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Displaying: 101-110 of 110 documents

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101. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Lester Embree Disciplines beyond Philosophy: Recollecting a Phenomenological Frontier
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“Frontier” signifies not only a line between areas but also the area beyond one’s home area. The early giants in phenomenological philosophy were often concerned with other disciplines. Husserl knew much about the psychology as well as the mathematics of his time. Heidegger had an involvement with Greek philology that others have continued. Gurwitsch and then Merleau-Ponty gained much from the psychiatry of Kurt Goldstein and they plus Sartre took Gestalt psychology very seriously. And Schutz founded the phenomenological theory of the cultural sciences. This pattern of interest in and benefi t from disciplines beyond philosophy continues in Klaus Held, Thomas Seebohm, and Bernhard Waldenfels, but is becoming increasingly atypical because of, among other reasons, the non-German model for the preparation of philosophers. The present essay is an attempt to remind phenomenological philosophers of this component of their deeper tradition and then to explore how it can be revived.
102. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Elizabeth A. Behnke Bodily Relationality: An Experiment in Phenomenological Practice (VII)
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Bodily relationality is such a rich field for phenomenological research that a preliminary survey is required in order to distinguish its multifarious modes. This essay sketches some possible themes and approaches, eventually arriving at a provisional description of some basic structures of interkinaesthetic relationality before following the lead of the Romanian phenomenologist Alexandru Dragomir in turning to an even more fundamental structure—namely, our embodied engagement with the here and now. After suggesting some ways in which to cultivate a more open, flexible style of bodily relationality, the essay concludes with a ten-point summary of key findings regarding bodily relationality.
103. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Michael D. Barber Endorsement and Eidos: Phenomenology and the Schutz/Voegelin Correspondence
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Like Alfred Schutz, Eric Voegelin opposed positivistic approaches to the social sciences through the method of locating the object of social science in life-world relationships. However, Voegelin’s metaphysical critique of modern political theory led him to emphasize sub-rational, metaphysical factors and to suspect epistemological/ methodological approaches, like phenomenology, that proceed independently of them. However, due to this strategy, Voegelin appears less self-reflective about the methodology underpinning his claims, in contrast to Schutz, who relied more heavily on phenomenological methods. Nevertheless, Voegelin discovers the attitude of committed participation exceeding the stance of phenomenology that must be used to describe it.
104. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Shaun Gallagher Neurophilosophy and Neurophenomenology
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Th e neurophilosophical project, as envisioned by Churchland, involves intertheoretic reduction, moving from (or eliminating) theories formulated in terms of common sense and folk psychology, to theories that have stood the test of scientific experiment. In her view, folk psychology, as well as introspective phenomenology, will be eliminated in favor of neuroscience. Neurophenomenology holds that phenomenology (as a practice)is not only possible, but is in fact a useful tool for science; and that phenomenology is ineliminable if the project is to pursue a neurobiology of consciousness. Clarification of these issues rests on an understanding of how phenomenology can be an alternative source of testable theory, and can play a direct role in scientific experiment. Rather than talking in the abstract about the role of theory formation in science, I consider two specific issues to show the difference between a neurophilosophical approach and a neurophenomenlogical approach, namely, the issues of self and intersubjectivity. Neurophilosophy (which starts with theory that is continuous with common sense) and neurophenomenology (which generates theory in methodically controlled practices) lead to very different philosophical views on these issues.
105. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Richard Cohen Levinas: Thinking Least about Death: Contra Heidegger
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Philosophers have traditionally aimed to die in life. From Socrates who argued that death was nothing to Spinoza who claimed “to think of death least of all things,” the “life” of the mind was an escape from the death of the body. In a sharp break from this tradition, Martin Heidegger in the groundbreaking phenomenological-ontology of Being and Time (1927), and thereafter, made death—as a person’s anxious ”being-toward-death”— the basic revelatory structure, the very self-understanding of the human person. As such, it is for Heidegger the privileged access to being’s historical revelation of itself to itself. Emmanuel Levinas, in independent and, as this essay shows, deeper phenomenological studies, fundamentally criticizes and rejects Heidegger’s vision. This is because without turning back to an escape into the eternal he discovers in human mortality and suffering a completely different meaning: the moral primacy of caring for the mortality of the other person before my own mortality, up to the point of “dying for” the other person and, even beyond this personal extremity, to the point of caring for the justice of the world “beyond my own death.” These meanings—whose exigency transcends a purely phenomenological science yet remain bound to human sociality—re irreducibly ethical. As such, as imperatives of greater and higher bearing than the call to ontological thinking, they impose the demands of ethics as “first philosophy.”
106. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Mélanie Bourdaa Interactivity in French Television Programming
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This article deals with interactivity in French TV programs. Actually, with the apparition of real-TV on our screens TV viewers have experienced a new way of watching television with the possibility to intervene in their favorite programs. How did that happen? Was it predictable? Is Interactivity present in every kind of programs? Th is article focuses on a brief history of TV programs, on the tools TV viewers can use to create their TV and on a panorama of French TV programs in which we can find Interactivity.
107. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
James Dodd The Problem of Givenness in Husserl’s Phenomenology
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What is the problem of givenness in Husserl’s phenomenology? This essay seeks to answer this question by developing the problem in terms of both static and genetic phenomenological analysis. Together, both dimensions of analysis lead to the importance of the question of time and temporality for phenomenology: the problem of givenness is the problem of time. It is suggested that Husserl’s approach to these questions is both rich and subtle enough to meet the objections of those who would argue that his phenomenology is unable to handle problems of being, intersubjectivity, and individuation.
108. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Christine Daigle A Sartrean Phenomenological Ethics
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In this essay, I explain how Sartre’s phenomenological ontology forms the ground for his elaboration of an ethics of freedom. I demonstrate that the ethics of absolute freedom is the logical outcome of Sartre’s views concerning the notion of consciousness as intentional. This ethics, despite the fact that it gives “no recipes,” entrusts the human being with full ethical responsibility and allows him to flourish as the creator of the world, of values and of meaning.
109. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Carolyn M. Cusick The Problem of Psychology and Public Service Advertising
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In much the same way that psychology mimics the goals and methods of natural science for purposes of studying the inner life of the mind instead of outer life, non-profit advertising mimics the methods of commercial advertising for social goods instead of profits. Using a few public service advertisements, particularly an anti-rape campaign poster, this essay lays out the parallel between psychology and non-profit advertising, and further, it explores how the failure of psychology to overcome the problem of naturalism is at the root of the growth of all forms of advertising and the attempt to manipulate citizen consumers.
110. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Philip Blosser Scheler and “Values that Belong to the Ethical Sphere”
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I respond to Peter Spader’s critique of my dissent from Scheler’s theory that ‘good’ is invariably a moral value generated as a by-product of realizing non-moral value. I review the development of my dissent in earlier articles, argue that the distinction between moral values (as values of ‘persons’) and, e.g., aesthetic values (as values of ‘objects’) is too facile, that some values are essentially moral, while others become moral through a transactional nexus, that the concept of non-moral good is indispensable, and that moral experience calls for more nuanced phenomenological description than the Schelerian conceptualization seems capable of providing.