Displaying: 1-20 of 3995 documents

Show/Hide alternate language

0.184 sec

1. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Inês Hipólito Inês Hipólito
Mind and Brain States: Embedding the Mental in the Living Organism
Mind and Brain States

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
With neurons emergence, life alters itself in a remarkable way. This embodied neurons become carriers of signals, and processing devices: it begins an inexorable progression of functional complexity, from increasingly drawn behaviors to the mind and eventually to consciousness [Damasio, 2010]. In which moment has awareness arisen in the history of life? The emergence of human consciousness is associated with evolutionary developments in brain, behavior and mind, which ultimately lead to the creation of culture, a radical novelty in natural history. It is in this context of biological evolution of conscious brains that we raise the question: how conscious brains connect with each other? In order to answer it, I will explore how brain states and conscious states each participate in dynamic interactive processes involving the whole organism. I will argue that a possible way to overcome the hard problem of consciousness might be based on the notion of embodiment as a process of embedding the mental in the living organism relating dynamically with the environment through the sensorymotor experience. In order to do so, I will provide an assembly between an anthropologic perspective of consciousness with contemporary Philosophy of Mind, Interaction Theory [Gallagher 2001, 2008; Zahavi 2001, 2008; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009].
2. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
James Grindeland James Grindeland
Blockers: A Reply to Hawthorne
Blockers: A Reply to Hawthorne

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Physicalism is roughly the thesis that everything is physical. The two most popular ways of formulating physicalism rigorously are the ways given by Frank Jackson and David Chalmers. The best objections, in turn, include John Hawthorne’s ‘blocker’ objections. Hawthorne argues that, if it is possible for there to be non-physical beings or properties that prevent certain mental phenomena from existing (i.e., non-physical blockers), Jackson’s and Chalmers’ formulations will be inadequate. Jackson’s formulation will be inadequate by virtue of not capturing all of the right physical dependence principles. Chalmers’ formulation will be inadequate in so far as, when modified to define ‘restricted physicalisms’, such as physicalism of the mental, the restricted formulations will not capture all of the right physical dependence principles. By contrast, I argue that Hawthorne’s blocker arguments are misguided on the grounds that non-physical blockers are impossible; I argue that his critique of Chalmers’ formulation is unsound by virtue of falsely presupposing that restricted physicalisms require restricted formulations of physicalism (I argue that it is only necessary to define physicalism of a world); and I argue that Jackson’s and Chalmers’ formulations capture all of the right physical dependence principles.
3. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
René Jagnow René Jagnow
Can We See Natural Kind Properties?
Can We See Natural Kind Properties?

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Which properties can we visually experience? Some authors hold that we can experience only low-level properties such as color, illumination, shape, spatial location, and motion. Others believe that we can also experience high-level properties, such as being a dog or being a pine tree. On the basis of her method of phenomenal contrast, Susanna Siegel has recently defended the latter view. One of her central claims is that we can best account for certain phenomenal contrasts if we assume that we can visually experience natural kind properties. In this paper, I argue that certain kinds of low-level properties, namely shape-gestalt properties, can explain these phenomenal contrasts just as well as high-level properties. If successful, this is a modest, but nevertheless significant result. Even though it does not prove the falsity of Siegel’s proposal, it nevertheless secures the existence of a plausible alternative.
4. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Bin Zhao Bin Zhao
Phenomenal Character, Representational Content, and the Internal Correlation of Experience: Arguments Against Tracking Representationalism
Phenomenal Character, Representational Content, and the Internal Correlation of Experience

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Tracking representationalism is the theory that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of tracking physical properties in an appropriate way. This theory holds that phenomenal character can be explained in terms of representational content, and it also entails that there is unlikely to be a strong correlation between phenomenal character and neural states. However, the empirical evidence shows that both claims cannot be true. So, tracking representationalism is wrong. Its fault is due to ignoring the internal correlation of experience, the existence of which shows that phenomenal character is shaped by neural states to a large extent, so it cannot be wholly explained by representational content.
5. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
José Eduardo Porcher José Eduardo Porcher
Can Anosognosia Vindicate Traditionalism about Self-Deception?
Can Anosognosia Vindicate Traditionalism about Self-Deception?

