of this criticism. Is it at all justified?
102. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Véronique M. Fóti Time's Agonal Spacing in Hölderlin's Philosophy of Tragedy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper interrogates Hölderlin's effort to deconstruct the speculative matrix of tragedy, with a particular focus on his "Remarks on Antigone," which are appended to his translation of the Sophoclean tragedy. In focus are, firstly, the separative force of the caesura, which stems tragic transport and is here analyzed, in terms of Hölderlin's understanding of Greece in relation to "Hesperia," as an incipiently Hesperian poetic gesture. Secondly, Hölderlin's key thought of the mutual "unfaithfulness" of God and man is at issue: the god here is revealed as sheer time, while man is thrown back upon the bare moment. This "unfaithfulness" must be tempered by a striving that turns back from the quest for transcendence to the measures of fmitude and to this world. By attentiveness to the singular (which is not the particular), the tragic poet, unlike the speculative philosopher, reveals time's agonal spacing.
103. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Käthe Trettin Tropes and Relations
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
A straightforward ontological account would be one which acknowledges relations as real beings, and that means, according to the scholastic tradition, as universals. The realist move in this sense which has been re-established within contemporary analytical ontology at least since Russell's early theory, is, however, not the only possible way to take relations seriously. In my paper I shall argue that there is much room for the ontological reconstruction of relations, even if one does not accept universals. The background for this argument is a particularist and realist theory, based on tropes ("trope" being the short name for "property instance" or "individual quality"). One way of reconstruction is that relations themselves are particulars. They are supposed to be relational or polyadic tropes (J. Bacon, D. Mertz). The other way is to hold that relations are internal or formal, and therefore do not require a category sai generis (K. Mulligan, P. Simons). I shall discuss these alternatives and finally opt for the second, i.e., the reconstruction of relations as internal to their relata. Moreover, I offer an argument for why basic relations such as existential dependence should be granted a transcategorial status within trope ontology. Hence, the gist of my paper is to take relations seriously without falling prey either to stubborn nominalism or to strict realism. What I intend to explore is a middle avenue thereby choosing the best of both sides in order to explicate a moderate view on the realism of relations.
104. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Irmgard Scherer Irrationalism in Eighteenth Century Aesthetics: A Challenge for Kant
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This essay deals with a particularly recalcitrant problem in the history of ideas, that of irrationalism. It emerged to full consciousness in mid-eighteenth century thought. Irrationalism was a logical consequence of individualism which in turn was a direct outcome of the Cartesian self-reflective subject. In time these tendencies produced the "critical" Zeitgeist and the "epoch of taste" during which Kant began thinking about such matters. Like Alfred Bäumler, I argue that irrationalism could not have arisen in ancient or medieval philosophical discourse, as they both lacked a certain type of rationalism required as its conceptual antipode. Only after the Lisbon earthquake (1755), and the ensuing reason vs. passion debate acknowledging for the first time both human powers as equal contenders, did the specter of irrationalism arise and become a focus. Kant's revolution in thought produced "transcendental psychology" reconciling "pure" sensibility and "pure" reason and provided, I argue, the conceptual wherewithal to grant aesthetic feeling and irrationalism a philosophical niche.
105. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Yvonne Raley Science and Ontology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Many philosophers (such as, for instance, Nancy Cartwright, Brian Ellis, and Hartry Field) regard scientific practice as the final arbiter in ontology. In this short paper, I argue that the very philosophers who profess to derive their ontological commitments from scientific practice impose certain views on the theories established by that practice that the practice itself does not support. This is not consistent with their view that science tells us what there is.
106. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Brit Strandhagen Disconnecting Reality: On Kant's Aesthetic Judgement
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In the Critique of Judgement Kant develops a theory of taste, according to which taste is the ability to make judgements concerning beauty, beauty in nature and in art. These judgements are based on a particular reflective activity, an activity in which the understanding is driven into a never-ending play with the imagination.In my paper I will try to show the actuality of Kant's aesthetic theory as a general theory of aesthetic experience, not only in connection with art, but as a particular kind of experience possible in other areas as well. Aesthetic experience is, as I read Kant, a peculiar kind of setting free, of detaching the connection between our experience and objective reality, a connection presupposed in every non-aesthetic discourse. This disconnection from the empirical world, which is essential in aesthetic reflection, I will call an aesthetic emancipatedness.To experience something aesthetically means to set it free, to embody it in the aesthetic emancipatedness, to set it free from the boundaries of normality and make it something extraordinary; a deviation. But a deviation would only exist in contrast to that which it deviates from. Emancipatedness can only exist in contrast to a not yet emancipated condition. This explains why the aesthetic experience also affects the moral and the cognitive aspects of reality.
107. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Chenyang Li International Human Rights Discourse as Moral Persuasion
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I argue that the nature of the international human rights discourse ("IHRD") is to promote certain moral values across various cultural traditions; as such, this should be done through persuasion; it should not merely be forcing people to change their behavior; it should seek to have people accept certain moral values that they have not embraced or accept certain moral values as more important than they have held them to be. With persuasion as a goal, we need to make strategies suitable for this purpose. The paper has the following sections.
108. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Robin Attfield Sustainable Development Revisited
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
My aim is to defend the concept of sustainable development both against economists' interpretations that make it involve perpetual gains to human well-being, and against sceptical accounts that make its meaning vary from speaker to speaker, serving as a cloak for the status quo and the suggestion that it be discarded. The assumptions of the economists' interpretation are questioned, and the centrality among early advocates of sustainable development of sustainable practices and of sustainability being social and ecological as well as economic is used to support a different interpretation. On this interpretation, sustainable development involves the satisfaction of basic needs and comprises the precondition of economically, socially and ecologically sustainable practices. What is to be sustained is overtly practices and more basically intrinsic value. This account is shown to assist with solving conflicts between nature preservation and alleviation of poverty, solutions to which are argued to embody sustainable development even in the absence of prospects of ever-increasing quality of life for humanity. While this interpretation already counts against sceptical accounts, these are also shown to arise from the adoption of the radical concept of sustainable development by governments, international agencies and multinational business at the Rio Summit of 1992, and consequent re-interpretations. But the rational response is not discarding the concept but rediscovering the radical core and potential to which these various bodies are in theory committed.
109. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Name Index
110. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Helena Siipi Naturalness in Biodiversity Management
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Decline of biodiversity—richness, variety and variability of living beings—is an issue of concern world wide. Nevertheless, not all biological diversity is valued by conservation biologists. Most of them reject an idea of creation of so called A-areas—i.e. maximally rich and diverse biotic areas which have been produced by methods like genetic engineering and species introduction. Reasons for this are considered. A-areas are artefacts: their existence has been intentionally brought about by intentionally modifying their properties in order to produce an entity of their type. Nevertheless, since some restored ecosystems are equally artifacts and still valued over A-areas in biodiversity management, artifactuality cannot alone explain the low value of the A-areas. The essential difference between A-areas and restored ecosystems is in naturalness of their properties. By contrast with the properties of A-areas, the properties of any restored ecosystem are similar to the properties of some ecosystems that have originated through evolutionary processes. I conclude that biodiversity management decisions are based on multiple and different conceptions of natural, unnatural and artificial. The most desired alternatives are natural in all senses of the terms. Because of limits set by the real world, conservation biologists sometimes have to settle for second best alternatives that are unnatural in some sense of the term, but not in all or many of them.
111. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Alicia Irene Bugallo Ecología Profunda y conservacíon de la naturaleza: nuevos desafíos
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Norwegian ecosopher Arne Naess distinguished 'deep' from 'shallow' or merely technical approaches to ecological issues. The first proposal of the Deep Ecology movement (1973) was rooted in a monistic gestalt ontology. Deep Ecology is a tool for enabling systematic discussion of total views, of how norms and consequences interact. We need a deep spiritual change of attitude. Responsible ways of living are more conducive to truly human goals than the present destructive lifestyles. The movement has an inseparable ecopolitical aspect. The later proposals of the Platform movement (subsequent to the Naess-Sessions platform of 1984) stressed a pragmatic intention as can be found in James, Schiller or even Protagoras. The eight principles of the platform constitute a methodological path from ultimate premises to the level of decisions in concrete situations. Supporters of Deep Ecology have an obligation to work to implement changes through political, economic, technological and ideological activism, emphasizing improvements in environmental quality, aesthetics, culture and religion rather than higher levels of material consumption. In order to deal with shallow politicians and decision makers, more supporters incorporate the materialistic, naturalistic concepts of ecological sciences, and the points of view of new schools of conservation philosophy, with complementary approaches from conservation biology and ecosystem ecology.
112. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
René von Schomberg The Erosion of our Value Spheres: The Ways in which Society Copes with Scientific, Moral and Ethical Uncertainty
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In the following, I will discuss the current social reaction to the ecological crisis and the ways in which society reacts to technological risks, which can be understood primarily as a reaction to scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the first section, I will clarify what is meant by scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the second section, I will contrast Max Weber's differentiation of science, law [Recht) and morality in the modern world with the process of de-differentiation of these value spheres, a trend which can be observed in the present-day context of the ecological crisis and technological risks. We shall see that social contradictions emerge in the functional relationships between these value spheres, and that such contradictions go hand in hand with these value spheres or contexts of discourse either losing their original function or becoming transformed. Science forfeits its role as a functional authority and becomes a strategic resource for politics. Law becomes a basic constituent of an amoral form of negotiation, which can no longer be properly grasped in terms of legal categories. Morality is transformed into fear, and economics yields unprofitable practices. In the third section, I will in attempt to open up the moral and ethical dimension of how to deal with uncertainty with the help of discourse theory (Apel, 1988; Habermas, 1996), as well as outline a possible solution.
113. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Elisa Aaltola The Moral Value of Animals: Three Altruistic Versions
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Altruism has often been thought to be the reason we treat animals with a certain moral respect. Animals are not moral agents who could reciprocally honour our well being, and because of this duties toward them are considered to be based on other-directed motivations. Altruism is a vague notion, and in the context of animals can be divided into at least three different alternatives. The first one equates altruism with benevolence or "kindness"; the second one argues altruism is based on recognising inherent value in others; and the third one emphasises identification. Out of these three the first one seems the poorest, for it ultimately falls into egoism: we treat animals with respect out of a need to cultivate our "humanity". The second option is well justified and has been defended thoroughly in the field of animal ethics. Still, it has been criticised recently for being too theory-dependent and even abstract. The third alternative seems tempting in its willingness to give room to practice instead of emphasising abstract moral notions. However, this willingness also comes with a price, for it seems unclear what the mere concentration on contexts and practice can tell us about duties and norms. The main problem is fitting together identification as a practical grounds for moral sentiment with the need for "codified" and even abstract moral principles. One way to do this, the paper suggests, is to use a three-level approach that seeks to take both sides into account.
114. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Kaija Rossi Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In my paper, I will argue that in the liberal tradition of thinking, illiberal practices of minority groups cannot be supported without interventions that already liberalize illiberal cultures. For example, positive group rights have to be evaluated in ways that demand democratization. Moreover, nonintervention with conditions, such as the right of exit, will fail to be noninterventive if taken seriously because illiberal treatment of individuals diminishes their ability to actualize their rights of exit. In addition, nonintervention as a basis of cultural preservation is based on a view of culture that is misleading in portraying minority cultures as entities where changes in the group could be differentiated into internal and external. I will claim that intervention is not as intrusive as often perceived, and, moreover, can be crucial for the wellbeing of women.
115. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Ömer Naci Soykan Looking at the World from Istanbul as a Metaphor
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The problem of environment is the leading common problem of people living on Earth, the sky and soil of which have been polluted. I believe that pollution in a broad sense is the basis for all other important problems of this world. Man has polluted himself and Earth. In the former, which is called cultural pollution, man becomes alienated from other members of his own species and in the latter, which is called physical pollution, man becomes alienated from nature of which he is a child. Both problems, which are based on alienation, show the deficiency in the implementation of the idea of the unity of man and nature, of the unity of mankind. The unity of humanity presupposes the consciousness of living in a common world and of the fact that man is a child of Earth. The possibility of and the necessity for such a consciousness to come into being in a physical-geographical space, which is metaphorically represented by Istanbul, in which different cultures managed to exist side by side throughout history, shows itself more clearly in the present day. Istanbul might be seen as the city which is probably most suitable for being seen as a metaphor for a world in which the idea of the unity of humanity may be realized in the future, because it is an entrance to Asia with its eastern side and to Europe with its western side and as such the point of intersection of the eastern and western cultures. It was a cosmopolitan city and still is. Having a look at the world from Istanbul as a metaphor is in a sense the same as having a look at Istanbul itself.
116. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Donald V. Poochigain Human Nature and Human Rights
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Human rights are universally accepted duties to one another as persons which make possible all other human relations. In order to get along in the world beings are grouped and treated as equal, distinctions being made only when an individual is familiar. Treatment of beings according to their general characteristics constitutes natural or species rights of which human rights are an instance. Such rights are an abstraction, an average of the behavior of all group members, extreme deviation from which is disregarded as pathological. Encompassed in human rights are welfare considerations as well as freedoms, all together establishing a minimal condition of life which everyone owes every other.
117. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Neval Oğan Balkiz Die Frage nach einer Reorganisation der Vereinten Nationen im Lichte der neuen Herausforderung für kulturelle Balance im Bereich Menschenrechte
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Die UNO soll die Menschenrechte schützen, aber kann sie das wirklich? Ist sie als Organisation dafür verantwortlich? Dürfen die Vereinten Nationen Menschenrechte mit Gewalt erzwingen? Ist Druck wichtiger als Dialog? Sind ihre Strukturen nicht überholt und müssten verändert werden, damit sie effektiver arbeiten kann?? Allen Mängeln zum Trotz waren die Vereinten Nationen seit ihrer Gründung als einziges universelles Forum der Völker immer wieder unentbehrlich. Stets zum Gespräch miteinander gezwungen zu sein, erwies sich zumal während der Höhepunkte des Kalten Krieges oft als entscheidende Hilfe. Immerhin gab es eine von der UNO betriebene innovative Fortentwicklung des internationalen Rechts. Solchen Verdiensten und Erfolgen stehen zweifellos Fehlleistungen und Rückschläge gegenüber, die keinesfalls unbeachtet bleiben dürfen. Ihre neben der Friedenssicherung wichtigste Aufgabe, nämlich den sozialen Fortschritt und einen besseren Lebensstandard in grö erer Freiheit zu fördern und natürlich die Menschenrechte zu schützen, konnte die UNO bisher nicht erfüllen. Der Unterschied zwischen Arm und Reich hat sich seit 1960 nicht etwa verringert, sondern ungefähr verdoppelt. Das reichste Fünftel der Menschheit verfügt heute über mehr als vier Fünftel des Weltsozialprodukts. Für das ärmste Fünftel bleiben gerade einmal 1,4%. Der ökologisch unhaltbare Lebensstil vor allem der groen Industriegesellschaften hat sich nur unwesentlich verändert. Noch immer fehlt in den reichen Ländern des Nordens die Einsicht , dass Armut und Umweltzerstörung im Süden kein fernes,sondern ein gemeinsames globales Problem darstellt. Die Gro en Mächte des Sicherheitsrates und die Mitglieder der G 8 lenken über die Weltbank, den internationalen Währungsfonds und die Welthandelsorganisation die Weltwirtschaft zu wenig im Dienste der Uberwindung der globalen Unterentwicklung, dagegen immer wieder zum eigenen Nutzen. Das Wichtigste ist und bleibt es, Sicherheit nicht mehr allein militärisch zu definieren. Auch die wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, kulturellen und ökologischen Ursachen von Konflikten müssen an der Wurzel behandelt werden. Am dringenden Reformbedarf der Vereinten Nationen kann nicht ernsthaft bezweifelt werden. Ziel der Reform ist , die menschliche Sicherheit in einem umfassenden, nicht nur militärischen Sinn zu begreifen. Aber ist die UNO überhaupt reformierbar? Diese Frage richtet sich zuallererst an die Regierungen der UN-Mitglieder. Die Frage ist nur, wie entwickelt sich eine solche Identität auf internationaler Ebene? Wie entsteht, wächst und gedeiht so etwas wie eine überstaatlichen Gemeinschaft, die auf der Universalität der Menschenrechte begründet ist? Wie lernen, uns nicht nur als Angehörige unseres Volks, unserer Familie, unserer Gemeinde, unserer Region, unseres Berufsverbands, unserer politischen Partei, unseres Staats, unserer überstaatlichen Gemeinschaft zu definieren , sondern vor allem als Angehörige der Menschheit, , als konkrete menschliche Wesen, deren individuelles Sein seinen primären natürlichen und zugleich universalen Ausdruck in seinem Status als Bürger findet. Kann dies, wie es Immanuel Kant bereits vor über 200 Jahren sah, mit Hilfe eines weltweiten "Weltbürgerrecht" verwirklicht werden? Muss dieses Weltbürgerrecht -wie Jürgen Habermas behauptet hat- die einzelnen Regierungen binden? Und muss diese überstaatliche Gemeinschaft ihre Mitglieder unter Androhung von Sanktionen zu rechtmä_igem Verhalten zumindest anhalten können?
118. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Contributors
119. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Andrew Hunter Indigenous Peoples' Intellectual Property
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The present paper examines conventional wisdom on the subject of the justification of indigenous peoples' intellectual property rights, and offers an alternative approach. The examination is achieved by a critique of two such conventional approaches in terms of the strength of each argument employed, and in terms of the efficacy of each in the roles allotted to them. The first such argument is Stenson and Gray's application of Kymlicka's individualist theory advocating national minority autonomy. The second argument is the labour entitlement theory of property acquisition, as advanced by Locke and Nozick. These theories only explain how a liberal social contract theorist would construct justifications from the outside. That this is inadequate is shown by reference to a case study involving indigenous claims against Australian law based on indigenous customary law. There, appeals are not made to abstract theory, but to tribal imperative. This observation finds sympathetic support in a reading of Hegel's philosophy of history. Hegel finds spirit in all peoples at all times. To Hegel, non-state peoples are developmentally prior to states; this means that states have developed dialectically from such peoples and cannot therefore deny them without self-contradiction. This places an onus upon a state that has subsumed an indigenous people to accommodate its laws and ways.
120. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Mitsuo Okamoto Peace Culture in Hiroshima
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Fifty-seven years ago. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were annihilated by unprecedented state terrorism. But survivors of both cities never said "Remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki!" No survivors harbored the feeling "once recovered from devastation of the holy land, Japan will not fail to revenge". Instead, they realized in the atomic inferno that violence begets violence and pledged: "Rest in peace. We will never repeat the mistakes. No more Hiroshima, No more Nagasaki".