Displaying: 101-120 of 2282 documents

0.04 sec

101. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Merrit P. Drucker The Military Commander’s Responsibility for the Environment
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I argue that military commanders have professional responsibilities for the environment in both peace and war. Peacetime responsibilities arise out of the commander’s general responsibilities as an agent of the state. Wartime responsibilities are part of the commander’s responsibility to protect noncombatants and to protect an environment that is the inherently valuable heritage of mankind. Commanders must assurne some risk to protect the environment. I conclude that we must stop not only the environmental damage caused by war, but also war itself if we are to remain a viable species.
102. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Douglas Crawford-Brown, Neil E. Pearce Sufficient Proof in the Scientific Justification of Environmental Actions
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Environmental actions require a willingness to act, which, in turn, is stimulated partially by the belief that an action will yield the desired consequences. In determining whether an actor was justified in exerting the will to act, therefore, it is essential to examine the nature of evidence offered by the actor in support of any beliefs about the environment. In this paper we explore the points in environmental risk analyses at which evidence is brought to bear in support of inferences conceming environmental effects of regulatory actions. The intent is to provide a framework for discussing the manner in which evidence may provide a sufficient basis for ethically sound decisions for environmental actions.
103. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Robyn Eckersley Diving Evolution: The Ecological Ethics of Murray Bookchin
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I provide an exposition and critique of the ecological ethics of Murray Bookchin. First, I show how Bookchin draws on ecology and evolutionary biology to produce a mutually constraining cluster of ethical guidelines to underpin and justify his vision of a nonhierarchical, ecological society. I then critically examine Bookchin’s method of justification and the normative consequences that flow from his position. I argue that Bookchin’s enticing promise that his ecological ethics offers the widest realm of freedom to all life forms is undermined by the way in which he distinguishes and privileges second nature (the human realm) over first nature (the nonhuman realm). I conclude that Bookchin’s promise can only be delivered by a biocentric philosophy (which he rejects) rather than by his own ecological ethics.
104. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
NEWS AND NOTES (2)
105. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Susan Power Bratton Richard Cartwright Austin: Beauty of the Lord
106. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Curt Meine Van Renssalaer Potter: Global Bioethics
107. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
NEWS AND NOTES (1)
108. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
The Gospel of Chief Seattle is a Hoax
109. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
John P. Clark Marx’s Inorganic Body
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Attempts to find an authentically ecological outlook in Marx’s philosophy of nature are ultimately unsuccessful. Although Marx does at times point the way toward a truly ecological dialectic, he does not himself follow that way. Instead, he proposes a problematic of technological liberation and mastery of nature that preserves many of the dualisms of that tradition of domination with which he ostensibly wishes to break.
110. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Eugene C. Hargrove Callicott and the Foundations of Environmental Ethics
111. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Eric Katz Peter Wenz: Environmental Justice
112. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Laura Westra Ecology and Animals: Is There a Joint Ethic of Respect?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Recent work in animal ethics has advanced principles that are too individualistic to be compatible with a holistic environmental ethic such as the land ethic proposed by Aldo Leopold. J. Baird Callicott, on the other hand, has attempted to reconcile the two ethics by suggesting that sympathy, natural among humanity, as he claims on Humean grounds, does not necessarily terminate at the species barrier. His argument shows minimally that it is not necessary that we abandon ecological ethics in order to view nonhuman animals as morally considerable. I argue instead that it is not sympathy, but hostility/indifference that manifests the reality of life in wild nature, and as such forms a better basis for an all-encompassing ethic. If one accepts that the factual realm suggests the limits of norms and establishes the background and context of normative judgments in this context (as Holmes Roiston, III, for instance, does), then a different line of argument can be developed. I argue that intraspecies and interspecies ethics ought to be different for us because behavior in the wild is different within and without a species. Further, I argue that hostility/indifference coupled with respect form the basis of an approach which embraces a holistic environmental ethic as weil as one concemed with nonhuman animals.
113. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
David Edward Shaner, R. Shannon Duval Conservation Ethics and the Japanese Intellectual Tradition
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
A systematic philosophy that presupposes an ecocentric world view, rather than a homocentric or egocentric world view, can be a viable resource for investigating issues in environmental philosophy and conservation ethics. Generally speaking, the Japanese philosophical and religious tradition represents a commitment to ecocentrism. This philosophical orientation is in concert with the world view of manynaturalists. We explore one example of ecocentrism by unveiling the crosscultural connection between the naturalistic philosophy of Louis Agassiz, a nineteenth-century French-American biologist, and the early writings of Nishida Kitarō, a twentieth-century Japanese philosopher. We suggest that the central player in understanding the ecocentric connection between Agassiz and Nishida is American philosopher-psychologist William James. James was once a student of Agassiz and his writings influenced Nishida's early work. Related issues concerning conservation ethics and the Japanese intellectual tradition are also addressed.
114. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Frederick Ferré Obstacles on the Path to Organismic Ethics:: Some Second Thoughts
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
An organismic viewpoint is a welcome alternative to modern mechanistic consciousness, with the latter’s excessive epistemic reliance on analysis, its ontological presumption of atomism, and its value commitments to competition, quantification, reduction, and predictability. These ideas have had negative social and environmental consequences and require replacement. Organismic ethics, grounded in the “wisdom of life”--especially the dialectical triad of creativity, homeostasis, and holism-is far healthier. But organicism alone has serious defects sometimes overlooked by environmental enthusiasts (earlier including this author): life’s creativity wastes individual organisms, and life’s holism neglects the unique value of parts in favor of larger unities. Is it possible to work out a genuinely personalistic organicism? Traditional personalistic idealism will not do, but insights into essential personal qualities may enrich the concepts of creativity, homeostasis, and holism enough to offer a start toward a more adequate ethic.
115. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Holmes Rolston, III Andrew Brennan: Thinking about Nature
116. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
NEWS AND NOTES (2)
117. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
John F. Reiger Curt Meine: Aldo Leopold: His Life and Work
118. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Robin Attfield Holmes Rolston, III: Environmental Ethics
119. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Daniel Putman Tragedy and Nonhumans
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The concept of tragedy has been central to much of human history; yet, twentieth-century philosophers have done little to analyze what tragedy means outside of the theater. Utilizing a framework from MacIntyre’s After Virtue, I first discuss what tragedy is for human beings and some of its ethical implications. Then I analyze how we use the concept with regard to nonhumans. Although the typical application of the concept to animals is thoroughly anthropocentric, I argue first that the concept of tragedy can be applied directly to nonhumans (a) because the loss of potential for some nonhumans may be as a great or greater than loss of potential for some humans to whom the concept applies and (b) because tragedy depends on what is valued and, for those creatures that do not conceptualize death, the destruction of the present moment through pain and suffeling is the ultimate loss, and second that self-awareness in the human sense is not necessary for tragedy.
120. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Stanley N. Salthe, Barbara M. Salthe Ecosystem Moral Considerability: A Reply to Cahen
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Appeals to science as a help in constructing policy on complex issues often assume that science has relatively clear-cut, univocal answers. That is not so today in the environmentally crucial fields of ecology and evolutionary biology. The social role of science has been as a source of information to be used in the prediction and domination of nature. Its perspectives are finely honed for such purposes. However, other more conscientious perspectives are now appearing within science, and we provide an example here in rebuttal to the claim that there is no warrant from within ecology for ecosystem moral considerability.