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The traditional conception of self-deception takes it for an intrapersonal form of interpersonal deception. However, since the same subject is at the same time deceived and deceived, this means attributing the agent a pair of contradictory beliefs. In the course of defending a deflationary conception of self-deception, Mele (1997) has challenged traditionalists to present convincing evidence that there are cases of self-deception in which what he calls the dual belief-requirement is satisfied. Levy (2009) has responded to this challenge affirming that there is at least one real cases of self-deception that meets this requirement, namely, that of anosognosia. In this family of conditions, the patient apparently believes that there is nothing wrong with her while, at the same time, providing behavioral cues that indicate that the patient is somehow aware of his disease. If Levy is right, then traditionalism about self-deception could be vindicated, after having been widely abandoned due to its need to postulate exotic mental processes in order to make sense of the attribution of contradictory beliefs. In this paper, I assess whether Levy’s response to Mele’s challenge is successful by analyzing his interpretation of the empirical evidence to which he appeals. Finally, I attack the cogency of the underlying commitments about the nature of folk psychology to which one is required to defer in order to draw from conflicting evidence the attribution of contradictory beliefs.
6. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 45 > Issue: 3
Alexei Cherniak Alexei Cherniak
Belief Content and Belief State
Belief Content and Belief State

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The paper is dedicated to the analysis of a contribution of the distinction between states and contents of beliefs to the explanation of changes of beliefs in some specific situations such as changed stakes or evidence. The plausible idea about beliefs is that an agent may have two different beliefs in the same proposition representing different relations to that proposition - belief states. Different accounts of states of beliefs were proposed. The claim critically observed in the paper is that a change of belief may be explained as a change of either proposition believed or state of belief. It is argued that explanations of changes of beliefs in terms of changes in their states are reducible to explanations in terms of changes in their propositional contents. In particular it is argued that cases where changing beliefs are expressed by sentences with so called essential indexicals, which are considered to be cases of changing belief states, but not propositions, may be described as rather instances of changing belief's propositional contents. There is also the account of belief as triadic relation between believer, believed propositions and mode of its presentation by believers. According to it belief change may be represented as a change of the mode of presentation which preserves propositional content of the belief. Against this account it is argued that modes of presentation of propositions either does not in fact contribute to semantic contents of corresponding beliefs or may be assimilated by their propositional contents. It seems plausible that to be relevant to the belief change the information is to be at least available to a competent reflexive agent of the belief, and this information then may be added to a propositional content of that belief after some reflection.
7. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 45 > Issue: 3
Ivan A. Karpenko Ivan A. Karpenko
The Notion of Space in Some Modern Physics Theories
The Notion of Space in Some Modern Physics Theories

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The article analyzes a number of modern physics approaches in different aspects, which are directly or indirectly affected by the problem of space. The variations of cosmologies based on the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, the theory of inflation, the holographic universe model, the model of the virtual universe, etc. and their scientifically validated combinations are examined for specifics of category of space interpretation in each case. In reliance to the historical and philosophical analys is the connection between the traditional interpretations of the concept of space in philosophy and the modern ones in physics is established. The context of some modern physical theories is concluded to bring new dimensions to the understanding of space (while retaining certain classical concepts).
8. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Steve Fuller Стив Фуллер
Customised Science as a Reflection of 'Protscience'
Клиентская наука как выражение научного плюрализма

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This article is concerned with two concepts. The first is a coinage of the author, 'Protscience', a contracted form of 'Protestant science', made in reference to the 16th—17th century Protestant Reformation, when the members of Western Christendom took their religion into their hands, specifically by reading the Bible for themselves and interpreting its relevance fortheir lives.Today we witness a similar tendency with regard to the dominant epistemic authority, science, whose 'reformation' often portrayed as 'democratisation'. However, a more exact understanding draws on the article's second key concept, the distinction drawn in marketing between 'customer' and 'consumer'. The former purchases to sell (i.e. a retailer), whereas the latter purchases to use. Many of the so-called 'anti-science' movements of recent times can be explained as a rise in 'science customisation', whereby people who have acquainted themselves with the latest science adopt a discretionary attitude towards what they will and will not believe of what they have learned. Keywords: anticipatory governance, democracy, New Age, placebo effect, Protestant Reformation, Protscience, science customisation.
9. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 47 > Issue: 1
Dimitris Kilakos Димитрис Килакос
How Could Vygotsky Inform an Approach to Scientific Representations?
Применение идей Выготского в исследовании проблемы научных представлений

