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101. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
102. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Agenda / Notebook
103. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Dimitri Ginev On the Hermeneutic Alternative to Normative Naturalism
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What I hope to do in this paper is to see whether Laudan’s normative naturalism may suggest a third alternative to normativism-naturalism dilemma in the analytical philosophy of science. In criticizing the view that all methodological rules are to be specified in the form of hypothetical imperatives, I offer the idea that a theory of scientific rationality (including its normative dimension) must go beyond the usual analytical format of “rational reconstruction”. It is precisely this idea that opens the door for a hermeneutic alternative to normative naturalism. On this alternative, one has to pay attention to the contextual normativity of doing scientific research, if one wants to give an account of the articulation of methodological rules and norms.
104. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Boletín de suscripción / Order Form
105. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
John R. Welch Singular Analogy and Quantitative Inductive Logics
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The paper explores the handling of singular analogy in quantitative inductive logics. It concentrates on two analogical patterns coextensive with the traditional argument from analogy: perfect and imperfect analogy. Each is examined within Carnap’s λ-continuum, Carnap’s and Stegmüller’s λ-η continuum, Carnap’s Basic System, Hintikka’s α-λ continuum, and Hintikka’s and Niiniluoto’s K-dimensional system. Itis argued that these logics handle perfect analogies with ease, and that imperfect analogies, while unmanageable in some logics, are quite manageable in others. The paper concludes with a modification of the K-dimensional system that synthesizes independent proposals by Kuipers and Niiniluoto.
106. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Libros recibidos / Books Received
107. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Boletín de suscripción / Order Form
108. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Francisco Salto, José M. Méndez Two Extensions of Lewis’ S3 with Peirce’s Law
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We define two extensions of Lewis’ S3 with two versions of Peirce’s Law. We prove that both of them have the Ackermann Property.
109. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Libros recibidos / Books Received
110. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla The Elementary Economics of Scientific Consensus
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The scientist’s decision of accepting a given proposition is assumed to be dependent on two factors: the scientist’s ‘private’ information about the value of that statement and the proportion of colleagues who also accept it. This interdependence is modelled in an economic fashion, and it is shown that it may lead to multiple equilibria. The main conclusions are that the evolution of scientific knowledge can be path-dependent, that scientific revolutions can be due to very small changes in the empirical evidence, and that not all possible equilibria are necessarily efficient, neither in the economic nor in the epistemic sense. These inefficiencies, however, can be eliminated if scientists can form coalitions.
111. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Agenda / Notebook
112. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
113. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Jordi Cat Must the Microcausality Condition be Interpreted Causally?: Beyond Reduction and Matters of Fact
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The ’microcausality’ condition in quantum field theory is typically presented and justified on the basis of general principles of physical causality. I explore in detail a number of alternative causal interpretations of this condition. I conclude that none is fully satisfactory, independent of further and controversial assumptions about the object and scope of quantum field theories. In particular the stronger causalreadings require a fully reductionist and fundamentalist attitude to quantum field theory. I argue, in a deflationary spirit, for a reading of the ‘microcausality’ condition as merely a boundary condition, inspired by Relativity, that different possible formulations of quantum field theory must obey.
114. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Nancy Cartwright Epilogue
115. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Informantes de THEORIA (1996-1999) / Reviewers for 1996-1999
116. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Erik Curiel The Constraints General Relativity Places on Physicalist Accounts of Causality
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All accounts of causality that presuppose the propagation or transfer or some physical stuff to be an essential part of the causal relation rely for the force of their causal claims on a principle of conservation for that stuff. General Relativity does not permit the rigorous formulation of appropriate conservation principles. Consequently, in so far as General Relativity is considered and fundamental physical theory, such accounts of causality cannot be considered fundamental. The continued use of such accounts of causality ought not be proscribed, but justification is due from those who would use them.
117. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Phil Dowe The Conserved Quantity Theory Defended
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I defend the conserved quantity theory of causation against two objections: firstly, that to tie the notion of “cause” to conservation laws is impossible, circular or metaphysically counterintuitive; and secondly, that the conserved quantity theory entails an undesired notion of identity through time. My defence makes use of an important meta-philosophical distinction between empirical analysis and conceptual analysis. My claim is that the conserved quantity theory of causation must be understood primarily as an empirical, not a conceptual, analysis of causation.
118. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Libros recibidos / Books Received
119. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Boletín de suscripci6n / Order Form
120. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Mauricio Suarez Presentation