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101. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Federico Leoni Introduzione. Un altro inconscio
102. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Jennifer McWeeny Introduzione. Il corpo del nostro tempo
103. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Ted Toadvine Presentazione
104. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Emmanuel Alloa, Judith Revel Introduzione
105. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Marie-Eve Morin Introduzione
106. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Rajiv Kaushik Introduzione
107. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Prisca Amoroso, Gianluca De Fazio Dall’arca Terra allo Spielraum: Natura, corpo, spontaneità
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Il saggio muove da una ricostruzione storico-concettuale dell’interpretazione merleau-pontyana del manoscritto di Husserl Rovesciamento della dottrina copernicana nell’interpretazione della corrente visione del mondo, con cui Merleau-Ponty è in dialogo sin dalla Fenomenologia della percezione, per ripercorrere gli sviluppi del tema della Terra nell’avanzare della riflessione merleau-pontyana sul corpo-proprio, sull’organismo vivente, sulla dimensione carnale dell’essere. La proposta di un ritorno alla Terra, intesa come Boden irriducibile dell’esperienza, trova infatti il suo risvolto ontologico nell’idea di Spielraum, che già Husserl definiva come “ambito di possibilità”, e che in Merleau-Ponty assume il senso di un margine di gioco sempre aperto nella carne. Boden e Spielraum, non a caso tematizzati da Merleau-Ponty in due corsi paralleli tenuti al Collège de France nell’anno 1959-1960, permettono una rivalutazione del vivente secondo un modello che, contro il riduzionismo meccanicista, privilegi la spontaneità e la contingenza, e aprono allo sviluppo dell’ontologia porosa che il filosofo andrà proponendo negli ultimi anni. Ricostruendo la funzione della riflessione sulla corporeità e sul rapporto del vivente al mondo-ambiente in questa maturazione, si argomenterà che la critica che Merleau-Ponty muove al dualismo empirismo-idealismo trovi nell’idea di Terra un momento chiave, che contribuisce ad orientarla in direzione di una filosofia della carne. Questo passaggio riconfigura la Natura stessa, pensata non già come un originario, ma in quanto ambito di possibilità processuale e transindividuale, come quel quasi-oggetto, come lo definiva, ancora, Husserl, che presenta un’irriducibile resistenza ad un pensiero di sorvolo, proprio in quanto è condizione del pensiero stesso e ancoraggio della vita tutta.This essay begins with a historico-conceptual reconstruction of the Merleau-Pontian interpretation of Husserl’s manuscript, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” with which Merleau-Ponty is in dialogue from Phenomenology of Perception onward, and revisits the development of the theme of the Earth in the progression of Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on le corps propre, the living organism, and the carnal dimension of being. The proposal for a return to the Earth, taken as irreducible Boden of experience, indeed finds its ontological reverse side in the idea of Spielraum, which Husserl already defined as a “milieu of possibilities,” and which in Merleau-Ponty takes on the sense of a margin of play always open in the flesh. Boden and Spielraum, two notions that Merleau-Ponty does not thematize by chance in the two parallel courses given at the Collège de France over the years 1959-1960, enable a reassessment of the living being according to a model that, against mechanistic reductionism, privileges spontaneity and contingency, and opens to the development of the porous ontology that the philosopher would propose in his final years. Reconstructing the function of reflection on corporeality, and on the relationship of the living being with its milieu in the process, it will be argued that the criticism directed by Merleau-Ponty against the dualism of empiricism-idealism finds in the idea of the Earth a key moment that contributes to orienting him in the direction of a philosophy of the flesh. This passage reconfigures Nature itself, no longer conceived of as an originating, but as a milieu of processual and transindividual possibilities, like that quasi-object, as Husserl again defined it, that presents an irreducible resistance against high-altitude thinking, precisely as the condition of thought itself and the anchorage of all life.Cet essai commence avec une reconstruction historico-conceptuelle de l’interprétation merleau-pontienne du manuscrit de Husserl, Renversement de la doctrine copernicienne, avec lequel Merleau-Ponty est en dialogue depuis la Phénoménologie de la perception, et revisite les développement du thème de la Terre dans la progression de la réflexion merleau-pontienne sur le corps propre, sur l’organisme vivant, sur la dimension charnelle de l’être. La proposition d’un retour à la Terre, prise comme Boden irréductible de l’expérience, trouve en effet son envers ontologique dans l’idée de Spielraum, que Husserl déjà définissait comme « milieu de possibilités » et qui chez Merleau-Ponty prend le sens d’une marge de jeu toujours ouverte