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In the quest for a new social turn in philosophy of science, exploring the prospects of a Vygotskian perspective could be of significant interest, especially due to Vugotsky ’s emphasis on the role of culture and socialisation in the development of cognitive functions. However, a philosophical reassessment of Vygotsky's ideas in general has yet to be done.As a step towards this direction, I attempt to elaborate an approach on scientific representations by drawing inspirations from Vygotsky. Specifically, I work upon Vygotsky's understanding on the nature and function of concepts, mediation and zone of proximal development.I maintain that scientific representations mediate scientific cognition in a tool-like fashion (Like Vygotsky's signs). Scientific representations are consciously acquired through deliberate inquiry in a specific context, where it turns to be part of a whole system, reflecting the social practices related to scientific inquiry, just scientific concepts do in Vygotsky's understanding. They surrogate the real processes or effects understudy, by conveying some of the features of the represented systems. Vygotsky's solution to the problem of the ontological status of concepts points to an analogous understanding for abstract models, which should be regarded neither as fictions nor as abstract objects.I elucidate these views by using the examples of the double-helix model of DNA structure and of the development of our understanding of the photoelectric effect.
10. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 47 > Issue: 1
Olga Stoliarova О.Е. Столярова
MiIlieu, Embodiment, and Cultural Studies of Science: Comment on Rom Harre’s the Social Ingredients in All Ways of Acquiring Reliable Knowledge
Проблема телесного воплощения и исследование науки в контексте cultural studies

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The article discusses the concept of milieu in its connection with a problem of embodiment as it is today posed in the cultural studies of science. It is pointed out that if we take the embodied milieu as a precondition and result of our theoretical and practical activities, then it challenges the traditional sense of the word «social and, accordingly, the basic purposes of a social philosophy of science.
11. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 47 > Issue: 1
Rom Harré Ром Харре
The Social Ingredients in All Ways of Acquiring Reliable Knowledge
Социальные основания получения надежного знания

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
A distinction should be drawn between natural sciences and cultural studies such as psychology and history. A social philosophy of science must be based on bringing them into a fruitful relationship. What relations are possible? There is the role of natural science concepts and methods in cultural studies and the role of concepts and methods of cultural studies in natural science, determining standards of good work and particularly the choice oif domains of research with respect to human welfare. Cultural studies of natural science as an institution emphasises the importance of standards of excellence and of the role of rights and dutiesin the life of scientific institutions.
12. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Tom Rockmore Том Рокмор
Epistemic Constructivism, Metaphysical Realism and Parmenidean Identity
Эпистемический конструктивизм, метафизический реализм и принцип тождества у Парменида

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The cognitive problem, which is a main modern theme, arises early in the Greektra- dition. Parmenides, who formulates one ofthe first identifiably "modern" approaches to epistemology, points toward identity as the only acceptable cognitive standard. The paper, which leaves epistemic skepticism for another occasion, reviews versions of metaphysicalrealism identified with Plato in ancient philosophy and Descartes in the modern tradition in suggesting that for different reasons both fail. The paper reviews German idealist versions of epistemic constructivism formulated by Kant, Fichte and Hegel. The criticalphilosophy provides a widely known, complex a priori account of cognitive constructivism.This account is amplified, corrected, and reformulated in different ways by such post-Kantian German idealists as Fichte and Hegel. A key element concerns the restatement ofthe abstract Kantian view ofthe subject as finite human being by Fichte and Hegel.Early in the Greektradition,in equatingthinking and being, Parmenides pointstothree approaches to knowledge as epistemic skepticism, metaphysicalrealism or epistemic constructivism. If epistemic skepticism is unacceptable and, metaphysical realism is implausible,then epistemic constructivism appearsto bethe most promising approach to cognition.
13. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 48 > Issue: 2
Dimitris Kilakos Димитрис Килакос
From the Parmenidean Identity to Beyond Classical Idealism and Epistemic Constructivism
От парменидовского тождества — за пределы классического идеализма и эпистемического конструктивизма

