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101. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Fred Adams, Charlotte Shreve Reply to Gennaro
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Last year Charlotte Shreve and I (Adams and Shreve 2016) presented an argument that synesthesia contains evidence against higher order thought theories of consciousness. Rocco Gennaro (2016) took up the challenge and argued that H.O.T. theories like his could handle the example and dismiss the argument. Below we suggest otherwise. We think the traditional versions of H.O.T. theory are still vulnerable to our argument and we maintain that Gennaro’s version is as well.
102. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Author Guidelines
103. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
About the Journal
104. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Alex Blum Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?
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We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators.
105. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Arnold Cusmariu The Prometheus Challenge Redux
106. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Michael Campbell Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore's Paradox
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In a series of articles Christopher Cowie has provided what he calls a ‘Master Argument’ against the Companions in Guilt (CG) defence of moral objectivity. In what follows I defend the CG strategy against Cowie. I show, firstly, that epistemic judgements are relevantly similar to moral judgements, and secondly, that it is not possible coherently to deny the existence of irreducible and categorically normative epistemic reasons. My argument for the second of these claims exploits an analogy between the thesis that epistemic norms are non-categorical and G.E. Moore’s paradox concerning first personal belief ascriptions. I argue that the absurdity of the assertion “I have evidence that p but no reason to believe it” shows that the norms of belief are categorical. I then consider the counter-argument that this categoricity is a ‘conceptual’ rather than an ‘objective’ requirement. By drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam and Charles Travis, I show that this counter-argument is unsuccessful. Putnam is one of the original proponents of the Companions in Guilt strategy. Thus, by supporting the CG argument through appeal to other Putnamian theses, I show that its insights can only fully be appreciated in the context of broader metaphysical and semantic lessons.
107. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Hili Razinsky Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity
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Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves a worry about the possibility of a conflict between an emotion and a judgement. Back into the 1980s Greenspan has argued that emotional ambivalence is possible, her reasons implying that objectivist accounts of emotion are inconsistent with ambivalence. Tappolet has more recently replied that perceptual accounts allow for emotional ambivalence since the opposed values seen in ambivalence are good or bad in different senses. The present paper identifies strict objectivist ambivalence between judgements and between emotional perceptions by contrasting them with such ambivalence of separate values such as evoked by Tappolet.
108. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
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109. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Terence Rajivan Edward Artefacts as Mere Illustrations of a Worldview
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This paper responds to an argument against a kind of anthropology. According to the argument, if the aim of anthropology is to describe the different worldviews of different groups, then anthropologists should only refer to material artefacts in order to illustrate a worldview; but the interest of artefacts to anthropology goes beyond mere illustration. This argument has been endorsed by key members of the ontological movement in anthropology, who found at least one of its premises in Marilyn Strathern’s writing.
110. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
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111. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
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112. Symposion: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Rocco J. Gennaro In Defense of H.O.T. Theory: A Second Reply to Adams and Shreve
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In Gennaro (2016), I had originally replied to Fred Adams and Charlotte Shreve’s (2016) paper entitled “What Can Synesthesia Teach Us About Higher Order Theories of Consciousness?,” previously published in Symposion. I argued that H.O.T. theory does have the resources to account for synesthesia and the specific worries that they advance in their paper, such as the relationship between concepts and experience and the ability to handle instances of ‘pop-out’ experiences. They counter-reply in Adams and Shreve (2017) and also raise further objections to H.O.T. theory which go well beyond the scope of their 2016 paper. In this paper, I offer additional replies to the points they raise in Adams and Shreve (2017).
113. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Anca Dohotariu Parental Leave Provision in Romania between Inherited Tendencies and Legislative Adjustments
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This article seeks to identify and analyse the most significant changes regarding parental leave provision in post-communist Romania, as well as the extent to which its legal adjustments that took place after 1990 reveal both old trends inherited from the former political regime as well as new tendencies influenced by EU norms and directives. Consequently, this article has a twofold structure. First, a brief overview of the main concepts and theoretical approaches to parental leave will allow us to proceed to a proper understanding of the epistemological tools underpinning this research object. Second, this article tackles the numerous legislative changes concerning parental leave that occurred after the fall of the communist regime. Although limited to a single category of research sources, this inquiry is indispensable for analysing the extent to which childcare and the gendered division of parental responsibilities have become real political struggles within the post-communist public agenda in Romania.
114. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Alex Blum The Hidden Future
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We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable.
115. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
About the Journal
116. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
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117. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Rajesh Sampath Reading “On Time and Being” (1962) to Construct the ‘Missing’ Division III of Being and Time – or “time and Being” – (1927)
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This paper will articulate the conditions of thinking about the transition of Division II in Heidegger’s Being and Time in order to imagine the architecture of the missing Division III, which never appeared in the published Part I of Being and Time (1927). The paper explores questions of temporality, historical temporality, and Heidegger’s confrontation with Hegel at the end of Being and Time while enlisting the resources of his very late lecture of 1962 – “On Time and Being” – to lay down the conditions of possibility to reconstruct the missing Division III. The paper argues that this feat has yet to be adequately accomplished given 90 years that have elapsed since the publication of Being and Time.
118. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
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119. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Emanuel Copilaș Third World Themes in the International Politics of the Ceaușescu Regime or the International Affirmation of the ‘Socialist Nation’
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The present article aims to offer a synoptic picture of communist Romania’s relations with Third World countries during the Ceaușescu regime. Within these relations, economic and geopolitical motivations coexisted along with ideological ones, thus making the topic one of the most interesting and relevant key for understanding RSR’s complex and cunning international strategy. However, I intend to prove that mere pragmatism is not enough to comprehend the drive behind Ceaușescu’s diplomatic efforts in post-colonial Africa; ideological factors need also to be taken into account.
120. Symposion: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Rizalino Noble Malabed Declaring the Self and the Social: Intellectual Responsibility and the Politics of the Cognitive Self
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The epistemological problem is traditionally expressed in the question “How do we know that we know?” The emphasis is on the relationship between the claim that we know and what it is that we know. We notice, only belatedly, that the agent who knows does not really matter in the question. The knower is but an abstracted entity whose only qualification is that s/he claims to know. Virtue epistemology’s virtue lies in the centering of the knower: What is it about the knower that enables her to claim that she knows or that enables us to agree that she indeed knows? The concept of intellectual responsibility in virtue epistemology does not only brings us into the realm of the normative but also implicates, necessarily, the social and the political. Invoking the openness of alternative virtue epistemology to unconventional sources and methods, this essay turns to metaphysics and social ontology in order to explore the problems of intellectual responsibility, society, and politics in humankind’s disposition and striving to know.