dans la chair. Boden et Spielraum, deux notions que Merleau-Ponty ne thématise pas par hasard dans les deux cours parallèles donnés au Collège de France au cours de l’année 1959-1960, permettent une réévaluation du vivant selon un modèle qui, contre le réductionnisme mécaniste, privilégie la spontanéité et la contingence, et ouvrent au développement de l’ontologie poreuse que le philosophe allait proposer dans les dernières années. Reconstruisant la fonction de la réflexion sur la corporéité et sur le rapport du vivant avec son milieu dans ce processus, on argumentera que la critique dirigée par Merleau-Ponty contre le dualisme empirisme-idéalisme trouve dans l’idée de la Terre un moment clé qui contribue à l’orienter en direction d’une philosophie de la chair. Ce passage reconfigure la Nature elle-même, pensée non pas déjà comme un originaire, mais en tant que milieu de possibilités processuelles et transindividuelles, en tant que quasi-objet, comme le définissait, encore, Husserl qui offrait une résistance irréductible contre une pensée de survol, précisément en tant que condition de la pensée elle-même et ancrage de toute la vie.
108. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Elena De Silvestri L’apparizione del nibbio: una lettura del fantasma tra Freud e Merleau-Ponty
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In Un ricordo d’infanzia di Leonardo da Vinci Freud delinea un profilo della personalità di Leonardo a partire da un fantasma del suo passato, da un ricordo in cui egli rinviene “la sintesi” della sua intera vita. Nella parte finale de Il dubbio di Cézanne Merleau-Ponty recupera questa stessa analisi freudiana, per farne emergere, più che una contestazione o una critica, un vettore eccentrico: se il fantasma del nibbio – come Merleau-Ponty lo definisce – può rappresentare il monogramma della vita e del passato di Leonardo, è unicamente in quanto ne esibisce la “ripresa creatrice”. A partire da quest’idea di un continuo scambio tra presente e passato, in cui si offre la possibilità stessa di un avvenire creativo, è possibile pensare ad una differente lettura del concetto psicoanalitico di fantasma. Esso fa parte di quelle realtà immaginarie che Merleau-Ponty, nell’ultima fase del suo pensiero, descriverà come inerenti alla struttura stessa del reale, e che testimoniano, a un tempo, di un momento essenziale nel processo di soggettivazione. Attraverso la lettura merleau-pontiana la nozione di fantasma sembra quindi sottrarsi ad ogni deriva deterministica, per configurarsi piuttosto come l’effetto di una risonanza in cui “fedeltà all’infanzia” e “ripresa creatrice” convergono senza contraddizione.In Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, Freud outlined a profile of the personality of Leonardo starting from a fantasy of his past, a memory in which he found “the synthesis” of his entire life. In the last part of “Cézanne’s Doubt,” Merleau-Ponty takes up this same Freudian analysis in order to bring to light, rather than a challenge or a criticism, an eccentric vector: if the fantasy of the vulture – as defined by Merleau-Ponty – can represent the monogram of the life and the past of Leonardo, it is precisely insofar as it manifests “creative revival.” From this idea of a continuous exchange between present and past, in which the very possibility of a creative future arises, it is possible to conceive of a different reading of the psychoanalytic concept of fantasy. The latter makes up part of those imaginary realities that Merleau-Ponty, in the last phase of his thought, will describe as inherent in the very structure of the real, and which testify, at the same time, to an essential moment of the process of subjectivation. Through Merleau-Ponty’s reading, the notion of fantasy seems to evade any deterministic derivation, instead configuring itself as the effect of a resonance in which “fidelity to childhood” and “creative revival” converge without contradiction. Dans Un souvenir d’enfance de Léonard de Vinci, Freud décrit un profil de la personnalité de Léonard à partir d’un fantasme de son passé, d’un souvenir dans lequel il trouve « la synthèse » de sa vie entière. Dans la dernière partie du Doute de Cézanne, Merleau-Ponty reprend cette même analyse freudienne pour en faire émerger, plutôt qu’une contestation ou une critique, un vecteur excentrique : si le fantasme du vautour – comme le définit Merleau-Ponty – peut représenter le monogramme de la vie et du passé de Léonard, c’est uniquement en tant qu’il en manifeste la « reprise créatrice ». À partir de cette idée d’un échange continu entre présent et passé, dans lequel s’offre la possibilité même d’un avenir créatif, il est possible de penser à une lecture différente du concept psychanalytique de fantasme. Ce dernier fait partie de ces réalités imaginaires que Merleau-Ponty, dans la dernière phase de sa pensée, décrira comme inhérentes à la structure même du réel et qui témoignent d’un moment essentiel du processus de subjectivation. À travers la lecture merleau-pontienne, la notion de fantasme semble en effet se soustraire à toute dérive déterministe pour se configurer plutôt comme l’effet d’une résonance dans laquelle la « fidélité à l’enfance » et la « reprise créatrice » convergent sans contradiction.
109. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Federico Leoni Presentazione
110. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Michel Dalissier Introduzione
111. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gael Caignard Problemi di ieri e di oggi: da Gide a Sartre
112. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Federico Leoni Introduzione. L’altro specchio di Merleau-Ponty
113. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Gianluca De Fazio Come due specchi prospicienti: Un’ipotesi monadologica nell’ultimo Merleau-Ponty
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Beginning with the relation between the question of Nature and the status of philosophy, this essay interprets the theme of the mirror through the chiasm between multiplicity and thought. This relation is not substantial dualism’s relation of the subject with the object, but rather, following the image used by Merleau-Ponty, it is like the relation between two mirrors facing each other, thus suggesting that the “subject” herself is a multiplicity. From thence, drawing inspiration from this quote in Eye and Mind, “the Cartesian does not see himself in the mirror”, I formulate both the problem of the body and the question of intersubjectivity as a field of individuation for all possible forms of subjectivity. Following this theme, the essay retraces the use of the mirror in the Note on Machiavelli. Finally, given that the theme of subjectivity as a multiplicity is related to the theme of corporeality (granting the principle of reversibility characteristic of a Merleau-Pontian ontology), the essay ends with an analysis of the idea of the body-mirror (and not simply the “body in the mirror”) which, from an intersubjective point of view, becomes an expressive relation in which each body is mirror and expression of the whole universe, thus unlocking an existential monadology.
114. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Prisca Amoroso La riflessione impossibile e il rispecchiamento nel mondo. Dall’esperienza infantile alla surréflexion
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This essay builds on two questions: the relation of the child with the other and the child’s way of knowing, in which the resistance of the unreflected is not yet problematized. Through a reconstruction of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Piaget’s idea of the child’s linear intellectual progression toward reflexive abstraction, I highlight the moment of unreflection by taking up the notion of ultra-thing, which Merleau-Ponty borrows from Henry Wallon. These ultra-things are entities with which the child entertains a vague relation and which always remain at the horizon of her perception without yet being possessed in a representation or grasped in a concept. They include, for example, the sun, the sky, the Earth, the body as an object, existence before the birth of the child – uninhabitable dimensions or, to the contrary, ones that are necessarily inhabited. The concept of ultra-thing has not been sufficiently explored in Merleau-Pontian studies and its importance remains underappreciated. This essay thus formulates a hypothesis about the relation between ultra-things and hyper-reflection.
115. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Matteo Bonazzi “L’uomo è specchio per l’uomo”. Merleau-Ponty, Lacan e la nascita prolungata
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This essay investigates the question of the birth of the subject through Lacan’s and Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the function of the mirror, specularity, and the speculative. The first section draws on the “duplication” of self-consciousness described by Hegel in the first pages of Phenomenology of Spirit. The question of the double and the mirror is then examined through the three main versions of Lacan’s mirror stage, interpreted in light of Merleau-Ponty’s own reflections. Finally, I draw on passages from The Prose of the World and Eye and Mind to illustrate an original convergence with questions raised by Lacan’s late teachings.
116. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Federico Leoni La telepatia e la macchia. Mirror neurons e monadologie merleau-pontyane
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A meditation on specularity as paradigms of a theory of experience which informs every field of philosophy and human sciences, including contemporary neurosciences. And a meditation, starting from neurosciences and mirror neurons, on the different readings of this paradigm of specularity and specularization. In particular, on that “second” reading of specularization, which suggests that the mirror is not an instrument of representation but of expression, not a device of adaquation but of creation. It is an hypothesis that Merleau-Ponty, facing the very same problems contemporary neurosciences are confonted to, reactivates in an increasingly systematic way in his later years, drawing from a tradition which we try here to reconstruct. From Merleau-Ponty to Bergson, from Bergson to Leibniz, this second reading of specularity contains a possibility which is still fruitful and which neurosciences themselves could adopt in order to reconsider in a new perspective the evidences they have considered until now from the point of view of a first reading of specularity. This second reading of specularity suggests that it is not so much necessary to explain how one subject comprehends the other, but how both subjects are comprehended within the transcendental space of what we could call an event. Empathy is not so much a syntonization among subjects, but subjects are a partial and local desyntonization of that empathic system we should place as the beginining and not at the end of the process. Consciousness does not represent the other consciousness, but they express in a simultaneous and specular diffraction the fundamental unity of an event which is every time unique and impersonal.
117. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Bernard Andrieu, Anna Caterina Dalmasso Introduzione. Pensare la tecnicità con Merleau-Ponty
118. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Edoardo Fugali Merleau-Ponty e Cézanne: visione e pittura come tecnologie incarnate
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The aim of this article is to demonstrate the intrinsically technical nature of visual perception and pictorial performance through their common anchorage in the corporeity that brings them into existence. As with any other artistic technique, painting reveals itself to be the natural extension of a technological attitude already rooted in the sensorimotor devices of the body in action; painting is led to inhabit a world that is of the same nature as corporeal agents, because the objects that populate it share with it the ontological element of the “flesh”. Through Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of Cezanne’s pictorial works, I demonstrate that the main purpose of painting is, analogically with the descriptive analyses made possible by the phenomenological reduction, to render intersubjectively evident the hidden work of vision before its sedimentation in an accomplished perceptual scene. As the experiments of contemporary neuroscience also demonstrate, perception is by and large a reconstructive process of “image-making” rather than an allegedly accurate reproduction of the spectacle of the world. Painting, on the other hand, both in terms of creation and for the observer, employs the same sensorimotor resources as instruments.
119. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Andrea Zoppis L’essere grezzo della tecnica
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Through a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s late courses on Nature, this essay presents a new reflection on technique and makes explicit the ontological significance of a rethinking of technique in this period. After an analysis of the historical sense of the notion of Nature and of animal behavior, we turn to cybernetics. The need to rethink man on the basis of his contingency, that is, on the basis of his relationship with the world and with the technical objects through which this relationship is structured, arises in the essay. Merleau-Ponty’s course on Nature has thus allowed us to investigate the ontological significance of the notion of technique by considering technical objects that Merleau-Ponty himself references. Technique, by prolonging Nature, becomes the keystone to the contact between man and Being, thus illustrating the necessity, for philosophy and for culture, of a return to the contact with brute being that founds and inhabits it.
120. Chiasmi International: Volume > 22
Saverio Macrì “Frange” del concetto di informazione: natura e tecnica in Merleau-Ponty e in Simondon
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This paper investigates how Merleau-Ponty and Simondon conceived the theory of information and, in particular, assessed its validity as an instrument of analysis in multiple fields of knowledge. Specifically, the comparison will analyze the relationship between organism and environment, which is central both to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature and to Simondon’s theory of individuation. For both authors, the analysis of processes of interaction between organism and environment is characterized by the search for a type of causality that distinguishes itself from mechanism, which reduces these interactions to a sum of independent parts occasionally tied by a causally determined relation. However, while Merleau-Ponty views the categories introduced by the theory of information as a mere reconstruction of the mechanistic perspective, Simondon revises these categories to overcome mechanism and move towards the construction of a model of experience based on relation.