view |  rights & permissions
14. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Alexander Ruser А. Рузер
Towards the Unity of Science Again?: Reductionist Thinking and it's Consequence for a Social Philosophy of Science
Назад к единству науки?

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
At first glance the Idea of the “Unity of Science" seems to be of interest for historians of science only. However, given the expectations especially social scientists face today, to provide simple answers and feasible solutions to pressing social problems a revival of the idea is not unlikely. In particular “reductionist" ideas, aiming to adopt theoretical and methodological insight from the natural sciences thrive. This puts not only the project but also the very idea of a social philosophy of science in jeopardy. For, in consequence two of its main pillars, (1) considering the social and historic circumstance of knowledge production and (2) the need for developing a philosophy of the social sciences are equally rendered irrelevant. This contribution focuses on the fundamental flaws and shortcomings of such reductionist models, argues in favor of the disunity of science and thus defends the idea of a social philosophy of science.
15. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Ivan Karpenko И.А. Карпенко
What is Time in Modern Physics?
Что такое время для современной физики?

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The problem of time is not an entirely physical problem. Physics itself does not contain a “time theory". That is particularly true in the sense that physics has not made any direct attempts to find the natural-science definition of the notion of time. Nevertheless, the concept of time emerges in science one way or another and still requires an explanation. Time fulfills an important role in the physics of XX and XXI centuries, though often a hidden one. Such a statement could be applied to both theories of macrocosm and microcosm. In the theory of relativity, time has been established as a secondary feature, a derivative of velocity and mass. However, it exists (although, as an illusion) and yet evokes the need of its philosophical interpretation. In quantum field theory time also (though implicitly) occurs according to the interpretation of the experiment results - for example, “where the particle was before its observation". Such “before"-cases indicate the very presence of time (more precisely, the observer's perception of its presence). Further theories, which have been the attempts to solve the problem of incompatibility of general relativity theory and quantum mechanics, such as the theory of loop quantum gravity, superstring theory, Shape Dynamics and others, also mention the concept of time. Time fulfills there a definite role and again evokes the question of its explanation in the frameworks of these theories. Most importantly, to find an exact meaning of this “time" term used here. This article deals with the problem of time in the context of several theories of modern physics. In particular, it attempts to give a definition of the term of time in relation to the philosophy of physics (physics itself does not characterize it). Such a task formulation has its relevance and novelty due to the facts that the discourse on the nature of time is still stipulated by Zeno's paradoxes, and the philosophy of science uses the obsolete vocabulary while describing the term. However, evidence suggests that modern physics has developed the new rules, or to be more precise, has stated the new principles, which the philosophy of science can not take into consideration without changing its vocabulary (the last also involves the modernization of intellectual intuition).
16. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Olga Koshovets, Taras Varkhotov О.Б. Кошовец
Experiments without Concrete: The Case of Economics
Эксперименты без материи

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The article examines the question whether the economic discipline can be regarded as a kind of natural science it strives to be, taking into consideration the interpretation of an economic model as a kind of a thought experiment and closer connection between thought experiment and experimentation. The authors turn to epistemological analysis of thought experiments both in natural sciences and in economics and consider the historical background of this research tool and its relations with the experimentation practice. The study shows that the use of thought experiments in the economic theory and in natural sciences are fundamentally different. In natural science the thought experiment has never been detached from the material experimentation. On contrary, in economics it is used as an isolated procedure. However, isolated thought experiment is not a full-fledged research tool for studying the reality, as in that case it will affect some troubles with realism and practical efficiency of the research results. Rather, it constitutes the instrument for structuring or «mapping» the field of inquiry and can give results with social-constructive capacities.
17. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
Enrique Villanueva Э. Вильянуэва
Argument and metaphysics
Рассуждение и метафизика

