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101. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Eric Palmer The Balance of Sovereignty and Common Goods Under Economic Globalization
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Common goods and political sovereignty of nation-states are intertwined, since without government the orderly treatment of common goods would be unlikely. But large corporations, especially global multinationals, reshape and restrict national sovereignty through economic forces. Consequently, corporations have specific social responsibilities. This article articulates those responsibilities as they pertain to managing common goods.
102. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Lawrence Lengbeyer Altering Artworks: Creators’ Moral Rights vs. The Public Good
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The grounds for recognizing that artists possess a personal “moral right of integrity” that would entitle them to prevent others from modifying their works are weak. There is, however, an important (and legislation-worthy) public interest in protecting highly-valued entities, including at least some works of art, from permanently destructive transformations.
103. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Julie van Camp The Unbearable Erosion of Common Goods: Copyright Extension and Eldred V. Ashcroft
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I identify issues of philosophical concern in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on copyright extension, and encourage the participation of philosophers in these public policy debates. Philosophers have contributions to make to the dialogue not captured exclusively by the technical and often narrow legal debate in the courts.
104. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Kathleen Poorman Dougherty The Socratic Elenchus and Moral Reflection
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Much recent attention has been paid to the Socratic elenchus, with considerable focus given to the structure of the elenchus and its desired benefits for both Socrates and his interlocutors. In this paper I focus on one of these benefits, namely the fostering of self-knowledge. I provide an examination of Socrates’ theory of self-knowledge and the way it is to be fostered through elenctic examination with an eye toward gaining afuller understanding of the foundations of our contemporary views. Though many commentators routinely dismiss the Socratic view as overly intellectual, I maintain that “knowing what we know and don’t know” remains an important component of self-knowledge, even if it needs to be supplemented by an understanding of our more general psychological traits and capacities. Additionally, I argue that the Socratic focus on self-examination as a means to gaining self-knowledge remains a timely and important moral task.
105. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Scott F. Aiken, Mark Anderson Argumentative Norms in Republic I
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We argue that there are three norms of critical discussion in stark relief in Republic I. The first we see in the exchange with Cephalus---that we interpret each other and contribute to discussions in a maximally argumentative fashion. The second we seein the exchange with Polemarchus---that in order to cooperate in dialectic, interlocutors must maintain a distance between themselves and the theses they espouse. This way they can subject the views to serious scrutiny without the risk of personal loss. Third, and finally, from Socrates’ exchange with Thrasymachus, it is clear that uncooperative discussants must be handled in a fashion that reinforces the goals of dialectic. So Thrasymachus is refuted and silenced not just for the sake of correcting his definition of justice, but also for the sake of those listening.
106. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Norman Fischer Fathers and Sons: On Piety and Humanity
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In the Apology of Socrates, Socrates is accused of corrupting the youth. Socrates accounts for this charge by saying that the young of Athens imitate him in revealing the ignorance of their elders. Philosophy is inherently, it seems, emancipatory, since it does not take any traditional opinion as per se authoritative. In this way, it seems that philosophy is essentially opposed to piety. In this essay, I willsuggest that the last few pages of Euthyphro indicate a conception of piety that is both consistent with philosophy in the Socratic sense as well as helpful in helping us understand more precisely the nature of philosophy’s emancipatory gesture.
107. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Susan Schoenbohm The Meaning of Politeia: Dikaiosunê as the Telos of Technê
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The aim of this essay is to revise the meaning of politics today in light of the full range of meanings of the ancient Greek word politeia. In Plato’s Republic (Politeia), we see a careful intenveaving of this range of meanings as Socrates’ discusses the means and ends of justice. Socrates elaborates a basic meaning of justice: the well-functioning coordination of peoples’ various skills (technai). Enacting justice in this sense enables people to meet their needs. In addition, Socrates points to a further political aim that justice in this basic sense should serve, one that first qualifies enacting justice to be an end in itself rather than only a technical means to afurther end beyond it. In this essay, I explore especially the importance of this additional aim in relation to the first.
108. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Robert Metcalf Editor’s Introduction to the Special Issue on Ancient Philosophy
109. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Matthew S. Linck The Harmony of Plato and Aristotle
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The pervasive tendency to characterize Plato and Aristotle as philosophers who are fundamentally in opposition blocks an adequate contemporary reception of their writings. This tendency results in superficial presentations of the philosophical concerns of both thinkers and obscures the historical affinity between their global projects. This article provides an example of a reading that respects the accord between Plato and Aristotle on one crucial issue: the foundation of a good life. With respect to Plato’s Republic, I demonstrate that the harmonization of the soul is the principal goal guiding the construction of the city in speech. Following this brief reading of the Republic, I turn to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and argue that once one understands the parameters of the inquiry, one can see that the programmatic foundation hinges on the possibility of harmonizing the multifarious capacities and faculties of the soul. In the final section of the article I suggest that this harmonic reading of Plato and Aristotle has implications for the teaching of philosophical texts generally.
110. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Corinne Painter Aristotle and the Moral Status of Animals
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In the last three decades, the consideration of whether non-human animals should be ascribed any moral status, and if so in what way it ought to be ascribed to them, has become of central philosophical, political and economic importance. Thus, given thecontemporary significance of what may be called (jar simplicity’s sake) the “animal issue,” it is worthwhile to examine in what way Ancient Greek philosophy might contribute to our understanding of the issue and to our philosophical response to it. With this in mind,in this essay I examine the issue of the moral status of animals from a “critical” Aristotelian perspective, on the basis of which I shall attempt: (§I) to show how, unlike the Cartesian view of animal nature, Aristotle’s conception of the non-moral status of animals stillinforms the prevailing contemporary view of the animal, and (§II) to establish that Aristotle’s failure to ascribe moral status to animals should be rejected (a) given his admission that animals are, by nature, capable of suffering while they are unable to engage in rational deliberation, and (b) given his understanding of the connection between moral blameworthiness, natural disposition, and various kinds of acts, particularly un-chosen and chosen willing acts. In this way, we shall show that although the prevailing contemporary view of the animal’s moral status represents a slightly more “elevated” view than Aristotle’s, insofar as (typically) we do not explicitly claim, as Aristotle did, that animals are due no moral consideration, by critically appropriating the relevant Aristotelian texts, we nonetheless findrich philosophical evidence that permits us to further elevate our conception of the moral status of animals such that we are prepared to grant them genuine moral significance, not just in theory but also in practice.
111. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Robert Talisse Socratic Citizenship
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For contemporary democrats, Socrates is a paradox: he is both the paragon of intellectual integrity and the archenemy of democracy. In this essay, the author attempts to navigate this paradox. By offering a revised account of the Socratic elenchus and an examination of Socrates’ objections to democracy, the author proposes a view according to which Socrates provides a compelling image of democracy citizenship. This image is then used to criticize and inform current versions of deliberative democracy.
112. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Audrey L. Anton Breaking the Habit: Aristotle on Recidivism and How a Thoroughly Vicious Person Might Begin to Improve
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Aristotle’s virtue ethics can teach us about the relationship between our habits and our actions. Throughout his works, Aristotle explains much about how one may develop a virtuous character, and little about how one might change from one character type to another. In recent years criminal law has been concerned with the issue of recidivism and how our system might reform the criminals we return to society more effectively. This paper considers how Aristotle might say a vicious person could change and what a penal system could do to facilitate such a transformation. It discusses how previous attempts to rehabilitate criminals may have failed because they do not address habit in the way that Aristotle advocates. This paper concludes that a rehabilitative model that addresses habit more aggressively than previous methods might be required to soften the hardest criminals.
113. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
James Highland Aristotelian Katharsis and Journalistic Ethics: How to Report on Disasters and Atrocities
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In this paper, I argue that journalists who report on tragedies need to avoid two extremes in reader reaction: a state of titillation, as well as a state of revulsion, with regard to the facts of the story. Either reaction distances the reader from experiencing the full reality of the tragic event. I suggest the benefit of studying Aristotle’s writings. In his Poetics and Rhetoric, Aristotle not only describes states of mind which the tragic dramatist takes care to avoid, but he also describes how such authors avoided these extremes. Reporters are not dramatists, but if reporters can apply Aristotle’s understanding of good tragic drama to their reporting, they can better avoid extremes in reader reaction which turn readers away from the full reality of disasters and atrocities, and thereby help them better cope with news that is often profoundly disturbing.
114. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Eugene Garver Aristotle and the Will to Power
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Once we get past moral outrage, Aristotle’s notorious discussion of slavery has several ever more disquieting challenges to modern thinking. Not only are slaves in a certain sense “natural,” but so is the master/slave relationship and so is mastery. While he thinks that living the right kind of state and having the right kind of character is a permanent solution to problems of slavishness, problems of mastery, of the despotic cast of mind, are permanent political problems, since the desire to dominate others has the same psychic source as the desire for friendship and for political reciprocity.
115. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
John Russon The Elements of Everyday Life: Three Lessons from Ancient Greece
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Against the dualistic conception of mind and matter that is characteristic of much modern philosophy, ancient philosophers (Aristotle and Sophocles) show us that our powers are always embedded in nature, and the existence of those powers is dependent upon the existence of the bodies they are “of” Aristotle’s discussion of the habituation in particular offers us the chance to see the materialityand the labor that are presupposed in the acquisition of new powers. Thucydides, finally, shows us the care needed to maintain the existence of these powers, and equally the attitude of neglect that the possession of these powers naturally induces.
116. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Robert Baird The Responsible Self: An Interpretation of Jean-Paul Sartre
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Struggle with self identity is a life-Iong moral undertaking, an essential dimension of which is connecting one’s past and future in a way that preserves integrity and wholeness. The argument of this paper is that one reading of Sartre’s understanding of bad faith and authenticity can illuminate this project. More specifically, the essay provides an interpretation of Sartre’s claim that “I am not what I am and I am what Iam not” that avoids understanding the self as an ontological nothingness poised between past and future. Rather, Sartre’s phrase is interpreted as recognizing that we experience ourselves as a rich, complex continuum that connects past and future. This understanding of the self acknowledges the tension between past and future, but sees that tension as the matrix out of which a responsible self emerges.
117. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
James McBain Epistemological Expertise and the Problem of Epistemic Assessment
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How do laypeople sitting on a jury make determinations of expertise? How, if at all, can laypersons epistemically assess the expertise of an expert or rival experts? Given that the domains of expertise are quite technical, if laypersons are to adjudicate the various proposed and often conflicting claims of experts, they must be able to determine the reliability of the experts as well as the truth of their claims. One way to address these concems is to say that the layperson needs to be in a position to make the determination herself. This view I will call individualism. Individualism maintains the burden of epistemic assessment is on the layperson, not on the expert. One such version of individualism is Jason Borenstein’s proposal as to what is needed for laypersons to make such an assessment. Borenstein’s proposal turns on the laypersons’ ability to understand the domain of expertise as well as the putative expert’s ability to satisfy a proficiency test. What I hope to show is that this proposal fails for two reasons. I argue that the nlove to proficiency tests does not warrant any layperson’s determination of truth or reliability and that given the limited epistemic abilities of laypersons they are not able to satisfy Borenstein’s proposed conditions for determination.
118. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Jeremy Wisnewski Murder, Cannibalism, and Indirect Suicide
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Reeently, a man in Germany was put on trial for killing and consuming another German man. Disgust at this incident was exacerbated when the accused explained that he had placed an advertisement on the internet for someone to be slaughtered and eaten-and that his ‘vietim’ had answered this advertisement. In this paper, I will argue that this disturbing ease should not be seen as morally problematic. I will defend this view by arguing that (1) the so-called ‘vietim’ of this cannibalization is not in fact a victim of murder, and that (2) there is nothing wrong with cannibalism.
119. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
John Forge What are the Moral Limits of Weapons Research?
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The paper tries to locate the moral limits of weapons research, an issue that comes about because weapons harm and unjustified harms are wrong.Doing research does not itself harm, so first it is shown that a means principle holds. Weapons research then needs to be justified, and two ways to do this arecanvassed, historical and a historical. The former takes account of the context in which the work is done and the circumstances the products used. It is arguedthat there can only be historical justifications, given that there are no inherently defensive, deterrent or humane weapons. However, weapons designs live onbeyond the circumstances in which they were created, and even if these amount to ‘just war’ there can be an assurance that the products will not be used unjustlyin the future. A radical solution is suggested for this problem.
120. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Jarett Weintraub A Gadamerian Response to MacKinnon
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In this paper, the author examines the philosophical underpinnings of Catherine MacKinnon’s arguments for the Model Ordinance, particularly as put forth in her book Only Words. These arguments are then refuted, employing Gadamer’s explication of the necessary conditions for the possibility of interpretation and understanding.