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Displaying: 101-120 of 1066 documents

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101. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Robert Sleigh Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge
102. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
James A. Keller A Moral Argument Against Miracles
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Those who believe that miracles (temporary suspensions of some law of nature accomplished by divine power) have occurred typically hold that they are rare and that only a small percentage of all people have been eyewitnesses to them or been direct beneficiaries of them. Although a claim that they occur far more frequently would be empirically highly implausible, I argue that the claim that God performs miracles in such a pattern unavoidably implies that God is guilty of unfairness. I articulate a criterion of fairness, discuss various types of miracles, and defend my conclusion against a variety of possible rejoinders.
103. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Stephen N. Dunning Love Is Not Enough: A Kierkegaardian Phenomenology of Religious Experience
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In a pair of articles published in Faith and Philosophy, C. Stephen Evans argues that Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, understands religious experience as the transforming power of an encounter with the love of God. However, in a book published under his own name, Kierkegaard gives a quite different picture of Christian experience. For Self-Examination makes clear that the reception of God’s love is a rebirth that can occur in the believer only insofar as he or she has died to the world - to all possessions, even to the possession of God’s love. According to Kierkegaard, this “dying to” is the truly transforming experience that characterizes Christian spirituality, and that provides the condition for a life infused with faith, hope, and love.
104. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
John Martin Fischer Libertarianism and Avoid Ability: A Reply to Widerker
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In previous work, I have claimed that the Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities work even in a world in which the actual sequence proceeds in a manner congenial to the libertarian. In “Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions,” Widerker criticizes this claim. Here I cast some doubt upon the criticism. Widerker’s critique depends on the falsity of a view held by Molina (and others) about the possibility of non-deterministic grounds for “would-conditionals.” Apart from this point, there are plausible versions of libertarianism which avoid the thrust of Widerker’s criticism.
105. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
J. P. Moreland Humanness, Personhood, and the Right to Die
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A widely adopted approach to end-of-life ethical questions fails to make explicit certain crucial metaphysical ideas entailed by it and when those ideas are clarified, then it can be shown to be inadequate. These metaphysical themes cluster around the notions of personal identity, personhood and humanness, and the metaphysics of substance. In order to clarify and critique the approach just mentioned, I focus on the writings of Robert N. Wennberg as a paradigm case by, first, stating his views of personal identity, humanness, personhood, and the relations among them; second, offering a comparison of a view of humans as substances (understood in the classic interpretation of Aristotle and Aquinas) vs. a view of humans as property-things; third, applying the metaphysical distinctions surfaced in the second section towards a critique of Wennberg.
106. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Kenneth J. Konyndyk Aquinas on Faith and Science
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Aquinas’s reflection on the relationship between faith and science took place amidst serious controversy about the acceptability of the very form of science Aquinas had adopted. Aquinas uses the Aristotelian conception of science and his own view of the place of theology and faith, to produce arguments for the compatibility of reason and science. I examine the arguments he presents in the Summa Contra Gentiles, and I criticize details of his arguments, but I endorse what I see as his general strategy.
107. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Thomas Talbott Three Pictures of God In Western Theology
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I begin with an inconsistent set of three propositions, each of which has the following characteristic: We can find prima facie support for it in the Bible. I then classify theologians according to which proposition they reject, and I identify three different pictures of God: the Augustinian picture, the Arminian picture, and the universalist picture. Finally, I explore some hermeneutical problems and suggest a way in which those who hold the universalist picture might interpret some of the texts upon which the doctrine of eternal punishment has traditionally rested.
108. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
David Widerker Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions
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Recently, John Fischer has applied Frankfurt’s well-known counter-example to the principle of alternate possibilities to refute the traditional libertarian position which holds that a necessary condition for an agent’s decision (choice) to be free in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility is that the decision not be causally determined, and that the agent could have avoided making it. Fischer’s argument has consequently led various philosophers to develop libertarian accounts of freedom which try to dispense with the avoidability constraint on freedom. My purpose in this article is to show that Fischer’s attack on traditional libertarianism fails, and, therefore, it is premature to abandon that position.
109. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Bruce W. Ballard MacIntyre and the Limits of Kierkegaardian Rationality
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Recently in this journal Marilyn Gaye Piety argued both that the critique of Kierkegaardian choice Alasdair MacIntyre offers in After Virtue misconstrues Kierkegaard and that a reformulated version of Kierkegaardian choice offers an important gain for philosophy. I argue that Piety has underestimated the power of the Maclntyrean critique of Kierkegaard, that consequently an adequate account of rational choice remains unavailable from that quarter, and that at crucial points MacIntyre’s own socially teleological approach to choice offers a superior account.
110. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Ronald L. Hall Kierkegaarad and the Paradoxical Logic of Worldly Faith
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I argue here that Kierkegaardian faith is essentially, albeit paradoxically, worldly---that Kierkegaardian faith is a form of world-affirmation. A correlate of this claim is that faithlessness of any kind is ultimately a form of aesthetic resignation grounded in a deep seated world-alienation. The paradox of faith’s worldliness is found in the fact that, for Kierkegaard, faith both excludes and includes resignation in itself. I make sense of this paradox by appealing to Kierkegaard’s idea of “an annulled possibility,” and conclude that faith’s love of the world is an affirmation via a double negation.
111. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
James Beilby William Rowe on the Evidential Value of Appearances
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While William Rowe has argued that the principle of credulity does not lend justification to religious experience, he must affirm something quite like the principle of credulity in his empirical argument from evil. To do so Rowe has proposed a modified version of the principle of credulity.I shall argue that Rowe’s modified principle of credulity creates for him a dilemma regarding the justification of belief in other minds. I further suggest it is not adequate for bridging the logical gap between the existence of apparently pointless evils and the existence of genuinely pointless evil.
112. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
John Beversluis Reforming the “Reformed” Objection to Natural Theology
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In this paper I offer a critique of Alvin Plantinga’s well known and widely accepted contention that his “Reformed” objection to natural theology can plausibly be said to derive from the writings of John Calvin and traditional Reformed theologians generally. I argue that although there is indeed a traditional Reformed objection to natural theology, Plantinga’s own objection is very different from and, in fact, incompatible with, it. I conclude that whatever the merits of Plantinga’s own position, it should not be confounded with that of Calvin or the Reformed tradition.
113. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
James A. Keller Should Christian Theologians Become Christian Philosophers?: A Reply to William Hasker
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This paper continues a debate about the relation between Christian philosophers and theologians begun by Gordon Kaufman, who argued that Christian theologians need not be interested in “evidentialism.” In particular it replies to a paper by William Hasker charging that an earlier defense of Kaufman’s position introduced tensions because it required judgments about the merits of “evidentialism” which could be defended only by using the evidentialist arguments whose importance Kaufman denied. This reply denies that there are the tensions Hasker claims and argues that the judgments need not rest on a detailed assessment of evidentialist arguments.
114. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Donald D. Hook, Alvin F. Kimel, Jr. Calling God “Father”: A Theolinguistic Analysis
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This essay explores the significance and implications of the causal theory of reference for the current debate on the necessity and exchangeability of the divine title ‘Father’ in the discourse of the Church. Identifying ‘Father’ as a vocative term historically grounded in the speech of Jesus and his Apostles, the authors assert that it successfully refers to God, functioning very much like a proper name. They also identify linguistic barriers to its replacement by other terms.
115. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Graham Oppy Professor William Craig’s Criticisms of Critiques of Kalam Cosmological Arguments By Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking, and Adolf Grunbaum
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Kalam cosmological arguments have recently been the subject of criticisms, at least inter alia, by physicists---Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking---and philosophers of science---Adolf Grunbaum. In a series of recent articles, William Craig has attempted to show that these criticisms are “superficial, iII-conceived, and based on misunderstanding.” I argue that, while some of the discussion of Davies and Hawking is not philosophically sophisticated, the points raised by Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum do suffice to undermine the dialectical efficacy of kalam cosmological arguments.
116. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
D. Z. Phillips Mysticism and Epistemology: One Devil of a Problem
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St. Teresa worried over the genuineness of her mystical experience. Her worries have sense within a form of life. Pike argues that her claims must be downgraded if no justification of the form of life can be given. The Devil could deceive us about any justification, Mavrodes argues, but certain experiences can be self-authenticating. Treating forms of life as though they were interpretations, Katz concludes that we must be agnostic about their truth. The paper argues that confusions between forms of life and judgements within them lead these authors to conclusions which obscure the confessional character of truth in these contexts.
117. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
William Hasker Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited
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This paper carries forward the discussion initiated by the publication in 1986 of “A Refutation of Middle Knowledge.” Answers are given to two objections that have been raised against the original argument. Next, an alternative argument by Robert Adams is discussed; this argument has the advantage of avoiding reliance on one of the most controversial premises of the original argument. Finally, a definition is given for “S brings it about that Y,” and this definition is used to construct a proof of the “power entailment principle.”
118. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Robert Greg Cavin Is There Sufficient Historical Evidence to Establish the Resurrection of Jesus?
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A number of Christian philosophers, most recently Gary R. Habermas and William Lane Craig, have claimed that there is sufficient historical evidence to establish the resurrection of Jesus conceived as the transformation of Jesus’ corpse into a living supernatural body that possesses such extraordinary dispositional properties as the inability to ever die again. I argue that, given this conception of resurrection, our only source of potential evidence, the New Testament Easter traditions, cannot provide adequate information to enable us to establish the historicity of the resurrection---even on the assumption that these traditions are completely historically reliable.
119. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
David O'Connor Hasker on Gratuitous Natural Evil
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In a recent contribution to this journal William Hasker rejects the idea, long a staple in philosophical debates over God and evil, that the existence of gratuitous evil is inconsistent with the existence of God. Among his arguments are three to show that God and gratuitous natural evil are not mutually inconsistent. I will show that none of those arguments succeeds. Then, very briefly, and as a byproduct of showing this, I will sketch out how a potentially vexing form of the problem of God and natural evil is facilitated by Hasker’s distinction between types of gratuitous natural evil.
120. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Sandra L. Menssen, Thomas D. Sullivan Must God Create?
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In this paper we evaluate two sets of theistic arguments against the traditional position that Cod created with absolute freedom. The first set features several variations of Leibniz’s basic proof that Cod must create the best possible world. The arguments in the second set base the claim that Cod must create on the Platonic or Dionysian principle that goodness is essentially self-diffusive. We argue that neither the Leibnizian nor the Dionysian arguments are successful.