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper explores the idea of linguistic meaning in the case of metaphysical referents or entities, quoting Plato's view assumed by Wittgenstein that there couldn't be a language for metaphysical referents like the Good or God. In order to expose the conceptual situation recourse is made to the thesis of a Logical Proper Name and to the thesis of Private Names as contrasting views of the nature of names and language. Furthermore, it is surmised that the Wittgenstein view helps to realise why there cannot be metaphysical arguments. But all of that is presented in a very sketchy way and has to wait for further development.
18. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
Daniel Tiskin Д.Б. Тискин
Conditional attitude ascription
Условное приписывание пропозициональных установок

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Many theories of the de dicto / de re ambiguity for quantifiers and descriptions follow the tradition started by Kaplan and Lewis in that they make use of notions that are epistemic in nature, such as the notion of acquaintance. This may create the impression that the question about de re in affitude report semantics should always be resolved by looking at the reported affitude; if the latter qualifies as de re according to some epistemological criteria, then also the affitude report may be true de re. The present paper aims to provide an argument to the contrary. The argument proceeds in several steps. First, we point out the existence of a wide range of de re readings (mostly already known from the literature), some of which do not target referential or quantificational expressions at all. Second, we show that the existing analyses either give wrong predictions for such cases, or are incomplete, or at least inelegant. Third, we offer a new analysis (which, as it turns out, has predecessors not united by any single tradition) whose main ingredient is the observation that the right predictions result from modifying the Context Set of the conversation in certain intuitive ways before the affitude report is added to the Common Ground. This is the semantic contribution of the paper. The philosophical upshot is that the reasons for an affitude report being de re at least in some cases have little to do with the grounds on which the corresponding mental state - the affitude itself - qualifies as de re. We also speculate as to how the proposed analysis, which divorces de re'ness from epistemic rapport, may be extended onto more traditional cases.
19. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
Evgeny Blinov Е.Н. Блинов
“Social engineering of the future”: Evgeniy Polivanov on the principles of early Soviet language building
«Социальная инженерия будущего»

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The article analyzes the project of scientific justification of language Reforms, realized by the Soviet regime in 20s and 30s, elaborated by Russian and Soviet linguist Evgenij Polivanov (1891-1938). Polivanov claims that a Soviet linguist should not limit his interests to the “general linguistics" and become an active “language builder" and “language politician". The reforms should be carefully planned by the experts in language sciences who master as well the methodology of dialectical materialism. In the polemics against Nikolai Marr's Japhetidology Polivanov argued that linguistics is a strict science and its deductions are not contradictory to Marxism, as the latter is primarily a materialist philosophy. His minimal program consisted in explaining his views on the evolution of language in the Marxist terms. The evolution of language is explained by the influence of internal and external factors. The socio-economical factors are not influencing the language in a direct manner, but their analysis allows to change the channel of language evolution. According to Polivanov, the introduction of Marxism into linguistics will make possible to explain the relationship between intralinguistic and extralinguistic factors and will transform the sciences of language into “social engineering of the future".
20. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 51 > Issue: 1
Walter Schweidler В. Швайдлер
On the sociocultural body of knowledge: Aspects of phenomenological approach to the social philosophy of science
О социокультурном теле знания

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The author defends the anti-representationalist claim that the formation of the proper names (and as a consequence – scientific terms or notions) cannot happen through certain ostensive pointing at some objects given here and now (like in B. Russell’s theory) or through perceptions which are generalized inductively or by means of Kantian apperception or Anschauung. In order to answer the question about the concepts formation we have to take into account the historical and socio-cultural background of the genesis of proper names which form the foundation and boundary of all classifications including the scientific ones. The author claims that there is an important difference between a personal belief or propositional knowledge and some implicit or background knowledge of the language community in its historical development. The first one could be evaluated on its truth / falseness. The second one however – being the foundation for the first one – cannot be evaluated in this manner. It simply is as it is.