Narrow search


By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:


Displaying: 101-120 of 613 documents

0.08 sec

101. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Gordon Pettit Moral Objectivity, Simplicity, and the Identity View of God
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I argue that one can consistently affirm that fundamental moral principles are objec­tive, universal, nonarbitrary, and invariable and yet are dependent on God. I explore and reject appealing to divine simplicity as a basis for affirming this conjunction. Rather, I develop the thesis that God is identical to the Good (the Identity View or IV) and argue that the IV does not fall to the criticisms of simplicity. I then consider a divine will theory (DWT) that claims moral principles are grounded in God’s will. The IV conjoined with the DWT show the consistency of the initial conjunctive claim.
102. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
John Milliken Euthyphro, the Good, and the Right
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The Euthyphro dilemma is widely deployed as an argument against theistic accounts of ethics. The argument proceeds by trying to derive strongly counterintuitive implications from the view that God is the source of morality. I argue here that a general crudeness with which both the dilemma and its theistic targets are described accounts for the seeming force of the argument. Proper attention to details, among them the distinction between the good and the right, reveals that a nuanced theism is quite unscathed by it.
103. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Erik Wielenberg Dawkins’s Gambit, Hume’s Aroma, and God’s Simplicity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I examine the central atheistic argument of Richard Dawkins’s book The God Delusion (“Dawkins’s Gambit”) and illustrate its failure. I further show that Dawkins’s Gambit is a fragment of a more comprehensive critique of theism found in David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Among the failings of Dawkins’s Gambit is that it is directed against a version of the God Hypothesis that few traditional monotheists hold. Hume’s critique is more challenging in that it targets versions of the God Hypothesis that are central to tradi­tional monotheism. Theists and atheists should put away The God Delusion and pick up Hume’s Dialogues.
104. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Steven B. Cowan Molinism, Meticulous Providence, and Luck
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Molinism entails that God cannot actualize just any possible world because God has no control over what counterfactuals of freedom (CFs) are true. This fact confronts the Molinist with a dilemma. If God has a plan for the course of history logically antecedent to his cognizance of the true CFs, then God would have been implausibly lucky if any actualizable world corresponded to his plan. If, on the other hand, God did not have a plan for the course of history antecedent to his cognizance of the true CFs, then Molinism is incommensurate with a meticulous view of providence.
105. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Scott A. Davison Cowan on Molinism and Luck
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In “Molinism, Meticulous Providence, and Luck,” Steven Cowan argues that the doctrine of meticulous providence creates a damaging dilemma for Molinists. I argue that Molinists can overcome this dilemma without giving up the doctrine of meticulous providence.
106. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
William Hasker Hasker on the Banks of the Styx: A Reply to Glenn Andrew Peoples
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Glenn Andrew Peoples has criticized my mind-body theory, emergentism or emergent dualism, on the grounds that it does not, as claimed, allow for the possibility of disembodied survival. I show that his criticisms are misplaced. His objections to my scientific analogies for mind-body emergence misstate what was said by the scientific authorities (Roger Penrose and Kip Thorne) on which I rely. And his philosophical argument relies on a definition of emergentism to which I do not subscribe.
107. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Steven B. Cowan On Target with “Molinism, Meticulous Providence, and Luck”: A Rejoinder to Scott A. Davison
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Scott Davison has raised some challenges to my case against the commensurability of meticulous providence and what I call Scheme-B Molinism, the view that God formulates his plan for the course of history consequent to his cognizance of the true counterfactuals of freedom. In this rejoinder, I attempt to clarify certain points of my argument and respond to his criticisms by showing that he has not dealt adequately with the relevant biblical texts or alleviated the worry that the Molinist view of providence reduces God to just “choosing which movie to play.”
108. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Mark S. McLeod-Harrison Much “To-Do” about Nothing: Hales’s Skeptical Relativism, and Basic Doxastic Perspectives
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Steven Hales’s defense of his philosophical relativism in “What to Do about Incommensurable Doxastic Perspectives” challenges a number of my criticisms made in my “Hales’s Argument for Philosophical Relativism.” I respond to each of these challenges and make a number of further observations about Hales’s position.
109. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Steven D. Hales What to Do about Incommensurable Doxastic Perspectives: Reply to Mark McLeod-Harrison
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The present paper is a response to the criticisms that Mark McLeod-Harrison makes of my book Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy. If secular, intuition-driven rationalist philosophy yields a belief that p, and Christian, revelation-driven epistemic methods yield a belief that not-p, what should we do? Following Alston, McLeod-Harrison argues that Christian philosophers need do nothing, and remains confident that their way is the best. I argue that this is a serious epistemic mistake, and that relativism about philosophical propositions is a superior approach. McLeod-Harrison also raises two objections to my account of relativism, the first against my rejection of the skeptical alternative, and the second attempting to show that I am committed to an epistemic theory of truth. I rebut both arguments.
110. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Garry DeWeese Quid ergo Hipponium et Floridensis?: Or, Does Horner Succeed in Referring? A Rejoinder
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
David Horner has recently offered a medieval argument for an Anglophilic pronunciation of the name of St. Augustine. I claim his disputatious account fails, both on an account of interlinguistic phonological equivalence, and on a Kripkean-style rigid-designator theory of reference. It turns out, surprisingly, that Floridians are closer to the truth about the correct pronunciation of the medieval saint’s name than are Englishmen.
111. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
David A. Horner Whether Augustine’s Name Should Be Pronounced AW-gus-teen or aw-GUS-tin?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The pronunciation of Augustine’s name is a matter of some dispute, between those (including most British scholars) who pronounce it aw-GUS-tin, and those who pronounce it AW-gus-teen. This essay argues for the former as the preferred pronunciation. It is (humorously) modeled on the technical argumentative model of the medieval disputation, which is known best by philosophers in the form of Thomas Aquinas’s masterwork, Summa Theologiae.
112. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Craig J. Hazen Editor’s Introduction
113. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Keith E. Yandell Religious Pluralism: Reductionist, Exclusivist, and Intolerant?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
There is a general recognition that there are various self-identifying religions. Many people find the idea that these religions differ in significant ways altogether too distressing to accept. Thus Religious Pluralism is often taken to define the only unbiased, rational, and acceptable approach to the diversity of religions. In fact, the Pluralist route is anything but unbiased or rational. Rather than being the only acceptable approach, it should be flatly rejected. While proclaiming its respect to all nice religious traditions (ones that are not nice are simply cast out), it proposes a radical reshaping of religious traditions along the lines that it favors. Coming to clear terms with this imperialistic fact concerning Religious Pluralist procedures is no part of their agenda.
114. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Chad Meister Guest Editor’s Introduction
115. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Paul K. Moser Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Kardiatheology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper contends that although many religious views are exclusive of each other, a morally perfect God worthy of worship would seek to include all willing people in lasting life with God. The paper distinguishes some different variations on religious exclusivism and inclusivism, and proposes an inclusive version of Christian exclusivism. The account implies that one can yield volitionally to God’s unselfish love and thereby to God de re, without any corresponding acknowledgment de dicto and thus without one’s knowing (or believing) that God exists. The paper finds the basis for this approach in the teachings of Jesus himself. In addition, the paper recruits a notion of kardiatheology to emphasize that a God worthy of worship would seek to transform the heart (or motivational center) of a wayward person even if this person does not (yet) believe that God exists.
116. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Walter Schultz Dispositions, Capacities, and Powers: A Christian Analysis
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Dispositional properties have been receiving an increasing amount of attention in the last decade from metaphysicians and philosophers of science. The proper semantics and ontology remains controversial. This paper offers an analysis and ontology of dispositional properties rooted in Christology and the biblical doctrine of creation. The analysis overcomes the standard problems faced by all such analyses and provides an account of “ungrounded dispositions.” The analysis involves a version of a Leibnizian-Aristotelian notion of possible worlds and provides a novel notion of truth-makers for subjunctive conditionals.
117. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Paul F. Knitter Religious Diversity: What to Make of It . . . How to Engage It? A Conversation with Paul Moser and Keith Yandell
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Knitter asks Moser if the soteriological inclusivism he is proposing for our understanding of God can also be extended to our understanding of Christ: Christ’s death and resurrection do not constitute or bring about saving grace; they reveal it, thus leaving room for the possibility of other revealers. For Yandell, Knitter first clarifies that the necessary conditions for dialogue are not established before but in the dialogue. He then urges an epistemic humility for all Christian philosophers in view of the ineffable Mystery of God—a Mystery that may well include, to the philosopher’s consternation, a “coinciding of opposites.”
118. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Warren Shrader Dembski’s Specification Condition and the Role of Cognitive Abilities
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper brings recent work in virtue epistemology to bear on the debate over design inferences. I intend to show that certain objections to William Dembski’s explanatory filter, in particular his specification condition, are on target, but that incorporating into the specification condition a notion borrowed from virtue epistemologists (a cognitive ability) makes the condition more understandable and immune to the criticisms that have been offered. I conclude by suggesting a way that one might flesh out the notion of a cognitive ability and revise Dembski’s account accordingly. This helps to advance the debate over design inferences.
119. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Shawn Floyd Preferential Divine Love: Or, Why God Loves Some People More Than Others
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I argue that there is an important sense in which God’s love is partial or preferential. In developing this argument, I appeal to Thomas Aquinas’s claim that God’s love for persons has the character of friendship. By its nature, friendship exhibits a considerable degree of partiality. For whether a person prefers to be united to another in friendship depends (in part) on whether the latter reciprocates the former’s affection and endorses those commitments conducive to fellowship. If God’s love is expressive of friendship (so described), then the sort of partiality some may wish to deny of his love may be one of its salient features.
120. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Thomas McCall On Trinitarian Subordinationism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this essay we examine a recent proposal in Trinitarian theology. Analyzing the claim that the Son is necessarily subordinate to the Father, we argue that there are no good reasons to hold such a view but that there are strong reasons to reject it. The arguments made by Bruce Ware and Wayne Grudem from the Christian tradition often rest upon fundamental misunderstandings of the theological issues at stake, their arguments from Scripture bring important—but flawed—metaphysical assumptions into the exegesis of biblical texts, and their own proposal is either hopelessly mired in contradiction or entails the direct denial of the full divinity of the Son.